Originally published June 1, 2021

Introduction

The notion of ethnic homogeneity has served a potent role in building modern nation-states. Governments have often used perceived ethnic homogeneity to unite their citizens, build a unified front against potential foreign enemies, and strengthen the nation-state. Certain tyrannical regimes, such as Nazi Germany, actively perpetuated the concept of ethnic homogeneity to justify totalitarian control. The development of modern Japanese state was no exception to propagating the vision of ethnic homogeneity. Writing in Education about Asia, John Lie notes that “Between 1952 and 1985, the Japanese government projected an ethno-racially homogeneous vision of Japanese society – one race, one ethnicity, one nation.”^[1] Even after 1985, the belief that Japan is a homogeneous society “remains a particularly powerful myth with enduring influence over the identity-formation of Japanese people.”^[2] Contrary to popular notions, however, ethnic minorities have long existed in Japan, including the Ainu in Hokkaido and the people of Okinawa. Motivated by colonial ambitions and ethno-nationalism, the Japanese government during the post-Meiji Reformation period subjugated these groups, suppressed their culture and language, and systematically encouraged them to assimilate into Japanese society. The ethnic minority status was only recently granted for the Ainu at the turn of the 21^st century. 

The Koreans are another ethnic minority group in Japan; until the past few years, recently, they were the largest group. Periodic waves of Korean migration occurred throughout history, such as the migration of the displaced people of Baekje to Kyushu after Baekje’s collapse in 660 and the kidnapping of Koreans after Japanese invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598 (文禄の役, Bunroku no Eki).^[3] The contemporary Korean population in Japan, however, mainly consists of descendants of those who moved or were forcibly relocated to Japan during Japanese colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945). After Japanese defeat in World War II, the Koreans were progressively stripped away of their previous imperial citizenship and continued to be subjected to economic destitution and social discrimination. For instance, the Zai (在) included in the term used to denote Koreans in Japan, Zainichi Kankokujin (在日韓国人) or Zainichi Chosenjin (在日朝鮮人), “implies ‘temporary’ residence.”^[4] This means that Zainichi have been viewed as ‘non-Japanese’ and considered differently by the Japanese majority.⁵ The Zainichi Koreans were also legally classified as resident aliens, keeping them as “strangers in their native land.”⁶

The division of their homeland by Soviet and US forces also led to the ideological division of Korean society in Japan, between the DPRK-oriented General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, or Chongryon (在日本朝鮮人総聯合会), and the ROK-supported Korean Residents Union in Japan, or Mindan (在日本大韓民国民団). The two Korean governments used the Zainichi Koreans to compete against each other and to gain legitimacy as the true representative government in Korea. Without protection from the Japanese or the two Korean governments, this left the Zainichi Koreans vulnerable to discriminatory violence from some Japanese individuals.^[5] 

The advent of globalization within the last three decades brought about a massive exchange of people between faraway places. Japan is no exception to this global trend.^[6] With increasing immigration of Chinese, Indonesian, Filipino and Nikkeijin (日系人, foreigners of Japanese descent) workers, Japan has been slowly turning into a multicultural society (多文化社会, Ta bunka shakai). This “growing awareness of multi-ethnic Japan renders the recognition of Zainichi increasingly mainstream.”^[7] Indeed, numerous Zainichi Koreans have come to the forefront of Japanese society, including Masayoshi Son (손정의,^[8] 孫 正義), the founder and CEO of telecommunications company SoftBank. It thus begs the question: how did the Zainichi identity shift over time, which factors contributed to their higher social standing in Japan today, and what does that mean for greater Japanese society?

To explore these questions, this paper will first examine how the Zainichi identity was formed by delving into the historic background of Korean arrival in Japan, the social and legal discrimination against Zainichi Koreans pre- and post-World War II, and their subsequent isolation within Japanese society. It will then trace how both external factors and internal efforts led to greater acceptance of Zainichi Koreans by the Japanese people. Based on the data and the presented interviews, the paper will argue that the current Zainichi Koreans have created an independent Zainichi identity, not bound to a specific nation-state but situated within the mainstream Japanese society. It will then inquire into the opportunities and challenges the Zainichi Koreans present within a multicultural Japanese society. 

