In a Kyiv bomb shelter, a wartime president addresses his people via a smartphone. In London, thousands march with foreign flags, chanting in solidarity with a land under siege. In Tehran’s studios, state TV anchors broadcast messages across the Middle East. These scenes show that modern conflicts are fought not only with missiles, but also with narratives that leap across borders. Digital stories and images have become a strategic frontline. From a communications perspective, war is now “about perception, telling a story about who is the victim and who is the aggressor.” Across the world, this “correspondence of conflict”—the public narrative back-and-forth of war—is shaping alliances, foreign policy, and diplomacy.

Three conflict zones illustrate this trend and each case demonstrates how digital communication and international perception can sway the course of wars and the world’s response.

Ukraine: Zelensky’s War of Words and Images

From day one of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine fought on the information front. President Zelensky posted a defiant video from central Kyiv declaring, “We are here”—proof that he and his cabinet had not fled and would resist. That brief clip set the tone for a new kind of wartime leadership, harnessing social media to rally the nation and win support abroad.

Zelensky understood that winning the narrative was as crucial as winning battles. He turned communication into a strategic weapon, delivering daily addresses to rally Ukrainians and making personal appeals to international audiences. One public diplomacy expert noted that Zelensky uses every platform — from speeches to X — to press Ukraine’s case. Under his guidance, Ukraine offered a model for how a nation under attack can shape its image via digital media.

Equally remarkable was how Ukrainian society joined the effort. Government social-media accounts adopted memes and other humor to keep Ukraine in global headlines and counter Russian propaganda. Ordinary Ukrainians became citizen reporters, sharing raw videos of bombed neighborhoods, civilian resilience, and frontline heroics. “Every Ukrainian became a voice of the embattled country . . . an eyewitness of brave resistance,” observed one analysis. Unpolished clips of everyday bravery had a major impact, their authenticity cutting through Kremlin propaganda. Amplified by influencers and a volunteer “PR Army” of communication professionals, these real-time stories helped truth prevail over disinformation.

This digital people’s war paid off diplomatically. By winning hearts and minds abroad, Ukraine won unprecedented international support. Public opinion abroad pressured many governments to impose tough sanctions on Russia and send weapons to Kyiv. NATO and EU leaders that once hesitated became more unified behind Ukraine, reflecting how Zelensky’s media diplomacy translated into tangible aid. Even diplomatic forums became venues for Ukraine’s narrative: at a 2024 peace summit in Switzerland, Zelensky’s team ensured global media heard his call for a “just peace.” In short, strategic storytelling reinforced Ukraine’s physical defense by aligning the world’s support with the nation’s struggle.

Israel–Gaza: A War of Narratives and Global Reactions

On October 7, 2023, Hamas militants attacked Israel. Graphic videos of the assault spread online within hours, sparking global outrage and sympathy for Israel. Israel quickly cast the attack as “Israel’s 9/11” and launched a military response. But as Israeli bombs pounded Gaza, a parallel war of narratives unfolded over who was the victim and who was the aggressor. Analysts noted that the conflict was about perception, with civilian suffering becoming the center of gravity for international support.

In Gaza, Hamas and ordinary Palestinians flooded social media with images of destroyed buildings and wounded civilians to sway global opinion. In past Gaza wars, support for Israel “faded as sympathies turned toward the Palestinians” amid high civilian casualties, and 2023 followed that pattern. Hamas’s media wing effectively used such footage to change international opinion. Outrage over the suffering sparked protests from Istanbul to London, with demonstrators waving Palestinian flags and demanding an end to the bombardment. 

Israel, meanwhile, pushed its own narrative: officials emphasized Hamas’s brutality and use of human shields, and the Israel Defense Forces circulated videos of precision strikes to show efforts to minimize civilian harm. Both sides churned out reams of supporting footage and armies of online supporters around the world eagerly shared content echoing their side’s view.

The information war peaked with the Gaza hospital explosion. Within minutes of the blast, Hamas blamed an Israeli airstrike for the carnage, while Israel insisted a misfired Palestinian rocket was to blame. Social media lit up with competing claims long before any evidence emerged. “False assertions flew on the internet,” demonstrating how each side weaponized unverified information (later evidence pointed to a failed militant rocket, but by then each narrative had hardened). This episode epitomized “Truth Decay”—the collapse of shared facts as partisans embraced whatever fit their narrative.

As these narratives battled, governments felt the pressure. The mounting civilian toll in Gaza and the global outcry forced Israel’s allies to grapple with public demands for ceasefires or restraint. Western leaders supportive of Israel faced protests at home, prompting some to soften their stance. In international forums, debates often mirrored the dueling narratives seen online. Even firm alliances strained under public opinion. The Israel–Gaza war showed that controlling the story is now integral to war. Military operations ran hand-in-hand with messaging. And as chants of “Stop bombing Gaza” or “Stand with Israel” echoed worldwide, it became clear that public sentiment can sway diplomatic calculations—sometimes pushing leaders toward de-escalation.

Iran: The Public Diplomacy of Resistance

Iran demonstrates how a narrative campaign can be waged outside of active battle to build influence. Tehran’s theocratic regime uses public diplomacy as a strategic tool to shape regional opinion. It leans on a “menu of narratives” that appeal to Arab and Muslim sensibilities—anti-imperialism, Islamic unity, and support for the Palestinian cause. By casting itself as the champion of the oppressed and the chief opponent of U.S. and Israeli aggression, Iran seeks to win hearts and minds across the Middle East.

Tehran propagates its message through state-controlled media and cultural outreach. International outlets like Press TV (English) and Al-Alam (Arabic) broadcast Iran’s perspective globally, countering Western narratives. By using media as a diplomatic tool, Iran aims to shape its image and build sympathy abroad. 

The regime also runs cultural and religious programs—from conferences to schools—to reinforce its “resistance” narrative. On social media, Iranian leaders speak directly to foreign publics: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei operates official X accounts in multiple languages to spread his message internationally. Meanwhile, Tehran’s cyber proxies wage covert influence campaigns: investigators found Iranian-run accounts masquerading as locals online to push anti-Saudi and anti-Israel propaganda.

This narrative offensive has helped Iran punch above its weight. By hammering themes of Muslim solidarity and Western perfidy, Iran has stirred sympathy among segments of the Arab public. U.S. analysts admit that while Washington focused on sanctions and military pressure, Iran was busy winning the war on the Arab street. The United States effectively “ceded the battleground of public diplomacy,” one report concluded, allowing Iran’s narrative to go unchallenged. Thus, when Iran backs proxy militias in places like Lebanon or Iraq, it often frames that support not as interference but as solidarity in a common struggle—an image that resonates with many. By mastering the narrative, Tehran has managed to expand its influence even under sanctions and isolation, wielding soft power where hard power cannot openly go.

The New Battlefield of Narratives

In a hyper-connected age, the narrative battlefield is nearly as crucial as the physical battlefield. Alliances form or fray based on the stories that dominate social media and television. Leaders must recognize that a viral tweet or image can sway international action faster than diplomatic cables. But this new reality also means misinformation can cause chaos like a missile strike. With every smartphone a potential broadcast, truth and propaganda often blur. The challenge is to counter falsehoods even as we harness communication for good. As one commentator noted, engaging with the media can “contribute to a successful peacemaking process” and should not be overlooked by policymakers.

The cases of Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran show that public communication is now a critical front. A compelling narrative can rally supporters or pressure governments more than any negotiation. Ultimately, who prevails in a war may hinge on whose story the world believes. The pen and the camera have become mighty weapons – and wielding them effectively could help shape a peaceful future.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Address by President of the Republic of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

On January 21st, 2025, Israel Defense Forces launched a major military raid on Jenin in the occupied West Bank entitled “Operation Iron Wall”. The Israeli military operations have since expanded to other areas of the West Bank, including the towns of Tulkarm, Nablus and Tubas. According to The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), at least 40,000 Palestinians have been displaced since the beginning of these attacks, which largely target refugee camps. This is the bloodiest assault on the West Bank since being formally occupied by Israel in 1967. 

Operation Iron Wall marks the first time the Palestine Authority (PA)—the Fatah-led governing body of the West Bank—fights alongside IDF forces in their assaults on Palestinian cities, killing many unarmed civilians and even journalists. Twenty years after coming to power, the aging Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the PA, faces growing criticism for this collaboration. The West Bank is facing an existential dilemma: either fight one of the most heavily funded militaries in the world or become completely annexed by its occupier, and the Palestine Authority openly engaging in treacherous behavior against its own people may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.

In 1958, 10 years following the creation of the state of Israel, which saw the violent displacement of over 750,000 Palestinians and the loss of nearly 80% of Palestinian land in what is called the “Nakba” (“catastrophe”), a group of Palestinian intellectuals who lived in surrounding Arab states formed the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Ḥarakat at-Taḥrīr al-Waṭanī l-Filasṭīnī), known as Fatah (“Victory”). Many of the founders of Fatah were originally from the Gaza Strip and were made refugees in their own homeland. The movement called on Palestinians of differing political backgrounds to unite and “organize a vanguard that would rise above factionalism, whims and leanings to include the entire people.” A core tenet of the movement stated that armed struggle would be necessary to ensure the total liberation of Palestine, with the writings of Frantz Fanon and historical achievements in Algeria and Vietnam drawing inspiration. 

In Cairo 1964, a coalition consisting of leaders in Arab governments across the Middle East and North Africa formed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO initially enjoyed greater legitimacy in the Arab world than Fatah in regards to the Palestine Question because it represented pan-Arab unity. Unlike Fatah, the PLO did not see armed struggle as the appropriate solution to the Palestine Question. This is in alignment with the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who also did not agree that it was the right time for Palestinian forces to take up arms and fight against Israeli forces. Some scholars like Ilan Pappé argue that Nasser “miscalculated Israel’s reaction” to Palestine, failing to predict Israel launching an offensive against neighboring Arab states in the Six-Day war, leading to the occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula.

Following 1967, Fatah and other Palestinian armed groups like the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) would conduct operations targeting Israeli military outposts. A battle in 1968 in the town of al-Karama in Jordan saw Palestinian forces “[inflict] relatively heavy losses on the Israelis,” leading to a surge in support for Fatah among Palestinian civilians. The following year, Fatah would gain the majority of seats within the Palestine National Council (PNC), the governing body of the PLO. As a result, Yasser Arafat, co-founder of Fatah and son of two Palestinians from Gaza City, would become the leader of the PLO. Arafat would become the face of the movement for Palestinian liberation on the global stage, and he would openly meet with many non-aligned and communist leaders to gain support for the Palestinian cause. Although once a strong believer in the necessity for armed struggle to solve the Palestine Question, Arafat would also make pleas for peace in the international arena. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1974, Arafat would famously say, “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”

Following the end of the First Intifada, the Israeli government and the PLO would sign two agreements known as the Oslo Accords, which created the Palestine Authority as the governing body of the Palestinian territories. Arafat, head of the PLO and Fatah, would become its first president. Mahmoud Abbas would become the second and current president of the PA following Arafat’s death in 2004. The defining image of this so-called “peace process” would see Prime Minister of Israel Yitzak Rabin and Yasser Arafat shaking hands at the White House in 1993. On paper, the Oslo Accords were meant to normalize relations between Israelis and Palestinians and lead to a last peace. However, in the thirty years since the initial signing of these accords, many scholars see Oslo as a failure. Political scientist Khaled Elgindy argues that the Oslo Accords did not address the “uniquely asymmetrical” relations between Israelis and Palestinians as “as occupier and occupied”. Historically, Oslo reflects a growing trend of Arab normalization of Israel, seen as recently as 2020 with the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE. 

Now, twenty years since his ascension to power, Mahmoud Abbas faces a political dilemma. In a December 2023 interview, Yasser Arafat’s nephew would state that Abbas’ rule over the West Bank must end, claiming that “85% of Palestinians want Mister Abbas to resign.” Even before Israeli tanks rolled into Jenin at the beginning of this year, there was increased violence against Palestinians in the West Bank perpetrated by PA forces. On December 14th, 2024, PA forces launched an assault on Jenin refugee camp, claiming that militant groups were attempting to spark an uprising. The assault would last over forty days, and 21-year old journalist Shatha al-Sabbagh was killed by the PA. Many journalistic organizations covering violence in the West Bank condemned the killing, but the PA cracked down on coverage of its assault, leading to Al Jazeera’s digital platforms being temporarily banned. Unfortunately, the current collaboration between Israel Defense Forces and Palestine Authority forces is nothing new for Palestinians in the West Bank.The history of the Palestinian liberation movement both inside and outside of Palestine is one marked with both collaboration and betrayal. The Palestinians in the West Bank are staring down a bleak future due to not only the occupation of their land but now their own government. Rhetoric coming from the United States does not bode much better, as Donald Trump’s Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, recognizes the West Bank as part of a greater Israeli state. Palestinans must live without the threat of displacement or death in their own homeland. As it stands now, the Palestine Authority stands in direct opposition to its founding principles in allowing for such a reality to happen.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “People Demonstration in Palestine,” by Mohammed Abubakr, Image source from Pexels | CC License, no changes made

Since Hamas’ attacks against Israel on October 7, and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza, London has been deeply affected. Grief, anger, and pain permeate the city which so many Muslims and Jews call their home. It has also shaken the British political system to its core, with both major parties divided, and asked questions about the UK’s role as a bystander to the horrors.

Underlying Tensions

The leaves have fallen in London, and half-forgotten Christmas lights still hang from the branches of the skeletal trees lining my street. The crisp, cold air and hustle-and-bustle of  tourists could seem a long way from the humanitarian disaster currently unfolding in the Middle East. However, there are small signs everywhere of its heavy presence: if you look closely at the bus stop, you’ll see posters calling for the return of Israeli hostages taken by Hamas, and if you stop under a lamppost, you’re likely to spot a ‘Free Palestine’ sticker or hastily scrawled graffiti. 

My corner of North London is a true melting pot; I am a stone’s throw from the North London Mosque as well as several large Hasidic Jewish communities. In some ways, the UK’s position in this conflict feels distinctly distant. The country is a former colonial power whose history of self-interest, broken promises, and blind drawing of borders is often cited as a cause of the conflict. Understandably, many no longer care what we have to say. On the other hand, it is deeply present — communities here are closely tied to the events happening in this conflict, and there is palpable tension. 

From Fear to Rage

The conflict is not just visible in posters and graffiti, but also in the treatment of individuals. At a Tube station recently, I witnessed a Hasidic Jew being harassed by a group of young men shouting “Palestine will be free.” When I asked him if he was alright, he smiled tiredly and said, “It’s okay, I’ve got used to it.” This is reflected in crime statistics: The Metropolitan Police say that there has been a 1,350% increase in hate crimes targeting Jewish people and that Islamophobic hate crimes are up 140%. London is a vibrant, multicultural, and multireligious city, but many now live with fear and anxiety about showing their faith.

This fear has also turned to anger. There have been regular protests in Central London calling for a ceasefire, with over 300,000 attending one march that took place on November 11. This provoked an angry counter-protest from the far right, with over one hundred arrested for aggressive and threatening behavior. In this way, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has become a new battleground for the ongoing culture wars in the UK, with violence on the streets of London indicative of the rising animosity. 

Politics Upturned 

These new divisions challenge the old Left-Right divide. Both of the UK’s major political parties, Labour and the Conservatives, struggle to know how to handle the crises and face internal discord. The divisive Conservative former Home Secretary, Suella Braverman, was forced to resign after calling those attending ceasefire protests “hate marchers.” Senior Labour Party opposition politicians have had to leave their positions after voting in favor of the UK calling for a ceasefire. Even more confusingly, the far-right is now marching in defense of Jews and is disrupting Remembrance Day events honoring veterans. This degree of polarization and anger, which too often descends into hatred and prejudice, is very dangerous. 

Social media activism has also played a role in this trend. Sites have seen a massive increase in infographics, tweets, and images relating to the conflict. Although messaging can be a helpful and heartfelt way of raising awareness of the suffering and gathering funds to alleviate it, social media can also be highly reductionist, extreme, and misinformation-laden. And oftentimes, it is those living relatively privileged lives in Western states whose posts are the most divisive and antagonistic. This turns social media, which can be a force for good, into a forum of blind rage and attacks. The reality is that this is a hugely complex conflict steeped in a long history that touches countless people’s lives. For this reason, now is a time for tact, understanding, and sensitivity. 

Sound and Fury

Unfortunately, politicians do not seem to understand this. Government and elected politicians can and should condemn both Hamas’s attacks and the nature of the Israeli response. Criticism of the way Israel is conducting its war does not necessarily equate to criticism of Israel as a state, Israelis as a people, or anti-Semitism. Equally, recognizing the horror of Hamas’ attack does not mean a lack of support for the Palestinian cause or a justification for the intensity of Israeli military violence. People are intelligent enough to hold these different ideas in their minds and to see that they are not all mutually exclusive. We need sensitivity and an understanding of how deeply and emotionally invested so many people worldwide are in this conflict, including in London. Empathy is vital. Politicians and the wider public have to understand the position of Jews in Britain and elsewhere, as well as the pressing and understandable fears they have. They also have to understand the generations of pain and suffering that the Palestinian people have faced and how that resonates with Arabs, Muslims, and many others worldwide.

Instead, politicians have sought to use the conflict to serve their interests. Most obviously, Suella Braverman used it as a way to appeal to right-wing voters by accusing the police of showing favorable treatment to pro-Palestinian protesters. This dangerous and wholly unfounded accusation of bias was done purely to help rile up her base as she potentially eyes up the leadership of the Conservative Party. The Labour leader, Keir Starmer, and his senior team have been too nervous about losing their lead in opinion polls to make a clear statement. Instead, they have either refused to answer or bluntly asserted Israel’s right to self-defense without thoroughly condemning its war crimes. 

Political Silence

Most worryingly, the British Prime Minister has offered very little in response to the conflict. Rishi Sunak has maintained Britain’s “unequivocal support” for Israel while calling for “specific pauses” in the fighting and urging Israel to try to avoid killing civilians. This shows that Britian’s politicians are unwilling to stand up and offer either a critical voice on foreign affairs or reassurances at home. Tensions and rising enmity must be cooled, and we should start listening to each other and engaging in dialogue. Instead, most senior British politicians are undertaking a different strategy — they are largely silent, offering little leadership or visible compassion to all those suffering in the UK and abroad.

This is a reflection of modern Britain on the international stage. The post-Brexit promise was of a new “Global Britain,”one that would be deeply engaged in foreign affairs. This is yet to be fulfilled. Instead, the nation’s confidence has been knocked, and politicians no longer know where the country stands. Of course, the UK must recognize its limited power to influence the conflict in the Middle East, but nevertheless, it has a responsibility to help push for peace. Perhaps the country could finally live up to its fantasies by playing the “wise, elder statesman” role and leading the calls for a ceasefire and peace talks. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has now taken that stand, and it’s about time Britain followed suit. An end to the fighting is in nearly everyone’s long-term interests.

Fighting the Flames

At the moment, London feels like a tinderbox; the tensions, anger, and anxiety are simply waiting for a spark. Politicians have a responsibility to help combat this. Rhetoric has to be cooled, and politicians should talk honestly and empathetically to help bring communities back together. They should also have the moral courage to take a stand on the international stage. London’s multiculturalism and diversity is what makes it great, and our leaders should celebrate and defend this to ensure the city remains a safe place for Jews, Muslims, and everyone else who calls it home.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Bring Them Home” demonstration on Parliament Square supporting Israel after the Hamas massacre in the south of Israel, uploaded Oct 15, 2023 | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons

Historical Background

Think of someone you disagree with the most — maybe you have even scuffled once or twice — and now you two must sit in a room together and agree on something. Even if you do succeed, how easily could this agreement be broken? That is the story of Israel and Lebanon.

However, the two countries have had cordial relations in the past. In 1949, Lebanon was the first Arab League country to sign an armistice agreement with Israel after the War of Independence. Lebanon did not take part in the Six-Day War in 1967 or the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Furthermore, the Lebanon-Israel border was peaceful until the early 1970s. The initial relations between the two were friendly, with Israeli students studying at the American University in Beirut and Zionists and Maronites working together to build their power against the Arab-Muslim world.

