Written by: Sara S. Al Aloul, American University of Beirut

Abstract

The impact of the Syrian crisis had not only spilled over into neighboring countries, but other continents as well. As of December 2018, according to a Mercy Corps report, there were 5.6 million Syrian refugees around the world, and 6.2 million internally displaced people^[1]. This huge number has taken a toll on host countries and talks of ensuring safe return of Syrian refugees to their home countries have been instigated at the international level. This paper will explore the problems associated with the return of Syrian refugees and their reintegration into their home country. It will explore the social and economic dynamics of their return in line with international human rights law. This paper is not written for an organization but is a product of individual policy research on the problem. I will begin by exploring the nature of the problem and its major points then proceed to identify the stakeholders concerned with this policy problem. The data collection method is mainly a synthesis of existing literature and evidence on the issue, provided by international organizations and policy research groups. My target audience is international bodies actively working on the return of these refugees and providing the logistical support this process requires. I will provide recommendations based on the evidence I have found and the method of implementation. 

The Problem

The state of Syrian refugees in the past 2 years has been a central concern of many international and humanitarian organizations working to provide them with the means to continue their life sustainably. Syrian refugees are scattered around the world in countries like Turkey, Germany, Lebanon, and Jordan. The case in Lebanon is especially alarming because of the limited size and capacity of the country to sustain its own citizens, and due to the actual state of living of the refugees in Lebanon. According to the UNHCR, over 50% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in extreme poverty^[2].

In 2017, Hezbollah worked on the return of refugees from the Arsal border area. According to Mohammad Afif, Hezbollah’s media spokesperson: “Through mediators and under specific conditions, a certain amount of refugees will be returning to certain villages in the western Qalamoun”^[3]. However, this was an informal operation that occurred without the intervention of the Syrian and Lebanese governments, just between the party and the opposition groups. This posed a great danger on the rights of the refugees returning to their home countries, and the need for entities like the UNHCR to supervise such operations. Professor Hilal Khashan at the American University of Beirut expressed that this incident reveals the amicable relationship and networks of Hezbollah in Syria. President Michel Aoun expressed in the Arab summit in early 2019 the urgency of the need to return refugees from Lebanon to Syria due to the pressure their presence has had on the already struggling economic crisis in Lebanon^[4]. Lebanon’s Minister of State, Adel Afioni, said his country will follow the Russian strategy for the return of Syrian refugees. This strategy was produced after a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 16, 2018^[5]. It specifies 76 residential areas in Syria to enable the return of around 360,000 Syrian refugees as a first step. 

The second step is to ensure the rehabilitation of the houses to allow for the return of half a million more refugees within a period of two years. As of December of 2018, Lebanon has reported the return of 1000 Syrian refugees to their homeland under the supervision of the Lebanese General Security and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)^[6]. Russia’s interests in the return of refugees stretch beyond the concern for the refugees’ rights and liberties though. Russian interests lie in the urban and infrastructure reconstruction of Syria^[7]. The reconstruction of Syria will promote competition amongst the involved players as they will benefit from major economic bursts. Moreover, since Russia still maintains significant political influence over Assad, it is likely that Russia will win many contracts of such reconstruction.

The main dimensions of this case include the political, legal, social, and economic concerns that come with the return of refugees to their home country^[8]. This return should come hand in hand with preservation of rights, and a ‘voluntary’, ‘safe’, and ‘dignified’ return. The concept of safety, according to the UN and the EU^[9], implies that their return must be linked to credible security guarantees, not just the absence of direct war. Political, legal, social, and economic safety must be guaranteed before planning and launching an initiative like the return of refugees. The concept of ‘voluntary’ return is blurry and must be explicitly defined to avoid loopholes that can pose a potential threat to the rights of refugees. Voluntariness is not simply the consent-giving action of refugees but can be further divided into two indicators: information and lack of coercion. First, refugees wishing to go to Syria based on certain terms of return must have vital information about the nature of their return and their situation after the return. Information about the areas they are returning to must be provided for them to make informed and conscious decisions. The status of their housing, land, and property must be made clear to them. Their status in Syria and their fate is of major importance before returning these refugees. The risk of detention or forced displacement after their return also exists, and it should be communicated to them properly as well as the employment of measures to ensure these incidents do not occur. 

Second, the ‘consent’ of these refugees is not valid in cases where they feel direct and indirect pressure from country officials and certain political groups who have an interest in their return^[10]. In June and July of 2018, Bekaa Valley municipalities conducted an extensive return campaign. They contacted refugees across camps and asked them to fill out surveys about their stance on returning to Syria, asking why they have not returned yet. According to the information in the surveys, the questions were framed in a biased way to encourage return and Syrians felt threatened by this^[11]. Another study was conducted earlier this year in Germany, asking Syrian refugees their perspectives on returning to Syria, and addressing the concept of ‘voluntariness’. Syrian nationals were interviewed face to face as they entered and exited from refugee registration centers. The main hypotheses of this study were: a) refugees who experience direct safety threats during conflict are more likely to consider returning after the restoration of stability in their countries and b) refugees with higher education levels are more likely to return, only if their countries transition to democratic systems of government^[12]. The study examined the influences on refugee decisions to return to their home countries. The results supported the hypotheses and presented the importance of informed refugee decision making. However this study was limited by the absence of ethnic and religious identities from the data and evidence. These two factors are of major importance to individuals and can often be deciding factors. Ethnic and religious identities can be the causes of social distress for returning individuals. Attention must be paid to where refugees are returning and if their return is impacted by the social and cultural rights afforded to them in their home countries. 