Historical Background

 The Japanese annexation of the Korean Empire in 1910 began a gradual influx of Koreans into Japan, where they were treated poorly. In the 1910s, most migrants were students who wished to “receive Japan’s modern education.”^[9]The labor shortage in the Japanese economy in the 1920s encouraged Koreans seeking better employment prospects to migrate to Japan, leading to a “rapid expansion of the ethnic Korean population in the main Japanese islands.”^[10] The majority of Korean workers became involved in “manual and menial work” such as construction work and mining, since most were “poorly educated and illiterate,” sharing jobs with social outcasts like Burakumin and Okinawans. Koreans usually received lower wages than the Japanese did and lived in “ghettoes because of poverty and discrimination.”^[11]Full-fledged discrimination induced the massacre of Koreans after the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. Japanese vigilantes murdered and raped innocent Koreans, swayed by rumours that Koreans were poisoning water wells, committing arson, and pillaging Japanese households, while the Japanese government turned a blind eye. Professor Sonia Ryang describes the extent of violence, comparing it to that suffered by African Americans under Jim Crow Laws:

Perhaps the worst moment for anyone to be a Korean in Japan came in 1923 in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake, when [a] pogrom-like hunt for Koreans spread across the scorched lands of Tokyo and its vicinity. Like the black bodies hanging from those southern trees, Korean bodies were on display without eyeballs, without nose, without breasts, their thighs and arms covered with lacerations and with very little skin surface intact.¹²

The beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 led to the enforced migration of Koreans. The Japanese government brought 700,000-800,000 Koreans to work in factories and mines and conscripted 200,000 Koreans into the Japanese military.¹³ The number of Koreans in Japan increased from 2,246 in 1910 to 300,000 in 1930 and 2 million in 1945.¹⁴

The Japanese defeat in World War II ended colonial rule but perpetuated the legal and social discrimination against Zainichi Koreans, forcing them to live impoverished lives. While most Koreans returned to Korea, “some 600,000 ethnic Koreans remained in Japan,” for they had achieved viable livelihoods, had married ethnic Japanese, or were “weary of the unrest and poverty in the Korean peninsula.”¹⁵ The Japanese government, however, considered Zainichi Koreans as foreigners. Theoretically speaking, the colonial hierarchy and postcolonial legacy transformed Zainichi Koreans into objects of “enmity and rejection” or of “hatred, denial of voting rights, and decline in social status.”¹⁶ They were stripped of their voting rights in 1945, relegated to alien status in 1947 through the Alien Registration Law, and were rendered stateless in 1952 after the Treaty of San Francisco.¹⁷ Moreover, Koreans were barred from employment in the public sector such as the railway and postal service, excluded from most social welfare services, and faced stronger discrimination from employment in the private sector.¹⁸ Zainichi Koreans were thus compelled to engage in “illegal or marginal economic activities such as illegal alcohol production, scrap recycling, and racketeering.”¹⁹ Under abject poverty with a low level of education and dismal living conditions, “deprived of their civil rights” and stable residential status, “Koreans hovered on the edges of Japanese society.”²⁰

 The competition between North and South Korea fractured the Zainichi community and complicated their identity. In the 1950s, Chongryon commanded the support of the majority of Zainichi Koreans by providing loans for ethnic Korean businesses and Korean language and culture education to Zainichi.²¹ Motivated by the desire to return to Korea and “the promise of paradise,” Chongryon launched a repatriation project, in which over 90,000 ethnic Koreans migrated to North Korea from 1959 to the 1970s.²² This was motivated by “perilous memories of a colonial past, as well as the abject living conditions and complete disenfranchisement from Japanese civic life.”²³ This trend was disrupted in 1965 with the normalization of diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Japan, which allowed Zainichi Koreans to obtain South Korean citizenship and receive permanent resident status from Japan, whose advantages included “freedom to travel and access to Japanese medical and welfare benefits.”²⁴ However, the South Korean government demanded that Zainichi who register as foreigners in Japan use the label of Kankoku (韓国), not Chosen (朝鮮).²⁵ Coupled with the fact that North Korea proclaimed anyone with the citizenship of “Chosen” to be North Korean citizens, the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea changed the meaning of the term “Chosen,” which used to mean imagined but reunified Korean peninsula.²⁶

At the same time, naturalization became considered taboo among Zainichi Koreans. The Japanese government advocated possessing Japanese citizenship to mean assuming Japanese ethnicity as well. Becoming Japanese further meant accepting the Japanese system of household registration (koseki), giving up the Korean system of lineage registry (jokbo), and adopting Japanese-sounding names.²⁷ For Zainichi who suffered colonial and historical discrimination at the hands of Japanese, these conditions were unacceptable and tantamount to “national betrayal” or treason.²⁸ This effectively set up a frameworkof “Chosen-seki (朝鮮籍)²⁹ =North Korea,” “Kankoku-seki (韓国籍)³⁰ =South Korea,”and “Nihon-seki (日本籍) =Traitor.” ³¹ The Zainichi became more isolated, shunning intermarriage between Koreans and Japanese people and resisting naturalization.³²