During World War II, Lebanese Zionism weakened due to French and British occupation of the country, which boosted the pro-Arab camp led by Bechara El Khoury. This camp believed peace was preferable to conflict between Arabism and Islam. In 1943, Lebanon gained independence, and El Khoury was elected president, leading to a negative popular attitude towards Israel in the years to follow. After Israel’s declaration of independence, Arab countries declared war and prepared forces to fight, but Lebanon, under El Khoury, only declared itself a belligerent instead of invading. Lebanon helped Arab armies and the Salvation Army in the south, as per the partition plan, which would share most of Lebanon’s southern border with an Arab country.

The armistice agreement between Lebanon and Israel didn’t specify the international border and relied on the border established during the British and French mandates in Syria and Lebanon. Israel conquered 14 villages and occupied Rosh HaNikra in Lebanon, but the Jewish population in Lebanon still grew after the establishment of Israel, unlike in other Arab countries.

In 1970, after the events of Black September, Palestinian terror groups established themselves in southern Lebanon, taking advantage of the weak Lebanese government, and carried out attacks on northern Israel.^[1] They also participated in the 1975 Lebanese civil war. To secure access to Beirut’s banks and port, Syria invaded Lebanon to stop the fighting and first targeted Palestinians, but later turned against Christians.^[2] In 1978, after a Palestinian attack on Israel, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) forces occupied southern Lebanon in Operation Litani. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was deployed to mediate between the terror groups and Israel, and IDF withdrew. The terror groups then obtained Katyusha rockets and 130 millimeter cannons, which they used to attack Israeli civilians.^[3]

1982 Lebanon War (Also known as “The 1^st Lebanon War” and/or “The Invasion”)

In the four years since the occupation of southern Lebanon, the terrorist organizations attacked Israeli citizens. These attacks ultimately led to the first Lebanon war in 1982, resulting in the expulsion of the PLO from southern Lebanon to Tunis, destruction of its infrastructure, and seizure of weapons by the IDF. The war also gave rise to the Iranian and Syrian backed Shiite organization, Hezbollah, in Lebanon, with the goal of violent resistance against the Israeli occupation.^[4]

On May 17, 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed the May 17 Agreement, which aimed to end hostilities and regulate relations between the countries while respecting each other’s territorial borders. The agreement called for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and a Lebanese commitment to prevent terror acts on its soil.^[5] However, the agreement was violated in February 1984 due to the breakdown of the Lebanese army, Syria’s refusal to withdraw forces, and Arab opposition to recognizing Israel. As a result, the Lebanese government cancelled the agreement on March 5, 1984.^[6]

Post-War Period and the 2006 Lebanon War (Also known as ”The 2nd Lebanon War” /“The July War”)

In the 1990s, Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon led to growing dissatisfaction, leading to a complete withdrawal of IDF forces on May 24, 2000. This ended 22 years of occupation.^[7] The SLA collapsed, and 6,000 members and their families fled.^[8] With the withdrawal of Israeli forces, calls for a review of the presence of Syrian forces, estimated at 25,000, increased.^[9]

After the withdrawal, terror attacks against Israeli citizens resumed with the Second Intifada, a violent Palestinian uprising that escalated the conflict to a level not seen in decades, causing thousands of casualties on both sides.^[10] On October 7, 2000, Hezbollah kidnapped three soldiers and Elhanan Tannenbaum was lured to Dubai and kidnapped.^[11] In 2004, Ariel Sharon released 400 prisoners in exchange for Tannenbaum and the bodies of the soldiers which inspired further attempts to kidnap IDF soldiers as bargaining chips.^[12] On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah attacked IDF vehicles, kidnapped two soldiers (Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev), thus sparking the Second Lebanon War.^[13] Since then, there have been no major conflicts due to Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, siding with Bashar-El-Assad.

Maritime Border Dispute Background

The Israel-Lebanon maritime border negotiations began on Oct 14, 2020, and led to the first agreement negotiated between the two countries since 1983.[14] The agreement defined the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone and territorial waters, preserving the eastern five kilometers (the “buoyed line”) status until the land border is settled. The prior dispute between Lebanon and Israel centered around the maritime border location, both claiming exclusive economic rights to a 330 square kilometer triangular buffer zone and claiming natural gas reserves.[15]

The 1982 Law of the Sea defines territorial waters as 22 kilometers from the coastline.[16] The maritime area north of Rosh HaNikra, Israel’s northernmost coastal town, is Lebanese territory, while the same area south of it is Israeli territory. An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) allows a state to use natural resources such as gas, oil, and energy production up to 200 nautical miles from the coastline.[17] The dispute between Israel and Lebanon concerned the size of the angle along which the border line would extend from the edge of their temporary land border into the sea, mainly impacting the area of economic waters.

In 2007, Lebanon and Cyprus signed a maritime agreement that had six provisions, but it wasn’t submitted to the UN or made official. The southernmost point in the agreement was stated to be subject to change. In 2010, Israel signed a similar agreement with Cyprus that marked the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon starting at the aforementioned point. However, Lebanon disagreed and submitted a proposal to the UN, which included an 860 square kilometer strip more than what Israel proposed.[18] This difference in opinion arose as Lebanon believed the border should be determined according to the Law of the Sea, not Israel’s agreement with Cyprus. Both Israel and Lebanon submitted their versions to the UN in 2011 but could not reach a compromise from 2011 to 2021.

The dispute over the maritime boundary between Lebanon and Israel has been reignited due to the discovery of natural gas reserves in Israel, as well as Lebanon’s energy crisis. The negotiations were conducted indirectly and took place at the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, following three years of preparation and amidst various crises in Lebanon, including the explosion in Beirut’s port, the economic crisis, and ongoing protests.

Determining Maritime Borders

The determination of a maritime boundary involves considering several factors, and there are three recognized methods for doing so. The first method involves projecting a perpendicular line (90 degrees) from the coastline.[19] In 2000, Israel adopted this method unilaterally and established a 5 kilometer-long line of yellow buoys protected by the Navy.

The second method, adopted by the UN to represent the Lebanese position, involves continuing the land border line into the sea. However, this created a triangle of disagreement because the westernmost section of the land line turned west at 270 degrees.[20]

The third method, known as the “median method,” was proposed by the United States during its mediation efforts between Israel and Lebanon. This method is based on drawing a median line between the two countries, where each point has an equivalent value from the nearest points on the lines of origin. This method is preferred according to international law but can result in slight differences in measurement.[21] The dispute between Israel and Lebanon over the location of this line resulted in a much smaller triangle of disagreement compared to the first method, as both parties agreed to adopt the median method years before reaching an agreement in 2022.

The Negotiation

In the maritime border negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, General Joseph Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese army, initially demanded an additional 1,430 square kilometers of the economic waters of Israel.[22] This demand was based on the continuation of the border marked between Great Britain and France in the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement of 1923.[23] This claim of ownership would include the Karish gas field, which is owned by Energean. Israel refused to negotiate over areas south of the disputed area.

After three rounds of negotiations in November 2020, the talks were halted. After a period of inactivity, the Lebanese government announced in April 2021 that they were annexing all of the disputed territories, despite Israel’s opposition.[24] Two weeks later, negotiations resumed, but they were stopped again in May 2021 due to a conflict between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip.

After several months, the negotiations resumed in January 2022 with the appointment of a new American mediator, Amos Hochstein. Hochstein believed that there was a window of opportunity until the elections in Lebanon in May 2022, and he worked towards finding a solution. However, the emergence of the Karish rig, a natural gas platform located off the coast of Israel, and Hezbollah’s launch of drones towards the rig which were intercepted by the IDF, reignited the tension.[25] Nonetheless, Israel maintained its stance that gas production from Karish would commence regardless of the negotiations.

The American mediator’s proposal in September 2022, which attempted to resolve the dispute over the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon, sparked renewed hope for a resolution. After several rounds of discussions, both parties agreed to several key points in principle. During the UN General Assembly meeting, American mediators held separate discussions with both sides and presented an outline for marking the maritime border. The outline was eventually presented in a final version, which determined the “buoyed line” as the beginning of the border and its continuation based on line 23 proposed in 2010 at the UN. This agreement was deemed permanent and marked the end of the conflict over the disputed maritime area. The agreement also regulated the development of cross-border gas reservoirs in the area and ensured that any future disputes would be resolved with US assistance. An international corporation was designated to be responsible for paying Israel for its share of the reservoir, with strict requirements to ensure that the corporation would not be subject to international sanctions, harm US aid, or be an Israeli or Lebanese corporation.

On October 27, 2022, the then President of Lebanon Michel Aoun, and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, signed an agreement on the disputed maritime border between their countries. The agreement, presented by American mediator Amos Hochstein, was signed at a ceremony at the UN base in Naqoura and officially submitted to the United Nations.[26]

Winter is coming!

The demand for natural gas worldwide has risen, particularly in Europe. The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused a global supply shortage, as Russia is a major natural gas exporter and accounts for almost 45% of the natural gas imported to Europe.[27] The shortage of natural gas in Europe has become severe, with only 74% of working gas in storage, compared to 94% the previous year.[28] Europeans need to heat their homes during cold winters, but as they phase out coal, there is a higher demand for natural gas, which combined with a shortage has caused a surge in prices. If Israel and Lebanon start extracting and producing energy from Lebanese the Qana and Karish gas fields, they have the potential to resolve the energy shortage in Europe and make significant financial gains.

For Israel, the agreement and safe development of the Karish field could reinforce its position as a clean energy leader, as it already has an estimated 1,000 BCM of natural gas.[29]

In Lebanon, the financial aspect of the agreement is crucial. The country is in the fourth year of an economic crisis with no end in sight. GDP has dropped to $20.5 billion in 2021 from $55 billion in 2018; the Lebanese pound has lost 95% of its value, causing prices to soar and destroying purchasing power; 80% of the population is now considered poor; and banks have frozen depositors out of dollar accounts. The government estimates financial losses at $70 billion, expected to increase if the crisis goes unaddressed. Many Lebanese people, including doctors, have emigrated in what has become the largest exodus since the civil war. Hospitals are operating at 50% capacity and 40% of doctors and 30% of nurses have emigrated or are working part-time abroad. Shortages in power and fuel, along with soaring prices, have made daily life difficult.^[30] The Sidon-Qana gas field, which belongs to Lebanon, could contain up to 100 BCM, making this agreement to develop clean energy and export natural gas potentially transformative for the economy. ^[31]

Political Instability

Both Israel and Lebanon face political instability which may hinder the implementation of the natural gas exploration agreement. Israel has had recent political turmoil with five elections, three different prime ministers, and an indictment against a former prime minister. Despite being politically powerful, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to form a government, leading to a coalition of smaller parties opposing him. The then elected Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, served a two-year term rotating with another six-month term served by Yair Lapid. Since then, the situation in Israel, with the newly proposed judicial reform, has deteriorated and reached an extreme point as demonstrations are held on a biweekly basis and disrupt the peaceful day-to-day of Israeli citizens.[32]

The situation in Israel regarding the Maritime Border Agreement signed by former Prime Minister Lapid has become uncertain with the election of Netanyahu as Prime Minister. Upon the signing of the agreement, Netanyahu expressed his concern by calling it a “historic surrender.” And claimed it will be “neutralized.” This raises concerns about the future of the agreement and its implementation under Netanyahu’s leadership.[33]

In Lebanon, the political climate is more uncertain and could pose a risk to the implementation of the Maritime Border Agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon. The former President, Michel Aoun, resigned and the country has yet to elect a new President after multiple rounds of elections.[34] Members of the parliament have expressed concerns and criticism about the agreement, and the identity of the elected officials could also pose a threat to its implementation. The political instability in Lebanon adds to the uncertainty about the future of the agreement and its successful implementation.

Lebanese journalist Mohamad Barakat claims that this is a normalization agreement for Hezbollah:

“If any of us dare express criticism that is deemed out of place by someone, we would be immediately blamed for cooperation with the enemy, but that does not stop them [Hezbollah] from making a deal with the Israelis. This is the height of audacity; one side is making an agreement with Israel while accusing other people of cooperation.”[35]

Paula Yacoubian, former journalist and TV host and a current member of the Lebanese parliament, is a main critic of the deal. Yacoubian claims that it is her country’s defeat, and that the agreement must be submitted to parliament for approval, as follows:

“The Israelis received the treasury, and we were left with a lottery ticket… Today, instead of Lebanon examining how to receive compensation from the Karish gas field, we are those who must provide compensation from the Qana field…. This is due to this weak deal. We do not know for certain what there is in Qana, compared to Karish in which there is definitely gas. What we will receive according to the agreement, is unknown and unsure… This agreement is a deal made by someone who has been defeated, the reality of fixing the maritime border is a bitter one.”[36]

Samy Gemayel, a Christian parliament member in Lebanon and a known critic of Hezbollah, expressed agreement with the need to establish a clear border between Lebanon and Israel through the Maritime Border Agreement. However, he mentioned that the timing of the agreement was convenient for Hezbollah and expressed his intention to help the government not fulfill its obligations derived from the agreement.[37]

Conclusion

The Maritime Border Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, signed on October 27, 2022, is a significant diplomatic and economic achievement, but its implementation is facing numerous obstacles. Political instability and uncertainty in both countries, as well as opposition from some parliament members, could pose threats to its success. It may live up to its potential, surpassing previous agreements in its success. However, given the historically financial irrationality that which characterizes the tense and emotional relationship between the two nations, and the unstable political leadership on both sides, you can count me among the sceptics.

[1] Black September (also known as the Jordanian Civil War) is a nickname for the struggle that took place between the Jordanian army and Palestinian organizations (which were organized in the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO), from September 1970 to July 1971.; Fisk, Robert. 2002. Pity the Nation : The Abduction of Lebanon. New York Thunder Mouth Press. p. 74.

[2] Carter, Terry, Lara Dunston, and Andrew Humphreys. 2004. Syria & Lebanon. Footscray, Victoria ; Oakland, Ca: Lonely Planet Publications. p. 31.

[3] Cooley, John K. 1984. “The War over Water.” Foreign Policy, no. 54:3.

[4] Robinson, Kali. 2022. “What Is Hezbollah?” Council on Foreign Relations. May 25, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah

[5] Kelly, James. 1983. “A House Divided.” Time. August 8, 1983. https://web.archive.org/web/20070930093214/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,955173-1,00.html

[6] Database, E. C. F. n.d. “Israel-Lebanon Treaty (1983).” https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/183

[7]Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain. 2000. “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?: Israel and Lebanon after the Withdrawal.” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3. September 2000, p. 17. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria00_eil01.html

[8] Id. P. 24.

[9] Id. P. 26.

[10] Pressman, Jeremy “The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”. Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (2003) : 114–141. https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/jcs/2003-v23-n2-jcs23_2/jcs23_2art07/

[11] The International Coalition of Missing Israeli Soldiers. http://www.mia.org.il/tannenbaum.html

[12] “Mid-East Prisoners Welcomed Home,” News.bbc.co.uk. January 29, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3442719.stm

[13] “Israel/Lebanon: Hizbullah’s Attacks on Northern Israel.” 2006. Amnesty International. September 13, 2006. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mde020252006en.pdf

[14] Stocker, James P. 2020. “Putting out to Sea: What the History of Lebanese-Israeli Negotiations Can Tell Us about Current Negotiations over a Maritime Boundary.” War on the Rocks. November 13, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/putting-out-to-sea-what-the-history-of-lebanese-israeli-negotiations-can-tell-us-about-current-negotiations-over-a-maritime-boundary/

[15] Henderson, Simon. 2021. “Lines in the Sea: The Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Dispute.” The Washington Institute. May 3, 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lines-sea-israel-lebanon-maritime-border-dispute

[16]  Churchill, R. R.. “Law of the Sea.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 11, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Law-of-the-Sea

[17] Metych, M.. “exclusive economic zone.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 25, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/exclusive-economic-zone

[18] “Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation.” 2012. MEES. September 28, 2012. https://www.mees.com/2012/9/28/op-ed-documents/cyprus-lebanon-cyprus-israel-offshore-delimitation/f994d750-6d1a-11e7-9675-d5a0b0510107

[19] United Nations. Division For Ocean Affairs And The Law Of The Sea. 2000. Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries. P.56. New York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/publicationstexts/Handbook%20on%20the%20delimitation%20of%20maritime%20boundaries_Eng.pdf

[20] Id, p. 57.

[21] Id, p. 47.

[22] Haboush, Joseph. 2022. “Lebanon, Israel ‘Narrowing Gaps’ towards Deal on Maritime Border: US Diplomat.” Al Arabiya English. February 9, 2022. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2022/02/10/Lebanon-Israel-narrowing-gaps-towards-deal-on-maritime-border-US-diplomat

[23] League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 22, N°565, pp. 363-373. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2022/v22.pdf

[24] Zaken, Danny. 2021. “Israel and Lebanon to Resume Maritime Border Talks – Report.” Globes, April 29, 2021, sec. News. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-israel-lebanon-to-resume-maritime-border-talks-report-1001369332#!

[25] Orna Mizrahi, Yoram Schwietzer, David Siman-Tov, “Launching Drones at the Karish Gas Field: Hezbollah’s Message to Israel and to the Lebanese”, The Institute for National Security Studies, July 3, 2022. https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/launching-drones-at-the-karish-gas-field-hezbollahs-message-to-israel-and-to-the-lebanese/

[26] Staff, ToI, and AFP. 2022. “‘A New Era’: At Border Ceremony without Handshakes, Israel-Lebanon Deal Takes Effect.” Times of Israel, October 27, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-border-ceremony-without-handshakes-israel-lebanon-agreement-goes-into-effect/#:~:text=Israel%20and%20Lebanon’s%20landmark%20maritime,by%20the%20Hezbollah%20terror%20group.

[27] Yuksel, Firdevs, “All Eyes Turn to Russia’s Share of EU’s Gas Imports.” Anadolu Agency, July 29, 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/all-eyes-turn-to-russias-share-of-eus-gas-imports/2647905

[28] “Why Is There an Energy Crisis in Europe?” Euronews. February 3, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/2022/02/03/europe-s-energy-crisis-why-are-natural-gas-prices-soaring-and-how-will-it-affect-europeans#:~:text=A%20record%2Dhigh%20increase%20in,841)%20a%20year%20from%20April.

[29] Karish, Energean Official Website. https://www.energean.com/operations/israel/karish/?__cf_chl_tk=qsppgPwOROw3BhGs3EYs_QxtM9718UrhpJs9Z6N_pao-1680894974-0-gaNycGzNClA

[30] “Factbox: Just How Bad Is Lebanon’s Economic Crisis?” Reuters, September 14, 2022, sec. Middle East. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/just-how-bad-is-lebanons-economic-crisis-2022-09-14/#:~:text=*%20Gross%20domestic%20product%20plunged%20to,in%20the%20import%2Ddependent%20country.

[31] According to the agreement, Israel is entitled to 17% of profits from the Sidon-Qana gas field; Danny Zaken, “”Sidon-Qana gas field could contain 100BCM”, Globes, October 28, 2022. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-sidon-qana-gas-field-could-contain-100-bcm-1001428180#:~:text=If%20the%20Sidon%2DQana%20field,(at%20least%20470%20BCM).

[32] “Israel’s political instability is putting the nation in danger – editorial”, The Jerusalem Post, September 13, 2022 – https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-716983; Natasha Turak, ‘”Huge Uncertainty’ for investors and economy as Israel’s government pushes for controversial reforms”, CNBC, March 1, 2023. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/01/israel-judicial-reforms-protests-against-netanyahu-risks-to-economy.html

[33] “Netanyahu wants to neutralize maritime border agreement with Lebanon”, The Cradle, October 31, 2022. https://thecradle.co/article-view/17614

[34] Mustafa Fahs, “Lebanon, Filling the Vacuum to Suit the Clique”, Asharq Al-Awsat March 10, 2023 – https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4204226/mustafa-fahs/lebanon-filling-vacuum-suit-clique; Patricia Karam, “A New Model for Presidential Elections in Lebanon”, Arab Center Washington DC, March 9^th, 2023. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-new-model-for-presidential-elections-in-lebanon/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Lebanese%20Constitution,simple%20majority%20in%20subsequent%20rounds.

