Introduction

The concept of smart power, first articulated by Joseph Nye in the early 2000s, has become a foundational framework for understanding how states navigate an increasingly complex global system. While traditional models of power focus either on coercive (military) or persuasive (soft power) mechanisms, smart power integrates both, combining military, economic, cultural, and diplomatic tools in a flexible, strategic approach to achieve state objectives. As the global order shifts toward multipolarity, the role of smart power becomes more critical. In a world shaped by hybrid threats, cyber warfare, and rapid technological advances, the ability to wield smart power is not just essential for global leadership but also for national resilience. 

This article explores the theoretical foundations of smart power, with a particular focus on the United States as the most successful example of its application. It critically assesses the U.S. approach and compares it with the strategies of other key global players, offering a comprehensive analysis of the strengths and limitations of each approach.

Theoretical Framework: Ingredients of Smart Power in International Relations

Smart power blends the foundational ideas of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Realists argue that coercive power—particularly military and economic strength—remains crucial for influence. Liberal institutionalists assert that states must build international cooperation through norms, laws, and institutional frameworks. Constructivists highlight the role of identity, legitimacy, and perceptions in shaping global interactions. Smart power synthesizes these theories, combining hard elements of coercion with soft tools of diplomacy, cultural influence, and multilateral cooperation, aiming to secure legitimacy for state actions.¹

The key ingredients of smart power include material power, diplomatic finesse, cultural diplomacy, narrative control, hybrid agility, and technological prowess. Together, these elements form a state’s ability to wield influence effectively and flexibly, engaging with both coercion and persuasion while adapting to the changing dynamics of international relations.

Smart Power in Practice: The United States

The United States has long exemplified the effective use of smart power, a strategic approach that integrates both hard power (military and economic coercion) and soft power (diplomatic, cultural, and normative influence) to pursue national interests. This model, as articulated by Joseph Nye, has been essential for the U.S. in navigating an increasingly multipolar world. The U.S. has leveraged its vast military capabilities, economic dominance, and cultural influence to shape the global order, but the efficacy of its smart power strategy has been contingent upon its ability to blend coercive force with the promotion of democratic values and multilateral cooperation.

Historically, the United States’ smart power strategy has hinged on a combination of hard and soft elements. The Marshall Plan of 1948, which provided economic aid to post-war Europe, is one of the most iconic examples of U.S. smart power in action.² By combining economic assistance with the promotion of democratic governance, the U.S. successfully shaped the post-war order and bolstered its influence over Western Europe.³ Similarly, during the Cold War, the U.S. demonstrated a masterful use of both military deterrence and diplomatic engagement, particularly in resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis through a delicate balance of threats and negotiations.⁴ These instances underscore the potential of smart power to integrate hard and soft elements in pursuit of long-term strategic objectives.

In recent decades, the U.S. has continued to adapt its smart power strategy to confront new geopolitical challenges. One of the most notable contemporary examples is the Pivot to Asia, which aimed to counter China’s rising influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategy combined increased diplomatic engagement with regional allies, economic partnerships through initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and military reinforcement through strategic alliances with countries such as Japan and South Korea.⁵ The Pivot to Asia highlighted the U.S.’s ability to use both soft power, through trade agreements and diplomatic outreach, and hard power, through military presence and security partnerships, to assert its influence in a changing global landscape.

Moreover, the United States’ cultural diplomacy has been a central pillar of its soft power. Institutions such as Hollywood, Silicon Valley, and prestigious universities have long been vehicles for projecting American values of freedom, innovation, and democracy worldwide. These institutions not only shape global perceptions of the U.S. but also provide a platform for fostering global networks of influence. A particularly significant example of U.S. soft power is the PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) initiative, which was launched in 2003. PEPFAR is one of the largest global health initiatives aimed at combating HIV/AIDS and has provided lifesaving treatment to millions of people, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. This initiative, blending humanitarian aid with diplomatic engagement, exemplifies the U.S. use of smart power to promote health, human rights, and global security, reinforcing its image as a leader in global health.

However, the U.S. has not been immune to criticisms of inconsistency and hypocrisy in its application of smart power, particularly when military interventions and economic sanctions have contradicted the values it promotes. The War on Terror, for instance, raised questions about the ethical limits of U.S. power, as its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan were seen by many as undermining its moral authority.⁶ Such contradictions reveal that the success of smart power is contingent upon maintaining a balance between coercion and legitimacy.

The rise of new technologies, such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI), has further transformed the U.S.’s approach to smart power. In the digital age, the U.S. has embraced the strategic use of information warfare, technological innovation, and digital diplomacy to assert its global influence. As a leader in both the development and regulation of emerging technologies, the U.S. has sought to shape the global rules of the digital economy, from data privacy laws to cybersecurity norms.⁷ This demonstrates the increasing importance of technological diplomacy as an extension of soft power, enabling the U.S. to project influence in the digital realm without resorting to traditional military force.

However, the deployment of smart power remains fraught with challenges. One significant concern is the legitimacy gap, where the use of coercion, such as economic sanctions or military interventions, undermines the credibility of U.S. values. For example, U.S. actions in the Middle East, framed as efforts to promote democracy, have often led to instability and human rights abuses, creating a disconnect between its professed values and its actions on the ground.⁸ Additionally, the rise of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which offers economic investments without the political conditionalities typically associated with Western aid, presents a challenge to the U.S.’s ability to use economic power as a tool of smart power.⁹ As China’s influence expands, the U.S. may need to recalibrate its smart power strategy to maintain its competitive edge in the face of alternative models of statecraft. 

The United States’ use of smart power remains one of the most sophisticated and adaptable strategies in international relations. By blending hard and soft power, the U.S. has managed to assert its global leadership while also responding to emerging threats and challenges. Yet, as the global order continues to evolve and new powers like China gain influence, the U.S. will need to refine its approach to smart power, ensuring that it remains a credible and ethical leader in a multipolar world. The future of smart power will depend on the U.S.’s ability to navigate the complexities of global diplomacy while maintaining the legitimacy and moral authority that have been central to its influence in the 21st century.

Comparative Analysis: Smart Power Beyond the U.S.

While the U.S. represents a case of comprehensive smart power deployment, other global players employ this strategy in different ways, shaped by their unique geopolitical positions and priorities.

China: China’s smart power strategy relies heavily on geoeconomic tactics. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to build infrastructure and create economic linkages across Asia, Africa, and Europe, is a prime example of China’s use of economic influence to extend its power.¹⁰ The establishment of Confucius Institutes worldwide, aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture, further demonstrates the importance of soft power. However, China’s use of coercion in regional disputes—particularly in the South China Sea—and its “wolf warrior diplomacy” have often undermined its soft power, demonstrating the risks of overemphasizing hard power in a global context.^{11 12}

European Union: The EU exemplifies a form of soft power through its regulatory influence, particularly in areas such as data protection and environmental policies. The EU has been successful in shaping global standards, promoting human rights, and pushing for environmental sustainability.¹³ However, its lack of a unified military force and dependence on NATO for security reduce its strategic autonomy, limiting the EU’s ability to deploy smart power in a more balanced way.¹⁴ The EU’s role in managing the migration crisis and its regulatory leadership in technology—such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—have demonstrated the EU’s capacity to influence the global agenda.¹⁵

Japan: As a middle power, Japan has embraced technological diplomacy and soft power to increase its global influence. Innovations in robotics, green technology, and its leadership in multilateral diplomacy, particularly within the United Nations and World Trade Organization (WTO), elevate its global standing.¹⁶ However, Japan’s pacifist constitution and reliance on U.S. security agreements restrict its ability to project power independently, thus limiting its overall smart power strategy.¹⁷

South Korea: South Korea’s smart power strategy combines cultural diplomacy, particularly through the global popularity of K-pop, with robust digital diplomacy. Yet, South Korea’s reliance on the U.S. for security and its ongoing geopolitical tensions with North Korea restrict its flexibility, making its approach to smart power more reactive than proactive.¹⁸

Conclusion: The Future of Smart Power in a Multipolar World

As multipolarity increases and emerging powers such as China, Russia, and regional players gain influence, the importance of smart power will only grow. While the U.S. must evolve its strategy to maintain its leadership position, smaller states can use smart power to level the playing field and assert their influence in global affairs. The ability to combine hard and soft power—rooted in legitimacy and innovation—will determine success in contemporary statecraft.

1.  Nye, Joseph S. The Future of Power. PublicAffairs, 2011. ↩︎
2.  Nye, Joseph S. “Smart Power: The U.S. Experience.” Harvard University Press, 2015. ↩︎
3.  Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. PublicAffairs, 2004. ↩︎
4.  Kennedy, Robert F. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Memoir.” The New York Times, 1962. ↩︎
5. U.S. Department of State. “Pivot to Asia: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region.” 2011. ↩︎
6. Chomsky, Noam. “Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance.” Metropolitan Books, 2003 ↩︎
7. Friedman, Thomas. “Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations.” Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2017. ↩︎
8. Mearsheimer, John J., and Walt, Stephen M. “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007. ↩︎
9. Belt & Road Initiative. “A New Silk Road: The Economic Power of China.” 2013. ↩︎
10. Ibid. ↩︎
11. Li, Xiaoyang. “Confucius Institutes: A Tool of China’s Soft Power.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2017. ↩︎
12. Callahan, David. “The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy.” Oxford University Press, 2020. ↩︎
13. Smith, Karen. “The European Union and the World: The External Relations of the European Union.” Oxford University Press, 2011. ↩︎
14. Keukeleire, Stephan, and Delreux, Tom. “The EU’s Foreign Policy: A Political Economy Approach.” Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. ↩︎
15. European Commission. “General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Impact and Regulations.” 2018. ↩︎
16. Shinoda, Tetsuro. “Japan’s Foreign Policy and Its Global Influence.” Japan Review of Political Science, 2016. ↩︎
17. Funabashi, Yoichi. “The Pacific Alliance and Japan’s Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey, 2015. ↩︎
18. Sung, Yoonhyuk. “South Korea’s Digital Diplomacy and the Role of K-Pop.” Journal of Korean Studies, 2020. ↩︎

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: U.S. Power, Image sourced from European Council on Foreign Relations | CC License, no changes made

Introduction

In an era dominated by military and economic interests, the concept of soft power offers an alternative framework for understanding global influence. Coined by Joseph Nye, soft power is defined as a country’s ability to shape the preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion or payment.¹ Japan exemplifies this influence through its cuisine, leveraging food as a tool for diplomacy and global engagement. Japanese culinary diplomacy, the strategic promotion of Japanese food culture abroad, demonstrates how cultural heritage can be leveraged to enhance economic prosperity, foster political alliances, and elevate a nation’s global standing.

Japanese cuisine, or washoku, was inscribed on the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage list in 2013, reflecting not only its rich tradition but also its potential as a diplomatic tool. This recognition aligns with Japan’s broader “Cool Japan” initiative, which promotes cultural exports to enhance the country’s image and soft power worldwide.² This article argues that Japan’s culinary diplomacy functions as a strategically designed soft power mechanism, facilitating tangible political and economic benefits while shaping international perceptions of Japan as a culturally sophisticated and innovative nation.

Theoretical Framework

Understanding Japanese culinary diplomacy requires situating it within the broader theoretical frameworks of soft power and cultural diplomacy. Building on Nye’s concept of attraction-based influence to its culture, political values, and foreign policies, unlike hard power, which relies on coercion or payment, soft power operates by shaping the preferences of others, making them desire the outcomes favored by the influencer.^{3 4}

Cultural diplomacy constitutes a vital subset of soft power, focusing specifically on the role of culture as a medium for building mutual understanding and trust between nations.⁵ Food, as a universal cultural expression, possesses unique qualities in this regard—it transcends language barriers, fosters social bonds, and cultivates favorable impressions of the source country.⁶ Emerging scholarship on culinary diplomacy underscores how states employ gastronomy to promote national narratives, enhance tourism, and establish informal channels of influence. ^{7 8}

Within the context of international relations, culinary diplomacy is recognized as a tool of public diplomacy, engaging both foreign publics and elites through cultural exchange and symbolic gestures.⁹ Additionally, it enables states to cultivate goodwill and expand their diplomatic reach beyond traditional political and economic interactions. Japan’s deployment of culinary diplomacy exemplifies these theories, with state and private actors collaborating to export Japanese food culture as a means to augment Japan’s soft power and global presence.

Understanding Soft Power and Culinary Diplomacy in Japan

Soft power functions through attraction—shaping preferences by rendering a nation’s culture, values, and policies appealing.¹⁰ Japan’s culinary diplomacy exemplifies this by leveraging its rich food heritage to foster positive international relationships and advance national interests.

Japanese cuisine is distinguished by its emphasis on seasonality, aesthetic presentation, balance, and healthfulness, qualities that resonate with global audiences increasingly attentive to quality and wellness.¹¹ Japan has institutionalized culinary diplomacy as part of its broader cultural export strategy, investing in the international promotion of food alongside other cultural assets.¹² The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) actively supports international outreach through cultural festivals, chef exchanges, and educational programs, thereby cultivating diplomatic goodwill and opening markets for Japanese exports.¹³

Moreover, Japan’s food diplomacy transcends economic objectives; it functions as a conduit for cultural exchange, peacebuilding, and regional cooperation. For instance, Japanese culinary culture has served as a diplomatic bridge in relations with neighboring countries such as South Korea and China, where historical tensions persist. By fostering shared appreciation for food traditions and culinary innovation, Japan creates informal spaces for dialogue and mutual understanding.¹⁴

Economic Impact

Following the elevation of washoku as a cultural heritage asset, the number of Japanese restaurants worldwide increased by approximately 30% between 2013 and 2019.¹⁵ This visibility has been directly linked to rising Japanese food exports, which surged from $6.1 billion in 2013 to $10.1 billion in 2018—a 65% increase.¹⁶ According to JETRO (2021), demand grew for ingredients such as miso, soy sauce, and sake, as Japanese cuisine gained traction globally.

