greece – The Yale Review of International Studies https://yris.yira.org Yale's Undergraduate Global Affairs Journal Thu, 14 Aug 2025 17:08:10 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://i0.wp.com/yris.yira.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/cropped-output-onlinepngtools-3-1.png?fit=32%2C32&ssl=1 greece – The Yale Review of International Studies https://yris.yira.org 32 32 123508351 Ancient Greek Heritage Diplomacy as a Means of Soft Power https://yris.yira.org/column/ancient-greek-heritage-diplomacy-as-a-means-of-soft-power/ Sat, 12 Jul 2025 18:07:17 +0000 https://yris.yira.org/?p=8741

Introduction

In an era marked by shifting geopolitical paradigms and the proliferation of non-traditional instruments of statecraft, culture has reemerged as a critical axis of international engagement. Beyond the conventional vectors of economic strength and military capability, states increasingly leverage cultural capital to shape global narratives, assert identity, and cultivate influence. Among these strategies, the diplomatic mobilization of heritage—anchored in the symbolic and historical resonance of antiquity—stands out as a particularly potent form of cultural statecraft.

Greece, heir to one of the world’s most storied civilizations, occupies a distinctive position within this landscape. Its ancient heritage—synonymous with the foundational tenets of Western thought, democratic governance, and artistic excellence—functions not merely as a source of national pride but as a dynamic tool of international engagement. This article explores the strategic deployment of Greece’s classical legacy through the lens of heritage diplomacy, analyzing its theoretical underpinnings, historical evolution, and contemporary applications. Through case studies and critical reflection, it considers how the invocation of antiquity can operate as a mechanism of influence, legitimacy, and normative authority in an increasingly multipolar world.

Theoretical Framework: Soft Power and Heritage Diplomacy

Joseph Nye defined soft power as a country’s capacity to influence others through attraction rather than coercion or payment.1 This form of power is deeply rooted in the appeal of a nation’s culture, political values, and foreign policies. Cultural diplomacy is a primary mechanism through which soft power is operationalized, utilizing cultural expressions, historical narratives, and artistic heritage to foster mutual understanding, trust, and normative influence on the global stage.

Within this broader framework, heritage diplomacy emerges as a strategic subset that mobilizes ancient and historical cultural assets to achieve foreign policy objectives. Unlike transient contemporary cultural products, ancient heritage carries profound symbolic capital that transcends time and place, anchored in its enduring historical significance and universal human resonance. Greece’s ancient civilization—renowned for foundational contributions to democracy, philosophy, literature, art, and legal thought—constitutes a potent reservoir of such symbolic capital.

By foregrounding this legacy, Greece does more than celebrate its past; it engages in identity politics that reinforce historical legitimacy and normative authority internationally. Heritage diplomacy thus operates at the intersection of culture and power, enabling Greece to craft and disseminate a compelling narrative that positions it as an indispensable progenitor of Western civilization and custodian of universal values. As Goff argues, heritage diplomacy transcends mere cultural promotion, becoming a sophisticated instrument of international normative influence that shapes global discourses on democracy, human rights, and civilization.2

This theoretical foundation situates Greece’s strategic heritage diplomacy within international relations theory, highlighting the convergence of soft power and cultural diplomacy to enhance national prestige and political leverage in an interconnected world.

Historical Context of Greek Heritage Diplomacy

Greek heritage diplomacy traces its origins to the 19th century, particularly the War of Independence (1821–1829). The newly established Greek state sought to reclaim and emphasize its classical past to consolidate national identity and secure international recognition. The rediscovery and preservation of ancient monuments became central to forging a cohesive national identity, serving as tangible evidence of continuity from antiquity to the modern era.3

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Greece consistently invoked its classical legacy in diplomatic efforts to establish cultural prestige. This manifested in various forms—from lobbying for the protection of archaeological sites to pursuing the return of cultural artifacts, most famously the ongoing dispute over the Parthenon Marbles housed in the British Museum. These efforts reflect a broader commitment to cultural patrimony as a matter of national dignity and international law.4 5

Following World War II, Greece institutionalized heritage diplomacy within its foreign policy, coordinating efforts through the Ministry of Culture and Sports alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The state promoted Greek culture globally via exhibitions, bilateral cultural agreements, and engagement with multilateral organizations such as UNESCO. The 2004 Athens Olympic Games symbolically linked Greece’s ancient history with modern global diplomacy and sport, exemplifying heritage diplomacy’s integration into official statecraft.6