[35] Daniel Salami, “Critics in Lebanon Say Hezbollah recognizes Israel by acknowledging maritime deal”, Ynet News October  13, 2022. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/rkmj11qsqj

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

Recent coverage of Israel and Palestine has focused on the new Netanyahu government’s efforts to weaken Israel’s supreme court, expand settlements in the West Bank, and strengthen the country’s far-right. But developments in Palestinian leadership are equally important. With an 88-year-old Mahmoud Abbas at its head, the Palestinian Authority (PA), the primary governing body in Palestinian territory, faces a looming succession crisis. Moreover, the PA’s authority has gradually declined as Israeli territorial intrusions have weakened its sovereignty and as poor economic conditions have simultaneously bankrupted the PA and increased poverty in the West Bank.

Growing discontent has led to the creation of various armed splinter groups such as the Lions’ Den and Jenin Brigades—just as they appeared during the Second Intifada, a Palestinian mass resistance movement against Israel that took place between 2000 and 2005. These developments are extremely dangerous as informal, decentralized groups performing isolated acts of violence could lead to further escalation with Israel—a problem that cannot be deterred by Israeli-PA security agreements that would ordinarily limit such violence. As an increasingly splintered PA meets an increasingly centralized Israel, there is no telling when the next major escalation will arrive.

In the Lions’ Den

On February 22, 2023, Israeli security forces entered the ancient city of Nablus in the northern West Bank, planning to arrest members of an armed Palestinian group known as the Lions’ Den, which vigorously opposes Israeli occupation. Soon after Israeli officials entered the city, three individuals fired gunshots at them. A four-hour-long gunfight commenced. By the end of the carnage, eleven Palestinians had been killed, and over one hundred were injured.[i] In an apparent response to the raid, six rockets were fired at Israel from Gaza, to which Israel retaliated with missile strikes directed at the Gaza Strip.[ii]

Raids of this kind have become commonplace in the West Bank—and they have become increasingly linked to cycles of violence and escalation. Consider an eerily similar Israeli army raid just four months earlier in the same city. On August 9, 2022, Israeli forces entered Nablus and killed Ibrahim al-Nabulsi, a well-known Palestinian resistance fighter known to locals as the “lion of Nablus.” Ibrahim al-Nabulsi had co-founded the Lions’ Den with three other men—all of whom have since been killed.[iii] But the organization has grown rapidly in spite of Ibrahim al-Nabulsi’s death. The Lions’ Den now consists of Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and Hamas members, and they have often engaged in armed gunfights with Israeli forces.[iv] Since Ibrahim al-Nabulsi’s death, militants have converted his safe house into a shrine, considering him a martyr for the Palestinian cause.[v] The organization has gained a significant following on social media. After his death, TikTok erupted with tributes to “the lion of Nablus,” and the Lions’ Den soared in popularity. After being banned on TikTok, the group moved to telegram, where they have 130,000 followers.[vi]

The rapid growth of the Lions’ Den symbolizes broader discontent in the region and contextualizes the recent proliferation of violence. After the February 22nd raid, the Lions’ Den took responsibility for six of the fighters who died.[vii] But the violent emergence of splinter groups has neither been limited to the city of Nablus nor to the Lions’ Den. Other groups have emerged such as the Jenin Brigades (based in Jenin, north of Nablus), a group which has been supported by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, and Hamas.[viii] Furthermore, in the aftermath of the February 22nd raid, splinter groups have competed with each other to claim responsibility for the fighters who died.[ix]

However, West Bank settlements, land confiscation, and frequent military operations conducted by Israel are not the only causes of resentment for Palestinians living in the West Bank. Many Palestinians are simultaneously infuriated with the Palestinian Authority, the primary governing body overseeing Palestinian territories in the West Bank, which has chronically failed to protect them. 

The Old Guard 

The Palestinian Authority (PA) was created in 1994 by the Gaza-Jericho agreement. The agreement gave it “nominal control over both security-related and civilian matters in urban areas of the [Occupied Palestinian Territories] (Area A), and only civilian control over Palestinian rural areas (Area B).”[x] The rest of the territory in the West Bank is under Israeli control. With Yasser Arafat as its president in the 1990s, the PA worked collaboratively with Israel to defeat Hamas. However, when negotiations with Israel failed in 2000 at Camp David, the Second Intifada began.[xi] By 2005, after years of intense fighting, and after Yasser Arafat had died and been replaced by Mahmoud Abbas as leader of the Palestinian Authority, violence had mostly come to an end. Since the end of the Second Intifada in 2005, Mahmoud Abbas has strived to maintain security ties with Israel in order to crack down on violence committed by splinter groups.[xii] 

However, Israeli-PA security ties have largely eroded. On February 6, 2023, in response to an Israeli assault on a Jenin refugee camp, Mahmoud Abbas announced that the PA would be suspending security cooperation with Israel, an action he had taken only once before.[xiii] As of February 26, 2023, reports indicated that Israeli and PA leaders had met in Aqaba, Jordan, in the hopes of reestablishing security ties.[xiv] Israeli and PA officials also met in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt on March 19, 2023.[xv] But these attempts are insufficient for the PA to regain its legitimacy and strength. By severing cooperation with Israel, the PA risks its very existence as the United States and Israel may implement crippling retaliatory sanctions in the event of permanent separation. The government cannot maintain cooperation while preserving its domestic legitimacy either, as Palestinians are growing more and more dissatisfied with a Palestinian government that has failed to protect them.[xvi] With Israel frequently raiding areas that are ostensibly under PA control, many Palestinians are convinced that the it lacks both sovereignty and legitimacy.[xvii] Thus, whether or not Israel and the PA maintain security cooperation, it is a “lose-lose” situation for the Palestinian Authority and Abbas.[xviii]

The Palestinian Authority has experienced a dramatic decline in economic and political support. In the aftermath of the pandemic, Palestinians in the West Bank have experienced widespread food insecurity and poverty, while “economic growth and the PA’s revenues remain below potential.”[xix] Moreover, foreign aid has declined from “27 percent of GDP in 2008 to 1.8 percent in 2021.”[xx] As a result, the Palestinian Authority is “on the brink of bankruptcy.”[xxi]

Meanwhile, Palestinian citizens have grown dissatisfied with an increasingly autocratic Abbas who has prevented elections and continued cooperating (for the most part) with Israel.[xxii] The 88-year-old has not given any indication of who his successor may be, sparking fears of a possible succession crisis and PA collapse.[xxiii] These sentiments are reflected by recent polling. Foreign Affairs reported in February that “more than 70 percent of Palestinians favor the formation of armed groups such as the Lions’ Den,” reflecting a greater belief among Palestinians in young resistance fighters than in the octogenarian, Abbas-led Palestinian Authority.[xxiv] In fact, in one poll, a surprising 36 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank said they would rather be “part of Israel” than to be in lands ruled by the PA.[xxv]

Dissatisfaction with the PA helps to explain the scale of the emergence of violent splinter groups in the West Bank—groups similar to those that partook in violence during the Second Intifada. And critically, these groups show no signs of stopping. When the PA’s mayor of Nablus offered an amnesty deal with Lions’ Den members, they rejected the offer.[xxvi] Other groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, and Fatah’s Tanzim continue to plan attacks.[xxvii] Moreover, even if individual splinter groups are eradicated, the hope they give to Palestinians is more important than their numbers.[xxviii] As a result, these splinter groups introduce enormous instability into the status quo. Indeed, as noted in a recent Foreign Affairs article regarding the potential for a Third Intifada, “such splintering mirrors a problem Israel faced in the second intifada, when it could no longer trust its Palestinian partner because the PA would not, and at times could not, crack down on violence.”[xxix] Additionally, these splinter groups tend to be extremely decentralized, embracing “broad violence” and “lone wolf attacks,” a recipe for escalatory violence.[xxx]

The Third Intifada?

While a youthful rebellion against the Palestinian Authority has challenged the authority of the old guard, a right-wing, traditionalist wave has centralized power in the hands of the Netanyahu government. Many have claimed that members of Netanyahu’s government are united in their goal to “weaken Israel’s judiciary and strengthen government control over both the courts and the civil service.”[xxxi] As a result, thousands of protestors have stormed the streets of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and many other cities across Israel.[xxxii]

As this relative strengthening of the Israeli government meets the erosion of the Palestinian Authority, there is no telling the speed at which the situation may escalate. In its weakened state, the Palestinian Authority often refuses to go after militants, emboldening splinter groups and increasing the frequency with which Israeli forces enter cities like Jenin or Nablus to arrest militants, resulting in more violence.[xxxiii]

At a tense moment like this, in which the situation in Israel and Palestine could be moving towards a Third Intifada, several important steps can be taken to prevent further escalation. In terms of stabilizing Palestinian leadership, foreign actors could consider supporting a “post-Abbas process” that would potentially legitimize his successor (if they are named) through democratic elections in the West Bank.[xxxiv] In addition, the United States and Israel could consider negotiating with Palestinians outside of Abbas’ orbit.[xxxv] To prevent other escalations, Israeli leaders, as well as leaders from foreign governments around the world, may be wise to temporarily hold off on “provocative visits and settlements in hot-button areas.”[xxxvi] 

But while the situation in Israel and Palestine has grown increasingly violent, there may be room for hope. Recent reports indicate that representatives of the Netanyahu government and of Mahmoud Abbas have been meeting secretly for some time.[xxxvii] Whether any true de-escalation will result from such meetings between Israeli and Palestinian Authority leadership is its own question, especially in light of the recent spiral of provocations, the weakening of the PA, and the growing strength of rogue splinter groups. But for now, that dialogue channels remain open may be the best local and foreign observers can wish for.

Photo: APAImages/Rex/Shutterstock (Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas holds a meeting.)

[i] Patrick Kingsley, “At Least 10 Palestinians Killed During Israeli Raid in West Bank,” The New York Times, February 22, 2023, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/world/middleeast/west-bank-nablus-palestinians-killed.html.

[ii] “Israeli Strikes Hits Gaza after Rockets Fired Overnight,” Reuters, February 23, 2023, sec. Middle East, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strikes-hits-gaza-after-rockets-fired-overnight-2023-02-23/.

[iii] “Lions’ Den – Mapping Palestinian Politics – European Council on Foreign Relations,” ECFR (blog), October 10, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/lions-den/.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Patrick Kingsley, “Killing of Young Gunman Highlights Shifts in Fast-Changing West Bank,” The New York Times, September 16, 2022, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/middleeast/ibrahim-al-nabulsi-west-bank-violence.html.

[vi] Emanuel Fabian, “Armed Upstart Lion’s Den Challenges IDF Bid to Crack down on Nablus Terror,” The Times of Israel, October 20, 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/armed-upstart-lions-den-challenges-idf-bid-to-crack-down-on-nablus-terror/.

[vii] Kingsley, “At Least 10 Palestinians Killed During Israeli Raid in West Bank.”

[viii] Daniel Byman, “The Third Intifada?,” Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/third-intifada-israeli-palestinian-conflict.

[ix] Kingsley, “At Least 10 Palestinians Killed During Israeli Raid in West Bank.”

[x] “Palestinian Authority (PA) – Mapping Palestinian Politics – European Council on Foreign Relations,” ECFR (blog), March 20, 2018, https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/palestinian_authority/.

[xi] Byman, “The Third Intifada?”

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Khaled Elgindy, “Why Security Cooperation With Israel Is a Lose-Lose for Abbas,” Foreign Policy (blog), February 6, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/06/palestinian-authority-israel-west-bank-security-cooperation-suspended-mahmoud-abbas/.

[xiv] Toi Staff and AFP, “At Aqaba Summit, Israel, PA Agree to Weigh Restarting Security Coordination, Meet Again in Egypt,” The Times of Israel, February 26, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/at-aqaba-summit-israel-pa-agree-to-weigh-restarting-security-coordination-meet-again-in-egypt/.

[xv] Jacob Magid, “Israel, PA Renew Vow to Curb Violence and Halt Unilateral Moves at Egypt Summit,” www.timesofisrael.com, March 19, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-pa-renew-vow-to-curb-violence-and-halt-unilateral-moves-at-egypt-summit/.

[xvi] Elgindy, “Why Security Cooperation With Israel Is a Lose-Lose for Abbas.”

[xvii] Byman, “The Third Intifada?”

[xviii] Elgindy, “Why Security Cooperation With Israel Is a Lose-Lose for Abbas.”

[xix] “The Palestinian Economy Will Continue to Operate Below Potential Without Concrete Policy Actions,” World Bank, May 9, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/05/09/the-palestinian-economy-will-continue-to-operate-below-potential-without-concrete-policy-actions.

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Elgindy, “Why Security Cooperation With Israel Is a Lose-Lose for Abbas.”

[xxii] Daniel Estrin, “A New Group of TikTok-Savvy Palestinian Fighters Tests Israeli Forces in the West Bank,” NPR, October 26, 2022, sec. World, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/26/1131362639/west-bank-lions-den-palestinian-group-israel.

[xxiii] “Managing Palestine’s Looming Leadership Transition,” February 1, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/238-managing-palestines-looming-leadership-transition.

[xxiv] Byman, “The Third Intifada?”

[xxv] David Pollock and Catherine Cleveland, “What Do Palestinians Want?,” The Washington Institute, July 23, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-do-palestinians-want.

[xxvi] Estrin, “A New Group of TikTok-Savvy Palestinian Fighters Tests Israeli Forces in the West Bank.”

[xxvii] Aaron David Miller, “Netanyahu Faces His Own ‘Israeli Spring,’” Foreign Policy (blog), February 23, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/23/israel-judicial-reform-protests-netanyahu-government-supreme-court/.

[xxviii] Estrin, “A New Group of TikTok-Savvy Palestinian Fighters Tests Israeli Forces in the West Bank.”

[xxix] Byman, “The Third Intifada?”

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Eliav Lieblich and Adam Shinar, “The End of Israeli Democracy?,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/end-israeli-democracy.

[xxxii] Miller, “Netanyahu Faces His Own ‘Israeli Spring.’”

[xxxiii] Estrin, “A New Group of TikTok-Savvy Palestinian Fighters Tests Israeli Forces in the West Bank.”

[xxxiv] “Managing Palestine’s Looming Leadership Transition.”

[xxxv] Byman, “The Third Intifada?”

[xxxvi] Ibid.

[xxxvii] Miller, “Netanyahu Faces His Own ‘Israeli Spring.’”

Abstract

It is often believed that Iran’s Islamic Republic and the State of Israel became estranged after Ayatollah Khomeini arose to power during the Islamic Revolution in 1979, but records show key figures in each government felt maintaining a secret relationship would be in the interest of both parties. As a result, millions of dollars’ worth of trade between Iran and Israel continued after the fall of the Shah and during Khomeini’s regime–– even though  Iran publicly denied Israel’s very existence. I argue the Islamic Republic’s decision to preserve secret ties with Israel after the revolution was a move to bolster regime security and counter international security threats coming from Iraq in the lead up to, and during, the Iran-Iraq war.

 I. Introduction

Why did the Islamic Republic continue clandestine cooperation with Israel? The question is puzzling because the revolution that put the Islamic Republic in power diametrically opposed all the Shah’s policies–including the monarchy’s covert relationship with Israel. The animosity between the two countries following the revolution in 1979 has been both fervent and public, with hostilities enduring to this day. The most prominent face of the Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, stated in an interview at the beginning of his tenure that his Islamic Republic would “break off relations with Israel because [it did not] believe there is any legal justification for its existence. Palestine belongs to the Islamic space and must be returned to the Muslims.”^[1] Furthermore, the Ayatollah’s condemnation of Israel as the “Little Satan” (only second to the United States which was dubbed the “Great Satan”) followed a larger narrative which Khomeini capitalized upon during the Iran-Iraq War after assuming power. 

In early 1980, Saddam Hussein and his army invaded Iran and a bloody eight-year war ensued. The devastating war ended in a stalemate and an estimated one to two million casualties. It is important to understand that in the 1970s, prior to the Revolution, Iran had a remarkably strong military backed by the West and funded by oil wealth. Simultaneously, Iraq in the hands of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party was also rising in the ranks. This balance of power shifted once the Ayatollah came to power in 1979 and Khomeinists purged the Shah’s army out of fear and distrust. Iraq recognized this and decided to attack its historical foe less than a year after the revolution took place. In an attempt to galvanize troops, Iranian leadership during the war period promised soldiers and soon-to-be martyrs the next stop after “conquering Baghdad” would be the “liberation of Jerusalem.”^[2] Ironically, however, the peak of clandestine Iran-Israel relations was during this time period. 

Taking a closer look at the events of this period, though, it’s not as hard to believe why Khomeini decided to maintain covert ties with Israel. As Sohrab Sobhani puts it, the Shah’s departure left Khomeini to inherit the world’s sixth largest army, $26 billion in foreign reserves, an oil industry producing $105 million a day, and the Shah’s legacy of close relations with Israel.^[3]  All were gladly accepted by the new regime except for friendly relations with Israel—at least publicly. As far as the world was aware, the new Islamic Republic’s feelings about Israel were evident in its decision to redirect the Shah’s Israeli mission to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was actively fighting the existence of Israel. 

II. Roadmap

I begin by providing a capsulized background of Iran-Israel relations since 1948. After laying down this historical foundation, I briefly compare Iran’s foreign policy pre-revolution (1948-1978) and post-revolution (1979-present). 

Once I outline the history, I move on to reviewing the literature surrounding Iran-Israel clandestine cooperation since 1948, with a particular focus on why it continued into the years 1979-1989. I divide the literature into three separate groups: 1. International Security, 2. Domestic Pressure, and 3. Individual and Ideological Aspirations. After providing an overview of the literature at hand, I ultimately argue international security threats were the main motivator for the Islamic Republic’s policy towards Israel. The second group of literature emphasizes the importance of Iranian domestic politics and its influence on foreign ties but falls short due to its underestimation of Khomeini’s desire to uphold the Islamic regime at all costs. The final group looks at the Shah and Khomeini as individuals, assessing their leadership and analyzing their personal vision for Iran. Looking at the puzzle through an individual lens helps gain insight into how these two leaders differed from one another, but ultimately, the logic of this argument fails to explain why exactly Khomeini would sustain the policies of a man he so detested.

After reviewing the literature, I present my argument, which states the decision to continue clandestine cooperation with Israel after the revolution was a choice of pragmatism over revolutionary ideology and was induced by the Iran-Iraq War. To expand on my argument, I split up this section into two subsections. The first, “Collaborating with the ‘Little Satan’,” examines Khomeini’s tacit continuation of the Shah’s pragmatic foreign policy. The second subsection, “The Lesser of Three Evils,” focuses on how the Iran-Iraq War proliferated Iran-Israel clandestine cooperation, and why the relationship dwindled almost immediately afterward. This section also illustrates how Cold War politics played into Tehran’s decision to continue cooperation with Israel.

I then use two separate case studies of international clandestine cooperation: Israel-Saudi Arabia and Israel-Azerbaijan to help contextualize and explain why enemies collaborate in international relations. Next, I compare the two cases and illustrate their relation to Iran-Israel relations from 1948-1989. I finish this section by presenting and critiquing common arguments that muddle the puzzle at hand. The first is that the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is guided primarily by ideology, and the second is the idea that Khomeini was merely a hypocrite. Both arguments are unsatisfying, and my goal is to unveil the complexity of the matter instead of generalizing a country’s policy based on its outward demeanor.   

I conclude the paper with a summary of key points discussed in each section and additional takeaways. I address counter-arguments, including the minimal focus placed here on the influence of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other external powers. Finally, I suggest potential areas for future research to hopefully connect the lessons learned during the initial years of the Islamic Republic and Israel’s relationship to the current one—providing a new perspective to what seems like a doomed relationship. Can Iran and Israel return to a pragmatic alliance in the future? What needs to happen for this to occur? 

II. Literature Review

Iran—up until the Islamic revolution in 1979—was a major rising power in the region. With this growth came an amassing influence that the Shah and other prominent figures in Iran had to manage effectively to avoid collapse. Interestingly, even with the Shah’s outward affinity for Western powers like the United States, the country favored secrecy when it came to Israel. Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shah’s arch nemesis, continued the late monarch’s covert cooperation with Israel even when all other policies were shunned—but why?