Culinary tourism has also become a significant component of Japan’s tourism sector. The Japan Tourism Agency (2019) reports that nearly 30% of international visitors cited Japanese cuisine as a primary motivation for their trip.¹⁷ Visitors often plan itineraries around food festivals and regional specialties, which fosters long-term cultural affinity and economic sustainability. Events like Japan Week in New York, drawing over 50,000 participants annually, and European Washoku Week, which increases Japanese restaurant patronage by 25% during the event, demonstrate the synergy between cultural events and economic outcomes.^{18 19}

The Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games provided another moment of strategic culinary promotion. Japan introduced “Sustainable Washoku” at Olympic venues, aligning the national brand with global concerns around environmental and public health. The initiative reached over 200 million viewers globally, with social media campaigns extending the narrative to over 350 million users.²⁰ Post-Games data showed a 15% increase in Japanese food exports, reinforcing the diplomatic and economic impact of culinary branding at global mega-events.

Diplomatic and Policy Implications

Japan’s use of culinary diplomacy reflects a deliberate application of soft power as foreign policy strategy. Grounded in Nye’s theory of influence through attraction, the promotion of washoku functions not merely as cultural display but as a strategic instrument of diplomacy. Japan integrates food diplomacy into regional summits, cultural agreements, and public diplomacy initiatives to cultivate goodwill, build informal channels of influence, and enhance its image as a peaceful, harmonious power.

This approach is especially visible in Japan’s outreach to ASEAN countries. Embassy-led food festivals, cooking classes, and bilateral cultural programming have softened historical tensions and fostered mutual understanding. For example, surveys conducted by JICA (2019) found a 20% rise in favorable perceptions of Japan among Southeast Asian participants following food-related events.²¹

The “Cool Japan” initiative also underscores how culinary culture is embedded in Japan’s foreign policy. High-profile chefs were appointed as cultural ambassadors, showcasing Japanese cuisine in cities like New York, London, and Paris.²² Food-themed events were regularly featured at G20 and APEC summits, blurring the lines between public diplomacy and trade.

Furthermore, culinary diplomacy supports Japan’s broader geopolitical posture. It subtly reinforces Japan’s leadership narrative in East Asia while counterbalancing regional powers like China and South Korea. Initiatives are often linked to wider economic agreements, such as CPTPP negotiations and Japan’s strategic dialogue with Western allies.

Japanese culinary diplomacy is also amplified through popular media. For instance, the anime series Shokugeki no Soma (Food Wars), broadcast in over 50 countries, sparked increased global interest in Japanese cuisine. In response, regions such as Hokkaido and Osaka saw food-related tourism rise by up to 15%.²³ Recognizing the cultural reach of such content, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has quietly supported culinary-themed media as an informal—but effective—tool of public diplomacy.²⁴

Conclusion

Japanese culinary diplomacy represents a paradigmatic example of how soft power can be deliberately harnessed to achieve multifaceted national objectives. Through the strategic promotion of washoku and other culinary traditions, Japan has not only enhanced its cultural appeal but effectively translated this attraction into concrete economic gains and diplomatic influence. The interplay between cultural heritage, economic policy, and international relations demonstrates the sophistication of Japan’s soft power strategy, which aligns with global trends toward sustainable development and health-conscious consumption.

In addition to culinary diplomacy, Japan employs a diverse array of soft power tools—including fashion, anime, technological innovation, heritage promotion, and educational outreach—forming a multidimensional strategy designed to cultivate sustainable international influence. By leveraging food culture as a diplomatic tool, Japan fosters cross-cultural understanding, promotes economic vitality, and strengthens political alliances. This approach confirms the critical role of cultural diplomacy within modern international relations and underscores the expanding relevance of culinary diplomacy as a vehicle for national power and prestige in the twenty-first century.

1. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). ↩︎
2. Yuichi Lam, “Cool Japan Strategy and the Cultural Industry,” East Asian Policy 6, no. 4 (2014): 38–49. ↩︎
3. Nye, Soft Power. ↩︎
4. Joseph S. Nye, “The Future of Power,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1 (2011): 2–12. ↩︎
5. Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 31–54. ↩︎
6. Craig LaBan, “The Role of Food in Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7, no. 2 (2012): 151–157. ↩︎
7. Rachel Rockower, “Recipes for Gastrodiplomacy,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 8, no. 3 (2012): 235–246. ↩︎
8. Claude Fischler, “Food, Self and Identity,” Social Science Information 33, no. 2 (1994): 275–292. ↩︎
9. Cull, “Public Diplomacy.” ↩︎
10. Nye, Soft Power. ↩︎
11. Naomichi Ishige, The History and Culture of Japanese Food (London: Routledge, 2011). ↩︎
12. Yuichi Lam, “Cool Japan Strategy and the Cultural Industry,” East Asian Policy 6, no. 4 (2014): 38–49. ↩︎
13. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). “Japanese Food Promotion Policy.” 2018. ↩︎
14. Sangkyun Kim, “Food as a Bridge Between Korea and Japan: A Culinary Diplomacy Perspective,” Asian Studies Review 40, no. 3 (2016): 414–428. ↩︎
15. Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO), “Japanese Cuisine Overseas: Growth and Impact,” 2020. ↩︎
16. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). “Japanese Food Promotion Policy.” 2018. ↩︎
17. Japan Tourism Agency, “Survey on Travel Motivations of Foreign Visitors to Japan,” 2019. ↩︎
18. Japan Society. Japan Week Annual Report. New York: Japan Society, 2019. ↩︎
19. European Japanese Association. European Washoku Week Impact Report. Brussels: EJA, 2018. ↩︎
20. International Olympic Committee, “Tokyo 2020 Olympic Culinary Program Report,” 2021. ↩︎
21. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “Public Perceptions of Japan in Southeast Asia,” 201. ↩︎
22. Yuichi Lam, “Cool Japan Strategy and the Cultural Industry,” East Asian Policy 6, no. 4 (2014): 38–49. ↩︎
23. Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO), “Japanese Cuisine Overseas: Growth and Impact,” 2020. ↩︎
24. Mila Kaneva, “Public Diplomacy and Popular Culture,” International Journal of Cultural Policy 17, no.2 (2011): 145–161. ↩︎

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Japanese Mochi, Image sourced from PICRYL | CC License, no changes made

When most people think about North Korea, images of both seclusion and hostility come to mind. North Korea is largely shunned by the international community–its only alliances are with China, Russia, and Iran–and many fear the country for its unpredictable leader, nuclear weapons, and aggressive political tactics. Nonetheless, the country has cultivated pockets of consistent, unappreciated power inside one of its greatest enemies: Japan. For years, North Korea has maintained influence across Japan, funding pro-North Korean organizations and integrating its propaganda into the education of Zainichi Koreans (Korean nationals who live in Japan). While these measures often fly under the radar of the international community, they are a powerful example of the pervasiveness of North Korean influence abroad.

In 1910, the Korean Peninsula was officially colonized by Japan. During the colonial period, all expression of Korean culture was stamped out in favor of Japanese culture, and many Koreans moved to Japan, both by choice and by force. By the time colonization ended in 1945, there were over two million Koreans living in Japan, and while many of them returned to their home country, hundreds of thousands stayed. These Zainichi Koreans affiliated themselves with one of two organizations – Mindan, which backed South Korea, and Choren, which backed North Korea. While Japan ultimately banned Choren and all other North Korean organizations in 1952, they quickly reformed under different names. Chongryon soon became the most prominent North Korean organization in Japan, operating money-generating institutions from banks to pachinko parlors. Its influence persists to this day, with around 25% of Zainichi Koreans affiliating themselves with the group.

A common goal that unites both Chongryon and Mindan is the promotion of Korean ethnic schools. Following World War II, discrimination against Koreans in Japan was (and continues to be) a fact of life for many, and Zainichi Koreans wanted schools where their children would be accepted and could connect to their cultural background. As a result, both Mindan and Chongryon established schools across Japan. Although both systems teach fundamentals like math, science, and history, there are key differences that set these institutions apart.

The few Mindan schools that exist use Japanese as their official language, offering Korean only as an elective course, while Chongryon schools stick to Korean for all classroom activities. Chongryon curriculum also includes pro-North Korea messaging. In every Chongryon classroom, portraits of former Supreme Leaders Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il are displayed, North Korea is referred to as “The Fatherland,” and maps of the Korean Peninsula show a united Korea with a capital of Pyongyang. Many Chongyron schools even have field trips to North Korea where students are made to feel welcomed by the country. This continuous propaganda is not simply a product of individual supporters of North Korea–the curriculum is shaped by the North Korean government itself. In 2021, the North Korean government released a statement that indicated it had spent around 500 billion won (about $350 million) on Chongryon and its schools in the 66 years since the organization was established.

In the late 1950s the Chongryon schools played a key role in North Korea’s “Return to Paradise” campaign in which nearly 100,000 Zainichi Koreans were repatriated to North Korea. During this time, North Korea’s economy was stronger than that of the South, and with the consistent propaganda disseminated by Chongryon and its schools, many Zainichi Koreans truly believed that by going to North Korea, they could live a better life. Most, however, were disappointed by what they saw upon their arrival on the shores of the North. Around 200 people involved in this movement ultimately defected from North Korea and returned to Japan. 

This repatriation campaign was a clear marker of Chongryon’s influence at the time, but since then, the pervasiveness of Chongryon schools in Japan has declined. More and more Zainichi Koreans align themselves with South Korea, and due to negative perceptions of North Korea in Japanese society, going to a Chongryon school can place children at a disadvantage when applying for jobs or further education. Furthermore, because the Chongryon schools are legally categorized as “miscellaneous schools” instead of “regular schools,” students at these institutions cannot get the same student benefits as others in Japan. The Japanese government has also taken steps to restrict these schools–while the government originally gave limited funding to Chongryon schools, in recent years this aid has significantly diminished, and in some prefectures, been completely cut off.

Despite these issues, it makes sense why many parents choose to send their children to Chongryon schools. Students explain that being surrounded by fellow Koreans allows them to be themselves in a way they cannot in other spaces, and because Chongryon schools operate in Korean, unlike Mindan schools, they are a better option for those who want to connect with their Korean heritage. Chongryon schools are also far more accessible. Mindan only operates four schools in Japan, but Chongryon runs dozens of schools across the country. It seems that for some, Chongryon schools provide an additional benefit of inadvertently teaching critical thinking–while some students may be blindly loyal to North Korea, others see this unique education as an opportunity to compare ideas and learn from different perspectives. 

While the heyday of Chongryon schools has come and gone, they are still a key part of the lives of thousands of Zainichi Koreans, for better and for worse. These schools are unquestionably major sources of propaganda, but parents who send their children to this education system shouldn’t immediately be villainized as North Korean sympathizers. By establishing more Mindan schools and implementing the Korean language into their core curricula, the Japanese government could at least partially resolve the dilemma of Chongryon schools, giving Zainichi Korean children accessible opportunities to connect with their culture without pro-North Korean indoctrination. As North Korea continues to dominate current events, the anxiety surrounding these schools will likely spike, and only time will tell how the Japanese government will tackle this complicated issue.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Kim Jong II Study Case, taken by Stefan Krasowski  | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

Today, Japan is facing an unprecedented demographic crisis: of a population of over 125 million people, 29% are over the age of 65 while more than one in ten are over the age of 80. According to the United Nations, Japan has the world’s oldest population, as measured by the proportion of people over 65, and the nation’s birth rate continues to decline. In 2022, fewer than 800,000 babies were born—the lowest number since records began in the 19th century. Among the many wide-reaching and fundamental problems associated with an aging population, mass labor shortages pose a profound and urgent obstacle for Japan —not least the national construction industry. In 2019, 25% of Japanese construction workers were over the age of 60 while less than 10% of construction workers were under the age of 30. Most pressingly, the Japanese Infrastructure Ministry estimated a shortage of 470,000-930,000 workers within the sector by this year and the infrastructure demands of the 2021 Tokyo Olympics only accented these shortages further.

In the lead up to the Tokyo Olympics, large-scale building and manufacturing projects, in addition to wide range of service sectors, required an enormous influx of additional labor. To fulfill this need, Japan recruited hundreds of thousands of migrant workers; notably, the government expanded the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) in order to accomplish this. Initially introduced as a program to transfer ‘technical skills and knowledge’ to less developed countries in the region, the TITP has instead become an opportunity for Japan to access disposable low-wage workers. As one executive working with intern support explained, “only around 10% of interns continue the same job after they go back home.” Instead, this person continued, “the main purpose for the interns is to make money […] [and] ‘international cooperation’ is just a rationale for the policy.”

Notably, TITP has garnered wide-scale criticism over reports of its numerous forms of abuse. These include “excessive overtime work hours, unpaid or underpaid wages, coercive salary withholding under the name of ‘mandatory savings’, passport confiscation, and habitual forms of verbal and physical violence.” Unlike other Japanese workers, technical interns do not have the right to freely association or collectively bargaining. Thus, many technical interns and foreign workers exist in a state of de facto labor-servitude due to penalties restricting employment transfers, economic responsibility for family members, and large debts from pre-departure fees.

The extent of this malpractice in preparing for the Olympics was showcased in a 2019 report by International Federation of Building and Wood Workers. Almost half of the workers consulted on Olympic sites did not have formal employment contracts, the study noted, and many were underpaid in addition to the majority being critically overworked. According to the Japanese Labour Ministry, there were twenty-one deaths due to Karoshi (suicide due to overwork) in the construction sector, the second highest of all sectors in Japan. Among these was a 23 year old man who worked 190 hours of overtime at the Olympic stadium in the month preceding his death. In preparation for the games, workers at the Olympic Village reported working 28 days in a row and workers at the New National Stadium reported working 26 days in a row. As a result of collective pressure, TITP interns are legally required to be paid the minimum wage—though their wages are two-thirds less than other Japanese construction workers on average. Problems continue with migrant workers interviewed by BWI further explaining that there were no translated safety materials or procedures on site. Today, the mortality rate of foreign technical interns in the construction sector is twice the rate of other Japanese workers in the industry.