Stakeholders

Such a mass scale problem is bound to have numerous stakeholders. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on stakeholders involved in the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon. Two clear stakeholders are the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Without their combined efforts and resources, the UNHCR and other humanitarian bodies cannot undergo the process of returning refugees home. Their material and political resources are of substantial value for the possibility of the safe return of refugees and the protection of their rights. However, some speculate that the return of Syrian refugees, from the perspective of the Assad regime, bolsters the claim that the regime won the war and is re-establishing control in the country. As a result, the Syrian regime benefits from this image of Syria being ‘safe’ and stable,’ establishing a positive international and local, political and military image. 

The United Nations is another very important stakeholder as it can be the medium of political discussions and negotiations between countries, with its political and human resources providing it with strong influence. The United Nations has the legitimacy needed to provide recommendations to host countries planning the return of Syrian refugees and pressure leaders to abide by international human rights law. The UN stated that conditions in Syria do not allow for large number of Syrians to return to their homes, even if the fighting has subsided^[13]. Organizations like SAWA for Development and Aid and Mercy Corps provide great sources of research and investigation on issues faced by refugees around the world, especially Syrian refugees. Such organizations and other civil society groups can help provide data and evidence as well as policy recommendations for decision makers and political leaders to take into consideration. Unfortunately, their power is somewhat limited to only human resources because they have little to no effect on how political decisions pan out at the end of the day, due to deep-rooted political interests in each country. 

Solutions

The primary data collection method I used for this paper was the synthesis of existing evidence from studies conducted on the prospects of returning refugees and the impact of returns on them on the long-term. I also conducted an individual face to face interview with a Syrian man living in Lebanon. The recent report produced by the UNHCR found that security is the single greatest factor that determines the return of refugees. ^[14]Refugees hoping for return are concerned with the basic services they need to live a healthy and developed life. Health, education and good infrastructure are the driving factors for return. In the report, 10% of the refugee population showed prospects of return if the rate of security doubled and the implementation of services tripled within the next five years. The report emphasized that voluntary return under good conditions can improve welfare while policies with focus only on maximizing the number of returns will reduce welfare. The report claimed that a more broad approach can have long-term positive impacts. This means that focusing on improving conditions for the Syrians and their host communities can increase the chance for voluntary return. 

On May 7^th, 2018, I interviewed a 28 year old Syrian refugee living and working in Lebanon. For the purpose of his privacy the alias Abbas will be used. Abbas fled Syria in 2014 amidst security threats to him and his family. He is originally from Der El Zor and his family owned 100 acres of land in the area. During the war, their house was partially destroyed and their farming and heavy machinery were destroyed. Property valued upwind of $100,000 was lost or destroyed and no prospect of life seemed possible. I asked Abbas what major factor would contribute to his return to Syria, and his response supported studies previously mentioned. Land and security are the two driving factors that would prompt Abbas and his family to return home to their village. Land is the significant economic factor here, and security is  a widely cited factor. I asked Abbas if he would return to a different town in Syria if it had economic potential for his family, and his response was one I had not heard before. He said: “absolutely not,” as social factors would burden him and his family because the new town would have different social/cultural tendencies. This prompted me to ask if he would consider migrating to a European or other Arab country and his response was again a negative. Abbas expressed urgent desire to return back home to his hometown and land, saying nothing else would replace that. “You either go back to where you belong, or you don’t at all” were the words Abbas chose. This however, is not the case for all Syrian refugees, particularly as some of the refugees’ hometowns are completely destroyed. But this draws attention to the importance of the social aspect of the problem, and the need for further investigation into the social reintegration of refugees into their communities. 

Implementation

The first and most important step in implementation is collecting the necessary information regarding refugees returning through self-organized methods. This poses a threat to their security but they do so because they distrust Lebanese authorities and all other involved actors. Second, little is known about the magnitude of the start-to-finish costs of implementing the return of refugees back to Syria. The General Security returns cost around $200 while others organized by local communities may cost $100^[15]. This does not include the arrangement of independent transport across the border. In terms of the role of the UNHCR, clarity should be provided because refugees are unaware of the exact role of the UNHCR, specifically on whether it covers the General Security costs or acts as an informal observer. Such information is key to the concept of ‘voluntary’ return. Without such information, refugees cannot make informed decisions. International humanitarian intervention should be limited to protecting the refugees’ post-return and ensuring safety conditions in the areas they will be returning to. Such a massive policy cannot be implemented abruptly, and a gradual approach may provide for better results in the long term. Refugees in urgent need for return should be prioritized based on criteria set by the Human Rights Watch and similar bodies to ensure fair and equal return of all refugees. 

Conclusion

According to the data synthesized in this paper, the major points of concern regarding the safe and dignified return of Syrian refugees rely on both voluntary return and security conditions post-return. Due to the territorial sovereignty of Syria, it will be difficult, yet not impossible, to implement security standards of protection for returning refugees. The UN can distribute humanitarian aid in the towns that need assistance the most and promote social cohesion between the returning population and the current residing Syrians. The research regarding this problem lacks the financial and logistical tactics needed to employ solutions. Financial experts on return and restructuring of cities must weigh in on the policy and provide the necessary expertise to ensure the effective implementation of this for the sake of long-term impacts. 