Intelligence expert Len Scott describes the advantage of secret alliances as the increased deniability of clandestine diplomacy, which adds to its value as a tool used by adversaries that would face criticism for engaging in a traditional alliance.^[4] Moreover, clandestine diplomacy assumes a willingness to talk with an adversary, even if these talks never amount to formal negotiations.^[5] With virtually the entire Arab world opposed to Israel’s existence, Iran seemed like one of the only plausible options Israel had for a regional companion. Iran, on the other hand, knew an overt alliance with a country they denied the existence of would tarnish its reputation among its Arab neighbors and compromise regime security. 

The existing literature can be categorized into roughly three groups of explanations for the secret relationship that emerged out of this situation. The first group focuses on the international implications of the Islamic regime publicizing their cooperation with Israel. Within this group, some view Khomeini’s vocal championing of Palestinian self-determination as a natural hindrance to any public cooperation with Israel, while others claim that the backdrop of Cold War politics was more significant. A major drawback of this group’s argument is it does not take into account the considerable differences amongst the many faces of leadership in Iran.

The second group consists of those that consider Iran’s domestic politics as the motive behind its vacillation towards Israel. This group cites prioritization of regime security as the main push factor towards covert cooperation with Israel. Domestic opposition to an exposed relationship would have been worse after 1979 than it would during the Shah’s reign since the legitimacy of the Islamic Regime rested on severing all previous ties with the West. The grounds for this argument are compelling, though its main pitfall is its lack of attention towards Khomeini’s campaign to export the Islamic revolution. 

The last group is unique in that emphasis is largely placed on individual leaders and their aspirations. In essence, this group places the Shah’s and Khomeini’s shared hegemonic ambitions at the core of Iran’s foreign policy during both of their tenures. This argument, however, fails to consider that both regimes maintained diverse leadership, making it hard to explain two phenomena with this lone wolf theory: (a) the substantial wavering of foreign policy throughout each leader’s reign and (b) the lack of amicable relations between Iran and Israel after the death of Khomeini. In post-revolutionary Iran, much of the literature emphasizes Khomeini’s ideological zeal as the main driver of his foreign policy. The logic of this assertion assumes clandestine cooperation between Iran and Israel would cease to exist without the Shah calling the shots, but this has not been the case. The reality is that Khomeini, who actively worked to reverse all that the Shah stood for, continued these covert negotiations decades after the fall of the Shah.

Group I: International Security

Scholars that emphasize the international dimension of an overt relationship between Iran and Israel make up this first group. Developments in the Middle East and broader international sphere during this time, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Cold War, inevitably played a role in Iranian foreign policy—but to what extent did these events affect Iran’s relations with Israel? Likewise, did these international events have any effect on the Islamic Republic’s decision to continue clandestine relations with Israel?

Iran’s Arab neighbors, especially the Gulf monarchies, were not pleased with the idea of a Shi’a-led movement preaching the trading of monarchies for Islamist governments near their borders. The influence of Khomeini’s fierce propaganda and revolutionary success was heard by Shi’a minority groups across the Middle East, which many Gulf monarchies in particular considered a looming threat to their power. Ultimately, Khomeini’s expectation that his Muslim neighbors would support him against Iraq failed to become a reality. Instead, a multilateral effort to help Saddam defeat Iran was formed; mostly because many regional powers feared the spread of an Islamic revolution in their own borders if Iran were to win the war. In fact, John Calabrese argues Khomeini’s effort to discourage collaboration with Saddam’s regime through anti-Zionist rhetoric and appeals to the Palestinian cause ended up reinforcing the Gulf states’ tilt towards Iraq.^[6] 

For the Shah, playing both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict worked in his favor, so there was no need to publicly declare his commitment to one side over the other as long as the regional status quo remained intact. This wavering public attitude abruptly shifted under Khomeini. Instead of maintaining the Shah’s ambiguous attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Islamic Republic firmly stood behind the Palestinians, deeming those that did not as traitors to Islam. Shahram Chubin explains this position by arguing the clergy’s pro-Palestinian posture became a source of legitimacy for the regime, as well as an area where it could stand out from its Arab counterparts.^[7] R.K. Ramazani puts forth that Khomeini’s insistence on exporting the Islamic Revolution and creating an Islamic international order led to his foreign policy doctrine of “Neither East, nor West, but the Islamic Republic.”^[8] Although through different means, the new regime shared with the monarchy before it a desire for Iran to transcend the quandaries of its neighbors and come out on top as a new model for regional hegemony. 

In his piece “Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Ramazani argues Cold War politics are essential in understanding Iran’s secretive approach to Israel. He describes Iran’s policy under the Shah as ‘calculative ambivalence,’^[9] with most of Tehran’s behavior driven by the regime’s fundamental goal of hindering Soviet influence in the region.^[10] In his eyes, the Shah’s regime did not merely view ties with Israel as a ‘discreet entente’ against Arab hostility, but primarily as a deterrent against increasing Soviet expansion into the Middle East.^[11] In contrast, under the Islamist Regime, Israel’s ties to the United States and Western world became its main pitfall. Tehran after the Revolution had now positioned itself as both an enemy of the West and Soviet Union. Nonalignment, however, became nearly impossible for the regime to sustain after the outset of the Iran-Iraq War. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris explain that up until the revolution, America armed Iran, meaning the new regime had to find American spares for its guns, planes, armored vehicles and tanks.^[12] Bulloch and Morris point out that Israel was both the nearest supplier and the most willing.^[13] Behrouz Souresrafil expands on this by highlighting the arms embargo placed on Iran by the U.S. during the war, ultimately forcing it to choose between buying needed arms on the black market for high prices or accepting Israel’s offer at a much lower price.^[14] In the end, Iran took up Israel’s offer despite its public opposition to the state’s existence.

A considerable drawback of this group of literature is its belief that Iran’s policy towards Israel depended on Khomeini as a sole actor. Although Khomeini played a major role in crafting Iranian foreign policy during his time in charge, the lack of a functioning foreign ministry in conjunction with the loud voices of the regime’s domestic opponents were just as important when it came to ties with Israel. Additionally, this argument assumes  the regime was more outwardly than inwardly focused when it came to politics. Again,  this could have just been Khomeini’s approach at the time, and not representative of the multifaceted Iranian regime as a whole.

Group II: Domestic Pressure

The second group of literature indicates the revolutionary government decided to continue covert cooperation with Israel was because the regime needed to do so to survive. Such two-timing is consistent with revolutionary movements throughout history, and thus, the regime’s decision to maintain ties with a state that can help keep it alive is not the historical exception it is often considered to be.

Souresrafil explains the Khomeini regime faced massive problems in running the country from the start and  turned to Israel in a bid to survive.^[15] These problems only got worse after a decrease in oil prices plunged the economy into a crisis and the costs of war began suffocating the regime.^[16] By and large, Souresrafil considers Khomeini’s foreign policy to be pragmatic and, at times, opportunistic.^[17] 

After eight brutal years and millions of dollars’ worth of Israeli weapons used by the Iranian regime against Iraq, the Iran-Iraq War came to an end and Khomeini’s newfound grip on power became the regime’s largest success. Trita Parsi explains the Iran-Israel relationship has always been based on common vulnerabilities during both the time of the Shah and Khomeini. Such a relationship, however, meant if one state gained enough power to deal with threats on its own, the need for the other would cease to exist.^[18] This is precisely what happened after the new revolutionary regime emerged from the Iran-Iraq War alive.       

With most of the mayhem now behind it, the new Iranian regime could now reinforce its position as a staunchly pro-Islamic and anti-Western entity. In addition, Israel and many Iranian Jews living in the country felt the relatively fair treatment Iranian Jews experienced under the Shah was now threatened by the Islamic Republic. This drove hundreds of thousands of Iranian-Jews out of Iran after 1979 and strengthened the pro-Khomeini domestic population. Sobhani argues the new Iranian regime realized this and began using it to their advantage once Iraq invaded Iran. In support of his argument, Sobhani describes a “arms-for-Iranian Jews” agreement, which was a tacit settlement between Israel and the Islamic Republic that essentially granted Iranian Jews freedom to leave Iran in exchange for much-needed arms. During these years of Iran-Israel clandestine cooperation, it is estimated that 55,000 Iranian Jews were permitted to leave Iran.

The main weakness of this group’s argument is its lack of consideration for Khomeini’s ambitious vision to export the revolution and become the ‘voice of the oppressed’. Domestic pressure — although an essential part of the puzzle — should be considered alongside the international security concerns of the state at the time.

Group III: Individual and Ideological Aspirations

The third group places the Shah and Khomeini’s individual aspirations at the forefront of Iran’s clandestine cooperation with Israel. This is a common direction that many scholars who study Iranian foreign policy take due to the Shah’s potent nostalgia for Iran’s glorious years as a powerful empire and Khomeini’s fierce Islamist ideology. Parsi explains how the Shah’s belief in Iran’s historical predisposition to regional prominence led him to adopt a relentless approach to Iranian regional primacy, certain that Iran was the only nation capable of maintaining peace in the Middle East.^[19] This group of literature asserts it was the Shah’s quixotic desire for Iranian primacy that drove his strategic relations with Arab and Israeli neighbors. Thus, Iran’s ultimate decision to ‘play both sides’ in the Arab-Israeli conflicts by cultivating relations with both Israel and Arab neighbors was an attempt to please as many parties as possible and build legitimacy for a Shah who sought to fill what he considered a power vacuum in the region. 

Helmut Richards describes the political scene in Iran preceding and following the U.S. and British-led coup on Mohammad Mosaddeq by illustrating how the Shah altered his image after returning from exile in 1953. One of the first things the Shah said after returning to Iran was that he had “known since early childhood…that it was [his] destiny to become King.”^[20] Following this notorious claim, he reinforced this conviction by “insisting that he [had] seen Ali, Saint Abbas, and the last Imam” during his time away from his country.^[21] When analyzing Iran’s decision to pursue clandestine relations with Israel before the Islamic Revolution despite domestic and international opposition, it is helpful to view  the decision through an individual lens. In this case, through the Shah’s eyes. 

The desire for regional hegemony was another characteristic inherited by Khomeini. Though seemingly different, Khomeini’s longing to export the Revolution beyond Iran’s borders resembles the Shah’s prominent belief that Iran’s destiny was to be a regional leader. Sobhani places great emphasis on Khomeini being the main obstacle blocking the path towards an Iran-Israel alliance, arguing Iran and Israel are “natural allies” and that the removal of Khomeini would cause the two powers to revert back to a strategic anti-Arab alliance.^[22] Whether Sobhani’s assumption held up after Khomeini’s death is debatable, but what is clear is that relations between Tehran and Tel Aviv are far from as strong as they were during the Shah’s reign. Taking an individual approach can be useful in gaining a better understanding of the Shah and Khomeini’s personal perspectives on the matter, as well as understanding why they took the steps they did towards Israel during their reigns. Many consider the Shah a pragmatic and cunning political figure but view Khomeini as a zealot unable to approach politics rationally, yet Khomeini continued the Shah’s pragmatic relationship with Israel. A major drawback of this group is its reliance on the assumption that the Shah acted as a lone wolf when approaching relations with Israel. If this was the case, then one would have expected covert ties to sever with the fall of the Shah in 1979, but in fact, clandestine cooperation between Iran and Israel continued under the Shah’s archenemy: Ayatollah Khomeini. Moreover, the world’s expectation that Iran and Israel would resume good relations after the death of Khomeini in 1989 did not manifest either. The reality is that Iranian society is highly complex and will always be home to regime hardliners as well as progressive reformists, irrespective of any individual leader.

Conclusion

Scholars who prioritize the international political climate as the main driver of Tehran’s policy during this time provide an argument maintaining a great deal of merit, yet their lack of regard towards Iran’s domestic population inevitably weakens their position. The same goes for the scholars that solely focus on the Shah’s ‘megalomania’ and Khomeini’s religious zeal. In order to fill these gaps, more research needs to be done on why exactly Khomeini’s regime continued clandestine cooperation with Israel despite notorious public condemnation; as well as why cooperation dwindled after the Iran-Iraq War.

The Road Ahead

I. Argument

In this section, I argue the Islamic Republic’s strategic preservation of ties with Israel symbolizes the subduing of ideology in favor of a pragmatic foreign policy prompted by international security threats. The first part looks at the preservation of ties as a means of regime survival during an era of regional instability. A newly-formed revolutionary government that is immediately sprung into a war will naturally need to compromise to survive — even one that prides itself on non-alignment. The second part proposes that, in comparison to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, covert cooperation with Israel was a more attractive alternative for the Iranian regime.

A. Collaborating with the ‘Little Satan’

Khomeini is not a man of religion. Whoever describes him as such is fanatical, stupid and understands nothing of politics. Khomeini is a politician. When he realizes he is losing more than he is gaining, he will establish peace.

– Saddam Hussein, Baghdad, 10 November 1982

In an anarchic international system riddled with uncertainty, states inevitably must compromise to stay afloat. The Islamic Republic was not immune to this reality. What became evident soon after Iraq invaded Iran was that Khomeini’s zealous rhetoric would have to be mutually exclusive from foreign policy for the regime to survive. Stephen Walt explains that ideological differences become less of an impediment to alliance formation when more immediate issues of security arise.^[23] When the Shah was in power, common security threats from Nasser’s Egypt and the Soviet Union brought Iran and Israel closer. Under Khomeini, Iraq’s aggression combined with Iran’s isolation from the international community made room for a renewal of such cooperation largely because Iran needed weapons. Indeed, Iran’s military at the outset of the war was in a dire state and Israel was one of the few options they had for assistance. At the start of the war, it was reported there were only twenty-eight tanks in the entirety of the Khuzestan province (the closest Iranian province to Iraq). The Iranian air-force— which had been one of the strongest in the region under the Shah— was in even worse shape; with only 40 percent of the entire fleet being salvageable (60 percent of F-5s, 40 percent of F-4’s, and 10 percent of F-14’s were functionable at the time).^[24] It is also estimated that in 1979-1980, 60 percent of Iranian military personnel had quit, in addition to the thousands arrested or killed by the new regime. Israel sold more than $100 million dollars’ worth of arms to Tehran in 1983,^[25] and by 1985, Danish cargo ships chartered by the Israeli government and private arms dealers made over 600 trips carrying American-made arms through the Persian Gulf to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.^[26]  As the war drew on, Israel made sure to keep Iranian planes flying, and Israeli instructors trained Iranian commanders on how to handle their troops.^[27]

Although the Shah was better at keeping a diplomatic front when it came to publicly discussing ties with Israel, neither him nor Khomeini could realistically cite ‘ideological alignment’ with Israel as being a factor in their cooperation. Additionally, the usefulness of Ben Gurion’s periphery doctrine —a key geostrategic doctrine involving Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia— was also dwindling in importance during the 1980s. What remained though, was Iran’s commitment to its position as a major regional power. 

The reality is that Khomeini’s harsh rhetoric towards Israel was more of an impassioned charade than it was a foreign policy doctrine during the 1980s. In these years, Iran’s strategic and rhetorical objectives contradicted each other  and revolutionary ideology was often set aside in light of realist considerations.^[28] Essentially, while Iran publicly condemned Israel and all it stood for, it continued covert cooperation and took very little tangible action against the Jewish state. The Israelis seemed to recognize this discrepancy between rhetoric and policy early on and continued to treat Iran as a potential regional ally regardless of the regime and its classification of Israel as a “cancerous tumor.”^[29] This was largely because Shimon Peres — Israel’s prime minister and foreign minister at the time — believed that Khomeini was just a temporary ailment to Iran-Israel relations, and that the United States should actively strive to bring Iran back into the Western-camp. Surprisingly, in 1982, Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon publicly announced on television that Israel would continue selling weapons to Iran despite American opposition. Iran denied, ridiculed, and responded to this claim by introducing resolutions to expel Israel from the United Nations.^[30] Yitzhak Rabin perpetuated this outlook, stating in 1987 that “Iran is Israel’s best friend and we do not intend to change our position in relation to Tehran, because Khomeini’s regime will not last forever.”^[31] Strangely enough, this paradox of rhetoric and policy lasted for eight years, waning with the end of the Iran-Iraq War and concurrent Cold War.

A key takeaway from Iran’s pragmatic policy was that security was ultimately more important to the regime than its hatred for the West. Throughout their respective reigns, both Saddam Hussein and Khomeini demonstrated their ability to compromise to ensure their political survival. Although not an automatic response, it was always known that both were willing to tone down their ideology if it meant they could maintain their power.^[32] This, however, changed with the end of the war in 1988. After emerging from an eight-year war alive, Iran began to back its anti-Western rhetoric with action. 

Compromise was less important to the regime after the war. Thus, even the tiny remnants of the Shah’s pragmatic relationship with Israel became severed. These years also saw a return to Khomeini’s desire to export the Revolution. This time, however, the regime’s approach was less focused on getting Arab countries on board, and more focused on targeting regional Shi’a minority populations. Lebanon and Syria became major points of interest for Iran because they were home to a large minority of Shiites, but Iran’s wandering eye was soon perceived as a direct threat to Israel’s security. The end of the Iran-Iraq War led the regime to realize it could protect itself even with all odds against it, and so compromising their ideology was no longer necessary for survival.

B. The Lesser of Three Evils

Neither east nor west, sometimes Israel, when it serves our interest best.

Sohrab Sobhani, “The Pragmatic Entente” (1989)

Khomeini’s rise to power brought with it a new populist dimension to Iranian foreign policy. This included a vehement hostility towards the United States and the Soviet Union, which the Ayatollah considered imperialists and enemies to Islam. To say the regime’s resentment was solely towards the West in the 1980s would be inaccurate, as Khomeini was insistent in his doctrine of “neither East nor West, only the Islamic Republic”. 

What is especially interesting about this period in history is that Khomeini’s regime accepted military supplies from Israel but rejected a similar proposal from the Soviet Union. Israel’s non-superpower status gave it an edge over cooperation with the United States or the Soviet Union, even if such cooperation was undisclosed to the public. In a way, it seems Khomeini ranked the United States and the Soviet Union higher than Israel in his proverbial ‘abomination’ scale. In this view, cooperation with ‘the Great Satan’ or the imperialist Soviets was a disgrace, so cooperation with ‘the Lesser Satan’ was less of a disgrace — especially in the midst of the Cold War when the Islamic regime prided itself on non-alignment. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War Khomeini gave a speech stating:

We did not collude even for a moment with America, the Soviet Union, and other global powers, and we consider collusion with superpowers and other powers as turning our back on Islamic principles.

The shift in post-revolutionary and post-war Iranian foreign policy occurred through a revived emphasis on its role as the defender of Islam, which was used to antagonize both superpowers more so than Israel. ^[34] Furthermore, Iran’s shaky history surrounding the Shah and U.S. – Russian intervention throughout the 20th century makes Israel a less threatening foe vis-à-vis the Iranian people. 

Ultimately, the Islamic Republic preserved the Shah’s clandestine policy towards Israel due to international security threats and a reluctance towards superpowers.

II. Evidence

A. Case Study #1: Israel and Saudi Arabia

The relationship between Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia varies greatly in its public image versus its private utility. The two states— historically hostile to one another— possess no official diplomatic relationship yet cooperate frequently on a covert level. Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to the commemorated Abraham Accords, even though the UAE and other Gulf neighbors are. Throughout history, what bonded this unexpected pair has been common security threats arising from regional neighbors. In the 1960s, this was the threat coming from Nasser’s Egypt. Since 1979, the two have shared an interest in curtailing Iranian expansion — specifically Tehran’s nuclear endeavors and Shi’a proxies. 