Case Studies Illustrating Ancient Greek Heritage Diplomacy

Greece is home to 19 UNESCO World Heritage Sites, including iconic locations such as the Acropolis, Delphi, Olympia, and Mycenae. Beyond their role in attracting tourism, these sites symbolize Greece’s immense contributions to humanity’s cultural heritage. Greece actively leverages its participation in UNESCO forums to advocate for heritage preservation, foster multilateral cooperation, and promote cultural dialogue. Such engagement enhances Greece’s diplomatic visibility, cultivates goodwill, and positions the country as a steward of universal cultural values. The Athens Olympics in 2004 represented a landmark moment for Greek heritage diplomacy. Framed as the revival of the ancient Olympic tradition, the Games underscored Greece’s central role in the origins of the Olympic movement and global sport. Beyond spectacle, the event served as a strategic diplomatic platform to project Greece’s historical narrative worldwide, bolster national pride, and attract tourism revenue.7

Greece engages in archaeological diplomacy through bilateral collaborations with countries sharing Mediterranean historical ties, such as Egypt. Joint excavations, exhibitions, and academic exchanges create avenues for cultural diplomacy that transcend political tensions and foster regional bonds. These collaborations highlight shared ancient legacies, facilitating cultural understanding and political cooperation.8 9 Greece’s persistent diplomatic campaign for the repatriation of the Parthenon Marbles from the British Museum exemplifies heritage diplomacy in practice. The Greek government employs international forums, cultural events, and UNESCO channels to raise awareness and exert diplomatic pressure. This campaign demonstrates how ancient artifacts serve as powerful soft power symbols, reinforcing national identity and international solidarity. Greece’s narrative emphasizes universal cultural heritage, respect for original context, and ethical stewardship—resonating globally beyond political divides.10 11

International Power Projection

Greek ancient heritage diplomacy significantly enhances the country’s diplomatic influence by reinforcing its global reputation as the cradle of Western civilization. This heritage acts as a bridge across cultures and political divides, enabling Greece to participate meaningfully in international dialogues centered on shared human values. Through cultural diplomacy, Greece projects an image of stability, historical continuity, and normative authority—translating into soft power leverage within forums such as the European Union, the United Nations, and Mediterranean regional organizations.12

Heritage diplomacy also enables Greece to assert normative leadership. By positioning itself as a protector of cultural patrimony and promoter of cultural dialogue, Greece crafts a diplomatic identity grounded in ethical stewardship and global responsibility. This moral dimension strengthens broader foreign policy goals, particularly in negotiations related to cultural property, migration, and regional security.13

Political Impact of Heritage Diplomacy

Domestically, heritage diplomacy strengthens Greek national identity and social cohesion by linking contemporary society to its ancient roots. The celebration of ancient heritage through education, public discourse, and state ceremonies nurtures a shared sense of pride and historical continuity.14

Politically, heritage diplomacy underpins Greece’s role as a cultural mediator between East and West, enhancing its influence in the geopolitically sensitive Eastern Mediterranean, where cultural and historical claims often intersect with political tensions. The symbolic capital derived from Greece’s ancient heritage allows it to engage regional neighbors and global powers alike from a position of normative strength.15

Additionally, heritage diplomacy plays a key role in contentious issues such as cultural artifact repatriation. Greece’s ongoing campaign for the Parthenon Marbles exemplifies the intersection of heritage diplomacy with national sovereignty and international law—serving as a critical test of Greece’s ability to transform cultural diplomacy into tangible political outcomes.

Economic Impact of Greek Heritage Diplomacy

The economic benefits of Greece’s heritage diplomacy are substantial, with cultural tourism representing a major pillar of the national economy. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, tourism accounted for approximately 20% of Greece’s GDP and employed one in five Greeks, with ancient heritage sites drawing millions of visitors annually.16 For example, the Acropolis attracts over two million visitors per year, generating revenue not only through admission fees but also through related sectors such as hospitality, transportation, and retail.