Towards Greater Integration

Fed up with systemic discrimination, Zainichi Koreans began to organise themselves to resist it. The second or third generations of Zainichi Koreans especially were frustrated that in spite of having been born in Japan and grown up under Japanese culture, they still experienced discrimination, exclusion, and violence.³³ Mobilisation began in 1970 with the Hitachi Case, in which Chong Sok Pak, a Zainichi Korean, sued Hitachi, one of Japan’s conglomerates. Pak had passed the company exam using his Japanese-sounding alias, but Hitachi withdrew its offer after discovering that Pak was Zainichi, openly stating that “We cannot hire a Korean.”³⁴ A group of Zainichi Koreans and Japanese supported Pak and condemned Hitachi, which argued in court that Pak “had falsified his resume by using a ‘false name.’”³⁵ After four years of trial, the Yokohama District Court ruled in favour of Pak:

The plaintiff wrote his alias in order to appear as if he were Japanese, but the motive that led to this fabrication deserves extraordinary sympathy on many points in light of the historical and social background of Koreans including the plaintiff as explained above, and in light of the reality that Koreans living in Japan are refused employment, particularly by big Japanese companies – except with special exceptions – for the sole reason that they are Korean.³⁶

The court’s sympathetic attitude towards Zainichi Koreans opened the way for a Zainichi civil rights movement. In 1977, the Japanese court struck down a clause which dictated that only Japanese citizens could become lawyers. In the 1980s, Chongsok Han, a Zainichi Tokyo resident, began the anti-fingerprinting movement, contending that “forced fingerprinting during alien registration was a violation of human rights and dignity” and wishing to “create a society that recognizes Zainichis as equal members of Japanese society.”³⁷ Zainichi Koreans refused to be fingerprinted despite threats of arrest, and more and more Japanese citizens began to recognize the discrimination Zainichi faced. Pressured by the Zainichi campaign, Japanese supporters, and the international community, the Japanese government eliminated the forced fingerprinting in 1993. The campaign to be recognised in public life continued in the 1990s with the inclusion of Zainichi in civil service positions and the expansion of local suffrage to Zainichi Koreans.³⁸ The Zainichi civil rights movement not only established the Zainichi’s own identity but also can be considered as part of their effort to live convivially with the Japanese.³⁹

 This internal mobilised resistance to discrimination was accompanied by the support of external events. The Japanese ratification of the International Covenants for Human Rights and UN Refugee Convention in the early 1980s required that Japan provide permanent resident status to Zainichi Koreans without South Korean citizenship.⁴⁰ They gained permanent residency in 1981 with the ability to easily acquire re-entry permits.⁴¹ In 1985, the Japanese citizenship law was amended so that children with Japanese mothers could also obtain Japanese citizenship; previously, only children with Japanese fathers were eligible for Japanese citizenship, per the 1950 law.⁴² This meant that half-Zainichi children with Japanese mothers could receive Japanese citizenship too. At the same time, Lie observes that the 1988 Seoul Olympics and 2002 World Cup positively changed the Japanese attitude about South Korea and that thus “occurred in tandem with the decline of ethnic discrimination.”⁴³ The gradual decrease in the influence of ethnic discrimination and the increase in ethnic recognition through the Zainichi civil rights movement and favourable external events brought the Zainichi closer to the main Japanese cultural and social life. 

Zainichi Today

Statistics shows that the Zainichi are becoming more assimilated into mainstream Japanese society. The number of Koreans living in Japan has decreased recently. In particular, the number of special residents, i.e. Zainichi Koreans, decreased from 471,756 in 2003 to 377,350 in 2012.⁴⁴ This can be attributed to the increasing number of Zainichi choosing to naturalize as Japanese nationals – 10,000 per year – and increasing rate of marriages between Zainichis and Japanese.⁴⁵ These trends are the opposite of phenomena observed until the 1960s with intermarriage shunned and naturalization viewed as taboo. They may also imply that Zainichi with Chosen-seki or Kankoku-seki citizenships will continue to decrease in number as time passes and become assimilated as Japanese citizens.⁴⁶

What is causing such assimilation of the Zainichi as Japanese citizens? An emerging, independent Zainichi identity may be encouraging Zainichi’s faster integration into Japanese society. The first facet of this new Zainichi identity is the recognition of their Korean roots. Hyun-Sun Kim, a sociologist focusing on the lives of Korean immigrants,conducted interviews with six second and third generation Zainichi Koreans living in Osaka from 2007 to 2008. Kim reveals that many of them felt “burdened” or “guilty” by using their Japanese alias instead of their Korean name.⁴⁷Myeong-Sun Park (朴明順) testifies that she “did not like living as a Japanese person” hiding her Korean ethnic identity, even though she hid her Korean roots because of the discrimination she would be subject to, an action she attributes to her “lack of ethnic character.”⁴⁸ Hae-Suk Bae (裵解淑) always questioned why she should continue using her Japanese alias even though she is Korean.⁴⁹ While living as Zainichi is difficult, using their Korean name clarifies their identity and autonomously raises their self-esteem.⁵⁰