Since the 2020 Olympics, the Japanese government has implemented a number of policies to improve conditions for foreign technical interns. These includes, for example, a provision allowing interns to transfer employment to sectors beyond their original assignments—a step towards combating exploitative practices. Additionally, the government has expanded the category of “Specific Skills Workers I” (SSWI) and “Specific Skills Workers II” (SSWII) to attract qualified foreign labor in specialized sectors including construction. Workers that fit the skill criteria of SSWI are allowed to stay in Japan for up to five years, and, upon passing a specialized industry exam, can attain the type SSWII visa—which offers additional benefits such as permanent residency and allowances for bringing family members to the country. Toshihiro Menju, an executive at the Japan Center for International Exchange, described these expansions as “the full-scale start of long-term settlement for more blue-collar workers.” In reality, however, these changes have been significantly smaller in scope than first anticipated. As of March 2023 per the Justice Ministry, only eleven people held SSWII visas, despite over 154,800 eligible SSWI workers living in Japan today. It is significant that a Justice Ministry panel, examining the prevalence of human rights abuses surrounding the TITP, recommended the abolition of the current system and the establishment of a new program promoting stronger support and protections for migrant workers. Change must occur.

As Japan faces a new stage in its history, questions of foreign labor and immigration will only become more essential to nation’s future. By 2070, Japan’s population is estimated to reach 87 million people—38% of which will be over the age of 65 and 10% will be of foreign origin. Temporary measures to access immediate labor such as the Technical Intern Training or Special Skilled Workers programs will not solve Japan’s labor and demographic crises, however. The mistreatment of foreign technical interns during the 2020 Tokyo Olympics exposed a critical mistake made by Japanese government as the country moves towards this new era: its representation of immigrant labor. Immigrants are not the disposable sources of labor that they have been treated as, but are instead humans who must become an integral part of Japan for its own economic and social future. Japan cannot continue to expand pathways for foreign workers as temporary labor without understanding the deeper issues as well—such as systemic issues of race in the country—it continues into a more resilient, expansive future.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation:新国立競技場, taken by 江戸村のとく– Own work | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

This essay won an honorable mention in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

“I’m very worried I won’t find enough money to feed my daughter,” cried a 32-year-old Cambodian seamstress, whose husband had died in a previous civil war. “We’re frightened.”¹ Her words echoed the anxiety widely held by Cambodians after July 2, 1997, when the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) seized control of the capitol Phnom Penh and expelled the rival royalist FUNCINPEC party.² The violence led most foreign countries to withdraw aid, leaving Cambodia’s economy crippled.³ Japan’s continued aid and sponsorship of the 1998 election served as a lifeboat for Cambodia’s economic stability, social welfare, and democratization efforts throughout the crisis period and into the 2010s. 

The eruption of political violence in 1997 reminded the Cambodian and international community of the horrors of the previous decade, when from 1975 to 1979 the communist Khmer Rouge attempted to transform Cambodia into an agrarian society⁴ and murdered 1.5-2 million people.⁵ Thus, the 1997 political crisis destroyed international confidence in Cambodia’s future. Japan’s continued aid to Cambodia reflected popular sentiment in Japan for a foreign policy framework promoting democracy abroad.⁶ Policy makers in Tokyo believed that by securing “freedom from want” (basic economic needs) they could foster “freedom from fear” (political freedom), thus developing the underlying factors involved in cultivating a democracy.⁷ With this rationale, Japan conditioned economic aid on the CPP’s adhering to the Paris 1991 Accords, guaranteeing human-rights, and holding free and fair elections in 1998. As a result, Japan’s foreign policy played a significant role in the economic growth and the emergence of pro democracy movements in Cambodia in the late 1990s, early 2000s, and the decades to come. 

Japan’s consistent aid stabilized economic growth and improved living standards after the 1998 elections. While other foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows had stalled in Cambodia, Japan poured $720 million into the country from 1997 to 2007. Specifically, Japanese grants helped to develop Cambodian infrastructure: Japan provided millions of yen for the development of rural irrigation and financed the Neak Leoung Bridge, which has linked poorer rural regions to urban services such as medical care and education.⁸ Furthermore, Japanese interest-free grants funded Japanese-led medical training in Cambodian hospitals and critical medical technology.⁹ These advancements have improved healthcare outcomes, including reducing the maternal mortality ratio from 1,020 per 100,000 births in 1990 to 250 per 100,000 births in 2015.¹⁰ Japan’s aid thus stabilized Cambodia’s economic growth and improved the country’s physical and social infrastructure in the early 2000s. 

In addition, Japan’s willingness to continue FDI, alongside its endorsement of the 1998 election, encouraged other Western countries to resume aid gradually in the 2010s. International aid to Cambodia steadily increased from $149 million in 2000 to $3.7 billion in 2019.¹¹ The continuous flow of FDI from Japan and other countries resulted in rapid economic growth in Cambodia, with foreign firms employing nearly half of the working population in 2014.¹² Therefore, Japan’s foreign policy benefited Cambodia’s economy in the long run by paving the way for foreign investments from other countries. 

Japanese foreign policy also fostered a climate of increased dissent and democratic energy by supporting 1998 elections in Cambodia with conditioned aid and organizational support. In the lead up to the 1998 elections, Japan’s sponsorship allowed pro-democracy leaders to establish campaigning and organizational infrastructure, which led to the first modern democratic movements in Cambodia. In 1998, organized by opposition political parties, over ten thousand Cambodians protested the CPP’s unfair election practices through a sit-in in front of the National Assembly Building. The Democracy Square Movement, as it was called, was the largest pro-democracy movement in the previous two decades.¹³ Meanwhile, Sam Rainsy, leader of the anti-corruption party, organized the first labor union in Cambodian history, which protested workplace corruption and poor working conditions.¹⁴ Indeed, Sam Rainsy remarked that he hadn’t expected so many protestors, considering the lackluster support for previous movements in the late 1980s.¹⁵ Furthermore, the democratic precedents established by the 1998 election, such as the (albeit limited) right to protest, were followed by political demonstrators in 2013 and 2014. These protests resulted in the seating of several anti-corruption members who had previously been barred from parliament.¹⁶ The Japanese-sponsored 1998 election nurtured an environment of political defiance and enabled nascent democratic movements in Cambodia to make political gains for the common Cambodian. 

One would be remiss to declare Japanese democratization efforts in Cambodia an absolute success, but the flawed elections were in part due to Cambodia’s historical political environment. According to Downie, election observers from the U.S. and E.U. reported several election irregularities, including voter intimidation by CPP members and politically motivated murders.¹⁷ However, the lack of complete fairness in the 1998 election might be more appropriately attributed to the historic political environment of Cambodia. According to historian Serge Thion, Cambodian society is rooted in clientship and patronage,¹⁸ where “people with limited means sought protection” from the elite class.¹⁹ This enabled “strong men” like Hun Sen to obstruct external efforts to democratize the country. In fact, elections would have been considerably less fair without Japanese aid. Japan, threatening to withdraw aid, influenced Hun Sen to allow FUNCIPEC opposition leader Prince Ranariddh to campaign in opposition.²⁰ Moreover, Japan contracted thousands of election workers and donated election equipment to maximize the election’s integrity.²¹ Despite challenges stemming from Cambodia’s political culture, Japan’s conditional aid and organizational support played a vital role in enabling Cambodia’s historically-significant, albeit flawed, 1998 elections that advanced the country a step towards greater democracy. 

Japan’s use of economic diplomacy to positively guide Cambodian politics and society, though imperfect, stands out for its successful fostering of democratic reforms and economic stabilization in the late 1990s and early 2000s. And yet, the world’s largest donors have increasingly turned away from conditioned foreign aid. The United States, as the largest foreign aid donor, has preferred an unequivocal approach, issuing blank checks to countries despite their flawed democratic institutions while often ignoring countries exhibiting potential for democratic transformation. Japan’s foreign policy approach offers an effective intervention model to spur positive development in emergent democracies.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Phnom Penh : New construction project | Image sourced from Flickr

1. Keith Richburg, “Pullout by Foreigners Paralyzes Cambodia,” The Washington Post, July 16, 1997, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/07/16/pullout-by-foreigners paralyzes-cambodia/7a641218-26c2-4e8b-a7f6-9d74a335090b/. ↩︎
2. Mikio Oishi and Fumitaka Furuoka, “Can Japanese Aid Be an Effective Tool of Influence? Case Studies of  Cambodia and Burma,” Asian Survey 43, no. 6 (2003): 893-895, JSTOR. ↩︎
3. Tony Kevin, “Cambodia’s International Rehabilitation, 1997–2000,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 3  (2000): 596, JSTOR. ↩︎
4. Alexander Laban Hinton, “Agents of Death: Explaining the Cambodian Genocide in Terms of Psychosocial  Dissonance,” American Anthropologist 98, no. 4 (1996): 818, JSTOR. ↩︎
5. National Research Council, 5, The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia,, ed.  Reed HE and Keely CB (Washington D.C: National Academies Press (US), 2001), 1, National Library of  Medicine. ↩︎
6. Maiko Ichihara, Understanding Japanese Democracy Assistance, March 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2024,  https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/03/understanding-japanese-democracy assistance?lang=en¢er=global.
   securing “freedom from want” (basic economic needs) they could foster “freedom from fear.” ↩︎
7. Ibid. ↩︎
8. Koizumi Yukihiro, Neak Loeung Bridge (Tsubasa Bridge) Construction Project, https://www.jsce.or.jp/e/archive/project/pj12.html.. ↩︎
9. “Cambodia and Japan to Improve Maternal and Child Healthcare,” We Are Tomodachi, Summer 2020, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2020/earlysummer2020/cambodia.html. ↩︎
10. Ibid. ↩︎
11. Mah, “Industrial-Led Economic,” 9. ↩︎
12. World Bank, Cambodia’s Future Jobs: Linking to the Economy of Tomorrow, November 19, 2019, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/publication/cambodias-future-jobs-linking-to-the-economy-of-tomorrow. ↩︎
13. Caroline Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991-2001 (London: RoutledgeCurzon,
    2003), 185-197, digital file. ↩︎
14. Ibid. ↩︎
15. Ibid. ↩︎
16. RFA Khmer Service, “Cambodian Opposition Leader Accepted as MP Ahead of Parliament Sitting,” Radio Free Asia, July 25, 2014, accessed May 30, 2024. ↩︎
17. Ibid, 49-52. ↩︎
18. Serge Thion, “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics,” International Journal of Politics 16, no. 3 (1986), JSTOR. ↩︎
19. Kheang Un, “State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 2
    (2006): 225-228, JSTOR. ↩︎
20. Oishi and Furuoka, “Can Japanese,” 895. ↩︎
21. Nalani Vittal, “Piecing the Peace in Cambodia: Return of Politics,” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 15 (2000): 1290, JSTOR. ↩︎

Last December, Japan watched on uneasily as another North Korean missile made its way into the East Sea. This was the third test of North Korea’s newest potential nuclear weapon, the Hwasong-18. Hwasong-18 is a solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that reaches up to 6,600 km altitude and boasts 74 minutes of flight time. Designed to be tipped with a nuclear warhead, the Hwasong-18 has vast potential for destruction. Unlike North Korea’s older weapons that utilise liquid fuel, the solid fuel weapon is more difficult to detect and intercept. The danger of North Korea’s increasing missile activities has been met with condemnation from Japan. But this is only the latest installation of historically rocky tensions between the two countries.

The Abduction Cases

In the 1970s and 80s, a series of missing persons reports plagued Japan. While speculations of North Korea’s involvement arose at the time, it was only in September 2002 that then-supreme leader Kim Jong-Il publicly confirmed the country’s role in the disappearances of Japanese citizens. North Korea admitted to having been behind 13 abductions. Official Japanese records identified 17 related cases. Some Japanese organisations even estimated up to 100 cases of missing persons tied to North Korea’s involvement. While Kim attributed the abduction cases to the overzealousness of the North Korean agents, the true motives behind them, and their full scope, remain a mystery.

Upon Kim’s confirmation that North Korea had abducted Japanese citizens, shockwaves of anger ensued in Japan. Many called for the return of the abductees. Japanese media provided extensive coverage of the victims’ abduction stories and portrayed North Korea as “the quintessential symbol of evil“. The Japanese government made the return of abducted victims a top priority in politics. Five victims eventually returned to Japan. However, the lack of answers shrouding the supposed deaths of the remaining eight victims (of the thirteen abductions to which Kim publicly admitted) and other unidentified abductees maintains a powerful grip in Japan. The youngest identified victim, Megumi Yokota, who had been abducted in 1977 at thirteen years old, became the face of public campaigns. While North Korea claimed that Yokota had passed away from suicide and returned her supposed remains in 2004, subsequent DNA testing by the Japanese showed a lack of DNA match between the given remains and Yokota. Shigeru Yokota, father of Megumi, campaigned for her return until his death in 2020 at 87. His wife, Sakie Yokota said: “My husband used up all his strength but could not meet Megumi.”

The abductions generated deep and lasting distrust and frustration among the Japanese towards North Korea. Japanese politicians continue to bring up the abductions by North Korea, framing it as a frontline issue hindering the two countries’ road to normalisation. The Japanese public is in agreement: In annual surveys conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding topics of citizens’ interest related to North Korea, the topic of abduction remains the highest, peaking consistently between eighty and ninety percent ever since 2002. The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had been highly vocal and advocated for the return of all the remaining abductees. When Prime Minister Kishida Fumio came to power in 2021, he also proclaimed his resolve to iron out the abduction problem. 

It is in this climate of unresolved conflict and tenuous relations that Japan developed its hard-line stance towards North Korea’s nuclear expansion. The abductions were seen by the public and the media as a direct violation of Japan’s sovereignty. Pressure is on the Japanese government to extend a hardened approach towards North Korea in other areas–most notably North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, which is deemed as an acute danger to Japan’s survival.

History of Japan’s hard-line anti-nuclear stance against North Korea

Japan has always taken a hard stance against North Korea’s use of nuclear missiles. Termed as the “dialogue and pressure” approach, Japan actively engages in international forums against North Korea’s nuclear activities. Notably, Japan has participated in six-party talks with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea held intermittently since 2003. The six-party talks were multilateral negotiations aimed at dismantling North Korea’s nuclear activities per the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. While negotiations took a turn for the better when North Korea declared to abandon its nuclear program in 2005, such talks fell through shortly after the country departed from the negotiation table in 2009. In 2022, Kim Jong-un’s declaration of the irreversibility of North Korea’s nuclear state status marked the bleak future of such negotiations. Japan is thus tasked to contend with a rogue nation with little regard for international norms.