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini and his regime began a propaganda campaign aimed at panning Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries as “un-Islamic” for evading their ‘Islamic duty’ to protect the Palestinians. What made this campaign threatening was the fact these statements were accompanied by Iranian-inspired Shi’a uprisings in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.^[35] The latter, being an absolute monarchy with a significant Shi’a minority population in its northern region, has always been concerned about Iranian influence on its soil. Conflicts involving Iranian proxies around Israel and the Kingdom’s borders exacerbated these concerns in the past twenty-years. The steady rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen have been a nuisance to Israel and Saudi Arabia’s security and have thus steered the two states towards intelligence sharing and clandestine diplomacy.   In an era where America’s regional influence is dwindling, and rapprochement between the West and Iran is underway, Saudi Arabia and Israel find themselves needing to adjust to the ever-shifting times. This shift caused Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to recognize Israel’s military capability and close relationship with the United States as a valuable connection that could help preserve a partnership with Washington.^[36] Most recently, evidence of cooperation between the two began to surface because of the Kingdom’s use of Israeli-made cyberweapons such as Pegasus, a spyware the monarchy uses to monitor dissidents abroad.^[37] For the most part, however, this cooperation has remained unofficial and out of the public eye. Some consider this to be because open relations with Israel historically carried higher costs than benefits for the Kingdom given domestic opposition and the position of other Arab countries towards the Palestinian issue.^[38] Thus, conducting clandestine diplomacy with the Jewish state is considered a win-win situation for the Saudi monarchy and its legitimacy as a conservative Islamist power. 

B. Case Study #2: Israel and Azerbaijan

The relationship between Israel and the former Soviet-state of Azerbaijan differs in some ways to the alliances mentioned above. First off, although Azerbaijan has yet to have an official embassy in Israel, cooperation between the two states is much more publicized. The capital city, Baku, is has a significant Jewish population, and the country recognized Israel’s statehood relatively early on (in comparison to Arab neighbors). These factors generated a more productive relationship, regardless of Azerbaijan’s majority-Muslim population and conflicting regional allies. 

Azerbaijan and Israel cooperate on three main fronts: interstate security concerning Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, strong trade relations, and countering Iranian influence. Like many other states that choose to maintain civil relations with Israel, Azerbaijan sees Israel’s influence in Washington as a major benefit to getting the Azeri voice heard on issues pertaining to Armenia and the ongoing conflict. The two states also face what they deem a constant existential threat, bringing them together in a coalition based on protecting their sovereignty and right to exist. From the outset of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Israel has supported the Azeri position while states like Iran and Russia supported the opposing side. Turkey, another major ally of Azerbaijan, plays an increasingly important role in Israeli-Azeri relations as the deteriorating relationship between Jerusalem and Ankara in recent years has increasingly pressured Azerbaijan to reevaluate its already-brittle ties with Israel. Such pressure provides insight on why relations between the two have not been publicized, and helps explain why Azerbaijan frequently votes against Israeli proposals in international forums.

In the economic realm, both countries have long enjoyed prosperous energy and arms trade, with the latter being the most controversial aspect of their relationship. Therefore, instances where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resurfaces are often when Azeri-Israeli relations are highlighted and most contentious. Regardless, Baku is also one of Israel’s most reliable oil suppliers following the fallout with Egypt after the Arab Spring.^[39] Still, the Israel-Azerbaijan relationship is most effective in curtailing the shared Iranian threat.

Azerbaijan, being previously part of the Persian Empire and then briefly a Soviet entity, has had a long battle with independence. Today, the small state borders Iran to the South and Russia to the North, making its geopolitical posture highly valuable to the West and its allies. Israel, realizing this, took advantage of Baku’s strategic position vis-à-vis Iran, especially as Iranian proxies began springing up around Israel’s borders. The past ten years, for instance, have witnessed an increase in cooperation between the two states regarding intelligence gathering on the Iranian border. Furthermore, Azerbaijan is a major target for Israeli defense industry exports.^[40] Over the years, Israeli defense companies have been involved in training Azeri special forces, constructing security systems for the country’s airports, and upgrading Soviet-era military equipment.^[41] In 2011, Israel began supplying the Azeri military with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellite systems to monitor the border. In 2012, $1.6 billion worth of weapons had been sold to Azerbaijan by Israel Aerospace Industries.^[42] Such actions against Iran worry the regime not only because of a heightened Israeli presence on their borders, but also because Azeris make up the largest minority group inside Iran. These developments could exacerbate longstanding tensions the regime suppressed for decades. The two states are playing a remarkably risky game, but it is through these common objectives that their relationship remains sturdy in the face of regional disapproval.

C. Comparing the Two

Having examined two separate case studies illustrating unconventional covert alliances, I now compare them in relation to Iran-Israel relations from 1948-1989. 

First, I focus on the secret aspect of these relationships. The logic behind the covert nature of the Israeli-Saudi and Israel-Iran relationships both stem from the outward hostility these countries possess with one another on the world stage. Some claim this enmity is primarily due to conflicting ideologies, but I find this argument weak. It is true Israel, being a Jewish state, differs from the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia’s Islamic anatomy, but this is not the primary driver or repellent of relations between the states. If this were the case, then Israel’s relationship with Azerbaijan, also a Muslim state, would be just as unlikely. What is in fact similar between these cases is that they all prefer cooperation to stay out of the public eye. This might seem odd when weighing the costs and benefits of having a strong public alliance, versus a fragile secretive relationship, but in the greater context of the Middle East and its ever-shifting loyalties, a hesitancy towards commitment is less surprising. 

The modern Israel-Azerbaijan relationship is also reminiscent of the Iran-Israel relationship from 1948-1978. Both depended on containing the threat of an aggressive neighbor and both were kept secret due to domestic and international backlash. What makes the Israeli-Saudi case different is that the Kingdom largely shares with Iran a similar outward vilification of the Jewish State unlike Azerbaijan, who maintains a relatively civil exterior. As a bonus, Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan both view Israel as being highly influential in Washington. In their eyes, a good relationship with Israel means more clout with the Americans— another conception shared by the late Shah.  

In the 1990s, the idea was that an Israel – Turkey – Georgia – Azerbaijan axis could constrain a developing Syria – Iran – Armenia – Russia axis.^[43] If you compare this to Ben-Gurion’s periphery doctrine in the 1950s, which envisioned an Israel – Iran – Ethiopia alliance as a counterweight to the Arab threat, a similar geopolitical strategy remains. The difference now is that the regional balance of power has shifted, and the Iranian regime is no longer threatened by its Arab neighbors in the same way it was in the latter half of the twentieth century, meaning Israel has become less useful to its interests. Using this logic, one surmises a world with a recovered and strengthened Iraq and Afghanistan would push Iran closer to Israel once again, but this is mere speculation. 

The rhetoric utilized by Khomeini and similar zealous figures in Saudi Arabia against Israel seems to have little to no effect on their actual foreign policy. Instead, radical figures utilize these tactics in an attempt to mask cooperation they themselves preach as taboo to their domestic populations. Such a strategy has less to do with ideology, and more to do with realism and regime security.

Another question one might ask: what needs to happen for a secret relationship to evolve into an open relationship? Truthfully, the answer to this question depends on several factors: individual leadership, regional security, great power competition. However, publicizing a formerly secret relationship would require, above all, the states involved to solidify their priorities. If a state with a thriving economy and strong military were to publicize a previously covert alliance with a weaker, ideologically-opposed state, there would need to be a practical reason to do so. For example, Iran-Israel cooperation up until the end of the Shah’s reign illustrated a scenario where one party wanted to publicize relations (Israel) and another felt it was unnecessary (Iran). The reason cooperation continued even after Israel’s wishes to publicize the relationship were turned down by the Shah was because Israel needed Iran more than Iran needed Israel at the time. Today, we can see a similar pattern emerging between Israel and several Arab states, making an agreement like the Abraham Accords more attractive to old enemies.  

III. Conclusion

In this paper, I attempted to answer the question of why the Islamic Republic continued clandestine cooperation with Israel. My argument attributes the prolonging of cooperation to the Islamic Republic’s implementation of realist policy to address security threats arising from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran.

This conclusion came after exploring several competing explanations in existing literature for this covert relationship, largely split into theories around (1) international security, (2) domestic pressure, and (3) individual or ideological aspirations. Ultimately, the international security argument is the most convincing, but the literature does not consider the discrepancies in Khomeini’s rhetoric versus his ultimate policy. The second group does a good job at explaining the complex internal makeup of Iran and how such complexity can affect foreign policy decisions, but this group falls short due to an underestimation of Khomeini’s determination to uphold the regime at all costs. The final group emphasizes the role of the individual in a state’s foreign policy and compares the leadership styles of the Shah and Khomeini but fails to explain precisely why Khomeini would preserve the policies of the Shah, a figure who the Ayatollah vowed to be the foil of, as well as why an Iran-Israel entente did not resume after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. The puzzle can best be understood through an amalgamation of certain aspects drawn from the current literature and new evidence I present further along in the paper. 

After reviewing the literature, I argue the decision to continue clandestine cooperation with Israel after the Islamic Revolution was a choice of pragmatism over revolutionary ideology induced by security threats stemming from the ongoing Iran-Iraq War. In the end, regime security was more important than Tehran’s hatred for the West. I also explored the security threat triggered by the Iran-Iraq War and explained the role Cold War politics played in the regime’s ultimate decision to extend covert collaboration. Since the Islamic Republic adhered to a “neither East nor West” doctrine during the Cold War, Israel’s non-superpower status made it a more attractive option for a state who desperately needed a security partner at a time of war.

In the following section, I compared two separate case studies of states with unorthodox secret alliances: Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel and Azerbaijan. I chose these two specific cases because certain aspects of their relationships resembled those of Iran and Israel from 1948-1989. By drawing parallels between these states and their covert cooperation with Israel, one can see how common security objectives between states often subdue ideological differences, a logic that could be easily applied to the Islamic Republic during the Khomeini years. 

While I find this theory helpful in answering the puzzle at hand, there are several shortcomings that arise from it. One limitation is a lack of attention towards the influence of the United States and Soviet Union on Iran’s decision to continue, and later eliminate, ties with Israel during these years. Furthermore, this article focused on the Iran-Israel relationship from 1948-1989 because covert data from more recent years has not yet been made publicly accessible. Once new information becomes available, there will be more room to assess the relationship in light of Iran’s recent history and the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei. Additionally, it would be interesting to analyze the Iran-Israel relationship during Iran’s ‘reformist era’ under Rafsanjani and Khatami and compare it to the Khomeini years. 

Moving forward, I envision several different takeaways that could emerge from an understanding of this unique relationship. For one, we should learn to prioritize a state’s actions over divisive rhetoric offered at face value. This will reveal a new world of possibilities when it comes to dealing with seemingly diplomatically unreachable states. A modern-day example would be U.S.-Iran cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and counterinsurgency coordination against the threat of ISIS. Low-level security cooperation between Iran and other states threatened by ISIS bolstered an interim coalition driven by common security objectives, showcasing such cooperation is achievable, even in the most unsuspecting of times.             

Some important questions that remain are: will Iran and Israel return to a pragmatic alliance in the future? And what needs to happen for this to occur? In light of this analysis, it seems possible that an Iran-Israel entente will surface once again, especially if the United States continues its withdrawal from the region. An absence of the United States from the Middle East will surely be a shock to the system, but major regional powers such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have already begun taking steps towards rapprochement. The Abraham Accords and recent diplomatic engagements between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia signal a new tide in Middle Eastern politics, and this newfound momentum holds the potential to bridge several deep regional chasms. Furthermore, I do not think a new Iranian regime is necessary for diplomatic progress to take place between Iran and Israel. The two states maintained a relationship for ten years under the leadership of Iran’s most radical leader to date — Ayatollah Khomeini — so arguments stating diplomatic advancement between the two countries is impossible under Iran’s current leadership seem overly simplistic. It is true both states are in different positions today than they were forty years ago, but the primary objectives of states in an anarchic world remain the same. To a large extent, I am optimistic about Israel and Iran’s potential to overcome the obstacles they face today — the uncertainty that taints the international system also assures its progression.

^[1] George E. Gruen, “The United States, Israel, and the Middle East,” The American Jewish Yearbook, no. 81 (1981): 143.

^[2] Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 (New York: Praeger, 1989), 231.

^[3] Ibid, 231.

^[4] Len Scott, “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy, Intelligence and National Security,” Intelligence & National Security19, no. 2 (2004): 331.

^[5] Ibid, 337.

^[6] John Calabrese, Revolutionary Horizons: Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 51.

^[7] Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Intentions, Capabilities, and Impact (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 60.

^[8] R. K. Ramazani,  “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 (2004): 555.

^[9] R. K. Ramazani, “Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Middle East Journal 32, no. 4 (1978): 414-415. 

^[10] Ibid, 419.

^[11] Ibid, 416.

^[12] John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: Its Origins, History, and Consequences (London: Methuen, 1989), 183.

^[13] Ibid, 183.

^[14] Behrouz Souresrafil, Khomeini and Israel, 2nd ed. (England: I Researchers Inc., 1989), 72.

^[15] Ibid, 2.

^[16] Ibid, 91.

^[17] Ibid, 113.

^[18] Trita Parsi,  Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 29.

^[19] Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 39.

^[20] Helmut Richards,  “America’s Shah Shahanshah’s Iran,” MERIP Reports, no. 40 (1975): 7.

^[21] Ibid, 7.

^[22] Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente, 171.

^[23] Stephen M. Walt,  The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 183.

^[24] Souresrafil, Khomeini and Israel, 57.

^[25] Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Haapiseva-Hunter, The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987).

^[26] Seymour M. Hersch, “The Iran Pipeline: A Hidden Chapter/A Special Report.; U.S. Said to Have Allowed Israel to Sell Arms to Iran,” The New York Times, December 8, 1991.

^[27] Bulloch and Morris, The Gulf War.

^[28] Parsi, “The Iran-Israel Cold War.”

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] Ibid.

^[31] Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 127.

^[32] Mansour Farhang, “The Iran-Iraq War: The Feud, the Tragedy, the Spoils,” World Policy Journal 2, no. 4 (1985): 672.

^[34] Mohammed E. Ahrari,  “Iran and the Superpowers in the Gulf,” SAIS Review 7, no. 1 (1987): 161.

^[35] Uzi Rabi and Chelsi Mueller, “The Gulf Arab States and Israel Since 1967: from ‘No Negotiation’ to Tacit Cooperation,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 4 (2017): 581.

^[36] Omar Rahman, “The Emergence of GCC-Israel Relations in a Changing Middle East,” Brookings, July 28, 2021. 

^[37] Eli Lake, “The Dark Side of Israel’s Cold Peace with Saudi Arabia,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-03/israel-s-cold-peace-with-saudi- arabia-has-a-dark-side.

^[38] Udi Dekel and Yoel Guzansky, “Israel and Saudi Arabia: Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend?,” The Institute for National Security Studies, 2013.

^[39] Ismayilov Elnur,  “Israel and Azerbaijan: The Evolution of a Strategic Partnership,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 7, no. 1 (2013): 71.

^[40] Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Israel-Azerbaijan: Despite the Constraints, a Special Relationship,” The Institute for National Security Studies, January 2015.

^[41] Ibid, 70.

^[42] Ibid, 70.

^[43] Lindenstrauss, “Israel-Azerbaijan,” 76.

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Written by Katrina Starbird

Asmahan Simry, Palestinian citizen of Israel and human rights activist focused on the treatment of Palestinians, introduced her humanitarian technology organization to undergraduates on March 5^th at the Slifka Center for Jewish Life at Yale.

The organization is Comet-ME, an energy organization grounded in its goal of providing basic utilities to communities in the West Bank.

Comet-ME, an Israeli-Palestinian organization, began operations in 2007 with the goal of providing electricity to off-grid communities spread throughout the West Bank. In 2013, the organization expanded its work to provide water distribution services. The organization uses solar and wind energy to provide this infrastructure. 60 communities, about 6,000 individuals of a total 200,000 Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank, have benefitted from their services.

Comet-ME operates in the Israeli-Palestinian region, specifically rural areas of the West Bank without large Palestinian cities nearby. Known as Area C, these are areas of the West Bank under Israeli civilian and military control. In the communities Comet-ME serves, Bedouins live beside Palestinians, often leasing the Palestinian’s land after Israel expelled the Bedouins from their own homelands in the 1950s. Residents typically live in tents or caves. The primary source of income is from the wool and butter of their sheep and goats. Hours are spent doing chores that could be done much more efficiently with the help of electricity. Individuals travel far to find a space to recharge electronics. Many travel to access cisterns that hold collected rain to supply for their water needs. The limited access to unmonitored water, coupled with the residents’ inability to dispose of biological waste properly, creates severe health risk.

When Comet-ME partners with a community, they install solar panels, wind turbines, and an energy center to store accumulated energy. They supply power to the tents and caves that make up the inhabitants’ living quarters. If an electricity system is in place, Comet-ME can install water pumps connecting households to the existing cisterns, filter the water, and provide long term water quality monitoring. Most importantly, they train a member of the community to maintain the resources.

Simry emphasized that the organization views the communities they work with as both partners and beneficiaries. The work that they do is not charity – while Comet-ME does not charge for the instillation of the infrastructure, individuals do pay their own energy bills. Simry explained that this ensures that the communities have a sense of ownership over the resources newly made available to them. The residents retain their self-dependence and pride.

Area C of the West Bank is a land ridden with stark inequalities. Here, the tents and caves of Palestinian inhabitants find neighbors in Israeli settlements. Where the Palestinian communities usually lack basic utilities, the settlements are well equipped with the electricity, water, access roads, and other resources needed to live a modern lifestyle in a desert area.

The different living realities are a result of the hostilities within the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict manifests itself in long-term aggressive action. The Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) controls building and infrastructure development in Area C. They mandate building permits for the construction of any facilities. It can sometimes take five years for any decision on the permit application to be released. Even then, the ICA often rejects the application. The ICA qualifies the Palestinian buildings as illegal even while their own settlements are illegal according to international law.

At the same time, the Palestinian Authority is obligated to provide schools and health clinics to Palestinians living in the region. Continuous denial of building permits from the ICA has led them to construct these facilities without Israeli permission. Without permits, these buildings are often torn down. Subsequently, schools and health clinics that have successfully maintained operation in this region are sparse.

Still, Palestinian communities persevere in these conditions in the name of holding onto ancestral lands. Many stay because departing from these areas would leave Area C, which makes up 60 percent of the West Bank, in full control of the Israeli settlements.

Comet-ME aims to alleviate the difficulties of living in such a conflict-ridden environment. As a part of their mission, Comet-ME cites, “The poverty and marginalization [of Palestinian refugees] … and in particular the absence of energy infrastructure, is more a product of the political situation than of geography or economics.” The organization delivers basic utilities to enable the Palestinian’s resilience against the Israeli government. When asked if any of the Palestinians in Area C seemed likely to consider moving away, Simry said, “No. The people that are there, they are staying. But they do want to have access to services.”

Comet-ME has also experienced difficulty with building in the region. In June of 2017, Israeli authorities came to Jib al-Deeb, a community Comet-ME had been servicing, and cut the power lines to the solar panels generating the community’s energy. 96 solar panels and other expensive electronics were seized, and the community was left powerless for three months in the heat of summer. Three months later, Comet-ME managed to get the batteries returned and the photovoltaic system functioning again. Still, tensions between the community and the Israeli government remain.

Comet-ME addresses many of these issues with legal battles. Comet-ME works with their international partners to prepare for such encounters. Their partners include governmental representatives from Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. When the microgrid system was stolen from Jib al-Deeb, it was with the help of these partners that Comet-ME was able to press their case and get the technology returned.

Despite the difficulties faced in implementing their service, Comet-ME has succeeded in improving the lifestyles of many different communities. With access to energy, chores such as laundry, cooking, and churning butter have increased efficiency. The butter in particular is valuable as it is one of the primary products sold to support the Palestinians’ livelihood. Students can study after dark. With the services provided by Comet-ME, residents of the area gain not just utilities, but time, physical energy, and money.

Comet-ME seeks to make available resources that would ease the lives of those that inhabit the zone of conflict between Israel and Palestine. As an organization that provides service to support those affected by political strife, Comet-ME seeks to empower the resilience of communities seeking to stay in their homeland.