International exhibitions, cultural festivals, and digital initiatives further stimulate economic activity by attracting foreign investment and nurturing cultural industries. These efforts create jobs and promote sustainable development around archaeological sites.17

Moreover, heritage diplomacy bolsters Greece’s creative industries—including publishing, film, and handicrafts—that thrive on rich historical narratives. By branding ancient heritage as a valuable cultural asset, Greece enhances its international competitiveness and fosters economic diversification.18

Strategic Recommendations 

To fully capitalize on its ancient heritage as a diplomatic asset, Greece should adopt a coherent and multifaceted strategy that integrates cultural diplomacy into its broader foreign policy framework. This entails expanding multilateral partnerships by collaborating with Mediterranean and European nations that share classical legacies, thereby coordinating preservation initiatives, advocacy efforts, and cultural exchanges that reinforce the global value of ancient civilizations. Embracing digital innovation is equally essential: the development of immersive virtual reality experiences, interactive exhibitions, and curated social media narratives can engage diasporic communities and younger audiences while democratizing access and modernizing outreach. Institutionalizing heritage diplomacy through the establishment of dedicated units within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—working in close cooperation with the Ministry of Culture, embassies, academic institutions, and museums—would ensure strategic alignment and policy coherence. 

In parallel, Greece should invest in cultural infrastructure by enhancing regional museums, funding archaeological research, and supporting heritage conservation initiatives with an emphasis on accessibility, education, and innovation. Furthermore, promoting public-private partnerships by collaborating with multinational technology firms, luxury brands, and philanthropic foundations can amplify efforts to digitize and disseminate Greek cultural heritage on a global scale. Taken together, these measures would enable Greece to strengthen its soft power, foster international goodwill, and secure durable political and economic dividends.

Conclusion

Greece’s ancient heritage constitutes an invaluable asset for projecting soft power through heritage diplomacy. Rooted in the country’s rich historical legacy, this form of cultural diplomacy fosters international cooperation, reinforces national identity, and enhances Greece’s standing on the global stage. As Greece navigates the challenges of the 21st century—including geopolitical tensions and economic pressures—leveraging its ancient heritage thoughtfully and strategically remains key to sustaining its influence and contributing meaningfully to global cultural dialogue.

This study underscores the multidimensional impact of heritage diplomacy, inviting policymakers and scholars to deepen analysis and support for such initiatives. The enduring legacy of Greece’s ancient civilization not only enriches humanity’s cultural tapestry but also serves as a beacon of soft power and diplomacy in an increasingly complex world.

  1. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). ↩︎
  2. Patricia Goff, “Heritage Diplomacy and Normative Power in International Relations,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 20, no. 5 (2017): 516–532. ↩︎
  3. P. Kitromilides, “Enlightenment and Revolution in Greece,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 8, no. 1 (1990): 3–30. ↩︎
  4. Michael Herzfeld, “The Greek State and Archaeological Heritage: Nationalism and Cultural Property,” American Ethnologist 14, no. 2 (1987): 286–300. ↩︎
  5. Michael Vickers, “Repatriation and Cultural Diplomacy: The Case of the Parthenon Marbles,” Museum International 73, no. 1–2 (2021): 36–48. ↩︎
  6. Jonathan Grix and Paul Brannagan, “The Olympics, Soft Power and Heritage Diplomacy: The Case of Athens 2004,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 8, no. 1 (2016): 79–94. ↩︎
  7. Kevin Toohey and Anthony Veal, The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective (CABI, 2007). ↩︎
  8. Jan Assmann, “Cultural Memory and Cultural Diplomacy: The Case of Ancient Heritage,” International Journal of Cultural Policy 17, no. 3 (2011): 291–307. ↩︎
  9. Eleni Sazakli, “Archaeological Diplomacy in the Mediterranean: Greek-Egyptian Cooperation,” Mediterranean Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2019): 88–105. ↩︎
  10. Yannis Hamilakis, “The Politics of the Parthenon Marbles,” Antiquity 87, no. 337 (2013): 759–73. ↩︎
  11. Maria Papadopoulos, “The Parthenon Marbles Dispute: Cultural Diplomacy and International Law,” International Journal of Cultural Property 24, no. 2 (2017): 123–46. ↩︎
  12. Kostas Kostis, “Greece’s Cultural Diplomacy and the European Union,” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 285–302. ↩︎
  13. Yiannis Papadakis, “Heritage Diplomacy and Regional Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Geopolitics 23, no. 3 (2018): 591–611. ↩︎
  14. Konstantinos Anagnostopoulos, “National Identity and Cultural Heritage in Modern Greece,” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 25, no. 2 (2016): 141–60. ↩︎
  15. Panagiotis Tsakonas, “Greece’s Cultural Identity and Geopolitical Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 (2015): 127–42. ↩︎
  16. Bank of Greece, Tourism and the Greek Economy: Statistical Overview (Athens: Bank of Greece Publications, 2019). ↩︎
  17. OECD, Cultural Heritage and Economic Development in Greece (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2021). ↩︎
  18. Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports, Cultural Industries and Heritage Preservation Report (Athens, 2023). ↩︎