It is no surprise that North Korea’s latest developments have placed Japan’s ballistic missile defences on high alert. Japan sends out J-Alerts to Japanese citizens, particularly on high-risk dates such as North Korea’s “missile industry day.” The country’s Ministry of Defence additionally pledges to go to the extent of “destructive measures” against any form of ballistics and missiles that land on the country’s territory. By threatening the use of military capabilities such as the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) or Patriot Missile PAC-3 to neutralise a North Korean missile, Japan asserts its long-standing opposition towards North Korea’s nuclear program in the global arena. Japan has also increased cooperation with the United States and South Korea, through real-time sharing of North Korea’s missile information in December 2023. 

Interpretations of North Korea’s recent missile attacks

The December missile tests mark one of the 16 tests that North Korea sanctioned in 2023, as part of the country’s “five-year plan for the development of defence science and the weapon system” introduced in 2021. Looking at North Korea’s missile development records, former United States Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) consultant Van Diepen projects the operational deployment of Hwasong-18 after approximately one or two more tests. With the potential inclusion of the Hwasong-18 in the country’s burgeoning array of nuclear armaments, the prospect of a North Korean nuclear attack appears increasingly plausible. Coupled with the country’s increasing testing of hard-to-detect short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) since May 2019, North Korea’s determination of becoming the world’s most formidable nuclear power is apparent. 

Waseda University Professor Shuji Miyazaki from the School of Political Science and Economics posits that North Korea’s vested desire to increase its nuclear weaponry is rooted in the self-preservation of the existing regime¹. Nuclear weaponry is an assurance of the Kim family’s reign. North Korea will take on a cautionary stance about the deployment of the weapons, only enacting bold actions should the country be put in crisis, with China’s hostility as a key factor determining its missile use. Miyazaki’s is largely aligned with that of Japan’s Ministry of Defence, which sees North Korea’s missile program as more of an act of safeguarding its existing regime instead of stemming from the desire for full-out war. 

The missile tests are strategic acts of provocation, serving to signal a readiness to confront the possible chance of armed conflicts in the near future. In light of the second missile launch last July, political scientists such as Sogang University Professor Kim Jaechun noted how it was timed to coincide with the 2023 NATO summit, which had the attendance of South Korean President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. This provocation conveyed Kim’s displeasure with the collaboration between both countries directed against North Korea. 

Future of Japan-North Korea relations and international security

The future of Japan-North Korea relations remains bleak. The seemingly unceasing nuclear missile testing compounded with the unresolved issue of abductions in the minds of the Japanese public makes the forging of diplomatic relations highly unlikely. Japan’s increasing cooperation with allies the United States and South Korea further poses a threat to North Korea, to which the latter could retaliate with aggression. While political scientists such as Professor Kim Jaechun believe North Korea’s missile aggression to be empty threats, given the erratic nature of the present dictator, one can never be sure of the tipping point of the imminent nuclear war. 

The 1970s and 80s abductions played a pivotal role in aggravating present-day tensions between Japan and North Korea, manifesting itself in Japan’s unyielding condemnation towards North Korea’s aggressive missile aggression. The lasting mistrust and historical grievances created due to the abduction cases complicate any possible efforts towards reconciliation. With the missile tests, such feelings of distrust are further intensified, reopening old wounds of the Japanese public. Continuing on such a trajectory, the threat of conflict between both countries looms ahead.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: North Korea strategic forces test-launched Hwasongpho-17 intercontinental ballistic missile on Mar. 24 under the direct guidance of its leader Kim Jong Un., Photo by Øyvind Knoph Askeland | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

1. Shuji Miyazaki (Professor, Waseda University), in discussion with author, Shinjuku, Japan, December 11, 2023. ↩︎

By the turn of the 20th century, the US was becoming a neutral isolationist great power alongside other great powers like Britain and Japan. As the US was lured out of its isolationism, all three fought together against the Central Powers during WWI. Although it retreated into isolationism during the interwar period, the US again allied with Britain to wage war against Japan over Pacific hegemony. Caught in the Thucydides Trap, the emerging Japanese Empire attacked the established American and British Pacific hegemons.

Yet by Thucydides’ same logic, the Anglo-American relationship should have resulted in war since the US was displacing Britain as an international hegemon. Likewise, the US relationship with post-war Japan should have resulted in combat in the 1980s. Neither the pre-WWII US-Britain nor US-Japan relationships were inevitable. Fundamentally, Britain’s and Japan’s varying abilities to compromise with the US through their respective instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—facilitated Anglo-American solidarity and Japanese-American strife during WWII. This paper seeks to identify the causes and trace the evolutions of these differing relationship trajectories, revealing critical lessons about how the US could best use its instruments of national power in pursuit of its national interest.

Pre-WWII US-UK “Special Relationship”

While the US and Britain shared values and history, an Anglo-American “special relationship” was not inevitable. Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson aptly noted, “Of course a unique relation existed between Britain and America—our common language and history ensured that. But unique did not mean affectionate. We had fought England as an enemy as often as we had fought by her side as an ally.”¹ Britain only found solidarity with the US by acquiescing to American demands in diplomatic negotiations, effectively utilizing information operations aided by a shared language and values, relinquishing military superiority, and ensuring complex economic interdependence.

Britain swallowed its imperial pride and made diplomatic sacrifices to court and compromise with a rising America before WWII, with all of America’s power and hubris. The US was exponentially growing after the American Civil War, and Britain admitted with humility that it could do little to stop America’s growth. In 1902, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury had already wistfully declared, “It is very sad, but I am afraid America is bound to forge ahead and nothing can restore the equality between us.”² Two years later, Britain’s First Sea Lord John Fisher acknowledged that if war happened, “under no conceivable circumstances… [could Britain] escape an overwhelming and humiliating defeat by the United States… [so it was] an utter waste of time to prepare for it.”³ Thus, Britain conceded to America’s newfound ability to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Whether with the Alaska-Canada boundary dispute, Venezuela’s debt-induced British naval blockade, or Panama Canal rights, Britain accepted American hegemony over the Americas.⁴ By WWI, Britain took further steps to court the US as an ally. Although the US initially declared neutrality during WWI, Britain sent the Balfour Mission to the US after it declared war on Germany, which significantly improved Anglo-American relations and wartime cooperation.⁵

While the British were disappointed in the American rejection of the League of Nations after WWI, Britain still sought to strengthen its relationship with the rising American behemoth. Thus, Britain crucially allowed its alliance with Japan to lapse by 1922—sacrificing its association with Japan in favor of one with the US—as Japanese-American relations were growing increasingly tense.⁶ Instead of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Britain looked toward the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 to maintain peace in the Pacific, even though it would have to cede global naval superiority by agreeing to naval power parity with the US.⁷ When Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald visited the US in 1929, he further promised that “Great Britain will not hereafter establish any military, naval or military aviation stations in her possessions in the Western Hemisphere nor alter any existing stations in such a way as to become a menace to the United States.”⁸ By the early 1930s, British diplomats were again disappointed by American isolation. In response to the 1931 Manchurian crisis, US Secretary of State Henry Stimson only expressed his verbal disapproval, stating to Japan, “The American Government … does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris…,” which sought to preserve peace.⁹ By 1934, US Ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew proposed an alliance with Britain against Japanese aggression, but his suggestion was initially unheeded.¹⁰ Soon after, FDR withdrew from the 1933 London Economic Conference, rendering global efforts at economic recovery from the Great Depression ineffective.¹¹ Over the next few years, the isolationist US even passed the Neutrality Act of 1935, which aimed to keep the US out of foreign wars. Yet in the face of foreign aggression from the revisionist Axis powers, British efforts to court and compromise with the US seemed to pay off by the end of the decade. Following preliminary American economic and military overtures to Britain, Britain and the US signed the 1941 Atlantic Charter outlining joint WWII aims. Still, Britain again acquiesced to necessary compromise, accepting the US demand that self-determination and free trade be included in the Atlantic Charter although such text would irreparably damage the long-term legitimacy of the British colonial empire and end the “imperial preference.”¹²

Shared Anglo-American values, language, heritage, and culture, along with extensive propaganda efforts, undoubtedly helped strengthen Britain’s information operations in the US. As then-Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden famously quipped, “United States policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least where non-American interests are concerned.”¹³ Since both the US and Britain were democracies compared to the revisionist fascist powers, aligning with Britain seemed more justifiable to the American public. Furthermore, the US likely felt a moral debt to Britain, especially since the Royal Navy helped enforce the Monroe Doctrine and ensured free trade and freedom of the seas for the past century in a way that allowed the US to focus on economic development over expensive naval expansion.¹⁴ FDR and Churchill also sustained a close friendship, with FDR cabling Churchill, “It is fun to be in the same decade with you,” and Churchill writing after they first met, “I felt I was in contact with a very great man who was also a warm-hearted friend and the foremost champion of the high causes which we served.” Conversations that did not need translators and Churchill’s matrilineal American heritage undoubtedly helped forge the friendship between the Anglo-American leaders. Clearly, the legacy of nouveau riche 19th-century Americans marrying off their wealthy daughters into noble but less wealthy British families left lasting cultural ties.¹⁵

In President Wilson’s view, these cultural ties were balanced by cultural differences between the two powers. Speaking in Buckingham Palace after WWI, Wilson declared, “You must not speak of us who come over here as cousins, still less as brothers; we are neither. Neither must you think of us as Anglo-Saxons, for that term can no longer be rightly applied to the people of the United States… there are only two things which can establish and maintain closer relations between your country and mine: they are community of ideals and of interests”¹⁶ While support for Britain may not have been uniform among the white American population, since significant numbers of Americans held Irish, German, and Italian ancestry by the early 20th century,¹⁷ Wilson’s statement glosses over how American “community of ideals and of interests” were fundamentally shaped by British ones, and how many Americans with Anglo-Saxon ancestry still held prominent positions in the US. Wilson also disregards the role of “yellow peril” racism in pushing the US closer to Britain, a seemingly less threatening white power.

Aided by Anglo-American sociocultural connections, Britain incorporated extensive information operations to improve its relationship with the US. By WWI, British intelligence already began experimenting—taking steps to cut US-German communications¹⁸ while distributing English-language propaganda throughout the US about British freedom defenders fighting against German barbarians,¹⁹ American and British lives lost during the Lusitania sinking, and the 1917 Zimmerman Telegram.²⁰ Britain continued its propaganda efforts during WWII in a more subtle but organized manner, with Churchill even admitting that the US entering the war on Britain’s side was what he “dreamed of, aimed at, and worked for.”²¹ After all, Churchill had sent Sir William Stephenson to covertly run the British Security Coordination in New York City with a primary goal of influencing pro-British American public opinion.²² Stephenson cultivated close relationships with American press correspondents, sharing the most gruesome images of bomb damage in Britain. Simultaneously, Britain courted Hollywood actors, authors, and academics to encourage pro-British movies, literature, and academic publications, thereby appealing to the American public and educated elite.²³ Thus, Britain could more effectively convince skeptical Americans that although it perhaps oppressed colonies like India and Palestine, allowing Europe and Asia to fall to fascism would be worse.

Britain ceded the military competition for prestige to the US rather than oppose American military expansion, lessening the perceived British military threat to American interests. After all, the British Cabinet had already recognized the futility of military competition with the US in the early 1900s. By 1909, Britain dropped the two-power standard, no longer requiring that the Royal Navy be the size of the following two largest navies combined.²⁴ Britain’s new one-power standard was codified in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, which allowed the US Navy to maintain the same naval ratio as the Royal Navy. Pressured by economic difficulties and popular antiwar sentiment in the interwar period, Britain focused its military on cost-effectively maintaining its colonial empire instead of competing with other great powers.²⁵ Yet the US still thought of Britain as a potential military threat. When the US and Britain could not compromise during the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference,²⁶ American war planners devised War Plan Red to invade Canada and cut off British trade routes.²⁷ Congress even proportioned $57 million to build airports for the plan in 1935.²⁸ Evidently, the US would strongly react to any potential military aggressors, and an Anglo-American alliance was not guaranteed.

As France fell and Japan expanded further into Asia, however, FDR finally approved the Destroyers for Bases Agreement, providing Britain with 50 old US Navy destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases of British military bases in the Americas.²⁹ Britain thus ceded much of its military power projection capabilities in the Americas. By early 1941, American and British military staff met in Washington DC to solidify a cooperative framework for if the US joined WWII, assuring Britain that if America entered the war, the US would be on its side.³⁰ During the Arcadia Conference immediately following Pearl Harbor, Britain further agreed to submit its military under the Washington-based Combined Chiefs of Staff.³¹ Although Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke worried that such an arrangement would cause Britain to lose military autonomy, Churchill nonetheless acquiesced to basing the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the US.³²

Britain created a risky complementary economic relationship with the US based on complex interdependence. Although both Britain and the US were major industrial powers, Britain already held colonies from which it could extract raw materials. Thus, Britain did not need to expand to obtain natural resources, which explains Britain’s vested interest in upholding the 1928 Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) renouncing expansionist wars.³³ Yet Britain was still dangerously dependent on American finance and supplies during wartime. Despite initial American neutrality during WWI, Britain took measures to block American exports to Germany and extensively borrow from US banks.³⁴ Already evident during WWI, Britain’s dependency on American economic support was manifestly growing, although Britain had also locked the US into a financial relationship in which allying with it would help guarantee that the US received British loan repayments. However, Britain’s enormous debt to the US angered the American public, especially during the economic landscape of the Great Depression. While Britain renegotiated its debt through the 1923 Dawes Plan, in which US banks loaned Germany money to pay reparations to the UK, which the UK used to repay its war debt to the US, US loans to Germany ended by the start of the Great Depression. By 1934, Britain defaulted on its WWI debt to the US, infuriating the American public. Thus, Congress passed the Johnson Act of 1934, banning all debt-owning nations from obtaining further American loans.³⁵

Britain’s extensive debt to the US raised tensions, but the US would perhaps never receive loan repayments if Britain became financially crippled. Therefore, Congress took tentative steps to aid Britain before WWII. Still wary of Britain’s outstanding debt, Congress’ Neutrality Act of 1937 allowed future belligerent nations like Britain to buy non-military supplies from the US only if they did so with cash and transported the supplies themselves, dubbed “cash and carry.” In practice, only Britain and France had the financial and naval means to import from the US. Congress’ Neutrality Act of 1939 further allowed “cash and carry” arms sales.³⁶ Beyond simply loan repayment concerns, British diplomatic, informational, and military efforts to cultivate relationships with the US effectively culminated in the 1941 Lend-Lease Act, which the US hoped would equip Britain and other Allies to fight themselves so the US could officially remain neutral.³⁷ Hesitant to lead Britain into another potential debt default, the US “lent” equipment mainly to Britain in exchange for Britain joining the “liberalized international economic order in the postwar world,” which the Atlantic Charter revealed had many strings attached.³⁸ Britain’s and other Lend-Lease recipients’ support of the US-designed post-war GATT, IMF, World Bank, and UN would soon provide clarity regarding how the Lend-Lease Act would ultimately benefit the US while avoiding debt-related antagonism. Japan would later join this international order, but only after a disastrous war with the US.