The second facet of this emerging Zainichi identity is the co-existence of resistance (抵抗, teiko) against Japanese discrimination and symbiosis (共生, kyosei) between Zainichi Koreans and Japanese people. In a survey conducted in 2012 for 216 Zainichi Koreans living in the Kansai region in their 20s to 40s, 61% replied that Japan hurt Koreans the most throughout history, but 71% replied that “one should forgive but not forget” the painful history with Japan.⁵¹ This implies that while the younger generation of Zainichi Koreans are critical towards how Japan tried to eliminate Korean identity in the past, they are not willing to completely erase their Japanese identity. Moreover, Jong-Gon Kim, a proffessor at Konkuk University in Seoul who focueses on the identity of Zainichi Koreans, conducted interviews in 2014 with six young Zainichi Koreans living in Kansai region reveals that the majority of young Zainichi cannot accept hostility towards Japan and want to be part of Japanese society.⁵²

The final aspect of the new Zainichi identity is the flexibility of nationality. This is in contrast to the past when the nationality one held determined one’s allegiance to a particular nation, as seen with the earlier rigid framework of “Chosen-seki vs. Kankoku-seki vs. Nihon-seki.” Jong-Gon Kim points out that many Zainichi Koreans do not speak the Korean language or know Korean culture well.⁵³ Just because one’s passport is South Korean does not mean that they are considered Korean; the derogative term “banjjokbari” (쪽발이) alludes to the discrimination against Zainichi by Korean compatriots.⁵⁴ But it is this discrimination and exclusion due to the difference between Zainichi Koreans and peninsular Koreans that make Zainichi Koreans realize that nationality cannot convey their identity, leading them to think that “defining one’s identity by one’s nationality is unfair.”⁵⁵ Furthermore, for the newer generations of Zainichi Koreans, nationality is becoming more of a choice: one can thus choose nationality according to need and can also change it.⁵⁶

Opportunities and Challenges

What does this evolution of new Zainichi identity mean for Zainichi Koreans and a burgeoning multicultural Japanese society? Lie presents a positive outlook by stating that more Japanese people seek “mutual recognition and reconciliation” under the banner of conviviality (kyosei), and that modern Zainichi Korean identity and multicultural society “suggest one possible outcome” of Zainichi’s century-long struggle.⁵⁷ Moreover, the way Zainichi Koreans integrate into the mainstream Japanese society with pride in their Korean heritage may provide guidance for newer incoming minorities in Japan, such as the Nikkeijin, the Chinese, and South East Asian migrant workers, to cement the blooming multicultural Japanese society. 

However, the claim that there is no longer discrimination against Zainichi Koreans in Japan seems untenable. Moon and Aoki qualify that the instability of employment and the precarity from dissolution of traditional families and communities are fuelling “historical revisionism” and are provoking increasing instances of hate speech against Koreans and Zainichi Koreans.⁵⁸ Indeed, far-right groups like Zaitokukai (Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi) frequently stage violent anti-Zainichi protests in Korean-majority neighbourhoods.⁵⁹ In the aforementioned survey of Kansai Zainichi Koreans, 66% of them have had experiences with discrimination. In addition, the development of the new Zainichi identity brings about a rift between the older and younger Zainichi generations. For instance, in Toichi Nakata’s 1994 documentary Osaka Story, Nakata’s Zainichi father disowns Nakata’s sister for marrying a Japanese man because the father felt that “Koreans and Japanese are different.”⁶⁰ How members of the older Zainichi generation can reconcile their past experiences with discrimination and the evolution of new Zainichi identity is yet to be seen. Thus, will the new Zainichi identity survive? Professor Sonia Ryang predicts:

Whether such a figure is able to retain his/her heritage with pride remains to be seen: the answer will hinge on the possibility of multicultural tolerance and acceptance on the part of Japanese society, resilience of Koreans in Japan, and taken together, possibility of coexistence of different peoples that were once unequivocally superior and inferior, the master and the subjugated.⁶¹

Conclusion

Zainichi Koreans have suffered systemic discrimination and violence since their first arrival a century ago. Until the 1960s, continued discrimination and exclusion from public life isolated the Zainichi community. Competition between North and South Korea complicated their identity and made the Zainichi more closed-off. However, the civil rights campaigns of the 1970s to 1990s and external events decreased instances of discrimination against Zainichi Koreans. Now, unlike in previous years, Zainichi are no longer bound by nationality, do recognise their Korean roots, and wish to succeed in the mainstream Japanese society. Whether this success can be sustained depends on multicultural tolerance of Japanese people and the perseverance of Zainichi Koreans, and for other minority groups in Japan, the impact of the Zainichi case remains to be seen. 