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Acropolis of Athens, Image sourced from Finestre sull’Arte | CC License, no changes made

]]>
8741
Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey Clashes with Neighbors Over Offshore Gas Reserves https://yris.yira.org/column/conflict-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-turkey-clashes-with-neighbors-over-offshore-gas-reserves/ Wed, 18 Nov 2020 07:37:51 +0000 http://yris.yira.org/?p=4477

Introduction

Tensions are rising in the eastern Mediterranean as Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece clash over access to significant offshore gas reserves.[1] Turkey has alarmed its neighbors by sending convoys of research and military vessels into disputed waters to begin the process of surveying and drilling, and Greece, Cyprus, France, and Italy have conducted military exercises or deployed more forces to the region in response. Mediation efforts by the EU have so far failed to broker any compromise, and recent clashes between Turkish and Greek vessels have led many to worry that a more serious conflict could emerge.[2][3] While this conflict is unlikely to resemble a full-blown war, it may develop to parallel the “hybrid warfare” present in a similar ongoing conflict in the South China Sea.[4] Perhaps more concerningly, the two disputes are scuttling maritime international law at a time when the rapidly globalizing world economy is increasingly reliant on the seas.

Defining Context: The Cyprus Dispute

Cyprus has been inhabited by Greek and Turkish populations for centuries, and this ethnic division has been the source of a decades-long conflict over the nation’s political status.[5] The island gained its independence from Britain in 1960, and at first, the government balanced power between the two groups, though the majority Greek population wielded significantly more power.[6] [7] In 1963, however, the compromise broke down, and the Turkish Cypriots left the government claiming that the Greeks had forced them out. The Greeks insisted they had left of their own accord.[8] Violence broke out between the two groups shortly thereafter, prompting UN intervention.[9] In 1974, Greece backed a coup d’état to install a leader who sought to reunify the country as a part of Greece, a primary goal of many Greek Cypriots.[10] [11]  This violated the treaty Turkey, Greece, and Britain had signed in granting Cyprus its independence, prompting Turkey to invade the northern part of the country to protect its independence.[12] Turkey continues to occupy the north, which is now formally organized as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and contains most of the Turkish Cypriot community.[13] Tensions persist between the two groups, and there is no current solution to reunite the country. 

This complicated domestic political situation has significant implications for granting Cyprus economic rights to maritime territory under international law. Turkey is the only nation to formally recognize the TRNC, while the predominantly Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus in the south enjoys international recognition, but this alone is not sufficient to solve the problem.[14] [15] Since international law apportions the right to exploit maritime resources to states based on their borders, it is unlikely that any consensus on maritime boundaries can be agreed upon as long as the sovereignty of Cypriot communities themselves remains in question.[16]

The Legal Dispute

Rights to exploit maritime resources are governed by international law under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, or UNCLOS. The convention grants each country exclusive access to all natural resources within 200 nautical miles of its coastline.[17] This area is known as a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ.[18] The exact delineation of EEZs has repeatedly led to conflict, as nations’ 200nm boundaries often overlap, and UNCLOS provides no explicit mechanism for reconciling overlapping claims.[19] Countries are required to work out agreements between themselves, which can be difficult when states have competing interests and a history of animosity.[20] Nations are also occasionally entitled to all waters above their continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles, and definitions of what this entails also tend to spark conflict.[21] 

Much of the gas in the Eastern Mediterranean lies in the UN-recognized EEZs of Greece and Cyprus, but Turkey insists that it too has drilling rights.[22] Turkey’s claims to Greek and Cypriot waters are distinct and both merit a close look. 

[France24 Image]

While Turkey has more coastline on the Aegean Sea, Greece has been able to claim the lion’s share of the maritime territory because of its numerous island possessions which stretch nearly to Turkey’s borders.[23] [24] Turkey argues that these islands are not justification to extend Greece’s EEZ, and international law has so far been relatively inconclusive on the matter.[25] [26] However, neither side so far has been willing to go to the international tribunal in the Hague for arbitration.[27] Instead, Turkey has sent vessels into Greek waters, and Greece has announced a military buildup in reply.[28] [29]