Pre-WWII US-Japan Relationship

Significant senior figures in Japan sought to avoid war with the US in the 1930s since they felt Japan would rationally lose an extended conflict with America. Marshall Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto even wrote, “Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and sign the treaty in the White House. I wonder if our politicians who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?”³⁹ Yet diplomatic intransigence, poor informational exchange exacerbated by racism, military rivalry, and economic competition between the imperial Japanese elite and the US made war inevitable.

The pre-WWII Japanese-American relationship became increasingly strained since neither side could diplomatically compromise over their respective interests in China. During the early 20th century, Theodore Roosevelt sought friendly relations with Japan, brokering the Treaty of Portsmouth, having the Great White Fleet visit Tokyo, and signing the 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement recognizing “the existing status quo.”⁴⁰ The 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the US and Japan only “strengthen[ed] the relations of amity and good understanding which happily exist between the two nations”⁴¹ by establishing mutual most-favored-nation treatment and delineated citizens’ rights.⁴² Soon, however, the US became increasingly troubled by Japan violating the US-sanctioned equal access “Open Door Policy” regarding China. Japan’s 1915 Twenty-One Demands to China included a clause that would violate the “Open Door Policy” by making China an effective Japanese protectorate, causing the US to lose faith in Japan as a trusted Pacific partner.⁴³ The US and Japan soon negotiated the 1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement to reaffirm the “Open Door Policy,” recognize Japan’s “special interests” in Manchuria, and ensure neither would use WWI to seek further rights and privileges in China, although President Harding declared it non-binding by 1922.⁴⁴ Thus, when Japan insisted on acquiring Germany’s Chinese territory in Shandong during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the US was outraged.⁴⁵ At the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, the US codified the “Open Door Policy” into international law and formally returned Shandong to China (albeit it was still under de facto Japanese control) with the Nine-Power Treaty, yet the Treaty would again be unenforceable. Simultaneously, the US pressured Britain to replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the non-committal Four-Power Treaty while limiting international naval force ratios to 5-5-3 for the US, Britain, and Japan, respectively, with the Five-Power Treaty.⁴⁶

Japan thought that it had been slighted by unequal treaties during the Washington Naval Conference and that the US would not risk war by responding to its aggression, further stressing its already strained relationship with the US. Thus, Japan soon renounced the treaties and invaded Manchuria in 1931, only encountering Secretary Stimson’s meek non-recognition response.⁴⁷ Japan’s presumption that the US would not significantly respond to its aggression seemed to hold true as tensions subsided in 1933.⁴⁸ Accordingly, Japan failed to take seriously Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Pittman’s speeches from 1935-1936 that the US would send “dominating” air and sea forces if Japan expanded further.⁴⁹ Disregarding Senator Pittman’s threat, Japan invaded the rest of China by July 1937, and the US initially issued a muted response again. By then, there was “complete unanimity of opinion” among Japan’s government, military, and business community regarding further expansion in China, making it impossible for Japan to back down. Yet after China’s September 1937 appeal to the League of Nations, the US joined the League in condemning Japan’s invasion of China proper.⁵⁰ FDR discreetly criticized Japan the following month, calling for “quarantin[ing]… the epidemic of world lawlessness.”⁵¹ Ambassador Grew notably saw such a global convening as a mistake, as he felt the lack of collective global repercussions would only encourage Japanese militarists. Although Ambassador Grew repeatedly warned otherwise, Japan formally joined the Axis Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy by September 1940, feeling increasingly constrained by American military and economic pressure. Japan’s alignment with the Axis further reduced the diplomatic zone of agreement with the Britain-aligned US on China. Japan’s public was growing weary of the stalled Japanese advance in China, but the Imperial Japanese Army was determined to continue even if it meant deposing Japan’s civilian government.⁵² Conversely, the US was losing patience, although it was not looking to engage Japan prematurely as Japan was growing progressively weak from overextension. Thus, the US continued providing aid to Britain and China while developing its own military capabilities. Hampered by the Imperial Japanese Army’s obstinate refusal to pull out of China and the American stubborn determination to restore the “Open Door Policy,” the US and Japan’s civilian government continued fruitless mid-level diplomatic negotiations until Pearl Harbor.⁵³

Yet when Prime Minister Konoe proposed a summit meeting with FDR in September 1941, Secretary Hull rejected the offer due to the perceived implications of such a meeting, exacerbating Japan’s perception of American disrespect.⁵⁴ This rejection concerned Ambassador Grew the most, as he believed such a summit could have calmed tensions—at the very least, it would have bought the US more time to prepare for war against Japan.⁵⁵ After all, FDR held a summit with Churchill to issue the Atlantic Charter, declaring that “should Japan… undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions… various steps would have to be taken by the United States [that] might result in war between the United States and Japan.”⁵⁶ Caught in the mirror imaging trap, however, anti-appeasement US policymakers did not recognize that Japan might adopt a “now or never” attitude as it felt increasingly disrespected and cornered militarily and economically. Even worse, Konoe resigned after Hull rejected a potential summit between him and FDR, paving the way for General Tojo’s no-guardrails military cabinet to replace him.⁵⁷ By 3 November 1941, Ambassador Grew cabled, “Japan may go all-out in a do-or-die effort, actually risking national hara-kiri… Armed conflict with the US might come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness,” but his warning was largely ignored in Washington.⁵⁸ On 26 November 1941, Secretary Hull reiterated America’s intransigent demand that Japan withdraw from China and French Indochina,⁵⁹ which Tojo’s military cabinet took as an ultimatum since Hull’s statement left no room for further negotiation.⁶⁰ While FDR tried one last time on 6 December 1941 to preserve peace by appealing to Emperor Hirohito to at least pull Japanese troops from Indochina, Tokyo received the message too late for the Pearl Harbor task force to retreat.⁶¹

Differing values and racism between the US and Japan facilitated poor informational exchanges and propaganda efforts. Meiji Restoration modernization efforts were centered around the Prussian model, which focused on authoritarianism, outward expansion, and limited civilian oversight of the military.⁶² Although Japan experimented with liberal “Taishō democracy” from 1905 to 1926, during which it was still open to diplomatic negotiations, the Shōwa Depression allowed a military dictatorship to take over by the 1930s.⁶³ Such lack of civilian control over the Japanese government pushed Japan closer to other fascist powers like Germany and Italy, and the US increasingly perceived further negotiations with Japan’s civilian diplomats as fruitless and morally objectionable. Furthermore, the US and Japan had different languages, heritages, and cultures, exacerbating nationalist “exceptionalism” as well as perceived and actual racism.

Crucially, Japan perceived the US as racist and insulting. After all, Commodore Matthew Perry sailed an American fleet into Tokyo in 1853 and US envoy Townsend Harris imposed an “unequal treaty” on Japan in 1858, forcing Japan to begrudgingly end its isolationism and accept American extraterritoriality.⁶⁴ While President Theodore Roosevelt respected Japan’s bushido tradition and newfound military might, Japan felt slighted by his supporting Russia’s no-indemnity position with the Treaty of Portsmouth and Japanese segregation in California.⁶⁵ Roosevelt managed to reduce tensions with an informal Gentleman’s Agreement in which Japan would limit emigration to the US and the US would not restrict Japanese immigrants already in the US,⁶⁶ but Wilson allowed the Agreement to be violated by California’s Alien Land Law banning Japanese immigrants from owning land in the state. Soon after, Wilson opposed Japan’s proposed racial equality clause during the Paris Peace Conference and Coolidge banned Japanese immigration to the US with the Immigration Act of 1924.⁶⁷ Such overt racism infuriated Japan as the US steadily eroded Japan’s privileged racial status. The Washington Naval Treaty’s restrictions on Japan’s naval power and further American diplomatic maneuvers only angered Japan further.⁶⁸ Ambassador Grew soon warned that the US needed to understand Japanese psychology to gauge potential risks and reactions to American actions,⁶⁹ but a lack of American awareness about Japanese cultural elements like bushido, yamato-damashii, and hakkō ichiu made that difficult. US racism toward Japan reduced potential diplomatic zones of agreement and chances to compromise while precipitating Japan’s racist attitudes toward the US and others.

Western racial theories induced Japanese ultranationalists to use yamato-damashii (“the Japanese spirit”) to justify its own version of the “white man’s burden” throughout the Pacific.⁷⁰ Influenced by its honorary privileged racial status among the West in the early 20th century and resentment over the US stripping that status away, Japan sought to colonize Taiwan, Korea, China, and other parts of the Pacific to create a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the slogan hakkō ichiu (“unify the whole world under one roof”).⁷¹ Japan’s objective became establishing an “Asia for the Asians” without the Western powers that it perceived as racist, and by 1933, Ambassador Grew was already warning Secretary Cordell that Japan has a “…national morale and esprit de corps—a spirit which perhaps has not been equaled since the days when the Mongol hordes followed Genghis Khan in his conquest of Asia,”⁷² forewarning the futility of trying to convince Japan to give up its claims in China. While pursuing an imperial expansion agenda, Japan was simultaneously supporting anti-colonial movements in Southeast Asia and India.⁷³ Such policies directly threatened American Pacific territories and lingering racial tension made Japanese-American cooperation difficult. Japan also embarked on brutal suppression campaigns in Korea, Taiwan, China, and other Pacific territories it conquered, such as Japan’s abhorrent Nanking Massacre, which turned American moral sentiment against Japan. Although the Imperial Japanese Army was undoubtedly brutal, the US used its actions to portray all Japanese people as cruel barbarians.⁷⁴ Ambassador Grew had taken care to warn that Japanese military actions often did not reflect government decrees and that most Japanese people were good with examples like Japanese bystanders saving the US Embassy dog from drowning in a palace moat, but his advice was sidelined.⁷⁵ Thus, the potential for diplomatic compromises between the US and Japan became even more limited.

Likely diminished in influence by racism and diverging values, the Japanese propaganda effort in the US was inconsistent and ineffective. Like Britain, Japan targeted both the American public and the elite. Japan aimed to leverage Asia-tied businesses, academics, and interest groups to influence US lawmakers while encouraging travel, “friendship films,” and baseball exchanges to depict Japan as more like the US than China. Japan sought to convince the US that a Japanese occupation of China would be beneficial, claiming that only Japan had the resources, technology, and ambition to “fix” China. Playing into the American rhetoric, Japan declared its Asian “manifest destiny” to make a “new deal” for China. Specifically, Japan claimed that Japanese troops brought peace, harmony, prosperity, and civilization to China, but the image it portrayed quickly faded after the 1937 Nanjing Massacre.⁷⁶ Any vestiges of such an image disappeared as Prime Minister Konoe declared a “New Order in East Asia” in 1938, repudiating the Open Door policy and closing occupied China’s economy and communications to the US. Japan’s claim that its invasion of China was aimed at halting Soviet communist expansion was perhaps more effective, as high Soviet-Japanese tensions between 1933 and 1941 would serve US interests.⁷⁷ Yet the effectiveness of Japan’s anti-communist argument was much diminished after the 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the Soviet Union joining the Allies in the same year.

Japan lured the US into a blatant military competition for prestige, so any strategic concessions would cause either side to lose face and power. Unlike the US, Japan’s military dominated its government by the 1930s, allowing it to violate diplomatic treaties made during the “Taishō Democracy” period when convenient. By December 1934, Japan declared to Secretary Hull that it would terminate the Washington Naval Treaty,⁷⁸ indicating that it would pursue rapid naval expansion. Japan’s admirals had calculated that Japan needed 70% of the thinly stretched US Navy’s strength for victory.⁷⁹ Yet even then, Japan understood that American industrial power exceeded that of Japan, so it needed to decisively destroy the American fleet if war broke out.⁸⁰ Beyond naval expansion, Japan had long embarked on rapid land expansion in the Pacific. By 1895, the US was already worried about Japan’s Pacific expansion after the First Sino-Japanese War, spurring the US to annex Hawaii for its strategic location.⁸¹ Over the next few years, Japan annexed Taiwan, Korea, and South Sakhalin while expanding its sphere of influence into Manchuria. By 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, precipitating the US Navy to begin rearmament.⁸² Japan forbid the US Navy from visiting any of its islands in 1935,⁸³ making future tension-reducing naval visits like the 1933 one to Tokyo impossible.⁸⁴ Furthermore, once Japan invaded the rest of China and reached Nanking in December 1937, Japanese soldiers sank the USS Panay and slapped a senior American diplomat,⁸⁵ ensuring a US military response.

In response to Japan’s military aggression, FDR acquiesced to Britain’s suggestions for Anglo-American naval staff talks and began cementing an anti-Japan coalition with the British, Chinese, and Dutch powers.⁸⁶ Congress also expanded the US Navy by 20% with the Naval Act of 1938.⁸⁷ If Japan continued expanding further south, war would be inevitable. By February and March 1939, Japan occupied Hainan and the Spratly Islands, putting Southeast Asian British, French, and American possessions under threat. Soon after, the Japanese Army blockaded British land in Tianjin in July 1939 and expanded deeper into China. In response, the US entered a war footing, signified by FDR forward basing the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii and establishing a joint Canadian-American defense board.⁸⁸ By 1940, Congress also further increased the US Navy size by 70% with the Two-Ocean Navy Act and implemented a nationwide draft through the Selective Training and Service Act.⁸⁹ However, Japan expanded again into French Indochina in September 1940. Thus, by 1941, FDR allowed Anglo-American military staff to plan for war in Washington DC and Singapore; set up the Office of Production Management to coordinate civilian and arms production; broke Japan’s diplomatic codes with MAGIC; sent equipment, advisors, and volunteer airmen to China; called the Philippine army to serve in a new US Army Far Eastern command; and moved American bombers to the Philippines. By 26 November 1941, Washington deciphered MAGIC intercepts warning of an imminent break in US-Japan relations and issued war preparation notices to US military commanders in the Pacific.⁹⁰ By 1941, the US seemed to have hit the point where it would not tolerate any further Japanese military expansion.