^[1]Quick Facts: What You Need to Know about the Syria Crisis.” Mercy Corps, August 26, 2019. https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis.

^[2]“Beirut, Damascus Working Together for Return of Syrian Refugees.” Press TV,2018.

^[3]Nazih Osseiran and Rhys Dubin. “Detained Lebanese ‘in Good Health’.” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon), 2017.

^[4]Lebanon Uses Arab Summit to Call for Syrian Refugees’ Return. Postmedia Network Inc, Toronto, 2019.

^[5]Aoun, Putin talk Russian role in Syrian refugee returns. Daily Star, Lebanon. Mar 26, 2019.

^[6]Lebanon to rely on Russian strategy for return of Syrian refugees: Minister (2019). . Tehran: SyndiGate Media Inc.

^[7]Anchal Vohra. Russia’s Payback Will Be Syria’s Reconstruction Money. Foreign Policy. May 5 2019

^[8]Mhaissen, 18

^[9]Reardon, Christopher. “Eight years on, Syrian refugees weigh thorny question of return”. UNHCR.  https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2019/3/5c83eafa4/eight-years-syrian-refugees-weigh-thorny-question-return.html

^[10]Mhaissen, 19

^[11]Mhaissen, 23

^[12]Serdar & Orchard, 5

^[13]Schlein, Lisa. UN warns against mass return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon. VOA News January 10, 2019 3:01 PM https://www.voanews.com/a/un-warns-against-mass-return-of-syrian-refugees-from-lebanon/4737514.html

^[14]Bank, World. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019. 8, 262.

^[15]Mhaissen, 26

Bibliography:

• Bank, World. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019. 
• “Beirut, Damascus Working Together for Return of Syrian Refugees.” Press TV, 2018. 
• Collard, Rebecca. “Syrian Refugees Return from Lebanon to an Uncertain Future.” FT.Com (2018).
• “Economic Projects to further Return of Syrian Refugees – Lavrov.” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire,2018. 
• Kaya, Serdar and Phil Orchard. “Prospects of Return: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Germany.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies (2019): 1-18. 
• “Lebanon to Rely on Russian Strategy for Return of Syrian Refugees: Minister.” Press TV,2019. 
• Lebanon Uses Arab Summit to Call for Syrian Refugees’ Return. Toronto: Postmedia Network Inc, 2019.
• Leiserson, Elizabeth. “Securing the Borders Against Syrian Refugees: When Non-Admission Means Return.” The Yale Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (2017): 185.
• Marks, Jesse. Syrian Refugees Face Growing Pressure to Return to Insecure Conditions. Here’s Why: With Resettlement and Integration Largely Off the Table, Return is Reduced to a Political Tool. Washington: WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington Post, 2019.
• Mhaissen, Rouba. Hodges, Elena. Unpacking Return: Syrian Refugees’ Conditions Concerns Sawa for Development and Aid. 2019
• Rhys Dubin and Nazih Osseiran. “Hezbollah Mediating Safe Return of Syrian Refugees.” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon),2017.
• Syria Arab republic, United States: End of fighting in Syria not enough for spontaneous return of Syrian refugees. MENA Report (2019). 
• Syrian Refugees Return Home from Lebanon. SyndiGate Media Inc, Tehran, 2019.
• “United Nations/Syria/Lebanon: UN Warns Against Mass Return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon.” Asia News Monitor,2019.
• Vignal, Leïla. “Perspectives on the Return of Syrian Refugees.” Forced Migration Review no. 57 (2018): 69-71. 
• Yahya, Maha, Carnegie Middle East Center, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018.

Introduction

Both limited and sovereign, Benedict Anderson’s theory encompasses a wide range of nationalisms, using such concepts as print capitalism and official nationalism to explain their manifestation, which I will apply to Arab-Palestinian nationalism. The current Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most controversial, violent, and divisive issues of modern era with many ways to frame the struggle and a multitude of actors to consider, all of which have evolved over time. Although this conflict occurs over a small strip of land, it has unavoidable international elements due to the land’s evolution from being a part of the Ottoman Empire (OE), a British colony in the interwar period, to an arena of Cold War tensions. Furthermore, although the struggle with Zionism and Israel dominate the conversation now, the modern Palestinian national consciousness has deep historical roots going back centuries, and ignoring these origins only further erodes trust and impairs negotiations. The current cycle of violence seems insurmountable, with the Israeli stance on settlement expansion and denial of Palestinians as a national community “deserving of a state,”^[1]coalesced with the Palestine Liberation Organization’s internal strife and factional discord. These circumstances suggest that the goal of statehood has never been more unattainable. How, then, does the vigor behind calls for Palestinian Nationalism remain resolute? Using Anderson’s theories of print capitalism and official nationalism, this paper will show that Palestinian nationalism is rooted in anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggles, orienting itself as an ideology that predated the creation of a Jewish homeland under the British Mandate. Furthermore, this paper will endeavor to show how the renewed violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict throughout the Cold War cannot be separated from the overarching ideological themes of that era, namely the struggle between imperialism and decolonization and that between communism and capitalism. 