Written by Sarah Lu

Introduction

Former US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered himself a formidable force in US diplomacy and US-Middle East negotiations from 1969 to 1975. After the 1973 War wherein Egyptian forces attacked Israel on the holy holiday of Yom Kippur, Kissinger was lauded for his implementation of “shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle East. More specifically, he was celebrated for somewhat successfully achieving bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel as a result of “shuttling” back and forth between nations to broker a series of disengagement agreements. While scholars like Rashid Khalidi and Paul Chamberlin emphasize the importance of Cold War divisions and the prioritization of US-Soviet relations in shaping US foreign policy during this period, the effects of Cold War politics and Kissinger’s implementation of shuttle diplomacy as a “wedge” are overstated. In addition to the superpower feud between the US and the USSR, shuttle diplomacy was also heavily influenced by Kissinger’s personal diplomatic and negotiating style in the years before it was formally instituted as well as domestic bureaucratic and political factors. These factors, including Kissinger’s relationship to former Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the Watergate scandal, played significant roles in influencing Kissinger’s bilateral relations with Israel and Egypt. This paper will investigate the role of Henry Kissinger in the US foreign policy pivot towards shuttle diplomacy. It will focus particularly on how and why shuttle diplomacy ensued in addition to tracing the trajectory of Kissinger’s approach to the Middle East from 1969 onwards.

Background: The 1973 War and Shuttle Diplomacy

Although shuttle diplomacy was more formally instituted after the 1973 War in which Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a two-front offensive against Israel, Kissinger’s strategy towards the Middle began developing during his tenure as President Nixon’s National Security

Advisor, which started in 1969. During this time, he established “standstill diplomacy” as a precursor to shuttle diplomacy. After the 1967 War, most of the international community, including the United Nations and the USSR, endorsed the comprehensive land-for-peace deal under UN Resolution 242, which would have resulted in Israel leaving its occupied territories and Arab nations recognizing Israel’s legitimacy in the region. Before UN 242 was discussed, however, Egyptian President Gamul Abdul Nasser declared a War of Attrition against Israel in 1969, which escalated until 1970. Despite Israel’s tactical victory in the war, the true result of the war was an impasse: Arab states refused to negotiate from a position of weakness, as they had suffered defeat and feared political instability from internal coups and revolts, and Israel saw no need to negotiate or concede due to their tactical victory.^[1]

In an attempt to resolve the impasse, Kissinger argued that the US should institute standstill diplomacy, a process in which the US would encourage a standstill in the peace process to convince Israel, Egypt, and other Arab countries that Moscow was powerless to help them.

The longer Kissinger promoted the impasse, the more Arab nations believed that Moscow could not assist them; as William Quandt states, “The main considerations underlying this stage of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy were to convince Sadat that a prolonged war of attrition, fueled by Soviet arms, would not succeed and to demonstrate to the Kremlin that the United States was capable of matching Soviet military deliveries to the Middle East.”^[2] It was during this time wherein Kissinger worked on overriding the implementation of UN 242. Instead, he focused on establishing bilateral relations with Egypt and Israel, which would set the stage for the Sinai I and Sinai II agreements that followed the 1973 War.

Kissinger’s Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategies

One crucial element of standstill diplomacy was that Kissinger saw no need to reach a comprehensive Middle East agreement that would solve fundamental issues like the Palestinian question:^[3] how would the borders of Palestine be defined, and would it be recognized as a legitimate state? Kissinger never sought to answer this quintessential question, yet it still continues to dominate the debate on the Arab-Israeli Conflict today. This diplomatic strategy towards the Middle East was not only the result of Cold War politics, but can also be attributed to Kissinger’s personality and diplomatic style, including his historic outlooks on diplomacy and foreign policy.

Before becoming  National Security Advisor, Kissinger was a prolific author and academic who held multiple degrees from Harvard University. He had also risen to national prominence as a supporter of realpolitik^[4], arguing that the US should have the capacity to wage a limited nuclear war^[5] as a response against President Eisenhower’s nuclear policy. In a Memorandum of a Conversation in 1971 between Kissinger and William Rusher, a publisher of the National Review, and other members of the conservative establishment, Kissinger heavily emphasized the deterioration of America’s defense capabilities, highlighting that American populations “would be defenseless if we were without retaliatory capacity” and advocated for “a policy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons”.^[6]

Prior to 1968, Kissinger also opposed many of the foreign policy outlooks he advocated  under Nixon, such as the emphasis on détente with the USSR, a greater partnership with Europe, and even Cold War politics^[7]. According to Joan Hoff in A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy, Kissinger reiterated: “I’m very worried that Nixon’s Cold War outlook has remained frozen since his vice-presidential years in the fifties and that therefore in the seventies, in the waning military pre-eminence of American power, it could lead him into taking undue risks.”^[8]  Even during the Nixon presidency, Kissinger  believed that Nixon was too optimistic in his view of foreign policy. Kissinger’s own foreign policy approach had 19th century European roots, which emphasized pessimism and restraint in comparison to Nixon’s tendency to take risks.

Kissinger’s aversion to risk with respect to foreign policy was incredibly pronounced in his approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, wherein he tended to tread lightly in order to avoid failure. In his conversation with Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz on March 30th, 1973, for example, Kissinger said, “I will take no initiatives. I will react in a slow-moving way to their proposals. If it moves slowly and drags through the summit, that is their problem. I am not aiming at a Nobel Prize in the Middle East”.^[9] As Hoff suggests, beginning in 1969, Kissinger initially did not want to get “bogged down” in the Middle East because failure was more likely than “flamboyant successes.”^[10] Kissinger also had limited prior experience in the region. Even Kissinger admitted that he knew “very little of the Middle East” when taking office as National Security Council Adviser, and had never been to an Arab country previously.^[11] Kissinger’s risk aversion and lack of experience in Middle East politics would follow him to the negotiating table in 1973, where he straddled the line between slow-moving diplomacy and wasting time. For Kissinger, this usually took form in making the US seem like a neutral arbiter in the Arab-Israeli conflict, even in light of the obvious tensions between the US and the Soviet Union and their vested interests in the region. In fact, Kissinger even portrayed Cold War “politics” as somewhat divisive in a memorandum to President Nixon in 1972, in which he suggested that the administration’s “ability to move Israel” would be dependent on avoiding the appearance of a US-USSR solution, justifying it as a “solution to a practical problem.”^[12] In his conversation with Ambassador Dinitz in 1973, Kissinger also seemed hesitant in taking a hard-line role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, going so far as to say that he was not even trying to negotiate peace. He states, “we are doing nothing, we are wasting time… So with the Russians there is practically nothing going on.”^[13]  In a cabinet meeting on October 18th, 1973, Kissinger employs a similar tone of diplomacy in relation to the USSR by saying, “we have told the Soviet Union this is a test of détente, but we have not thrown down the gauntlet… We are trying to use diplomacy as a bridge to a decent settlement. We will make our case to the public after the diplomacy has concluded.”^[14] What exactly Kissinger meant by “diplomacy” was relatively unclear. In such conversations, Kissinger was cautious to avoid an ideological approach, instead focusing on these so-called principles of diplomacy and negotiation to maximize political gains for the United States. There was no long-term plan or overarching policy stance because there seemed like there was more to lose; the vagueness was intentional. Thus, Kissinger’s standstill and shuttle diplomacy approaches are easily linked to his pre-existing philosophies of realpolitik and political pragmatism, in which he emphasized short-term, vague, and impartial solutions to increasingly complex issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Kissinger acquired more autonomy as a decision-maker in the Nixon administration, his approach towards the Middle East would eventually overshadow the alternative that sought to reign in a long-lasting, comprehensive, and multilateral peace: the Rogers Plan.

The Undermining of the Rogers Plan and U.N. Resolution 242

Although Kissinger repeatedly saw himself as a chessmaster with the Arab-Israeli conflict as just one piece on the chessboard, there was almost certainly an alternative to his approach. The alternative was a plan outlined by William P. Rogers, who served as Nixon’s Secretary of State from 1969 to 1973. Presented in 1969, the Rogers Plan emphasized a multilateral and comprehensive peace approach that advocated for UN 242’s land-for-peace deal. Nixon initially considered Rogers as the leading expert on negotiations in the Middle East, and both Nixon and Rogers had pressed Tel Aviv to rejoin UN-sponsored discussions after the War of Attrition, warning them that the Big Four powers would step in and intervene if Israel impeded negotiations.^[15] The sharp pivot in US policy from UN 242 towards shuttle diplomacy after 1973 was therefore largely the result of Kissinger’s attempts to impose his own diplomatic approach to the situation. By repeatedly undercutting Rogers and undermining Nixon’s faith in Rogers, Kissinger was able to create a political and bureaucratic environment wherein he was able replace Rogers himself. In a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on February 21, 1973, for example, it was clear that both Nixon and Kissinger were intent on Kissinger meeting the Egyptians for negotiations, despite not having informed Rogers beforehand. They were also explicitly collaborated without informing Rogers and even criticized his tactics for negotiation. Kissinger stated to Nixon that “I really hope we don’t give anybody exclusive jurisdiction, because he’ll [Rogers] get us into the same mess he’s gotten us. Your methods—the methods you and I, on your behalf, have used—work because we never get ourselves in.”^[16] Rogers became so isolated in the White House that Nixon rarely wrote any of his memoranda or comments on news summaries to Rogers.^[17] Nixon would also criticize Rogers for his lack of ability and initiative, which Kissinger would exploit to his own benefit. As Kenneth Stein emphasizes,

As national security adviser, Kissinger ‘mercilessly exploited Secretary of State Rogers’ laid-back style and unwillingness to jump into a fray.’ As a Kissinger aide noted, ‘Their relationship revealed all the shabby traits of Henry’s character: his secretiveness, suspiciousness, and vindictiveness.’ The under-secretary of state at the time recalled that he spent as much time negotiating between Rogers and Kissinger as he did on the Arab-Israeli conflict.^[18]

Bureaucratic scuffing aside, Kissinger took advantage of his proximity to Nixon and his penchant for realpolitik to therefore discredit UN 242 as a potential solution, believing that the need for just and lasting peace within secure and recognized borders under the resolution was “so platitudinous that the speaker could not be serious.”^[19] Kissinger even personally reached out to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and encouraged her to not accept the Rogers Plan; he would also meet separately with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him that the White House had no interest in the Rogers Plan. For Kissinger, this was the most efficient way to establish bilateral relations in the Middle East, as he believed that shuttling between Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, and Israel’s Prime Minister, Golda Meir, would save him from Nixon’s “unproductive interface” and the bureaucracy of the slow-moving Geneva committees^[20]. In addition to strengthening bilateral ties between the US and Israel and the US and Egypt, Kissinger’s ability to sidestep bureaucracy and manipulate the key players within would prove beneficial for his own vision of diplomacy. In a 1973 Cabinet Meeting, Kissinger directly rebutted Nixon’s stance that a ceasefire could be negotiated with UN 242. Kissinger stated that “242 is not a new proposal. It is very dangerous to speculate about any particular formula. The major problem now is to get the parties into a negotiation with a formula so vague that each party can save face.”^[21] With Kissinger’s pessimistic foreign policy approach and his tendency to minimize risk, it follows that he would harp on UN 242 for being too “particular”—it was perfectly consistent with his entire approach to the Middle East.

The declining influence of Rogers paved the way for Kissinger to increase his foothold in the bureaucracy of US foreign policy decision-making. By 1973, Rogers’ authority had already been heavily undermined by Kissinger, who had become much closer to President Nixon during that time. Additionally, Rogers and Joseph J. Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and Asia, had attempted to negotiate a ceasefire in 1970 that was violated within seconds, which represented another harsh blow to Rogers’ credibility. Meanwhile, Kissinger had established himself as the necessary intermediary between the US, Israel, and Egypt via his back-and-forth meetings behind Rogers’ back with major actors such as Meir. There was even an indication of an “American special relationship” with Israel that encouraged the Arabs to deal with Washington instead of Moscow when it came to diplomacy.^[22] With the Rogers Plan now out of the picture, Kissinger was fully able to execute his method of diplomacy, pivoting away from the Cold War framework of a one-sided, superpower-negotiated solution and instead established the US as an intermediary between parties like Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. In a memorandum to Nixon on May 17th, 1972, Kissinger states: “I would want to avoid the atmosphere of total inflexibility since that could lead the Soviets to step up their military program in Egypt.”^[23] Kissinger realized that calling for the expulsion of Soviets in the Middle East would polarize Arabs and drive militants towards buying Soviet arms–his tactics needed to be flexible and adaptable in order to establish bilateral relations.

Kissinger’s Dominance in Post-1973 Negotiations

It was this notion of flexibility that allowed Kissinger to appease both the Israelis and Arabs,^[24] and and it was his dominant position in negotiation as well as his previously established relations with Middle East dignitaries that established him as indispensable. In addition, due to Moscow’s “rigid bureaucratic chain”,^[25] Kissinger was able to gain the upper hand in negotiations, as he had less constraints and less bureaucratic limitations. There was no particular idea which Kissinger brought to the table that made the difference. Instead, it was the need for an intermediary who had the confidence of both sides,^[26] which Kissinger managed to acquire over time. He was also overly insistent on gaining Egypt and Israel’s trust during negotiations. There are accounts that Kissinger refused to leave the Middle East until he had firm commitments from Cairo and Tel Aviv to an agreement, even when Nixon wanted Kissinger to come home and stage a public agreement with him.^[27]

With Egypt, Kissinger maintained communications with Sadat’s national security advisor, Hafez Ismail, through a CIA backchannel. He would often meet with Ismail without Rogers’ approval as the Rogers Plan was still being considered, presenting himself as Egypt’s ally against Israeli manipulation and rejecting the Israeli demand that disengagement would mean the withdrawal of Egypt from its territory among the Suez.^[28] Egypt would therefore appeal to the US to help its Third Army Corps during ceasefire negotiations in the 1973 War, as exemplified in Sadat’s message to President Nixon: “Thus, while the Egyptian side has kept to its word, the Israeli side is still resorting to dilatory methods… I therefore request you to take a firm and clear stand with respect to these continued Israeli methods of defeat.”^[29] Kissinger and the US were vital in negotiations between Egypt and Israel, with Kissinger often overstating his promises to one country or the other in order to deepen their respective trust.

In regards to Israel, many suggest that Meir’s faith in Kissinger was also the result of his success. According to Stein, Meir had “regarded him as a friend of Israel and trusted his basic instincts to ensure Israeli security.”^[30] Though Meir had major ideological differences with Kissinger, she understood his vital role in the negotiation process, as Kissinger had almost daily contacts with Israeli Ambassador Dinitz. It seemed that the rest of Israel did as well.^[31] When Nixon and Kissinger visited Israel in 1974, a New York Times article reported that while “a crowd outside cheered the President, [they] cheered louder for Secretary of State Kissinger, who seemed delighted.”^[32] The article also stated that Nixon’s role in the Watergate Scandal had been heavily problematized in Israel, which allowed Kissinger to be seen as the shining diplomat in US-Israel relations. Therefore, domestic factors like Watergate had a considerable influence on the structures and institutions that allowed for American decision-making on foreign policy, and it is one of the reasons why Kissinger’s power in the Nixon Administration became so salient.

Domestic Factors: Public Opinion, Watergate, and Bureaucracy

The influence of domestic factors, like public opinion and the Watergate Scandal, significantly affected Kissinger’s position in negotiations, his power in the administration, and consequently, US foreign policy in the Middle East. When Watergate emerged in 1973, Nixon aimed to replace front-page Watergate headlines with news of Rogers’ resignation and Kissinger’s appointment as his successor.^[33] Believing that foreign policy could rescue Nixon from impeachment proceedings and domestic troubles, Kissinger also attributed multiple successes in the Middle East to Nixon in order to bolster his approval ratings. In the 1974 New York Times article entitled “Kissinger Takes Edge Off Watergate”, Philip Shabecoff writes that “for the first time in recent memory, issues of Watergate and impeachment did not arise at the midday White House news briefing… instead, questions concentrated almost exclusively on foreign affairs, including the agreement between Israel and Syria and the President’s forthcoming summit meeting in the Soviet Union.”^[34] On the eve of Nixon’s resignation in 1974 within the confines of the White House sitting room, Kissinger told Nixon that when it was all over, the President would be remembered for the peace he had achieved,^[35] even if Kissinger had done most of the legwork.

Nixon’s preoccupation with Watergate therefore created a power vacuum in which Kissinger and other foreign policy officials like Alexander Haig and Brent Scowcroft could dominate foreign policy. Kissinger himself stated, “one of the more cruel torments of Nixon’s Watergate purgatory was my emergence as the preeminent figure in foreign policy”.^[36] With the scandal, Nixon’s closest officials like Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and Domestic Policy Chief John Ehrlichman both resigned. Kissinger was the only one who remained. Although Nixon wanted to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, his preoccupations with Watergate would force Kissinger to take the rein, allowing him to have “extraordinary latitude in shaping the details of American diplomacy, calling on Nixon to invoke presidential authority as necessary…and on occasion ignoring his directions.”^[37]

It was also obvious that Nixon was not functioning at full capacity and could not deal with the consequences of the 1973 War himself. On October 20th, 1973, Scowcroft advised Kissinger that Nixon was “devoted exclusively to the Watergate tape crisis” and became “very relaxed with respect to the Middle East issue… he is quite preoccupied with the domestic situation and much more passive toward your mission and the Middle East crisis.”^[38] During the proposed ceasefire and the subsequent Israeli and Egyptian violations of the ceasefire, Kissinger noted that Nixon sounded very distressed and overwhelmed by his own impeachment; Nixon was also far more concerned with the OPEC oil embargo and Geneva peace negotiations than he was with Kissinger’s discussions with Middle East diplomats.

Watergate even made its way to Israel.  A New York Times article detailing Nixon and Kissinger’s visit stated that “[Nixon] encountered, here in Israel, the first show of hostility of his Middle Eastern journey — signs, held by some in the crowds, disparaging his role in the Watergate affair.”^[39] The weight of the Watergate affair stood almost fully on Nixon’s shoulders, affecting Nixon’s ability to negotiate and make decisions about the Middle East. Kissinger, who replaced Rogers as  Nixon’s right-hand man on foreign policy, was entrusted with the power to make decisions when Nixon was incapable. When Soviet forces threatened intervention in October 1973, Kissinger had been the one to place US military forces on DEFCON III alert—the highest state of readiness during peacetime conditions—when Nixon was asleep, completely missing the Cabinet meeting when the alert was called. Both Haig and Kissinger believed he was “too distraught to participate in the preliminary discussion,”^[40] and while none of the officials who had met during the discussion were even elected to public office, Kissinger’s decision was rarely questioned due to Nixon’s prior trust in Kissinger as well as Nixon’s lack of engagement due to Watergate. Quandt emphasizes that these decisions were typical for Kissinger, especially in the context of Watergate: “Kissinger was concerned that the Watergate scandal not appear to impede the conduct of American foreign policy. Intentional overreaction would be better than underreaction.”^[41] The DEFCON III alert turned out to be a necessary overreaction for the US, as it would eventually deter Soviets from intervention and result in unprecedented negotiations between Egypt and Israel.

Sinai I and Sinai II

The DEFCON III alert and the negotiations that followed resulted in the Sinai I and Sinai II peace agreements between the US, Egypt, and Israel. While the agreements were not a comprehensive solution aimed at long-term peace in the Middle East, Sinai I and Sinai II were the logical outcomes of Kissinger’s entire diplomatic trajectory in the Middle East from 1969 onwards. Moreover, they would not have been possible if Kissinger did not already establish a relationship of mutual trust and dependency with Egypt and Israel, nor if Kissinger had not been able to cement his position in the Nixon Administration to have a decent amount of control over foreign policy.

During Sinai I negotiations in 1974, Kissinger shuttled back and forth to broker an agreement between Israel and Egypt, which focused on army lines and buffer zones. It was followed by negotiations for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement plan, which took much longer and centered on the control over the city of Quinetra, but nevertheless reached an agreement on May 31, 1974. After Nixon had resigned, Kissinger negotiated another agreement between Israel and Egypt, or Sinai II, which led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai and an UN buffer zone established in 1975.

Sinai I and Sinai II were transformational in the Middle East, as they had represented a de facto alliance between the US, Egypt, and Israel; not only did US aid for both Israel and Egypt increase staggeringly from the 1970s onward, but the US managed to broker peace between two countries that were locked in conflict for decades. Unfortunately, the unseen consequence was that the agreements completely omitted the issue of Palestine and its potential role in securing long-term peace in the Middle East. This oversight would become the main issue in the Middle East for decades to come–the effects of which extend beyond the scope of this paper. In the years before Sinai I and Sinai II, however, alleviating the pressures generated by the 1973 War was of utmost importance to Kissinger, and his unorthodox means of doing so certainly corresponded with his tactical approach to diplomacy.