In Cyprus, Turkey also objects to the Republic of Cyprus’s plans to lease drilling rights to portions of its EEZ to European oil companies.[30] Ankara argues that the Turkish Cypriots in the North are entitled to some of the revenues the Greek South was planning to keep for itself.[31] This is where the controversial relationship between the North and the South comes into play. If Cyprus truly is one country, then Northern Cypriots would have a legitimate claim to some of the benefits.[32] Turkey also claims direct sovereignty over some waters off the coast of Cyprus for its own use, alleging that they are rightfully Turkey’s, though this claim has lacked much explanation or legal backing.[33] Ankara is clearly determined, however, as it has sent a number of research and military vessels to survey the area for drilling while forcibly keeping an Italian vessel licensed by the Republic of Cyprus out.[34]

The Verdict

While many details of the dispute, particularly those regarding interpretations of international law, are relatively ambiguous, one thing is abundantly clear: Turkey has demonstrated its willingness to aggressively use military force to exercise its national policy. While Turkey claims territory under UNCLOS, it has not formally signed and ratified the treaty, nor does it seem willing to settle the matter in international court.[35] [36] Turkey’s bold and active use of its military has galvanized its neighbors against it, as Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, Palestine, the UAE, and France have formed a loose coalition to oppose its claim to the gas reserves.[37]

Turkey appears to have two distinct motivations behind its aggression in the region. One is economic and relatively straightforward; Turkey spent $41 billion on energy imports in 2019, which is economically and strategically disadvantageous.[38] The other is political and much more complex. Erdoğan, like other authoritarian leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, has repeatedly used aggression overseas to project a facade of strength in order to distract from his domestic political failings and weaknesses.[39] Turkish rhetoric has focused on reclaiming a “blue homeland,” referring to parts of the Eastern Mediterranean that many Turkish political elites consider having been stolen from Turkey by European colonial powers.[40] This rhetoric has concerned several European leaders, including one French politician who compared Erdoğan’s aggression and rhetoric to that of Hitler in the years leading up to WWII.[41] While this last comparison is likely an exaggeration, Turkey’s behavior does fall in line with a concerning global trend. Disaffected powers such as Turkey, Russia, and China have increasingly pushed against or outright rejected the authority of international institutions created largely by the West in the past 75 years.[42] There is certainly room for the argument that these institutions were heavily biased to favor the Western powers, but the outright rejection of institutions designed to prevent another world war by some of the largest powers in the world is nonetheless extremely concerning.

A Parallel Crisis: The South China Sea Case

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean bears remarkable similarities to a congruent flare-up in the South China Sea between China and its neighboring countries.[43] Both regions are immensely important for international shipping and contain significant natural resources.[44] In addition, both China and Turkey have employed similar methodologies, as the two powers have aggressively used naval power to enforce their claims.[45] One notable divergence between the two situations is the level of regional resistance each aggressor has faced.[46] China has largely gone unchecked in its expansion: even an explicit ruling by the UNCLOS tribunal which declared that artificial islands do not carry EEZ rights failed to deter Chinese expansion.[47] Turkey, on the other hand, has faced considerable opposition from its neighbors, many of whom have more developed militaries.[48]

Future of the Dispute and International Law of the Seas

The crash in oil prices brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic offered a chance for all parties to slow down and draft a strategy to de-escalate the conflict, but this chance will likely be wasted, as Erdoğan recently opted to press on and continue the drilling.[49] Going forward, experts predict that Turkey may follow in the footsteps of China and adopt a “hybrid warfare” strategy that includes the use of a paramilitary-style coast guard to enforce its claims.[50] Such conflict is troubling to see, especially in two of the most important sea routes for international trade. The coming years will be pivotal for the future of UNCLOS and maritime international law. If the current institutions fail to resolve these ongoing disputes, the world might need to take a second look at its strategy to ensure peace on the high seas.


Works Cited

[1] Romain Brunet, “Troubled Waters: Greek-Turkish Escalations in the Mediterranean,” France 24, August 28, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200828-troubled-waters-greek-turkish-escalations-in-the-mediterranean.

[2] Robin Emmott, “Greece, Cyprus Told to Wait for EU Action on ‘provocative’ Turkey,” Reuters, October 16, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-summit-turkey-idUSKBN271173.

[3] Alessandro Gagaridis, “Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean: Another South China Sea?,” Geopolitical Monitor (blog), March 20, 2018, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/rising-tensions-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-another-south-china-sea/.

[4] Gagaridis.

[5] David Hunt, “Cyprus — Britannica Academic,” August 25, 2020, https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/Cyprus/109746#214648.toc.