Orienting Perceptions of Palestinian Nationalism  

In tracing the origins of Palestinian nationalism, a number of academics have argued that it arose entirely in response to the creation of an explicitly Jewish Homeland during and after WWI. Premier among these thinkers is Bernard Lewis, a British-American historian who derides that Arabs as a whole had any concept of nationalism let alone Palestinian nationalism, until WWI.^[2]Daniel Pipes, another Harvard-educated historian, also claims, unequivocally, that there was no “Palestinian” identity before 1920, suggesting that the Arabs of that region [Leila Isk1] identified only as Muslims, with little to no positive or negative relationship to nearby Christians and Jews.^[3]In his book The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, lauded for its evenhanded examination of both sides of the conflict,^[4]James L. Gelvin writes that “Palestinian nationalism emerged during the interwar period in response to Zionist immigration and settlement.”^[5]In saying so, he reaffirms that same narrative of a people with no examinable national consciousness or attachment to the land until confronted with large-scale colonialism. However, Gelvin warns readers not to belittle the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism on the basis that it followed Zionism, emphasizing that nearly all nationalisms occur in opposition to some determinable ‘other.’^[6]

In making this statement, Gelvin presumably seeks to offset efforts by Israeli nationalists and others to disparage the legitimacy of the Palestinian demand for statehood as an anti-Semitic rebellion of modern times, rooted in Arab nationalism or supremacy. This attitude has been a prevailing objection to Palestinian nationalism since its conception — that Palestinian nationalism is suspect because it did not exist before the Balfour Declaration. For example, Arthur Balfour, writing in 1919, asserted that “Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions … [and] of far greater import than the desires and prejudice of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.”^[7]Balfour is of the opinion that the Arabs, as recentresidents, have a tenuous claim to the land, their desires negligible in the face of Zionist tradition. This idea reverberated far into the 20th century — consider former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, who claimed that “There was no such thing as Palestine… they did not exist.”^[8]Balfour, as the British Foreign Minister, marked the burgeoning contours of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the onset. These statements shed light on how Palestinian nationalism was and is perceived — as a latent manifestation of identity rooted in prejudice, inherently anti-Semitic, devoid of historical significance.

Origins of Palestinian Nationalism

Through the Advent of Print Capitalism

 Anderson considers the dawning of national consciousness as stemming from a unique interplay between technology, capitalism, and the diversity of human language, which all converged to help people imagine a community which had none “but the most fortuitous relationship to existing political boundaries.”^[9]Printcapitalism, stressing the proliferation of the printing press, allowed a common language to create a discourse between peoples far away through the ever-expanding capitalist marketplace. This understanding of how nationalism emerges — not just in opposition to others, but through a collective understanding of each other as a community with shared knowledge, values, and grievances — is applicable to the Palestinian case. This nuanced understanding of nationalism is crucial to chart the formation of Palestinian nationalism at its infancy, place it on equal footing with Zionism and give Palestinians a foundation upon which to claim statehood. This essay, in employing Anderson’s understanding of nationalism, does not deny that Palestinian nationalism grew out of opposition to Zionism, given that nearly all nationalisms, including Zionism and European nationalisms,^[10]emerged in response to some definable other, and were thus finite in their scope.^[11]Rather, this essay seeks to contextualize Palestinian nationalism as a more grounded anti-imperial opposition that began in earnest with 19^th-century  Jewish immigration, building on an embedded territorial consciousness, thus demonstrating that a collective ‘Palestinian’ identity existed before WWI, using print capitalism to broadcast itself. 

Through an analysis of early Palestinian newspapers, elements of a modern Palestinian national consciousness driven by peasant worries over land and displacement due to increased Jewish immigration to Jerusalem, are clearly identifiable. When chronicled in newspapers, these concerns reached political elites, creating a horizontal comradeship, or fraternity,^[12]under the common identification of “Palestinian.” During the Ottoman Empire, the Arabic press in Palestine emerged latently only after the Young Turk revolution, but did so robustly, with no less than 15 Arabic newspapers by December 1908.^[13]These newspapers played a crucial role in propagating what had been to this point largely peasant concerns over increased Jewish immigration from 1839-1914,^[14]crossing class and religious boundaries and allowing elites and peasants to relate to one another. Rashid Khalidi, in a survey of these early newspapers like al-Karmiland Filastin^[15]notes that “Arabic language papers began to reflect a mounting concern about the dangers posed by Zionist colonization.”^[16]The prevailing view among Palestinians —that Zionism was  a colonial expansion endangering their way of life — predated the creation of a Palestinian colony under the British Mandate. As such, calls for Palestinian self-determination today cannot be dismissed out of hand as a reaction to the creation of Israel; rather, they need to be understood as stemming from a far more entrenched identity that Palestinians have held for centuries. 