Works Cited

Fukuoka, Yasunori. “Introduction: ‘Japanese’ and ‘Non-Japanese’.” In Lives of Young Koreans in Japan, 1-12. Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific Press, 2000.

“Jjok-bari.” (쪽발이) Standard Korean Language Dictionary. Accessed December 6, 2017. http://krdic.naver.com/detail.nhn?docid=36450500.

Kim, Hyun-Sun. “An Analysis of Nationality and Identity of Koreans in Japan.” (국적과 재일 코리안의 정체성) Economy and Society 83 (2009): 313-341.

Kim, Jong Gon. “A Third-Generation Koreans-in-Japan’s Identity and Value-Oriented.” (재일’ & ‘조선인’으로서의 정체성과 가치지향성) The Journal of the Humanities for Unification 59 (2014): 31-57.

Lie, John. “Zainichi: The Korean Disaspora in Japan.” Education about Asia 14, no. 2 (2009): 16-21.

Moon, Gyeong-Su and Yoshiyuki Aoki. “Zainichi: Three Homelands and Three Eras.” (자이니치, 3개의 조국 그리고 3개의 시대) Shilcheon Munhak, August 2015.

Moon, Rennie. “Koreans in Japan.” Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education. Accessed November 16, 2017. http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan.

Nakata, Toichi, dir. Osaka Story. 1994; Beaconsfield, UK: National Film and Television School, 1995. DVD.

Okunuki, Hifumi. “Forty Years after Zainichi Labor Case Victory, Is Japan Turning Back the Clock?” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), Jan. 21, 2015. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2015/01/21/issues/forty-years-zainichi-labor-case-victory-japan-turning-back-clock/#.Wg2hFWjWw2x.

Ra, Gyeong-Su. “The Multiculturalism of Japan and Current State of Zainichi.” (일본의 다문화와 자이니치의 현재) Research Group for Global Korean Business and Culture 35 (2010): 75-85. Accessed November 16, 2017. http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE02089848

Ryang, Sonia. “The Rise and Fall of Chongryun—From Chōsenjin to Zainichi and beyond.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 14, no. 15 (2016): 1-16.

Son, Seung-Cheol. “Kidnapped Koreans during Imjin War.” (임진왜란피로인, 壬辰倭亂捕虜人) Encyclopedia of Korean Culture. Last modified January 22, 2015. http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Index.

Thorp, Vivien Kim. “February Issue: I am Zainichi.” KoreAm, February 2012. http://kore.am/february-issue-i-am-zainichi/

Yi, Ji-Ho. “Examining the Identity of Counter-Protesters against Anti-Korean Movement in Japan.” (일본의 反혐한 시위대, 그들의 정체를 알아보니..) The Chosun Ilbo (Seoul, Korea), Oct. 7, 2013. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/10/07/2013100701540.html?Dep0=twitter&d=2013100701540.

Yoo, Hyuck Soo. “Struggles and Challenges of the Zainichi Korean/Chosen Society: Focusing on the Relations between “Old” and “New” Comers.” (재일한국/조선인 사회의 갈등과 과제) Korean Journal of Japanese Studies 10 (2014): 308-329.

References

^[1] John Lie, “Zainichi: The Korean Disaspora in Japan.” Education about Asia 14, no. 2 (2009): 18.

^[2] Yasunori Fukuoka, “Introduction: ‘Japanese’ and ‘Non-Japanese’,” in Lives of Young Koreans in Japan, (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2000), 2.

^[3] Seung-Cheol Son, “Kidnapped Koreans during Imjin War,” (임진왜란피로인, 壬辰倭亂捕虜人) Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, last modified January 22, 2015, http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Index. Son notes that Japanese and Korean scholars disagree on the number of Koreans Japanese military kidnapped, from 20,000 to 400,000. 

^[4] Ibid., 12.

⁵ Lie, “Zainichi,” 16. Lie explains that while the term Zainichi “can refer to non-Koreans,” it “has become synonymous with the ethnic Korean population in Japan.” This paper will use both Zainichi and Zainichi Koreans interchangeably throughout. 

⁶ Vivien Kim Thorp, “February Issue: I am Zainichi,” KoreAm, February 2012, http://kore.am/february-issue-i-am-zainichi/

^[5] Jong Gon Kim, “A Third-Generation Koreans-in-Japan’s Identity and Value-Oriented,” (재일’ & ‘조선인’으로서의 정체성과 가치지향성) The Journal of the Humanities for Unification 59 (2014): 53. 

^[6] Gyeong-Su Ra, “The Multiculturalism of Japan and Current State of Zainichi,” (일본의 다문화와 자이니치의 현재) Research Group for Global Korean Business and Culture 35 (2010): 75, accessed November 16, 2017. http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE02089848.