Conclusion

Within the scope of Kissinger’s diplomacy and foreign policy outlook, long-term peace in the Middle East from 1967 onwards was never the ultimate goal. As a man dictated by political pragmatism, Kissinger was less influenced by the need for peace within secured borders than his concern for solving political problems as they arose. Oftentimes, this meant establishing relations of trust with countries like Egypt and Israel despite US long-term goals in the region. Furthermore, Kissinger’s disdain for bureaucracy and personal philosophies towards diplomacy would significantly influence the ways in which he dealt with the Middle East, most of which would have never come to fruition had he not exerted a huge amount of influence in the Nixon White House. With the declining influence of Rogers and the emergence of the Watergate scandal, Kissinger was in an ideal position to take the lead on negotiations within the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he had the personality and diplomatic approach to insert himself into such a position. Shuttle diplomacy was therefore not only an isolated, Cold War-approach solution to the 1973 War, but had also followed a much longer trajectory in relation to Kissinger’s diplomacy and the domestic factors that arose during the Nixon years.

Yet, in the long-term scheme of US foreign policy, Kissinger’s policies actually created a foreign policy blowback that contradicted  his original goals of restraint and success in the Middle East. By focusing on Egypt-Israel relations and sidestepping the Palestinian question, the US was inherently unable to serve as a neutral arbiter in future Middle Eastern relations, unfortunately stalling any future prospects for US-led peace in the region. The biggest consequence of Kissinger’s tactical and pragmatic politics was therefore his hubris and inability to see the need for a comprehensive peace plan in the Middle East—an area of the world that requires more than a realpolitik game of chess to navigate.

Bibliography

Hoff, Joan. “A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26,

no. 1 (1996): 107–29.

Woodward, Bob, and Carl Bernstein. “Book Says Nixon Prayed, Wept on Departure.”

Washington Post. March 27, 1976. Item 06. The Harold Weisberg Archive.

http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%20Files/N%20Disk/Nixon

Kissinger, Henry, and Richard Nixon. “Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger).” Office of the Historian, February 21, 1973.

Conversation No. 860–15. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d22.

Stein, Kenneth W. Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace. Taylor & Francis Group, 1996.

Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. Simon and Schuster, 2005.

Shabecoff, Philip. “Kissinger Takes Edge Off Watergate.” The New York Times. May 31, 1974. https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/01/archives/kissinger-takes-edge-off-watergate.html.

Sadat, Anwar al-. “Memo: Message for the President from President Sadat.” Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/51112a4a993247d4d8394484.

Kissinger, Henry. “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon.” Office of the Historian, May 17, 1972. Box 1167. National

Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d287.

Kissinger, Henry, and Simcha Dinitz. “Memorandum of Conversation.” National Security Archive, March 20, 1973. The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/HAK-8—11-71.pdf.

Kissinger, Henry, and William Rusher. “Memorandum of Conversation with Conservative Opinion Leaders.” National Security Archive, August 12, 1971. The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/HAK-8—11-71.pdf.

Kissinger, Henry. “Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting.” Office of the Historian, October 18, 1973.

Document 201. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p1/d20.

Korn, David A. “US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan.” Middle East Journal 44, no. 1 (1990): 37-50. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328055.

Herbers, John. “Most Israelis Hail Nixon; Some Cite Watergate Role.” The New York Times. June 16, 1974. https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/17/archives/-most-israelis-hail-nixon-some-cite-watergate

Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Washington DC: Brook

Endnotes

^[1] Paul Chamberlin, Lecture (How would I cite this?)

^[2] William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington

DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 114

^[3] Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (Simon and Schuster, 2005), 551

^[4] A system of politics or principles based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations.

^[5] Lecture 2/20/18

^[6] Henry Kissinger et. al, Memorandum of Conversation with Conservative Opinion Leaders  (The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977, 2006)

^[7] Joan Hoff, A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy (Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1996), 107-129

^[8] Ibid., 109

^[9] Henry Kissinger and Simcha Dinitz, Memorandum of Conservation (The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977, 2006)

^[10] Joann Hoff, A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy (Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1996), 107-129

^[11] David Korn, US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan (Middle East Journal, 1990), 42

^[12] Henry Kissinger, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, 1972)

^[13] Henry Kissinger and Simcha Dinitz, Memorandum of Conversation

^[14] Henry Kissinger et. al, Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting (Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973)

^[15] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 274

^[16] Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes)

^[17] Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (Taylor and Francis, 1999)

^[18] Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 31

^[19] David Korn, US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan (Middle East Journal, 1990), 42

^[20] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 550

^[21] Henry Kissinger et. al, Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting

^[22] Quandt, Peace and Progress: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967

^[23] Henry Kissinger, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

^[24] Joann Hoff, A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy, 120

^[25] Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 34

^[26] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power

^[27] Ibid.

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] Anwar al-Sadat, Memo: Message for the President from President Sadat (Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Room)

^[30] Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 34

^[31] Ibid.

^[32] John Herbers, Most Israelis Hail Nixon: Some Cite Watergate Role (Jerusalem: The New York Times, 1974)

^[33] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 505

^[34] Philip Shabecoff, “Kissinger Takes Edge Off Watergate” (Washington DC: The New York Times, 1974)

^[35] Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, Book Says Nixon Prayed, Wept on Departure (Washington DC: Washington Post, 1976)

^[36] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 505

^[37] Quandt, Peace and Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, 208

^[38] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 526

^[39] John Herbers, Most Israelis Hail Nixon; Some Cite Watergate Role

^[40] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, Partners in Power, 530

^[41] Quandt, Peace and Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 197

Written by Numi Katz

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu  announced on December 24 that Israel would hold early elections on April 9th, 2019. The announcement came after Netanyahu convened his coalition’s leaders in an emergency meeting to discuss their governing prospects after a period of legislative gridlock.

In the announcement to press, Netanyahu reflected on his coalition’s “four full years in tenure with incredible achievement.” The decision to call for elections arose “out of budgetary and national responsibility” and with a goal of increasing its mandate to “continue to govern in our own path.” The coalition presented a display of solidarity after two months of internal struggles and in anticipation of the challenging campaign ahead. The call for snap elections is best understood in the context of both legislative and personal turmoil.

Netanyahu claims that now is the time for snap elections after the apparent subdual of national security tensions in Gaza and at the Israel-Lebanon border. His administration came under criticism for their handling of both situations with just 36% of the public approving of the administration’s actions in Gaza. Compounded with public dissatisfaction, the situation in Gaza brought to light internal strife within Netanyahu’s coalition. Out of disapproval of a peace agreement between Israel and Hamas, Netanyahu’s defense minister Avigdor Liberman resigned from his post and withdrew his party from the governing coalition. Liberman’s resignation and withdrawal of his party, Yisrael Beiteinu, means the governing coalition holds just a one seat majority in the Knesset.

On the legislative front, Netanyahu’s struggle to pass a controversial new conscription law has captured national attention. The new law attempts to resolve the dispute over the conscription of yeshiva age Ultra-Orthodox teenagers who would otherwise serve in the army. In September 2017, the Israeli Supreme Court struck down a policy exempting ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students from military conscription, tasking the government with drafting new legislation to remedy the situation. Between the first and second drafts of the bill Netanyahu lost the necessary votes to pass the bill with the resignation of Avigdor Liberman. Now, he faces defections from all sides with both left leaning and religious parties pulling their support for the bill after its second reading. The law is extremely important to Netanyahu’s constituency and legislative paralysis helped push the coalition towards calling elections to increase their mandate.

Not only has his coalition faced challenges from all sides, but Netanyahu himself is also the subject of his third corruption investigation. Israel’s Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit recently announced that he would begin reviewing the case for corruption charges against Netanyahu. The call for snap elections constrains and politicizes Mandeblit’s investigation. Given the short time frame it is unlikely that the prime minister will be indicted or cleared before votes are cast. Perhaps more consequential to the legitimacy of the investigation, any announcement made in the context of ongoing elections is at risk of being construed as politically motivated. The call for snap elections not only emerges from legislative needs but hopes to preempt the corruption investigation from making Netanyahu a non-viable candidate.Despite underlying instability, early public opinion polls and past approval ratings suggest that Netanyahu’s coalition is likely to remain in power for another term. Victory, however, will be hard fought. The largest threat to Netanyahu comes from ex-IDF chief Benny Gantz who leads the Israel Resilience Party. Polls put Gantz’s newly created party second in the polls, but still well behind Netanyahu’s Likud. Rather than poaching Likud voters, Gantz’s decision to enter the race appears to pull voters from Yair Lapid’s centrist party. With three months until election day, a difficult campaign lies ahead for Israeli politicians.

Image Caption: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat shake hands at the signing of the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles.

Introduction

The Oslo Peace Process was the first direct, bi-lateral set of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Distinct from the multilateral Arab-Israeli track at the Madrid Conference, it represented a historic break-through between principal players. With the 1993 Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially recognized Israel’s right to exist. Meanwhile, Israel recognized the PLO’s right to self-government as an autonomous Palestinian people. While Oslo left many final-status issues such as the return of refugees, borders, settlements, and the status of Jerusalem undetermined, the exchange of land for peace, beginning with the 1994 withdrawal of troops from Gaza and Jericho, was promising. In theory, it would resolve the frustrating contest over territory ongoing since the expansion of Israel’s borders in the 1967 Six Day War, while committing both sides to resolve outstanding issues through non-violent means. Despite this early promise, historians recount the Oslo Accords with an overwhelming sense of failure and defeat. Ultimately, rejectionists from both sides managed to undo the delicate trade-off of land for peace. The peace process was hijacked and used as a springboard for terrorism and fear.

Analysis of Oslo’s failure typically begins with an analysis of its limited capacity to endure throughout the 1990s. Indeed, Oslo stretched beyond the 1993 Declaration of Principles, to the 1995 agreement at Taba, or Oslo II, the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and finally the 1999 Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum.^[1]  Oslo’s experimentation with the incremental building of trust, its gradualism, was fatal as it “provide[d] opportunities for destroying, as much as constructing confidence.”^[2] Leaders were forced back to Camp David in 2000 for an entirely new peace process as the momentum behind the interim agreement disintegrated. In fact, many argue that Oslo died as early as November, 1995, when Prime Minister and chief negotiator Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by right-wing activist Yigal Amir in Tel-Aviv.^[3] This notion that individuals hold instrumental value in history has been essential to contemporary reflections on Oslo. For instance, historian Avi Shlaim insists it was not the fall of Rabin, but the subsequent rise of Likud Leader Benjamin Netanyahu, which is to blame for the failure of the accords.^[4] He notes that Netanyahu was a vocal opponent of the peace process as a young Member of the Knesset in the opposition and later as Prime Minister. From 1996 to 2000, the period for which Oslo II had promised significant withdrawal from the West Bank, Prime Minister Netanyahu oversaw the building of a record number of settlements.^[5]

This paper rejects this individual-centered historiography. It must be noted that this approach was used by the signatories of the Oslo Accords themselves, who couched the process as a ‘‘peace of the brave.”^[6] Relying on the personal qualities of leaders, whether brave, or extremely fallible, to explain the strategic developments which occurred while they held office is a shallow approach which neglects the broader geo-political and national realities of the moment. In particular, the argument that an anemic leadership kept Oslo from surviving the turbulent resistance of the 1990s, ignores the compatibility of Oslo’s terms with the fractious reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is this mismatch which arguably gave rise to resistance in the first place. Further, the neat paradigm of two coherent adversaries promulgated by the Oslo Accords, contradicted the internal battles gripping both the Israelis and Palestinians at the time. It was Oslo’s masking of the vital re-negotiations of sense and significance at the heart of Israeli and Palestinian society, which led to a debilitating distrust and stalling negotiations. It was not only the spoilers who explicitly intended to disrupt the peace process, but a poorly tailored peace process, which was to blame. This can be evidenced by the fact that genuine non-violent resistance to Oslo emanated from the moderate core of both Palestine and Israel. It was not exclusively the product of those at the fringes of radical society. Prospect theory in international relations, which seeks to explain deviations in rational decision-making, says that peace agreements must be “sold” by the elite to the general public.^[7]  Oslo was “sold” as a peace between two peoples rather than a peace between delegations of statesmen, which is precisely why the failure to understand and incorporate the national aspirations of these peoples into the terms of the agreement, also led to its failure overall.

Rather than fixating on the markers of its failure in the 1990s, this paper will explore the decision-making process which determined Oslo’s contents in the late 1980s. After this brief historical overview, it will proceed with a discussion of the internal disagreements facing both Israelis and Palestinians at the time. These clashes widened the gap between the official bi-lateral objectives of Oslo, and the vastly more complicated reality of each of the groups that was a party to it. First, the conflict over Israeli ideology and identity, and the emergence of the “new historians” and other Zionist revisionist who questioned the Israeli project in the rare reprise of peace which followed the tumult of the Lebanon War. Second, the contest over political representation in the Palestinian Territories. By recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate political representative of the Palestinian people, Oslo manufactured an undemocratic consent about who ought to govern, and it enflamed existing tensions.

Historical Overview

The 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles was inspired by an earlier peace plan by David Shultz of the Reagan administration, devised during the early days of the first intifada, the Palestinian uprising which began in 1987. The intifada led to renewed international attention and regional peace initiatives. Between February and June 1988, Shultz mimicked Henry Kissinger’s technique of “shuttle diplomacy” to promote his plan by travelling three times to the Middle East in five months.^[8]  With the recent blunder of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon in mind, Shultz pursued a cautious U.S. Middle East policy which envisioned international diplomacy as a means to facilitate bi-lateral meetings to establish peaceful working relations and a government in the Palestinian territories. The goal was to keep the American mediators at a comfortable distance from the chaos of the Middle East.^[9]  Ultimately, the plan was frustrated by the oncoming victory of George H. W Bush in the 1989 Presidential elections and the continued isolation of the PLO, which was in the early days of the intifada still reluctant to accept non- violent resistance.^[10]

This changed in November 1988, when in a speech to the General Assembly, Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO, finally met U.S. demands to renounce terrorism, and accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which called for Arab-Israeli peace and mutual recognition.^[11]  Arafat’s declaration re-invigorated hopes of a bi-lateral Shultz style plan, and it seemed truly genuine. Earlier in the year, Arafat had been denied entry to the United States to speak in New York. The Reagan administration proclaimed that Arafat “knows of, condones and lends support to acts of terrorism.”^[12]  Shultz himself decided not to recommend a waiver of the law that prohibited individuals identified as terrorists from entering the country because ”no participant in a peace process can wave the flag of justice in one hand and brandish the weapons of terrorism in the other.”^[13]  Of course this objection was referring to Arafat’s 1974 speech to the UN General Assembly, in which he came ”bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun.” In this more intense speech, Arafat cautioned the audience, and the international community, not let the olive branch fall from his arms.^[14]  He still presumably, held the fighter’s gun. It was unclear in 1974 where PLO violent resistance was headed and many were still reeling from the 1970 conflict in Jordan: Black September. In 1988, however Arafat made himself very clear. He sought a peaceful and just settlement, drawn from “realistic and attainable formulas that would settle the issue on the basis of possible rather than absolute justice.”^[15] In essence, Arafat was turning the page on revolutionary pipe dreams of reclaiming the whole of Eretz Israel, from the Mediterranean sea to the Jordan River. Additionally, the 1988 speech was accompanied by a new Palestinian Declaration of Independence written by renowned Palestinian poet Mahmoud Dariwsh and proclaimed by Yasser Arafat on 15 November 1988.^[16]

Throughout 1989–1990, U.S. peacemaking efforts centered on a plan similar to the Shultz plan, put forward by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. It called on the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to elect representatives who would negotiate interim arrangements for self-governance with Israel. This would be followed by a permanent status agreement.^[17] However, In March 1990, controversy over how to proceed with Shamir’s plan led to the fall of Israel’s national unity government.^[18]  The failure of the plan, combined with sharp U.S.-Israeli exchanges over Israeli settlement-building in the Occupied Territories, strained relations between Bush and Shamir.^[19]

Yet again, the ambitious land-for-peace style deal was put on hold in favor of a traditional multi-lateral track. The United States proceeded with the October 30, 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. Co-chaired by President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the conference was attended by Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese delegations. It was the first time all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict gathered to hold direct negotiations.^[20] Importantly, the Palestinian team was part of a joint Jordanian delegation which expressly excluded the PLO.^[21] Exiled in Tunis since their expulsion from Southern Lebanon in 1982, the PLO was not considered the prevailing voice of the Palestinians.^[22] Furthermore, Madrid was curated by America’s NATO Gulf War coalition which had just succeeded in driving Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. The PLO was a vocal supporter of Hussein and the Ba’ath Party in Iraq, and was therefore unwelcome.^[23]

Shimon Peres, Israel’s Foreign Affairs Minister described multi-lateral negotiations according to the “the bicycle principle … when one pedal moves the other moves by itself.”^[24]

The problem with Madrid was that the bicycle peddle was stuck. Israel and the U.S. focused on the Syria track to resolve missile threats in the Golan Heights but Hafez Al-Assad of the Syrian Ba’ath party was an incredibly difficult negotiator. Al-Assad was unwilling to make compromises.^[25]  As the squabbles of the Arab world slowed Madrid down to a halt, Yossi Bellin and Shimon Peres began to think of an alternative strategy, back to the original essence of the Shamir and the Shultz plans.^[26]

The stalemate in the Madrid talks ultimately led to the opening of the Oslo back channel and secret talks, held over an eight month period in 1993 in Oslo, Norway. Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Johan Joergen Holst and Social Scientist Terge Rod Larsen played hosts and were able to provide an easy and honest connection between Israel and the PLO.^[27]  The reason for the ease of the secret negotiations and the frankness of talks between the three partners was that a back-channel had actually started as early as 1979, when Yasser Arafat requested a direct line to the Israeli government through the Norwegian government. Arafat’s request came after the revelation that the Norwegians were selling oil to the Israelis during the international shortage which followed the collapse of the Iranian monarchy and the Islamic Revolution. Norway was situated as a peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon around PLO operatives, and this commercial decision compromised Norwegian impartiality. Norway, the PLO and Israel negotiated this back-channel to make up for it. Peres and Rabin were also inclined to give greater attention to Oslo with the growing threat of Hamas and Islamic jihad in occupied territories.^[28]  This allowed the West to perceive Arafat as less of a frightening figure and it refocused them on his recent declarations of peace in New York. Furthermore, by June 1990, according to Benny Morris, “the Intifada seemed to have lost direction. A symptom of the PLO’s frustration was the great increase in the killing of suspected collaborators.”^[29]  Between 1988 and 1992, intra-Palestinian violence and the execution of suspected collaborators claimed the lives of nearly 1,000 people.^[30]  An assessment by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Director of Military Intelligence of the time stated that Arafat’s dire situation made him “the most convenient interlocutor for Israel at that particular juncture.”^[31]

Oslo’s primary significance was the promotion of a formula of land for peace and the mutual recognition of both sides. Land for peace is a legal interpretation of UN Resolution 242. It affirms that peace should include the application of two principles: withdrawal of Israeli forces (giving up land) and termination of all claims or states of belligerency (making peace). In addition, Oslo essentially provided the constitution for a de facto government in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority would be self-governing in terms of raising taxes and spending revenues on portfolios like health, police, and social welfare.^[32]  Palestinian jurisdiction for the interim agreement was split into Area A, where it maintained full control; Area B where Palestinian civilian control was combined with Israeli security control; and finally Area C with full Israeli security and civil control.^[33]  After a five-year interim period, the hope was that negotiators would move on to a permanent settlement which addressed the tricky details including Areas B and C.

This proved very difficult. While there was one high-level committee for figures like Abbas and Peres, a “nuts and bolts” committee met at the Red Sea resort of Taba regularly. Negotiations on the transfer of security authority to a growing Palestinian police force were particularly challenging. Underlying the “labyrinth,” negotiations at Taba in 1995 was a basic conceptual divide.^[34] The Israeli representatives wanted a gradual and strictly limited transfer of power to Palestinian police to maintain overall responsibility for security, while Palestinians wanted an early and complete transfer of power to enable them to lay the foundations for an independent state.^[35]  Furthermore, seeds of mistrust on security matters were sown by disruptive resistance and violence from both sides.