In Response to Official Nationalism

Beyond misgivings surrounding Zionism, these newspapers also demonstrate a burgeoning anti-imperialist sentiment among Palestinians against the Ottoman Empire, where local nationalist leanings threatened the dynastic state, provoking an official Ottoman nationalism and Turkification process. An analysis of these early Palestinian newspapers indicates a growing dissatisfaction with the Ottoman central authorities, specifically noting a common feeling that local needs were being ignored in favor of new Ottoman alliances with Jewish organizations.^[17]Frustration in the face of the empire’s lax stance on Zionist colonialism went a long way to invigorate the newly emerging Palestinian and local Arab nationalisms. Anderson’s “official nationalism” becomes relevant here; this Andersonian contribution to the analysis of the emergence of the modern nation states, suggesting that large multi-ethnic empires might attempt to assert dynastic control of their population, a procedure described as “stretching the short, tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.”^[18]A kind of “official nationalism” emerged on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, although instead of co-opting popular anti-Imperialist sentiment, as Anderson describes of European dynasties, they looked to suppress and replace it entirely. For example, the Ottomans took steps to suspend Palestinian newspapers that criticized Jewish land purchases, including Al-Karmiland Filastin,^[19]and imposed mandatory Turkish-language requirements in schools, courts, and local government offices.^[20]The friction between Ottoman imperialism and Palestinian nationalism was reflected in the aforementioned newspapers and permeated every class and ethnicity within the empire — for example, the editor of Al-Karmil,one of the most sharp critics of the Ottoman Empire and Zionism, was a Protestant Christian Arab.^[21]The banning of the newspapers exposes their impact in bringing Palestinians of all religious affiliations, political statuses, and economic classes together in opposition to empire. The pervading concern of Zionist immigration, now inextricably linked with imperial overreach, inspired locals to protest Zionist immigration directly to the Ottoman Authorities.^[22]Thus, Zionism itself did not provoke nationalism, instead working with anti-imperialist sentiments as a focal point for Arab nationalism as a whole, and Palestinians in particular, to rally around. 

 There also exists significant evidence of a territorial consciousness of a distinct Palestine set apart from the rest of the Arab region under the Ottoman Empire, upon which nationalism could emerge. This evidence dates back to the 17th century, and ancient religious and legal texts from that time period make reference to Filastin (Palestine), in a sense that went beyond “‘mere’ objective geography.”^[23]In a book of legal opinion written by Khary al-Din al-Ramli (c. 1671), there are numerous references to Filastin, indicating that the reader is aware of the concept of Palestine, despite the fact that the term was not used by the Ottoman Empire, which had long before split the land into several districts (sanjaqs).^[24]In fact, al-Ramli was referred by his contemporaries as the “Alim [Scholar] of Filastin.”^[25]Consequently, when the national consciousness of Palestine emerged in the face of increased Jewish immigration to Jerusalem and surrounding cities, it emerge on top of an entrenched territorial consciousness. Palestinian nationalism is thus given an element of antiquity, which Anderson notes nearly all nationalists share despite the objective modernity of the nation-state concept.^[26]Therefore, the political communities that emerged in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire, despite spending centuries administered by a central authority, were cognizant of a deeper territorial history and divide that would attempt to reassert itself with the fall of empire. 

 Although most of the aforementioned scholars date the birth of Palestinian nationalism to the 1920s, by this time, it was already a firmly accepted and common narrative among Arabs in Palestine, Muslims and Christians alike, due in large part to print capitalism. During this time, in response to Jewish immigration and anti-imperialism, there were many inherently nationalist Muslim Christian Associations, which were linked in their opposition to Zionism and imperial overreach.^[27]In fact, at an anti-Zionist rally in February 1920, Maronite vicar Paul ‘Abboud described Palestine as the “sanctuary of Christianity and the direction of prayer for Islam,” designating Jews as “the enemy of the cross and crescent.”^[28]This influential and commonly-held feeling among Palestinians was so prevalent that it provoked retaliation by Herbert Samuel, who proposed a legislative council based on the Balfour Declaration of 22 members, only 10 of whom could be Arabs;^[29]in other words, Arab Muslims and Christians, who made up 94% of the population, could have only 45% of the seats.^[30]By this point, nationalist ideology was so strong in Palestine that the British Empire was making a concerted legislative effort to control and diminish it. This event is also reminiscent of another character of official nationalism, whereby the dominant group might take such an anticipatory strategy in the face of an “emerging nationally-imagined community.”^[31]In this way, the imperial interference on behalf of the Jewish population further cemented the Palestinian perception of Zionism as a colonial enterprise supported by empire.

In any discussion about the emergence of Palestinian nationalism in relation to the Ottoman Empire and Zionism, it is important to note that often nationalism and the modern nation-state emerged unevenly, overlapping with each other and empire even as it came into conflict with them. Anderson, in coining “official nationalism,” notes this reality of empire and nations blending together at some point, overlapping and intersecting in an effort to define themselves and cling to relevance. For example, Ottomanism, the ideology of the Ottoman Empire until its collapse in the 20th century, evoked an Arab response by emphasizing Turkish nationalism,^[32]and in trying to consolidate and reinforce control of their empire, the Ottomans pushed Arab elements away. Similarly, within Arab regions (Syria, Jordan, Palestine), local crises prevented any full adoption of Arab nationalism. For example, Palestinian nationalism was evoked by shared concern for Jewish immigration limited to their boundaries, distinct from the issues facing Jordan or Syria, spelling the failure of a more universal Arab nationalism.^[33]Furthermore, even when the Ottoman Empire collapsed, “nations” as we conceive of them now did not replace it.  A new Empire took its place, despite clear territorially-rooted nationalist movements, and instituted a new colonial master through the British mandate, which continually gave priority to another ‘rival’ nationalist claim, in order to consolidate its own authority. So even as empire waned, nationalism did not replace it evenly, and the triumph of one nationalism was not the triumph of all nationalist movements. 