While Japan also established a risky complex economic interdependence relationship with the US, the relationship worsened over time due to economic and actual warfare. At first glance, Japan seemed to have the better position. After all, Japan lacked Britain’s debt shield (or debt curse) with the US, and the US actually traded more with Japan than China before WWII.⁹¹ Japan also critically lacked natural resources like oil and metal ore, so it became America’s third-largest export market. In fact, 80% of Japanese oil was imported from the US, with much of the rest from the Dutch East Indies.⁹² Thus, Japan’s invasion of China was primarily enabled by American oil. Ambassador Grew even initially suggested that war with Japan was not worth the risk, given that the US supplied nearly 44% of Japan’s imports, much higher than the rest of Asia combined in the mid-1930s. American trade with China amounted to less than the cost of one week of war against Japan, so the US business community corroborated Ambassador Grew’s suggestion, calling for continuing trade despite Japan’s aggression.⁹³ WWII breaking out in Europe provided the US even more of an economic opportunity in Japan, as increased US exports could fill reduced European exports to Japan.⁹⁴ Yet Japan pursued a manipulative trade policy of high tariffs and goods dumping to bolster its economy, limiting finished goods imports while severely undercutting foreign textile and light industrial goods manufacturers.⁹⁵ Such practices were enabled by Japan’s currency manipulation, allowing the yen to depreciate by 60% against the US dollar so its exports would become cheaper.⁹⁶ Japan depended on the US since it lacked natural resources, but its unfair trade practices foreshadowed how the US economy could suffer if the US allowed imperial Japan to create the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” with China and Southeast Asia’s vast natural resources and market.

Spurred by an inability to compromise diplomatically, racism, and Japanese military aggression, the US soon sacrificed short-term economic benefits for perceived long-term strategic stability in the Pacific. By 1938, the US enacted a “moral embargo” on Japan, requesting that American oil, mining, and airplane companies stop supplying Japan. The following year, the US began providing loans to China and ended Japan’s most-favored-nation status by abrogating the 1911 US-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. When Japan further expanded into northern French Indochina in 1940, the US formalized its “moral embargo” into a “virtual embargo” through export controls. By 1941, the US formalized economic support for Britain, China, and other Allies through the Lend-Lease Act and froze Japanese assets. Without American oil and metal ore, Japan’s empire would collapse.⁹⁷ Although both sides were to blame, such economic warfare cornering Japan directly induced Japan’s subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor.

Implications

Britain’s diplomatic and informational overtures, along with its strategic military and economic concessions to the US, allowed it to avoid the Thucydides Trap. However, Japan’s confrontational military and economic relationship with the US helped weaken diplomatic and informational ties, causing both to fall into the Thucydides Trap of a disastrous great power war. In setting the tone of their respective relationships with the US, Britain and Japan used different elements of their national power to varying degrees. Britain diplomatically courted and compromised with the US, but Japan’s civilian government was hindered by the imperial Japanese military. In the information space, Britain’s propaganda efforts were more effective due to shared values, language, heritage, culture, and consistency, contrasting with Japan’s propaganda efforts, which were hindered by differing values, racism, and inconsistent narratives. Militarily, Britain enabled American military expansion while Japan’s expansionist military threatened the US military’s standing and strategic interests. Although both Britain’s and Japan’s economies were intertwined with the US through complex economic interdependence, Britain turned its debt liability into an asset while Japan became an increasingly menacing economic and strategic threat to the US. Overall, the US and Britain prioritized mutual cooperation toward long-term strategic interests, even if those interests helped the US more than Britain. In contrast, the US-Japan dynamic was marred by strategic oversight that brought about war. Although the US had ample warning about Japan’s intentions from Ambassador Grew and MAGIC intercepts, group-thinking Washington policymakers failed to recognize that an economically- and militarily-stagnating Japan may lash out at the country that it saw as its oppressor, likely in part due to racism and an excessive focus on the European theater. After all, the US premise that a rational Japan would submit to US military and economic domination to avoid war and hold better negotiating power in shaping the Pacific regional order betrays America’s ignorance of Japanese cultural elements like the bushido code.

While US-Japan relations may have been tense before WWII, the US, Britain, and Japan now have a very close trilateral relationship eight decades later. Britain has continued focusing on soft power diplomatic and informational levers within its relationship with the US, which post-war Japan has also sought to develop. The US occupation of post-war Japan and subsequent interactions between cultures created an enduring set of shared democratic values, reducing the opportunity for further conflict between the US and Japan. Furthermore, both Britain and Japan now rarely challenge America’s military and economic dominance. Instead, both serve pivotal roles as American deputies in Europe and Asia, helping to maintain the post-war international order by supplementing American hard power against revisionist rivals like Russia or the PRC. Such is the case because the US has created a symbiotic relationship with Britain and Japan—even if the relationship may benefit the US the most, Britain and Japan have largely benefited as part of the American empire’s peripheral elite as well. After all, US military dominance has allowed Britain and Japan to downsize their military and focus on other elements of national power, and American grants and loans enabled Britain’s and Japan’s post-war economies to dramatically recover to a point where they became among the largest in the world. Although the US and Japan did engage in a trade war during the 1980s, Japan was open to diplomatic concessions to the US through measures like the Plaza Accord and Louvre Accord due to post-war Japan’s established role as a US ally, civilian control of government, better informational exchange, and military aversion.⁹⁸ Thus, the US and Japan were able to resolve their economic differences peacefully rather than get caught in the Thucydides Trap again.

Britain’s and post-war Japan’s diverging paths with imperial Japan highlight ways the US can enhance its DIME framework. After all, it often seems like the US pursues forceful military and economic threats rather than diplomatic compromise or effective information operations. As was the case with imperial Japan, such an imbalance favoring hard power threatens to engulf the US in a future great power war. In the diplomatic space, the US should consistently encourage mutually beneficial compromises when they suit America’s long-term strategic objectives. “Appeasement” may be a dirty word, but short-term tactical concessions would prevent the US from imperial overreach and getting trapped in dangerous, avoidable confrontations. To enhance its informational capability, the US ought to develop cultural understanding by encouraging diverse immigration and ensure that it separates the government from the people, especially in authoritarian regimes where the government is often not representative of the people. Incorporating diverse perspectives in targeting, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information would reduce groupthink, providing the US with a better position to extend American narratives in other countries, negotiate diplomatic compromises, enhance military positioning, and refine either mutually beneficial or coercive economic measures. Beyond encouraging cultural understanding, however, the US should ensure that its actions are consistently morally defensible to be a compelling role model for the values-based system that it seeks to uphold. Continually violating established norms weakens America’s ideological position, damaging US global standing to the benefit of America’s adversaries.

The US ought to incorporate lessons from WWII to optimize its DIME levers of national power in its strategic competition with the PRC. Although the PRC has militarily and economically flourished under the American international order, Xi Jinping’s China seems to be following imperial Japan’s path into the Thucydides Trap. Like imperial Japan, the PRC may aggressively lash out militarily as its power peaks, constrained by US and allied military encirclement and economic strangulation.⁹⁹ Yet unwarranted China-bashing in the US will only exacerbate the likelihood of such a war. To avoid war, the US should adopt British-refined diplomatic and informational national power elements while selectively incorporating military deterrence and economic export controls.

In the diplomatic arena, the US should cooperate and compromise with the PRC on issues beneficial for America’s long-term strategic goals, perhaps incorporating the PRC into a symbiotic relationship like the UK did for the US. Although the US ought to hold its moral high ground on Taiwan and human rights issues, also restricting Track 1 and Track 1.5 diplomacy risks war. Especially for shared concerns like climate, global health, intellectual property protection, counterterrorism, and nuclear proliferation, US-PRC collaboration is critical. After all, mutual cooperation in those areas would facilitate symbiotic relationship development and lessen tensions. Even if the US and PRC have strained military and economic relations, such should not cause breakdowns in other diplomatic areas where collaboration is essential. Joint US-PRC global initiatives on transnational issues like the UN Sustainable Development Goals would reduce the possibility of war and further long-term US strategic interests, even if they entail short-term compromises with the PRC. In fact, since the PRC already has influence in many developing countries through the Belt and Road Initiative, joint collaboration could actually allow the US to extend its influence into those countries. Most countries aligned with the US are less susceptible to the PRC’s authoritarian influence anyway.

Adopting lessons from Britain and Japan, the US should improve how it uses information to enhance American national power relative to the PRC. The US and PRC do not share similar values, language, heritage, and culture, risking increased xenophobia toward Chinese Americans. The US should take steps to publicly amplify the separation between the Chinese people and the PRC—a government that does not represent its people—to make the Chinese diaspora feel welcome and respected. In fact, ensuring continued high-talent immigration from the PRC would exacerbate its brain drain while making US industries more competitive. After all, Chinese immigrants are more likely to work in STEM fields and stay in the US due to increased freedom and higher salaries, making the American technological sector more competitive. Although some may be concerned about espionage, immigrants must pass a background check, and the likelihood of such espionage is extremely low anyway.¹⁰⁰ Beyond the STEM benefits, the large Chinese dissident community in the US can be a highly effective propaganda tool in amplifying counternarratives against PRC information operations and calling for a democratic China. After all, the Hawaii-educated Sun Yat-sen overthrew imperial China by gathering support in US Chinatowns, and his democratic legacy lives on in Taiwan today.¹⁰¹

Militarily, the US ought to contain the PRC’s territorial expansion but take care not to lure the PRC into a military competition for prestige. The US and PRC should pursue nuclear and conventional arms limitations, perhaps also with stipulations that the PRC demilitarize its South China Sea islands in exchange for the US pulling back from some of its bases in the first island chain containing the PRC. Such compromises would allow both sides to lessen military tensions. Even in the unlikely scenario that the US fails to detect an impending PLA invasion of Taiwan, the US would still have plentiful partners from Japan to Australia that can serve as rapid first responders. Furthermore, focusing more on naval power than stationary military bases would prevent a PLA first strike from destroying the many American bases in the first island chain, thus lessening the opportunity for a great power crisis to arise. Beyond compromise, the US should focus on strategically deploying more affordable, effective, and explicitly defensive anti-access/area denial systems rather than aggressively perceived offensive weapons.

As was the case in the relationship between the US and imperial Japan, the US and PRC maintain an economic relationship based on complex interdependence in which decoupling may induce war. Instead of fully decoupling from the PRC, the US should aim to ensure that it does not rely on the PRC for critical imports and items made using forced labor while reducing the US-PRC trade deficit. Although free trade between the US and PRC is likely not feasible, retaining as much US-PRC trade as possible would decrease the likelihood of an economically devastating war for both sides while reducing costs based on each country’s comparative production advantage. As for restricting the PRC’s unfair economic practices like currency manipulation, dumping, and intellectual property theft, the US should impose consequences on the PRC equivalent to the unfairly gained amount but not resort to norms-violating tit-for-tat. With semiconductors, the backbone of the modern world’s tech-oriented economy, the US should ensure that it does not entrap the PRC economically through excessively stringent export restrictions. After all, the US and its allies retain the most advanced chip design and manufacturing capabilities regardless of whether semiconductor export controls are in place. While current semiconductor export controls focus on the most advanced chips—allowing the PRC to continue importing lagging edge nodes—they still present high risks in forcing the PRC to further develop its own indigenous chip manufacturing capabilities and heightening the threat of war if the PRC sees itself as perpetually falling behind, unable to outcompete American and US-allied chip technologies. Trade benefits both the US and PRC, and the US should seek to preserve as much economic interdependence as possible. Thus, the PRC’s self-inflicted economic wounds caused by Xi Jinping’s aggressive crackdowns will only grow more apparent, providing less room for Xi’s ultranationalist regime to blame the US for the PRC’s economic woes. Nevertheless, as with Britain and Japan, more economic interdependence would also better incentivize the PRC to uphold the current international order if its economy continues thriving.