^[7] Lie, “Zainichi,” 21. 

^[8] These are the Korean characters for Masayoshi Son’s Korean name, Son Jeong-ui. 

^[9] Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 77.

^[10] Lie, “Zainichi,” 16.

^[11] Rennie Moon, “Koreans in Japan,” Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, accessed November 16, 2017, http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan; Fukuoka, “Introduction,” 1. Burakumin are the “descendants of people defined as outcastes during the feudal Middle Ages.” They worked as executioners, butchers, and tanners: occupations that were considered impure. Burakumin were thus ostracized from the mainstream society and lived in enclaves;  Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

¹² Sonia Ryang, “The Rise and Fall of Chongryun—From Chōsenjin to Zainichi and beyond,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 14, no. 15 (2016): 1. 

¹³ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

¹⁴ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 77. 

¹⁵ Lie, “Zainichi,” 16.

¹⁶ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 37.

¹⁷ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

¹⁸ Gyeong-Su Moon and Yoshiyuki Aoki. “Zainichi: Three Homelands and Three Eras,” (자이니치, 3개의 조국 그리고 3개의 시대) Shilcheon Munhak, August 2015, 329.

¹⁹ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

²⁰ Ryang, “The Rise,” 7.

²¹ Lie, “Zainichi,” 16.

²² Ibid., 17; Ryang, “The Rise,” 7.

²³ Ibid., 8.

²⁴ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

²⁵ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 44.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Lie, “Zainichi,” 18.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Chosen-seki (朝鮮籍). The Japanese government assigns this nationality to Zainichi Koreans who have neither Japanese nor South Korean citizenship.

³⁰ Kankoku-seki (韓国籍). This denotes South Korean citizenship.

³¹ Nihon-seki (日本籍). This denotes Japanese citizenship; JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 34.

³² Lie, “Zainichi,” 19.

³³ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 38.

³⁴ Hifumi Okunuki, “Forty Years after Zainichi Labor Case Victory, Is Japan Turning Back the Clock?” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), Jan. 21, 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2015/01/21/issues/forty-years-zainichi-labor-case-victory-japan-turning-back-clock/#.Wg2hFWjWw2x.

³⁵ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 80; Okunuki, “Forty Years.”

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 80. Prior to the 1990s, Japanese alien registration law required Zainichi Koreans to be fingerprinted during alien registration; Lie, “Zainichi,” 20

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 80. 

⁴⁰ Ryang, “The Rise,” 8.

⁴¹ Ibid. 

⁴² Hyun-Sun Kim, “An Analysis of Nationality and Identity of Koreans in Japan,” (국적과 재일 코리안의 정체성) Economy and Society 83 (2009): 321.

⁴³ Lie, “Zainichi,” 20.

⁴⁴ H-S Kim, “An Analysis,” 320; Hyuck Soo Yoo, “Struggles and Challenges of the Zainichi Korean/Chosen Society: Focusing on the Relations between “Old” and “New” Comers,” (재일한국/조선인 사회의 갈등과 과제) Korean Journal of Japanese Studies 10 (2014): 312.

⁴⁵ H-S Kim, “An Analysis,” 321-322.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 329. It is difficult to estimate the proportion of Zainichi Koreans who opt to use Korean names. Using Korean names in public is still stigmatised, and it takes a lot of personal courage for individual Zainichi Koreans to ‘come out’ and start using their Korean names.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 327.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 328.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 329.

⁵¹ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 40. 

⁵² Ibid., 41.

⁵³ Ibid., 47. 

⁵⁴ “Jjok-bari,” (쪽발이) Standard Korean Language Dictionary, accessed December 6, 2017, http://krdic.naver.com/detail.nhn?docid=36450500. “Ban” means half (半) while “jjokbari” is the Korean derogatory term for Japanese people. “Jjokbari” roughly translates to ‘split feet,’ which refers to the fact that the Japanese people traditionally wore the geta, which are wooden sandals that separate the big toe from other toes, akin to modern day flip-flops; JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 47.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 48. 

⁵⁶ H-S Kim, “An Analysis,” 338; JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 49.

⁵⁷ Lie, “Zainichi,” 21. 

⁵⁸ Moon and Aoki, “Zainichi: Three,” 336. 

⁵⁹ Ji-Ho Yi, “Examining the Identity of Counter-Protesters against Anti-Korean Movement in Japan,” (일본의 反혐한 시위대, 그들의 정체를 알아보니..) The Chosun Ilbo (Seoul, Korea), Oct. 7, 2013. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/10/07/2013100701540.html?Dep0=twitter&d=2013100701540. 

⁶⁰ Osaka Story, directed by Toichi Nakata (1994; Beaconsfield, UK: National Film and Television School, 1995), DVD.