Decolonization and the Cold War: Palestine-Israel Conflict

Anderson’s theories of nationalism also provide a deeper understanding of international relations during the Cold War, with the framework of Palestinian nationalism rooted in anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist struggles having been adopted by a new class of nationalist leaders. Fayaz A. Sayegh, a US-trained Christian Palestinian,^[34]in his 1965 study Zionist Colonialism in Palestine, outlines the pervading relationship between empire and colonialism in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian struggle. Sayegh traces the historical contours of ‘Zionist Colonialism’ to the scramble for Africa of the early1880s, setting off the hunt for a Jewish Nation, a program that would quickly take on the characteristics of the British Empire.^[35]He notes the ‘Jewish Colonial Trust’ and ‘Colonial Commission’ set up in 1898 as the first institutions of the Zionist enterprise, and laments that with the alliance to British imperialism and the creation of the United Nations,^[36]the nearly 100-year effort for the creation of a Jewish nation at the expense of Palestinian political and physical rights was achieved. 

What fascinates the most about Sayegh’s writings is his designation of the UN as an instrument of imperial power, and how this classification has changed over the course of the Cold War. At the time of the creation of Israel, the Ottoman Empire was just beginning to recede, and the nature of the UN was still quite imperial, as seen by an analysis of the 1947 vote on the partition of Palestine into two states. Nearly every European country, and most of Latin America (although there were many accusations of bribes and US political and economic pressure to do so),^[37]voted for the partition, and every Middle Eastern country voted against it, with the final vote tallying up to 33-13. The acknowledgement of a new non-Arab nation in the Middle East, a region which links together Asia and Africa, thus happened “without the free consent of any neighboring Asian or African country.”^[38]Of course, further into the Cold War and through subsequent decolonization wars, UN membership swelled until decolonized nations greatly outnumbered former imperial powers. This shift in the power dynamic would mean the US had to employ vetoes to defend Israel in the face of truly international condemnation of its actions.^[39]One wonders what the outcome of Resolution 181 might have been, had there been at that time a robust non-aligned movement with newly independent colonies, like Algeria, which might have sympathized with Palestinian nationalism.  

Thus, Palestinian nationalists were not excluded from the Cold-War ideological battle. Through their participation in decolonization dialogues, like at the 1955 Bandung Conference,^[40]they were forced to pick sides. The Bandung Conference’s final communiqué declared its support for the Palestinian people.^[41]In response, a Jewish newspaper wrote that “Red China supports Arabs.”^[42]The US, in turn, supported Israel, whom they saw as an outpost for democratic and capitalist values in the Middle East, and more similar to them than the strange Arabs.^[43]This dynamic also played a role in international institutions, adding to the “Cold War paralysis” of the UN Security Council, as the US would continually veto resolutions that censured Israel.^[44]In this way, through the Cold War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict evolved to have even more far-reaching international dimensions, involving China and the US. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fueled by Cold War tensions, thus fits with the definition of a Cold War proxy war: a civil war used by international actors to pursue ideological agendas. 

The reality of the Cold War, of course, was that it was actually quite hot, infusing new life and death into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Civil conflicts with foreign intervention tend to be bloodier and longer than those without,^[45]especially when a strong foreign power intervenes heavily on one side,^[46]as the United States has done for Israel, sending more than $3.8 billion in aid.^[47]This endless flow of arms, military training, and money from the US is buttressed by unintentional international support for terrorist/insurgent organizations in Gaza and the West Bank, which receive money from Saudi Arabia, Iran, the EU, and the UN, ostensibly for humanitarian aid though often rerouted toward weapons and arms purchases.^[48]This translates to a constant stream of money and arms to either side, a constant fuel to this decades-old flame. The conflict thus continues to take lives, and numerous negotiations efforts are constantly thwarted by an inability to reconcile the needs and desires of either side. Of course, this may be another aftereffect of the long-standing civil nature of the conflict, which are rarely resolved with negotiated settlement, but rather one side declaring all out military victory.^[49]

Conclusion

The reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of a deep and entrenched history intertwined with colonialism, empire, and multiple nationalisms. Anderson’s theories of print capitalism and official nationalism help to navigate the origins of a national consciousness within Palestine. Evidence of this consciousness as well as imperial and nationalist opposition to its formulation can be found in early Palestinian newspapers, communications of the British Empire and the activities of Palestinian leaders throughout the 20th century and earlier. An examination of these sources reveals a deep-seated territorial and social awareness among Palestinians of their own distinct boundaries, which gained traction and transformed into a recognizable nationalist movement in the wake of Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 19th century and frustration with the Ottoman central authorities. Orienting Palestinian nationalism as a reaction to what they perceived as an imperially-supported Zionist colonialism adds another lens through which to interpret the conflict in relation to the decolonization movements of the Cold War, as an early and ongoing manifestation of that effort. The internationalization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not just as a product of empire but through Cold War tensions as well, reinvigorated the violence. Furthermore, the narrative of Palestinian nationalism that emerges from Anderson’s theory of nationalism also helps in understanding the nature of international relations from WWI through the Cold War until contemporary times, where nationalism emerges in fits and starts, the world order evolves constantly between supremacy and multilateralism, and regional conflicts become global controversies. Whatever the international implications, all conversations must acknowledge the plight of the millions of Palestinians both dispersed around the world and concentrated in Gaza and the West Bank, placing historical and national weight behind their calls for binding self-determination. 