Conclusion

America’s pre-WWII relationships with Britain and Japan reveal critical lessons about how different instruments of national power can prevent or facilitate great power relationships from falling into the Thucydides Trap. The US-Britain “Special Relationship” evolved through strategic diplomatic compromise; shared values, language, heritage, and culture; effective propaganda; military non-aggression; and economic interdependence. The breakdown in US-Japan relations was induced by diplomatic intransigence, different values and racism, inconsistent messaging, military competition, and economic warfare. Such a contrast between the outcome of great power relationships underscores the necessity of compromise and the threat of overusing hard power at the expense of soft power. Yet the US, Britain, and Japan are now tightly knit in maintaining a stable international order together, revealing that past adversaries can transform into cooperative alliances. The lessons from WWII are vital for contemporary US foreign policy, especially regarding how to effectively manage America’s evolving relationship with the PRC by using all US instruments of national power complementarily. The US must enhance its diplomatic engagement, cultural understanding, strategic military deterrence, and economic interdependence to navigate the 21st century’s great power competition landscape and foster a peaceful and prosperous global environment.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima | Image sourced from Joe Rosenthal/Wikimedia Commons

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56. Welles, Benjamin S. 1941. “The Atlantic Conference: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles).” Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/at08.asp.
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57. Grew, Joseph C. 1944. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn From the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph G. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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58. Grew, Joseph C. 1941. “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State.” Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1931-41v02/d379.
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59. US Department of State. 1941. “Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura).” Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan. https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411126bpw.html.
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60. Crozier, Andrew. 1997. The Causes of the Second World War. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishers.
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61. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1941. “Appeal to Emperor Hirohito to Avoid War in the Pacific.” The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/appeal-emperor-hirohito-avoid-war-the-pacific.
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62. Martin, Bernd. 2005. Japan and Germany in the Modern World. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
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63. Japan National Diet. n.d. “Taisho Democracy.” Japan National Diet Library. Accessed December 16, 2023. https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha3/index.html.
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64. US Department of State. n.d. “The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853.” US Department of State. Accessed December 16, 2023. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/opening-to-japan.
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65. US Department of State. n.d. “The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.” US Department of State. Accessed December 16, 2023. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/portsmouth-treaty.
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66. US Department of State. n.d. “Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900-1922.” US Department of State. Accessed December 16, 2023. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations.
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67. Merida, Tarik. 2020. “A Japanese Anomaly: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan’s Racial Identity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 18, no. 20 (October). https://apjjf.org/2020/20/Merida.html.
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68. Nomura, Kichisaburo. 1935. “Japan’s Demand for Naval Equality.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/1935-01-01/japans-demand-naval-equality.
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69. Grew, Joseph C. 1944. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn From the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph G. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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70. Carr, Michael. 1994. “Yamato-Damashii ‘Japanese Spirit’ Definitions.” International Journal of Lexicography 7, no. 4 (December): 279-306. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijl/7.4.279.
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71. Wang, Ziming. 2023. “Hakkō Ichiu: Religious Rhetoric in Imperial Japan.” Religions 14 (21). https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010021.
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72. US Department of State. 1933. “Letter from Joseph C. Grew to Cordell Hull.” PBS. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/fdr-japan/.
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75. Grew, Joseph C. 1944. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn From the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph G. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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76. Grasso, June M. 2019. Japan’s “New Deal” for China: Propaganda Aimed at Americans Before Pearl Harbor. London: Routledge. ↩︎
77. Grew, Joseph C. 1944. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn From the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph G. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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78. Hull, Cordell. 1934. “Memorandum by the Secretary of State.” Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, General, the British Commonwealth, Volume I. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d329.
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79. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. 1997. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
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80. Finlayson, Dale K. 1973. Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American relations, 1931-1941. New York: Columbia University Press.
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81. Shepardson, Peter. 2010. “Annexing Hawaii: The Real Story.” Cultural Survival. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/annexing-hawaii-real-story.
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83. Campbell, Earnest G. 1942. “Japan’s Mandate In The Southwestern Pacific.” U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1942/june/japans-mandate-southwestern-pacific.
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84. Grew, Joseph C. 1944. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn From the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph G. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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85. US Department of State. 1938. “The Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Allison) to the Secretary of State.” Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, the Far East, Volume IV. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1938v04/d475.
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     ↩︎

The the LGBTQ+ community has battled for decades to secure their basic human rights.  This article analyzes the varying degrees of success of LGBTQ+ movements in China and Japan, especially how they not only indicate different levels of freedom, but also the vital role that “people power ” has in society’s aptitude for development. 

China

Most LGBTQ+ gatherings in China have occurred in an underground environment. Its citizens don’t have much of a voice; with every political group affiliated under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and president Xi Jinping, China’s government is effectively a dictatorship where dissenting opinions can place people in danger.¹ LGBTQ+ communities gathered in secret over WeChat, the primary social media app in Asia, giving support to each other because they couldn’t confide in anyone around them.² Nearly sixty percent of the Chinese LGBTQ+ community is at a greater risk of depression due to loneliness, anxiety of being outed  and lack of identity affirmation, according to a health survey conducted by the Beijing LGBT Centre.³ They are also five times more likely to consider suicide. These WeChat groups, while hidden and online, have been integral for the LGBTQ+ community in China.

However, a lack of government support can shut down even the most successful attempts for the advocacy of LGBTQ+ rights. In 2014, an inspiring milestone within the Chinese LGBTQ+ community occurred when a judge ruled in favor of LGBTQ+ rights for the first time ever in the country. Yanhui Peng, co-founder of LGBT Rights Advocacy China and currently a visiting scholar at Yale Law School, had filed a lawsuit against conversion therapy and won the case.⁴ LGBT Rights Advocacy continued to file a dozen more cases and help those who needed representation in court.⁵ There were more movements scheduled to take place, but the lockdowns under China’s “zero-Covid” policy made it difficult for any events to be organized.⁶ Shanghai Pride canceled its annual pride event in 2020 after its organizers were harassed by the police.⁷ In July 2021, WeChat began shutting down any group chats that had formed to provide support and advocacy for LGBTQ+ people.⁸ Other social media content platforms deleted content relating to pride and the LGBTQ+ community. In this hostile environment, LGBT Rights Advocacy China shut down in November 2021.⁹ Covid-19 and China’s policies had an extensive negative impact on the LGBTQ+ community, making it difficult for its members to gather and have a voice.¹⁰ Lack of free speech is the main obstacle, with many worried about the consequences of speaking out and members of the community itself deciding to remain closeted for safety, LGBTQ+ topics continue to be thought of from a perspective of outlandishness and negativity by many in China. There isn’t a reliable way to mobilize or present dissenting opinions from the norm.

LGBTQ+ press in China has actually increased in positivity over recent years – the problem is that there is less press coverage occurring overall. Covid-19 has taken the spotlight in many Chinese news outlets, resulting in a 40% drop on LGBTQ+ related stories on publications.¹¹ Even while positivity toward LGBTQ+ topics has increased, such as straying away from HIV or other STDs and moving toward highlighting the struggles of LGBTQ+ people in work environments, they still face discrimination on a regular basis.  Further, while they are advocating for equal treatment and kindness, there isn’t a reliable way for the public to become aware of these developments.¹² The government also must grapple with pressing issues such as inflation and administration policies, resulting in LGBTQ+ policies being placed on the backburner.¹³ Censorship of LGBTQ+ content is also a sign that the government, while officially neutral, is leaning toward anti-LGBTQ sentiments.¹⁴ Leading social media and news platforms also don’t encourage diverse views which makes it difficult for progress to be made.

China’s culture, rooted in tradition, is another challenge for LGBTQ+ rights advocacy movements. The integration of many anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments in everyday life through advertisements, societal expectations, and gender norms makes it inherently difficult for the LGBTQ+ community to be made publicly aware in a positive light. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore announced on August 21st that his plan to “protect the nation’s definition of marriage” excluded same-sex marriage.¹⁵ Same-sex relationships had been decriminalized, but there are no laws protecting them against discrimination.¹⁶ In addition to discrimination in the legal setting, the cautious attitude toward LGBTQ+ content in Singapore feeds further into the negativity surrounding it. The Walt Disney film “Lightyear” portrays a scene with two females kissing, resulting in an adults-only rating which demonstrates the perpetuating sentiment that anything challenging societal tradition is a negative influence.¹⁷ The restriction of LGBTQ+ topics makes it harder for people to show compassion toward members of said community. Furthermore, Confucianism in China frowns upon the possibility of having no descendants. The saying for this is “不孝有三，無後為大 (bùxiào yǒusān, wú hòu wéi dà).”¹⁸ Hesitation or lack of support toward LGBTQ+ identities don’t stem from outright hostility, but rather because it goes against the ideology that continuing a family is one of the most important responsibilities in life. These clashing values of traditional ideology and the open mindedness required to support LGBTQ+ people are thes primary reasons why it’s difficult for China to be accepting of them. 

Japan

Japan, in comparison, has shown more steady progress toward public understanding of the LGBTQ+ community. An online survey conducted in 2019 by professor Yasuharu Hidaka of Takarazuka University revealed that nearly 67% of its 10,700 participants in Japan felt that “compared with five years ago, diversity of sexual orientation and gender identity is better recognized by society.”¹⁹ Although discriminatory remarks still exist in workspaces and school environments, the survey does show improvement over time. This is in direct contrast with the diminishing press of China’s LGBTQ+ communities in recent years. Therefore, the extent of the influence of the public voice is an important factor that determines the velocity of changing societal norms.

One of the most important factors allowing LGBTQ+ communities in Japan to achieve more success is press freedom. The World Press Freedom Index ranking this year placed Japan at 71st and China at 175th out of 180 countries.²⁰ The openness to new perspectives facilitates the normalization of different identities, which is highly important for historically marginalized communities such as LGBTQ+ groups. In addition, 2022 saw the most women and LGBTQ+ candidates running in political elections: 181 and 4, respectively.²¹ Four doesn’t seem very high, but it does mark an improvement because it’s the highest number there’s ever been in one election. More surveys have found that around eight to ten percent of the Japanese population identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, but there is currently only one member in the upper house who openly identifies as such. Furthermore, surveys also indicate that most Japanese citizens are in favor of more representation of minority groups in politics and legalizing same-sex marriage, but the official regulations or laws have not been put into place.²² All of these instances demonstrate that while Japan is showing progress on a societal level thanks to its press freedom, the LGBTQ+ community still struggles with legal barriers and low representation in political matters.

A major legal setback for the LGBTQ+ community in Japan was a court ruling in June 2022 stating that it’s constitutional for same sex marriage to be restricted.²³ This highlights two important ideas. First, there has been a lot of support and advocacy by the people to make this happen, which means that the setback was not a result of public opposition. Rather, the decision was met with disappointment from many LGBTQ+ activists and couples who filed lawsuits. Second, even though the people of Japan have advocated for more diversity in politics and fairer treatment of LGBTQ+ members, the societal pressure for change has yielded very slow legal results. Some cities like Ube in the Yamaguchi Prefecture introduced the concept of “marriage certificates” in response to the ruling. These certificates grant some rights to LGBTQ+ couples as if they were legally married, including the ability to get housing loans and apply for a mortgage.²⁴ The legal benefits are not nearly as extensive as those that heterosexual couples receive in Japan, but these certificates have inspired companies to give members of the LGBTQ+ community support that otherwise wouldn’t have been possible. It also resulted in more public awareness of the struggles that LGBTQ+ people face. 

There is still a lot of progress to be made in Japan of course. Many citizens who identify as being part of the LGBTQ+ community still feel isolated in everyday life and worry about the reactions of their families and close friends. Moreover, candidates in government positions still don’t proportionally represent the LGBTQ+ population. However, it is good news that Japan is slowly inching toward a more open environment.²⁵

“People Power” in Societal Progress

The difference in the strength of LGBTQ+ communities between China and Japan demonstrates an important concept: press freedom is crucial for societal development. China’s attempts to shut down gatherings is not just a reflection of the government’s opposition to LGBTQ+ rights, but also of the larger implications of a dictatorship. New ideas are shut down if they clash with tradition so it’s difficult for any new movements to be successful even if they might benefit the common good. On the other hand, Japan’s increased amount of press freedom has allowed the public to become more familiar with the LGBTQ+ community, resulting in relatively more support and understanding from its people over time.²⁶ Japan has shown that an incremental approach is effective in bringing change and that differing opinions are necessary for improvement to happen. The findings from this article show that while the fight for LGBTQ+ rights is still ongoing, there is hope everywhere. With press freedom, incremental changes, and open minds, it’s possible for the LGBTQ+ community to receive the support and kindness they need. 

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation:| Image sourced from Flickr

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14. Nathanael Cheng, Molly Henry, Seojung Kim, “The Resilience of East Asia’s LGBTQ Community.” ↩︎
15. Faris Mokhtar, “Singapore Debate on LGBTQ Rights Heats Up in Test for Leaders.” ↩︎
16. Chen Lin, “Singapore will decriminalize sex between men, prime minister says,” Reuters, August 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/singapore-will-decriminalise-sex-between-men-pm-2022-08-21/. ↩︎
17. Faris Mokhtar, “Singapore Debate on LGBTQ Rights Heats Up in Test for Leaders.” ↩︎
18. UNDP, USAID, “Being LGBT in Asia: China Country Report,” United Nations Development Programme, 2014, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/asia_pacific_rbap/rbap-hhd-2014-blia-china-country-report_0.pdf. ↩︎
19. “Quarter of LGBT people in Japan have experienced outing: survey,” Kyodo News, October 28, 2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/10/2b73ba83c419-quarter-of-lgbt-people-in-japan-have-experienced-outing-survey.html. ↩︎
20. “Asia-Pacific Absolute and Autocratic Control of Information,” Reporters Without Borders, 2022, https://rsf.org/en/classement/2022/asia-pacific.
    ↩︎
21. Eduardo Martinez, Mariko Tamura, “FOCUS: Record women, LGBTQ election hopefuls run to shake up Japan politics,” Kyodo News, July 7, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/07/1415d868fd6f-focus-record-women-lgbtq-election-hopefuls-run-to-shake-up-japan-politics.html. ↩︎
22. Ben Dooley, “Japan’s Support for Gay Marriage Is Soaring. But Can It Become Law?,” The New York Times, November 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/world/asia/japan-gay-marriage.html; Elaine Lies, “Japan court rules same-sex marriage ban is not unconstitutional,” Reuters, June 20, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-court-rules-barring-same-sex-marriage-not-unconstitutional-lgbtq-rights-2022-06-20/. ↩︎
23. “Japan court says ban on same-sex marriage is constitutional,” National Public Radio, June 20, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/20/1106313824/japan-court-ban-on-same-sex-marriage-constitutional. ↩︎
24. “Yamaguchi city of Ube ratifies rights for LGBTQ couples,” The Japan Times, November 29, 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/11/29/national/social-issues/yamaguchi-ube-city-lgbtq-rights/. ↩︎
25. Ben Dooley, “Japan’s Support for Gay Marriage Is Soaring. But Can It Become Law?.” ↩︎
26. Brian Wong, “What Asia’s LGBTQ+ Movement Can Learn From Japan,” Time Magazine, March 30, 2021, https://time.com/5951039/asia-lgbtq-japan-lgbt/. ↩︎

3rd Place, High School Essay Contest 2021

臭い物に蓋 —

Put a lid on what smells bad. This Japanese saying reflects the nation’s culture of desiring to melt in with the crowd – in other words, prioritizing the larger community over one’s rights or opinions. The symbolic act of “putting a lid on what smells bad” is equivalent to ignoring criticisms and focusing on obscuring the issue in question, when instead the problem must be solved. In context to this, one can point out that Japanese individuals rarely raise their voices to criticize – especially when it comes to political issues and the government. The tendency to ignore and conceal a flaw does deteriorate individuals’ critical judgment skills. However, this fact does not serve as a big problem in Japanese society, where the nation’s overall benefit is essential.