Hamas set out to embarrass Arafat and delegitimize non-violent resistance. The day before the Declaration of Principles was signed, Hamas killed three Israeli soldiers in Gaza. The day afterwards, a suicide bomber self-exploded in a police station.^[36]  Between 1993 and 1996 a total of 300 Israelis were killed in such attacks.^[37]  The Israeli consciousness was particularly wounded by the 1994 Dizengoff bus attack which killed 13. Many pondered the fact that the No.5 bus targeted by Hamas, ran to a prosperous area of north Tel Aviv which was home to many supporters of the Labor Government.^[38]  Palestinian terrorism was becoming more severe, uncontainable and chaotic. This escalation made the essential cause of violence, calls to justice against the occupation, more difficult to sympathize with, even for left-wing Israelis.

Likewise, the 1994 Hebron massacre killing 29 Palestinian worshippers in the Mosque of Ibrahim during the holy month of Ramadan by Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli settler and member of the far-right Kach movement, hardened the Palestinians. UN Resolution 904 condemned the incident and expressed shock and grave concern about how a lack of security control for the Palestinian people would influence the peace process.^[39]  The Israeli Knesset consequently banned the Kach party from politics.

The Hebron attack, similarly to the Dizengoff attack, irreparably damaged trust. Dizengoff confirmed Israelis’ fears about negotiating with “terrorists.” Even though PLO and Hamas commands were separate, Israeli media painted all “Palestinians” as one. Meanwhile, the Hebron attack by a settler on a Mosque, spoke to the broader challenges posed by increasing numbers of settlements to the survival of the Oslo accords. By-pass roads violently cut through land; and walls erected to separate communities claimed additional land.^[40]

Settlements did not contravene the terms of the Oslo interim agreement, but many Palestinians argued that the interim arrangement had enabled them. The settlements were a symbol of the occupation, a source of daily friction, and a “constant reminder of the danger to the territorial contiguity of their future state.”^[41]

As the Oslo interim agreement inched closer to a final-status negotiation, the violence and tension between the Israelis and Palestinians only increased. For example, Oslo II, which was signed on the 28th  of September, 1995 was substantively insignificant. Oslo II extended on the principle of Palestinian authority explained in Oslo I by providing elections to a Palestinian council, permitting the transfer of legislative authority to this council, and providing for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from more Palestinian urban centers.^[42]  However, Oslo II was incredibly significant in the reaction it incited. The day the Knesset endorsed the agreement, demonstrators gathered in Zion square in Jerusalem. Netanyahu, the leader of the Likud, “was on the grandstand while demonstrators displayed an effigy of Rabin in an SS uniform.”^[43]  A month later, Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, a religious-nationalist. After the death of Yitzhak Rabin, settlement activity continued under several prime ministers, Labor as well as Likud.^[44]

Importantly, Oslo II was endorsed by the Knesset by a majority of just one vote. Oslo was not only doomed by a growing distrust between Israelis and Palestinians, but rather by its neglect of the divisions in internal politics, and the slim margins of consensus on both sides. Shimon Peres followed Rabin down the “pot-holed road to peace” but his efforts ended with his electoral defeat in May 1996.^[45]  Rabin’s successor, Ehud Barak, struggled with providing staunch leadership on the peace process and let his hand slide on settlements. The same was true of Ariel Sharon who succeeded him. Ironically, when Netanyahu came to power, intense American pressure actually compelled him to concede territory to the PA on two occasions, the Hebron Protocol of January 15 th,1997, and the Wye River Plantation Memorandum of October 23rd, 1998. The Likud government committed to withdrawing from a further 13% of the West Bank in three stages over a period of three months.^[46] However, a revolt in Netanyahu’s own ultra-nationalist and religious coalition brought down the government after just one settlement withdrawal. The fall of the coalition government was in some way inevitable because of the basic contradiction between its declared policy of striving for peace with the Arab world and its ideological makeup, which militated against trading land for peace in favor of a purely Jewish state.^[47]  Meanwhile, on the other side of the green line, the bloody tug of war for legitimate rule over the Palestinian people continued to be fought between Hamas and the PLO.

The end of the Cold War and the Gulf War represented seismic shocks to the international system which at the time seemed to reduce the risks of seeking peace and increasing the incentives to take such risks for both the Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, the geopolitical arena had changed, shaping a “new world order,” more impartial to the conflict and willing to provide the time and resources to broker a peace.^[48] Moscow’s embrace of “new thinking” in foreign policy, and coalition making based on a united front for justice rather than bi-polar Cold War competition, gave negotiators the hope that this Middle East peace — free of Soviet arms deals, proxy wars, or covert support to terrorist organizations like the PFLP — would be different. The purpose of the bi-lateral meetings in Norway was in a way to drown out the noise of the international community, now supposedly at peace with itself, to leave the Israelis and Palestinians to their own devices. While recent developments may have been conducive to global peace, this model neglected the internal divisions which had been sown in Israeli and Palestinian society. These will be explored in the coming two sections. They were the greatest barriers to building trust, and finding peace.

Israel: Contested Identity

Yaron Ezrahi writes in his book Rubber Bullets, on power and conscience in modern Israel, about the understudied effect of the intifada on Israeli society. The intifada ushered a transformation in the way Israelis envisioned their relationship with the Palestinians. It led many to acknowledge the quest for Palestinian national self-determination for the first time ever and changed Israel from a warrior to a peace-making nation. To Ezrahi, nothing symbolized this cultural shift better than the army’s use of rubber bullets to confront stone-throwing Palestinians during the second intifada.^[49]  He credits democratic liberalism, which flourished as Israel inched further away from the intense military years of the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1960s and 1970s. Why was Israel unable to sustain a peace-making policy orientation after Rabin’s death and throughout the Oslo peace process? One simple explanation is the disruptive terrorist attacks discussed above. The attacks hardened both sides and sowed distrust. However, if Ezrahi’s thesis about liberal democracy is true, the return to warrior Israel is also about the defeat of an individualist and free-thinking identity in favor of a collectivist nationalist one.

The Oslo peace process did not provide an ideology or symbol of nationhood to match its policy of peace with the Palestinians.^[50]  In the absence of a common narrative, “Jewish Israel” and “democratic Israel” re-engaged in an identity battle, each in an effort to cast their narrative as the mainstream. This identity struggle was exacerbated by the emergence of the “new historians,” who presented radically new national facts and modes of historical interpretation.^[51]  Coined by author Benny Morris, “new historians,” describes a group of young Israeli writers recasting the standard Zionist narrative. Morris, along with Shlaim and several others, told a history of Israel’s triumphs that for the first time, did not hide a Palestinian history living by its side.^[52]  In doing so, they challenged the foundational beliefs that Israelis held as self-evident. For decades, Israelis both politically left and right were raised on a celebratory version of their history – a story of the heroic return to Zion and the resettlement of the desolate Jewish homeland. Morris and his colleagues shifted the focus of historical inquiry away from the wonder of Jewish national rebirth to that of Palestinian suffering.^[53]  This historical interjection essentially raised the stakes over narrative control, and furthered societal divisions. Israelis squabbled over the legitimacy of activist organizations like “Peace Now,” and the appropriateness of history school books and the national curriculum.^[54]  The long-term structural forces of demography in the country, namely the disproportionately high growth rate of the ultraorthodox and Religious-Zionist segments of the population and their membership in majority coalitions in government, probably led to the victory of collectivist, warrior Israel over time.^[55]  More importantly for this discussion, however, Israelis emerged as a disorganized unit with no common conception of their national aspirations. This hurt Oslo’s chances. The identity crisis proved debilitating.

It is important not to present this renegotiation of Israeli identity as purely factional, and especially not to present it as a conflict between secular and religious Israelis. Monumental questions about Israel, its place relative to Palestine, and its position in the Middle East, were prevalent amongst individual Israelis and engaged with in different ways. This is why the narrative of extremists dismantling peace is too simple.

Considering Israeli politicians’ views on the intervention in Lebanon helps to illustrate this point about how individuals, including political leaders, engage with contested ideologies. Ariel Sharon came to office in 2001 from a military background as former Minister of the IDF. In 1983, the Israeli Kahan Commission was appointed to investigate the Sabra and Shatila massacre committed in a Palestinian refugee camp during Israel’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war. The Commission found that Israeli military personnel, aware that a massacre was in progress, failed to stop it, and that Ariel Sharon bore personal responsibility for the bloodshed.^[56]  Amos Oz speaks to this collective guilt, and later on selective memory of trauma, in The Slopes of Lebanon, a book about memory and historiography in Israel. Oz argues that Israelis cannot point to Menachem Begin, or Sharon who carried out his orders during the Lebanese War only. He insists, “this war was a war of the people.”^[57]  He then asks who the people actually were. For example, the Labor party and the centrist Shinui party (Democratic Party for Change), either voted with the government or abstained in the vote of no confidence when the war broke out. Meanwhile, “M. K. Imri Ron, of the left-wing Mapam, was photographed in his army uniform and his officer’s insignia, calling upon his party to support the war and not to incense the people.”^[58] Labour party leader Yitzhak Rabin, who would be Oslo’s peace man, recommended “tightening the siege on Beirut.”^[59]

Final-status negotiations were consistently delayed in the context of the Oslo Accords, because they would force such moderates to engage with their contradictions. Importantly, it would also warrant that political leaders take a decisive position in the fight between the liberal and conservative conceptions of Israel. The argument which insists that the failure of Oslo was as a result of the failure of leadership in the face of resistance, disregards what was a complex reality for leaders who had to balance their personal political ideology, that of their party, and their prospects of political success. To win elections, politicians must align their platforms with popular sentiments. Final-status negotiations which would deal with the return of refugees, or indeed the simple recognition of the total number Palestinians living in Israel as citizens, posed a major dilemma to both the identity calculus and the political calculus.^[60]  How could Israel remain both a Jewish and democratic state if the majority was Arab? This was perhaps the most important final-status question. As the internal struggle over identity persisted, Israelis and their leaders never emerged united to answer such difficult final-status questions.

Palestine: Contested Leadership

The intifada was a mass uprising of Palestinians through mostly nonviolent means like boycotts and demonstrations.^[61]  The PLO’s willingness to engage in the Oslo peace process with the intifada raging in the background fueled disenchantment and the view that Arafat and his henchmen were collaborators of Israel.^[62]  Many Palestinians did not consider the international arena, no matter the promises of post-Cold War peace, an even playing field in which to seek a just end to the occupation. Where identity and ideology were contested on the Israeli side, the Palestinians were uneasy with the legitimacy Oslo gave to the PLO as their rightful leaders.

Furthermore, the loss of life and the despair that ensued after the popular resistance movement fell apart, led many to the Islamic militant group, Hamas, which grew rapidly in its pledge to Palestinian liberation through “sacrifice, blood and jihad.”^[63] Hamas of course became a significant spoiler of the frail pacifism which held Oslo together. Again, a recasting of “extremism” is required in this discussion in order to arrive at a better understanding of the essential internal divisions gripping the Palestinians. Criticisms of the accords were not exclusive to the periphery of Palestinian society, and indeed came from its very center, notably, from poet Mahmoud Darwish, who had written the 1988 PLO Charter which accompanied Arafat’s renunciation of violence at the United Nations, and academic Edward Said.^[64]

In the London Review of Books the morning after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, Said wrote about his many apprehensions with the deal. He saw in the PLO another corrupt Arab government, with injustices emanating from the considerable divide between the elite and the people, where Palestinians themselves were but “guests,” and never key partners in governance.^[65]  He considered the gains of the intifada squandered by the PLO’s unwillingness to seek multiple alternatives in negotiations. This demonstrated that prospect theory – the “selling” of peace accords from the elite negotiators to the people – clearly failed. Edward Said provides an important reflection on violent terrorism, arguing that the terms of the accord and the framing of the process by the PLO drove people to violent extremism by renouncing their right to popular resistance.^[66]  Though Hamas and Professor Edward Said stood at wildly different junctures in the world, it was the same point about the strait jacket of international diplomacy and the assignment of the PLO as the ultimate leaders by foreigners without the consent of the people, which both Hamas and Said questioned.

By no means was Said the singular voice of moderate resistance, nor should his particular criticisms be taken as the ultimate reasons for why the Oslo Accords failed. Nonetheless, his challenge to the idea of the PLO’s unquestioned predominance speak to the problem with Oslo’s negligence of Palestine’s long history of contested leadership, and indeed it’s constant negotiation between violent and non-violent resistance. Like its negligence of the Israeli contest over identity, this proved fatal.

The original Arab Nationalist Movement of George Habbash, was an umbrella organization which branched off into several other Palestinian groups like the PLO and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) during the 1970s.^[67]  Intense rivalries divided these factions as they sought influence. The PLO including Arafat was expelled from Beirut to Tunis by the South Lebanon Army and the Christian Phalange following the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, not to mention its earlier expulsion from Jordan following Black September in 1978. Distant from the active arena of warfare, and eager to gain a push towards legitimacy by the international community, the PLO developed an argument for non-violent resistance. Meanwhile, the PFLP which represented a secular socialist resistance, stood by its legacy of airplane hijackings and car bombs.^[68]

The first Intifada took a “new mythological character embodied in the ‘stone child’ or stone-throwing youth, which assumed the role of the fedayee who had been worn out by his conflict abroad.”^[69]  This was of great help to the PLO, as the international and domestic trends favored the strategy of non-violence it had adopted by necessity. While this convenient alignment of values empowered the PLO at the moment, doubts about their commitment to full and meaningful justice for all Palestinians, including those displaced, led many to doubt the PLO’s intentions and the power given to them through Oslo’s interim governing arrangement. As Said and Darwish warned, this temporary structure imparted a long-term reality. The lethargy of the PLO and its elite organization, combined with a fervor for resistance that was ignored, led to a splintering of leadership between violent and non-violent. Palestine became “fragmented between two internal entities, having transformed the confrontation with the enemy into a confrontation within [itself].”^[70]  As the spoilers of peace continued on the other side of the green line, and anger from Palestinians in the ever shrinking green line grew, the Palestinian leadership, like the Israeli, never meaningfully moved forward towards final-status negotiations.

Conclusion

The understanding of states as cohesive units in international affairs with secure leaders at their helm cannot be assumed in a situation where the Israelis are constantly re-negotiating their identity and the Palestinians do not know who is in charge. The two-state solution did not necessarily die because Netanyahu and successive Israeli governments were determined to kill it, and it was not because Palestinians allowed terrorism to take place. The moral courage of individuals is not what should be in question, but rather the compatibility of an agreement with the aspirations of the people. In such a theater of pain and distrust, both the policy solution, and the mode of its communication to the public are equally important. With no grasp of the internal battles which were re-negotiating national aspirations, Oslo missed the mark. Whether willful, or completely unintentional, “ignorance of narratives on both sides lead to a situation in which both sides including their respective leaders were unaware of the red lines and domestic constraints limiting the other.”[71]  This discussion cannot be treated as a cultural after thought. Rather than theorize about what Oslo’s failure means, understanding the meaningful internal barriers to trust which leads to its downfall is critical if there is ever to be a revival of the peace process which fully acknowledges Palestinians and Israelis with full respect.

About the Author

Joudy Sarraj is in her final year at the University of Toronto as a Heaslip Scholar. She is a double major in international relations and ethics, society and law. Joudy is interested in institutional and economic development issues, particularly in post-conflict scenarios.

Endnotes

[1] Landon. E Hancock and Joshua. N. Weiss, “Prospect Theory and the Failure to Sell the Oslo Accords,” Peace & Change 36 (2011): 429.

[2] Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 317.

[3] Ibid., 319.

[4] Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin, 2000), 603.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Landon. E Hancock and Joshua. N. Weiss, “Prospect Theory and the Failure to Sell the Oslo Accords,” Peace & Change 36 (2011): 433.

[7] Ibid.

[8] “Shultz Plan, 1988,” Palestine Facts, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_shultz_plan/

[9] William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 393.

[10] Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 326.

[11] “Declaration of Principles,” September 13, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx

[12]  Robert Pear, “U.S. Denies Arafat Entry For Speech to Session of U.N,” New York Times, Archives, November 27, 1988. https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/world/us-denies-arafat-entry-for-speech-to-session-of-un.html

[13] Ibid.

[14] “2282nd  Plenary Meeting.” United Nations General Assembly. November 13, 1974.

https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A238EC7A3E13EED18525624A007697EC

[15] “Speech by Yasser Arafat to the United Nations,” Haaretz, May 13, 2002, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5268352.

[16] “Palestinian Declaration of Independence,” MidEast Web, November 15, 1988, http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm.

[17] Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 50.

[18] “The Madrid Conference, 1991,” Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/madrid-conference.

[19] William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 390.

[20] “The Madrid Conference, 1991,” Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/madrid- conference.

[21] Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 55.

[22] Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 314.

[23] Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 55.

[24] Ibid., 59.

[25] Ibid., 60.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., 63.

[29] Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 (New York: Knopf, 1999), 612.

[30] Ibid., 613.

[31] Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 60.

[32] Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 60.

[33] “Declaration of Principles,” September 13, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx

[34] Ibid.

[35] Dennis Ross, Margaret Warner, and Jim Hoagland, “From Oslo to Camp David to Taba: Setting the Record Straight,” The Washington Institute, Policy Watch 340,August 14, 2001, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/from-oslo-to-camp-david-to-taba-setting-the-record-straight.

[36] Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs,

2008), 318.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., 322.

[39] “Resolution 904 (1994),” March 18,1994, United Nations Security Council, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/4690652A351277438525634C006DC10

[40] Geoffery R. Watson, Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement (Oxford

University Press, 2000), 25.

[41] Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 72.

[42] Ibid., 47.

[43] Ibid., 48.

[44] Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 320.

[45] Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” International Relations of the Middle East, eds. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 48.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of

International Relations 5 (1999): 5-36.

[49] Yaron Ezrahi, Rubber Bullets: Power and Conscience in Modern Israel (New York: Straus & Giroux, 1997), 151.

[50] Landon. E Hancock and Joshua. N. Weiss, “Prospect Theory and the Failure to Sell the Oslo Accords,” Peace & Change 36 (2011): 427- 452.

[51] Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, “From Taboo to the Negotiable: The Israeli New Historians and the Changing

Representation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 241-58.

[52] Ibid., 246.

[53] Paul Scham, “The Historical Narratives of Israelis and Palestinians and the Peacemaking Process,” Israeli Studies Forum 21, no.2 (2006): 64.

[54] Dov Waxman and Ilan Peleg, “Neither Ethnocracy nor Bi-nationalism: in Search of the Middle Ground,” Israel

Studies Forum 23, no.2 (2008): 55-72.

[55] Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 411.

[56] Amos Oz, The Slopes of Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, Ltd., 1987), 40.

[57] Ibid., 41.

[58] Ibid., 42.

[59] Dov Waxman and Ilan Peleg, “Neither Ethnocracy nor Bi-nationalism: in Search of the Middle Ground,” Israel

Studies Forum 23, no.2 (2008): 55- 72.

[60] Paul Scham, “The Historical Narratives of Israelis and Palestinians and the Peacemaking Process,” Israeli Studies Forum 21, no.2 (2006): 59.

[61] Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 322.

[62] “Leaflet No. 1,” Jewish Virtual Library, 1988, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/hamasintifada.pdf.

[63] Sinan Antoon, “Mahmud Darwish’s Allegorical Critique of Oslo,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 2 (2002);

Edward Said, “The Morning After,” The London Review of Books 15, no. 20 (1993).

[64] Edward Said, “The Morning After.”

[65] Ibid.

[66] Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin, 2000).

[67] Leila Khaled, My People Shall Live: The Auto-biography of a Revolutionary, eds. George Hajjar (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973).

[68] Honaida Ghanim, “The Urgency of a New Beginning in Palestine: An Imagined Scenario by Mahmoud Darwish

and Hannah Arendt,” College Literature 38, no.1 (2011): 88.

[69] Ibid., 90

[70] Paul Scham, “The Historical Narratives of Israelis and Palestinians and the Peacemaking Process,” Israeli Studies Forum 21, no.2 (2006): 56.

[71] Ibid.