^[1]Seth Anziska, Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo. (Princeton University Press, 2018), 290. 

^[2]Bernard Lewis, Semites and anti-Semites: an inquiry into conflict and prejudice. (WW Norton & Company, 1999), 169.

^[3]Daniel Pipes, “The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine.” The Jerusalem Post (1950-1988),Sep 13, 2000.

^[4]Mark Sedgewick.”A Review of: “James L. Gelvin. the Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War.”.” Terrorism and Political Violence20 no. 3 (2008): 443-445.

^[5]James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: 100 Years of War. (Cambridge University Press: 2014) 92-93. 

^[6]Gelvin, Israel-Palestine Conflict, 92-93. . 

^[7]Arthur Balfour to Lord George Curzon, memorandum, 11 August 1919, Britain Foreign Office PRO. FO 371/4185, quoted by Anthony Nutting,Britain and Palestine: a legacy of deceit. (Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, 1970) http://www.balfourproject.org/balfour-and-palestine/.

^[8]Frank Giles, “Golda Meir: who Can Blame Israel?” The Sunday Times(London, England), June. 15, 1969.

^[9]Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. (London: Verso Books, 2006), 46.

^[10]See, for example, Gelvin, 92-93, and Edward Said, Orientalism. (New York: Vintage, 1979), 1-2.  

^[11]Anderson,Imagined Communities, 7. 

^[12]Anderson, 36. 

^[13]Ami Ayalon, & Nabih Bashir, “Introduction: History of the Arabic Press in the Land of Israel/Palestine,” הספרייה הלאומית, accessed March 25, 2019,http://web.nli.org.il/sites/nlis/en/jrayed/pages/history-of-the-arabic-press.aspx.

^[14]Muhammad Y. Muslih, The origins of Palestinian nationalism. (Columbia University Press, 1988),14. 

^[15]Unfortunately, english translations are not readily available, but original Arabic issues of FilastinandAl-Karmilcan be found at the Arabic Newspapers Archive of Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine at http://web.nli.org.il/sites/nlis/en/Jrayed#. 

^[16]Khalidi,Palestinian Identity, 121. 

^[17]Muslih,The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, 84.

^[18]Anderson,Imagined Communities, 86.

^[19]Neville J. Mandel, “Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine,” (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 1965), 101-102.

^[20]Muslih,The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, 61.

^[21]Mandel,”Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine,” 204.

^[22]Mandel 205.

^[23]Haim Gerber, “‘Palestine’ and Other Territorial Concepts in the 17th Century.”International Journal of Middle East Studies30, no. 4 (1998): 563.

^[24]Gerber, “”Palestine” and Other Territorial Concepts in the 17th Century,” 565. 

^[25]Gerber, 566.

^[26]Anderson,Imagined Communities, 5.

^[27]TaysīrJabārah,Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin Al-Husayni: Mufti of Jerusalem, (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1985), 66. 

^[28]Jonathan M. Gribetz, Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early Zionist-Arab Encounter,(Princeton University Press, 2014), 236.

^[29]Jabārah,Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin Al-Husayni, 66.

^[30]Justin Mccarthy, The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate, (Columbia University Press, 1990).  

^[31]Anderson, 101.  

^[32]Muslih,The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism,212.

^[33]Muslih, 214.

^[34]Todd Shepard, Voices of decolonization: A Brief History with Documents,(Macmillan Higher Education, 2014), 157.

^[35]Fayez A. Sayegh,Zionist Colonialism in Palestine. Vol. 1. (Beirut, Lebanon: Research Center, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965), 6. 

^[36]Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine, 16.

^[37]See, for example; U.S delegation threatening to cut aid in relation to this vote via Liberian Ambassador; John Quigley,Palestine and Israel: a challenge to justice, (Duke University Press, 1990), 37, Philippines change their vote after phone call from washington see; Phyllis Bennis, Before and After: U,S Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis, (New York: Olive Branch Press, 2003), Promise of a $5 million loan for Haiti see: Ahron Bregman, & Jihan El-Tahri. The fifty years war: Israel and the Arabs. (UK: Penguin, 1998), 25, to name a few instances.

^[38]Sayegh, 17.

^[39]Jeffry Frieden, David Lake, and Kenneth Schultz, World Politics: Interests, Interaction, Institutions, (WW Norton & Company, 2016), 215.

^[40]See, for example picture of Mufti Amien El Husaini as part of a Palestine Observer Delegation, Asian-African Conference Archives | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, accessed April 04, 2019, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-heritage/registered-heritage-page-1/asian-african-conference-archives/.   

^[41]Shepard, 66.

^[42]“Anti-Israel resolution Adopted at Bandung: Red China supports Arabs,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 22, 1955, https://www.jta.org/1955/04/22/archive/anti-israel-resolution-adopted-at-bandung-red-china-supports-arabs.