This social phenomenon can explain the structural arrangements in Japanese politics regarding governance, namely how the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is able to stay in power for such a long period. In fact, the LDP, since its organization in 1955, has almost always been the ruling party of Japan. Japan, with a nominal GDP of 5.6 trillion dollars, is the third-largest economy in the world, and it enjoys a very stable political landscape. Both signs of societal affluence – economic prosperity and political stability – could be materialized through the Liberal Democratic Party’s tight grip of power. After all, the consistent passing of contextually similar bills can only materialize when the leading party stays in power for a long time. Additionally, policies that need to be carried out in the long term succeed comparatively often in Japan.

The Liberal Democratic Party’s long reign on the political throne can be explained through the Japanese people’s tendency to accept things as they are, in addition to their reluctance towards speaking up to criticize. At an early age, Japanese children are given the impression that “standing out” can lead to bullying, known as ijime in Japan. Consequently, people feel reluctant about speaking up, even if there are clear points to criticize. The jargon “KY,” used among teenagers in Japan, also reflects the nation’s individuals’ desire to blend in with the rest of the crowd. “KY” is the abbreviation for the Japanese phrase, kūki o yomanai (空気を読まない) – “unable to read the air.” This expression is used to describe someone who cannot comprehend the situation accurately. In other words, someone who does not follow the implicit “rules” of society. Through this as well one can presume how important mingling with others is in Japanese society.

This apprehension is how the abovementioned social tendency affects Japan’s political landscape and governance. Even if, for instance, in a hypothetical situation, an individual discovers that corruption is existent in the Liberal Democratic Party, he or she would not be willing to point it out to the public. As a result, majority votes go to the LDP in the general elections every time, and the corruption will continue with no adjustments.

Broadening the meaning of “governance” to the Japanese society itself (because governance directly influences the society), one must acknowledge how Japan’s societal atmosphere affects the direction of the society itself. Individuals being unwilling to criticize the government is, in one aspect, prioritizing national interests. The reason is that thanks to the people’s implied support (backed by lack of political criticism) for the government, Japan is capable of pursuing national goals and benefits with a strong driving force. Prioritizing national interests over individual ones certainly brings stability and prosperity to society. Japan is one of the best examples of this. As emphasized above, Japan is one of the strongest economies in the world and has a well-established societal framework. However, there are side effects to the social security and affluence that Japan enjoys. In exchange for a strong community, perhaps essential factors, such as innovation or growth, were sacrificed. In context to this, one can speculate on the number of Nobel Prizes that Japan has won. There are 25 medals in total – 11 in physics, 7 in chemistry, 4 in medicine, 2 in literature and 1 in peace, and 0 in economics.

The Norwegian Noble Committee offers most prizes in fields of natural science. However, one must still recognize the fact that Japan contributed more to the natural science field than to disciplines that deal with social sciences, which place more significance in debate and contradictions. Though one must not generalize upon the basis of data regarding 25 Noble laureates, it is rational to assume that Japan is more advanced in natural science, and less so in social science. This reflects how Japan and its people are culturally distant from debating and criticism, the main factors that bring social change.

Through this, one can carefully assume that while Japanese society stable and strong, there is little room for significant developments or innovations.

In Japan, the desire to blend in with the crowd, in addition to the tendency to prioritize society above all else, influences governance in the nation in various ways, directly and indirectly, negatively and positively. Regardless, the culture itself takes up a significant part of each individual’s lives and has a big influence on their sense of identity. Hence, despite the need for some change in the societal atmosphere, it is impossible and wrong to eliminate its roots in Japanese society. All things considered, to materialize social stability and growth within Japan, there is a need for reasonable amendments to be carried out in the long term.

Works Cited:

Miura, Lully. 2021. “What’s Behind Japan’s Political Stability?”. The Japan Times.https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/09/27/commentary/japan-commentary/whats-behind-japans-political-stability/.

“Closing the lid for National Interests”. 2021. Hankyung.Com.
https://www.hankyung.com/international/article/2017022028121.

Kook, J., 2013. Japan in a Vial. Seoul: Hanwool.

Hiromitsu, I., 2002. Where to Go to College. Tokyo: Godansha

Benedict, R., 1978. The chrysanthemum and the sword. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle.

Written by: Yi Wei, University of Toronto

Japanese colonial ideology operated in Korea from the times of the Korean protectorate, in 1905, to the end of the Second World War, in 1945. Japanese colonial ideology worked through three distinct and yet mutually reinforcing channels: knowledge production, economic policies, and brute force. This essay seeks to shed light on the workings of the Japanese colonial ideology in colonial Korea through a chronological examination of events. 

Before the annexation of 1910, the Japanese epistemic community produced a profuse collection of writings on the Korean body. Japanese ethnographers portrayed Japanese and Koreans as peoples of the same race, with the former being more advanced in terms of civilization. On the one hand, Japanese ethnographers argued that Japanese and Koreans “possessed considerable physiognomic, linguistic, and cultural similarities.”^[1]On the other hand, Japanese ethnographers quickly insinuated differences between the two peoples. They branded Koreans as ignorant, lazy, and incapable of initiating progress.^[2] This simultaneous similarity in race and differences in dispositions and stages of development validated Japan’s role in leading Korea in civilizational and cultural development. In this case, Japanese ethnographic knowledge production justified Japan’s eventual annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910. Japanese colonial ideology channeled itself through ethnographic knowledge production.

Furthermore, in the precolonial period, sanitization dominated Japan’s discourse on Korea. Japanese scholars characterized Koreans as filthy, and some even branded Seoul, the capital city, as the “shit capital.”^[3]Japanese knowledge production on the hygienic situation in Korea led to the establishment of Seoul Sanitation Association (SSA) in 1907 during the protectorate period.^[4]Outwardly, the SSA was founded to carry out sanitary reforms, aligning Korean sanitary conditions to those of Japan. In reality, the SSA utilized brute force to enforce Japanese hygienic standards to individual Korean households. The colonial police intruded into private spaces of Korean homes, surveying hygienic conditions and collecting sanitation fees.^[5]In this case, brute force was employed by the colonial police to enforce the Japanese discourse on sanitization. Japanese colonial ideology worked through both knowledge production and brute force. 

Japan was able to annex Korea in 1910 due to its military strength. Contrary to the later claims of Makoto Saito, the union of Korea and Japan was not “peacefully accomplished by the mutual consent of the people.”^[6]The looming presence of the military enabled the annexation. The first decade of Japanese colonial rule in Korea was coined “the military rule” for valid reasons.^[7]A year from annexation, the colonial police arrested 700 Korean opponents of colonial rule. These dissenters were imprisoned, tortured, and prosecuted.^[8]This heavy hand of the police characterized the first decade of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Brute force enforced Japanese colonial ideology in the 1910s. 

In the early 1910s, the new colonial government enacted economic policies and institutional arrangements. Most notably, the government initiated the cadastral survey.^[9]This economic policy demonstrated the workings of Japanese colonial ideology in two ways. Firstly, as Kim Dong-No argued, the Japanese cadastral survey institutionally favoured Korean landlords at the expense of Korean tenants, pitting the latter against the former in an domestic class warfare.^[10]The cadastral survey preserved the land rights of the landlords and deprived the land rights of the tenants, widening the economic disparity between the landlord and the tenant. The cadastral survey was an early demonstration of Japanese colonial tactic of divide and rule. 

Secondly, in Marxist terms, the cadastral survey initiated a capitalist process of primitive accumulation in Korea. Through making landownership singular and commodifying land, the Japanese colonial government made Korean land legible to the Japanese capitalist machine. Meanwhile, as tenants were denied their traditional tenant rights to land, they were deprived of their means of production. Without ownership to land, tenants could not control the fruits of their labour and actively seek advancement through hard work. Thus, poor tenants were made even poorer. They became free-floating labour power that was ready to be absorbed by the Japanese capitalist machine. In such a way, Japanese economic policies, such as the cadastral survey, institutionally reduced Korean tenants to poverty and accumulated an abundance of cheap Korean labour power for the empire. Japanese colonial ideology worked through economic policies. 

In the early 1910s, Japanese intellectuals continued the process of knowledge production to legitimize its hold on Korea. Similar to the ethnographic works, portions of these works stressed a simultaneous sameness and difference between Japan and Korea. For instance, as shown in Do-Hyun Han’s work on colonial religious governance, Shamanism was framed as the dominant Korean religion. Japanese colonial scholars argued that Korean Shamanism was a primitive branch of Japanese Shintoism. They argued that in terms of religion, Korean was “below Japan on the evolutionary stage of civilization.”^[11]This epistemic installation of Shamanism as the dominant Korean religion showed the workings of the Japanese colonial ideology. 

In 1919, a group of Korean nationalists read the March First Declaration of Independence in a restaurant in Seoul. This resulted in months of demonstration and protest against Japanese rule, which came to be known as the March First Movement.^[12]Japanese reaction to the March First Movement could be seen in two layers. Firstly, the colonial police suppressed demonstration through brute force. The colonial police burned villages, shot on crowds, and conducted mass searches.^[13]An obituary, published in the New York Times, confirmed this narrative. A female participant of the March First Movement, Yi Kwan-sun, was imprisoned, interrogated, and died in the process.^[14]Indeed, when knowledge production and economic policies failed to hamper a Korean nationalist front, brute force was employed to subdue the uprising. 

 Secondly, Japanese reaction to the March First Movement could be analyzed through Makoto Saito’s address to the American people. Published in an American journal, this was an example of Japanese knowledge production that aimed to influence international public opinion. In this address, Makoto Saito claimed that Japan’s use of force to put down the March First Uprising was “grossly and unjustly misrepresented.”^[15]The governor general claimed that the colonial administration was attentive to Korean voices and that Japan would “grant the Korean people the administration of local affairs at some opportune time in the future.”^[16]Saito’s promise to grant Koreans self-rule was congruent with the League of Nations’ promise to grant mandates with self-rule at some time in the future. Japan’s power to publish its narrative of the March First Movement, disseminate it to the public in the West, and invoke western language stabilized international opinion in its favour. In this case, Japanese colonial ideology functioned through knowledge production to shape international opinion. 

In the 1920s, economic policies and brute force worked together to prevent a common Korean front and maintain Japanese colonial ideology. As mentioned earlier, economic policies created an increased socio-economic distance between Korean landlords and Korean tenants; the same was true in terms of politics. Korean landlords constituted the majority of Korean elites, who formed the moderate faction in the nationalist cause. Korean tenants, on the other hand, were predominantly radical socialists. The moderates sought to work within the colonial framework while the radicals wished for a complete overthrow of the colonial system.^[17]In this way, radicals branded moderate nationalists who worked within the colonial system as Japanese collaborators. Class tension, which originated from earlier economic policies, created divisions within the Korean nationalist cause. Meanwhile, the colonial police selectively utilized brute force to prevent activities of nationalist groups, mostly, those of the radical Communists.^[18]The police’s crushing of radical Communist nationalists and tolerance of moderate nationalists further strengthened the radical’s perception of the moderates as collaborators. 

During WWII, the colonial ideology worked through economic arrangements that institutionally impelled Koreans to contribute to the Japanese war effort. In 1937, reduced to dire poverty by Japanese economic arrangements, Korean men readily enlisted as soldiers and Korean women left home to find work. Many Korean women were tricked to become comfort women. Indeed, class and poverty were central in the analysis of Korean comfort women.^[19]Japanese economic policies heightened poverty and impelled Koreans to offer their labor power, and in the case of Korean comfort women, sexual labor power, to fuel the Japanese war machine. 

Knowledge production was used to legitimize annexation and shape international opinion. Economic policies were enacted to heighten class tensions and accumulate Korean labor power. Brute force was used to annex, threaten, and quench rebellions. The three sectors were interwoven to create, uphold, and empower the Japanese colonial ideology in colonial Korea. Among the three sectors, knowledge production and brute force were mutually constitutive. Knowledge production justified the use of brute force, and force realized the agendas of the knowledge production. Knowledge production often worked hand in hand with economic policies to instill colonial rule. When both knowledge production and economic arrangement failed to proactively destroy dissent and Korean national aspirations, brute force was dispatched to silence Korean voices. The three sectors worked to frustrate Korean national efforts and hinder the awakening of Korean national consciousness.

Works Cited

^[1]Todd Henry, “Sanitizing Empire: Japanese Articulations of Korean Otherness and the Construction of Early Colonial Seoul, 1905-1919,” The Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 3 (2005): 639-75, http://www.jstor.org/stable

/25075828, 645.

^[2]Todd Henry, “Sanitizing Empire: Japanese Articulations of Korean Otherness and the Construction of Early Colonial Seoul, 1905-1919,” 647-648.

^[3]Todd Henry, 651.

^[4]Toddy Henry, 655.

^[5]Todd Henry, 656. 

^[6]Makoto Saito, “A Message from the Imperial Japanese Government to the American People – A Home Rule in Korea?” The Independent, January 31, 1920. 

^[7]Michael Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey: A Short History(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 37.

^[8]Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey, 38

^[9]Kim Dong-no, “National Identity and Class Interest in the Peasant Movements of the Colonial Period,” in Lee, Ha, and Sorenson, eds., Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea, 1910-1945, (Seattle: Center for Korea Studies Publications, 2013), 156. 

^[10]Kim Dong-no, “National Identity and Class Interest in the Peasant Movements of the Colonial Period,” 166. 

^[11]Do-Hyun Han, “Shamanism, Superstition, and the Colonial Government,” The Review of Korean Studies 34, no.1 (2000): 34-54, http://111/dbpia.co.kr/ Article/NODE0115987, 36.

^[12]Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey, 48. 

^[13]Robinson, 48. 

^[14]Inyoung Kang, “Overlooked No More: Yu Gwan-sun, a Korean Independence Activist Who Defied Japanese Rule,” New York Times, last modified March 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/obituaries/overlooked-yu-gwan-sun.html.

^[15]Makoto Saito, “A Message from the Imperial Japanese Government to the American People – A Home Rule in Korea?” The Independent, January 31, 1920. 

^[16]Makoto Saito, “A Message from the Imperial Japanese Government to the American People – A Home Rule in Korea?” The Independent, January 31, 1920. 

^[17]Robinson, Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey, 61-69. 

^[18]Robinson,Korea’s Twentieth-Century Odyssey, 70.

^[19]Pyong Gap Min, “Korean ‘Comfort Women’ The Intersection of Colonial Power, Gender, and Class,” Gender & SocietyVol.17 No. 6 (2003): 939-957.