[6] Sewell Chan, “Cyprus: Why One of the World’s Most Intractable Conflicts Continues (Published 2016),” The New York Times, November 7, 2016, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/world/europe/cyprus-reunification-talks.html.

[7] Turkish Heritage Organization, “The Cyprus Dispute at a Glance,” The Cyprus Dispute at a glance, accessed November 7, 2020, https://www.turkheritage.org/.

[8] Chan, “Cyprus.”

[9] Turkish Heritage Organization, “The Cyprus Dispute at a Glance.”

[10] Turkish Heritage Organization.

[11] Hunt, “Cyprus — Britannica Academic.”

[12] Turkish Heritage Organization, “The Cyprus Dispute at a Glance.”

[13] Chan, “Cyprus.”

[14] Chan.

[15] Achilles Skordas, “Oil Exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean: Cyprus, Turkey and International Law | Wilson Center,” accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/oil-exploitation-the-eastern-mediterranean-cyprus-turkey-and-international-law.

[16] Skordas.

[17] Rachel Esplin Odell and Annelle Sheline, “Analysis | Greek and Turkish Ships Are Playing Chicken at Sea. There’s Already Been One Crash.,” Washington Post, accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/12/greek-turkish-ships-are-playing-chicken-sea-theres-already-been-one-crash/.

[18] Odell and Sheline.

[19] Odell and Sheline.

[20] Odell and Sheline.

[21] Odell and Sheline.

[22] Brunet, “Troubled Waters.”

[23] Odell and Sheline, “Analysis | Greek and Turkish Ships Are Playing Chicken at Sea. There’s Already Been One Crash.”

[24] Patrick Wintour, “How a Rush for Mediterranean Gas Threatens to Push Greece and Turkey into War,” The Guardian, September 11, 2020, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/11/mediterranean-gas-greece-turkey-dispute-nato.

[25] Odell and Sheline, “Analysis | Greek and Turkish Ships Are Playing Chicken at Sea. There’s Already Been One Crash.”

[26] Wintour, “How a Rush for Mediterranean Gas Threatens to Push Greece and Turkey into War.”

[27] Odell and Sheline, “Analysis | Greek and Turkish Ships Are Playing Chicken at Sea. There’s Already Been One Crash.”

[28] Emmott, “Greece, Cyprus Told to Wait for EU Action on ‘provocative’ Turkey.”

[29] Odell and Sheline, “Analysis | Greek and Turkish Ships Are Playing Chicken at Sea. There’s Already Been One Crash.”

[30] Frisco Dubbelboer, “UNCLOS UNDER PRESSURE: LAW OF THE JUNGLE OR LAW OF THE SEA?” (Clingendael Institute, July 28, 2020), https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/unclos-under-pressure-law-jungle-or-law-sea.

[31] Renee Maltezou, “U.S. warns Turkey over offshore drilling near Cyprus,” Reuters, October 5, 2019, https://fr.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-greece-pompeo-mitsotakis-idAFKBN1WK04G.

[32] Skordas, “Oil Exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean.”

[33] Dubbelboer, “UNCLOS UNDER PRESSURE: LAW OF THE JUNGLE OR LAW OF THE SEA?”

[34] Dubbelboer.

[35] Odell and Sheline, “Analysis | Greek and Turkish Ships Are Playing Chicken at Sea. There’s Already Been One Crash.”

[36] Dubbelboer, “UNCLOS UNDER PRESSURE: LAW OF THE JUNGLE OR LAW OF THE SEA?”

[37] Wintour, “How a Rush for Mediterranean Gas Threatens to Push Greece and Turkey into War.”

[38] Ahmed Helal, “For Turkey, the Libyan Conflict and the Eastern Mediterranean Are Inextricably Linked,” Atlantic Council (blog), October 28, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/for-turkey-the-libyan-conflict-and-the-eastern-mediterranean-are-inextricably-linked/.

[39] Odell and Sheline, “Analysis | Greek and Turkish Ships Are Playing Chicken at Sea. There’s Already Been One Crash.”

[40] Wintour, “How a Rush for Mediterranean Gas Threatens to Push Greece and Turkey into War.”

[41] Wintour.

[42] Wintour.

[43] Gagaridis, “Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.”

[44] Gagaridis.

[45] Gagaridis.

[46] Gagaridis.

[47] Gagaridis.

[48] Gagaridis.

[49] Dubbelboer, “UNCLOS UNDER PRESSURE: LAW OF THE JUNGLE OR LAW OF THE SEA?”

[50] Gagaridis, “Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.”

]]>
4477