^[43]Michael Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1996) 400. 

^[44]Frieden et. al, 215.

^[45]Dylan Balch-Lindsay, and Andrew Enterline, “Prolonging the killing? Third party intervention and the duration of intrastate conflict, 1944-92,” In Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, WA, (1999):25.

^[46]Reed M. Wood, Jacob Kathman, and Stephen Gent, “Armed Intervention and Civilian victimization in Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research49, no. 5 (2012): 648. 

^[47]Nathan Thrall, “How the Battle over Israel is Fracturing American Politics,” The New York Times, March 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/magazine/battle-over-bds-israel-palestinians-antisemitism.html.  

^[48]Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Where Hamas Gets its Money,”Forbes, last modified, January 16, 2009, https://www.forbes.com/2009/01/16/gaza-hamas-funding-oped-cx_re_0116ehrenfeld.html#2a6424f57afb.

^[49]Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil War, 1945-1993,” American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995): 681.

Bibliography 

“Anti-israel Resolution Adopted at Bandung; Red China Supports Arabs.”Jewish Telegraphic 

            Agency. April 22, 1955. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.jta.org/1955/04/22/archiv            e/anti-israel-resolution-adopted-at-bandung-red-china-supports-arabs.

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.            Verso Books, 2006.

Anziska, Seth. Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo. Princeton 

            University Press, 2018.

Ayalon, Ami, and Nabih Bashir, Dr. “Introduction: History of the Arabic Press in the Land of 

            Israel/Palestine.”הספרייה הלאומית. Accessed March 25, 2019. http://web.nli.org.il/sites/n 

            lis/en/jrayed/pages/history-of-the-arabic-press.aspx.

Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew Enterline. “Prolonging the killing? Third party intervention 

            and the duration of intrastate conflict, 1944-92.” In Annual Meeting of the Western 

            Political Science Association, Seattle, WA, (1999): 25-27.

Balfour, Arthur James. “The Balfour Declaration.”London: British Foreign Office(1917).

Barnett, Michael N. “Identity and alliances in the Middle East.” The culture of national security: 

            Norms and identity in world politics(1996): 400-47.

Bennis, Phyllis. Before & after: US foreign policy and the September 11th crisis. New York: 

            Olive Branch Press, 2003.

Bregman, Ahron, and Jihan El-Tahri. The fifty years war: Israel and the Arabs. Penguin UK, 

            1998.

Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Where Hamas Gets its Money,”Forbes, last modified, January 16, 2009, 

            tml#2a6424f57afb. 

Frieden Jeffry, David A. Lake and Kenneth A. Schultz. World Politics: Interests, Interaction,                  Institutions.New York: WW Norton & Company, 2016.

Gelvin, James L. The Israel-Palestine conflict: One hundred years of war. Cambridge University            Press, 2014.

Gerber, Haim. “”Palestine” and Other Territorial Concepts in the 17th Century.” International                  Journal of Middle East Studies30, no. 4 (1998): 563-72. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1643     41.

Gribetz, Jonathan Marc. Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early Zionist-Arab 

            Encounter. Princeton University Press, 2014.

Jabārah, Taysīr. Palestinian Leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni: Mufti of Jerusalem. Vol. 5. Kingston 

            Press, 1985.

Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian identity: The construction of modern national consciousness.                       Columbia University Press, 2010.

Lewis, Bernard. Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice. New York: 

            W.W. Norton, 1999.

Licklider, Roy. “The consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945–1993.” 

            American Political science review 89, no. 3 (1995): 681-690.

Mandel, Neville J. “Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine.” PhD diss., University 

            of Oxford, 1965.

McCarthy, Justin. “The population of Palestine: population history and statistics of the late                       Ottoman period and the mandate.” (1990).

Muslih, Muhammad. “Arab politics and the rise of Palestinian nationalism.” Journal of Palestine             Studies16, no. 4 (1987): 77-94.

Muslih, Muhammad Y. The origins of Palestinian nationalism. Columbia University Press, 1988.

Nutting, Anthony. Britain and Palestine: a legacy of deceit. Council for the Advancement of                   Arab-British Understanding, 1970.

Pipes, Daniel. “The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine.” The Jerusalem Post (1950-1988),Sep 

            13, 2000.

Quigley, John. Palestine and Israel: A challenge to justice. Duke University Press, 1990.

Said, Edward W. Orientalism. Vintage, 1979.

Sayegh, Fayez Abdullah. Zionist colonialism in Palestine. Vol. 1. Beirut, Lebanon: Research

            Center, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965.

Sedgwick, Mark. 2008. “A Review of: “James L. Gelvin. the Israel-Palestine Conflict: One                      Hundred Years of War.”” Terrorism and Political Violence20 (3): 443-445.

Shepard, Todd. Voices of Decolonization: A Brief History with Documents. Macmillan Higher 

            Education, 2014.

Thrall, Nathan. “How the Battle over Israel is Fracturing American Politics.” The New York                     Times. Last modified March 28, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/magazine/ba ttle-over-bds-israel-palestinians-antisemitism.html.

Wood, Reed M., Jacob D. Kathman, and Stephen E. Gent. “Armed intervention and civilian 

            victimization in intrastate conflicts.” Journal of Peace Research49, no. 5 (2012): 

            647-660.