⁶¹ Ryang, “The Rise,” 14. 

In August of 2022, President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act enacted some of the largest-ever subsidies and rebates to incentivize the domestic production and consumption of solar panels, electric cars, and other green technologies. [1] Yet the batteries required by these American-made electric vehicles, panels, and turbines necessitate the import of thousands of tons of minerals mined and refined in China. Rare Earth Elements (REEs), a group of minerals including samarium, neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, are necessary components of REE magnets, the strongest permanent magnets in the world. China currently holds a monopoly in the rare earths supply chain, extracting 60% worldwide and processing 87%. [2] Because of the leverage that this monopoly gives a foreign competitor, and the role the REEs play in technology crucial to both defense and economic growth, building an independent REE supply chain is necessary for the United States to protect national security, compete in the international economy, and achieve climate goals.

Rare earth elements are considered “rare” despite their relative abundance because they are generally not found in viable concentrations. [3] Extracting them is extremely dirty, and most developed countries are not willing to endure the environmental hazards that accompany these mines. There are also high economic barriers to entry into the REE market, especially the capital expenditure costs of building mines and processing plants and the difficulty of competing with Chinese companies that benefit from cheap labor and land and less regulation. In the case of China, the state ownership of the industry was key to its market dominance today. The Chinese Communist Party can invest in infrastructure to prioritize economic growth and market dominance in a way that a private businesses prioritizing profit would not.

Past Political Tensions

History proves that rare earth elements and who controls them are geopolitical issues of great importance. In 2010, in response to the arrest of a Chinese fisherman who collided with the Japanese Coast Guard in the disputed waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, some believed that China de facto banned exports of REEs to Japan. While Japanese companies said that their shipments of REEs had been stuck at customs, a spokesman for the Chinese MIIT maintained that, “China will not use rare earths as an instrument for bargaining.” [4],[5] This incident exemplifies how China could use its control of REEs as leverage in international negotiations, even tacitly, and it was one of the prompting factors for the United States to look into reopening their own mines in the 2010s. Similarly, the Chinese government imposed export quotas and duties on REEs in 2012, which led to the United States and other nations with major REE reserves filing a World Trade Organization complaint. [6] China removed the export restrictions by 2015 to resolve the dispute but this episode was a further wakeup call for many import-heavy nations that it was crucial to either stockpile minerals or look to alternate sources.

China’s monopoly over these minerals also creates an opportunity to withhold essential components of defense technologies and thus stifle other militaries. Nations with the strongest military influence are often the ones with the most developed defense technologies, for example in the case of nuclear proliferation. Thus, as technology and rare earth elements become more interdependent issues, being denied access to the latter could cause the United States to lose its technological advantages. The Lockheed Martin company’s F-35 Lightning II fighter jet’s use of Chinese-originated REEs demonstrated this vulnerability when the Chinese government allegedly sought to gauge how controls on REE exports might affect the United States’ ability to produce the jets in 2021. [7],[8] It is therefore critical to national security that the United States has uninterrupted access to REEs for the most cutting-edge jets, submarines, lasers, electronic hardware, and more. 

Opportunities in the United States

While there are many reserves in the United States and elsewhere, the high costs of developing the plant, equipment, and metallurgical processes to refine the minerals can partially explain why there are no REE mines operating domestically. If the federal government subsidized development for private companies and expedited permits to help them build the necessary infrastructure, the risk and costs to private investors would be minimized. One example of this public-private cooperation is the Department of Defense’s partnership with Australian company Lynas through the Defense Production Act to fund a light rare earth mining and separation project in Hondo, Texas. Clearly there are site options and interested shareholders, but as of now, no sites have commenced production or established a timeline, demonstrating how difficult it is to get these projects off the ground without more government support.

The singular rare earth mine to operate in the United States – the Mountain Pass Mine in California – is a good case study of the volatility of REE mining. After a series of bankruptcies, toxic waste spills, closures, and resuscitations throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Mountain Pass was bought out of bankruptcy by the MP Materials rescue consortium in 2017. [9] This mine was framed as a bulwark against the Chinese monopoly; yet a main shareholder in MP Materials, the Shenghe Resources company, has mixed ownership between private Chinese investors and the Chinese government. Since the mine began production, Shenghe is “the sole buyer of MP’s rare earth concentrate, which Shenghe sends to China for processing.” [10] Although the Department of Defense has awarded a $35 million contract to build a heavy rare earth elements processing and separation facility on-site, Beijing’s strategic plan is to continue bringing as much unrefined REEs to China from their overseas investments to then process and export as a higher-value product. [11] While this mine is a crucial step towards bolstering domestic mining, especially if the processing facility is added, the United States economy is certainly missing out on a profitable step of the supply chain by exporting its raw materials.

Foreign Investment and Ally-Shoring

Another option to fill the gap in the supply chain is to partner with trusted democracies and nations that are vulnerable to the influence of China’s One Belt One Road initiative. Much of Europe, including the EU, has prioritized shifting to green energy (which will require many REEs) with a renewed urgency after Russia, its largest supplier of oil and gas, invaded Ukraine. While there are currently no mines in Europe and the nations are thus 100% import-dependent, there are deposits in Kiruna and Norra Kärr in Sweden, Storeknuten in Norway, and Kvanefjeld in Greenland. [12],[13] Shenghe Resources, the same company that partially owns the Mountain Pass Mine, is the largest shareholder in the Kvanefjeld project. Like in the United States, strict environmental standards in Europe have prevented mining and no sites have broken ground yet. [14]

Additionally, Africa, South America, and Asia have become a frontier that the United States and China both want to bring into their sphere of influence in the competition over minerals. Brazil, India, and Vietnam have some of the highest REE reserves in the world and China’s One Belt One Road Initiative has accordingly prioritized investing in these critical allies. [15]

For example, Brazil receives the most investment from China of all countries in South America, and 7% of that investment is in the mining sector. [16] India and Vietnam are members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and India is also a member of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. Shenghe Resources again owns shares in an Australian company that is pursuing the Ngualla Rare Earth Project in Tanzania. On the other hand, there is also a strong presence of G7 countries in the global south; the British-owned Rainbow Rare Earths company is pursuing the Phalaborwa Project in South Africa and Gakara Project in Burundi. [17] American investment should be targeted towards companies based out of friendly countries like the UK to build an “ally-shored” supply chain. [18]

Conclusions

As natural resource strategist David Abraham put it, “Mining is not antithetical to a green economy; it’s a necessity.” [19] With concentrated efforts, it is possible to pursue more mining without compromising environmental health by funding scientific research agencies to develop cleaner extraction, separation, and recycling methods. For example, scientists at Harvard University and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency are each exploring methods to separate rare earth elements using bacteria filters and microbes rather than harsh chemicals. [20],[21] If the Biden Administration is serious about creating a green American economy, it is crucial to begin with rare earth elements. This issue is very timely as the threat of China invading Taiwan and related trade disputes loom. It is therefore best to begin permitting and ramping up production as soon as possible. As we approach an inflection point in U.S.-China relations, these unassuming minerals have the simultaneous potential to transform the United States into a zero-carbon society, and risk, if left unaddressed, to throw U.S. climate, foreign affairs, military, and economic policy into radical uncertainty.

References

[1] Congress.gov. “Text – H.R.5376 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.” August 16, 2022. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376/text.

[2] International Energy Agency, Critical Minerals Policy Tracker, (Paris: IEA, 2022), https://www.iea.org/reports/critical-minerals-policy-tracker.

[3] Baolu Zhou, Zhongxue Li, and Congcong Chen, “Global Potential of Rare Earth Resources and Rare Earth Demand from Clean Technologies,” Minerals 7, no. 11 (2017): 203, https://doi.org/10.3390/min7110203.

[4] Mari Yamaguchi, “China rare earth exports to Japan still halted,” The Associated Press, October 21, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20110909131412/http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9J02PF01.htm#

[5] CNN Wire Staff, “Official: China won’t use ‘rare earths’ as a bargaining chip,” CNN, October 29, 2010,http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/10/28/china.rare.earth/index.html.

[6] World Trade Organization, “DS431: China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum,” 2021 edition, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds431sum_e.pdf.

[7] David S. Abraham, “War Effort: Hard and Smart Metals,” in The Elements of Power: Gadgets, Guns, and the Struggle for a Sustainable Future in the Rare Metal Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015): 168, https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.12987/9780300216714

[8] Sun Yu and Demetri Sevastopulo, “China targets rare earth export curbs to hobble US defence industry,” Financial Times, February 16, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/d3ed83f4-19bc-4d16-b510-415749c032c1.

[9] Marla Cone, “Desert Lands Contaminated by Toxic Spills,” LA Times, April 24, 1997, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-04-24-mn-51903-story.html.

[10] Mary Hui, “A Chinese rare earths giant is building international alliances worldwide,” Quartz, February 19, 2021, https://qz.com/1971108/chinese-rare-earths-giant-shenghe-is-building-global-alliances.

[11] U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Awards $35 Million to MP Materials to Build U.S. Heavy Rare Earth Separation Capacity,” Feb. 22, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2941793/dod-awards-35-million-to-mp-materials-to-build-us-heavy-rare-earth-separation-c/.

[12] Kjetil S. Grønnestad, “There may be one billion tonnes of rare minerals here,” Teknisk Ukeblad Media, June 20, 2022, https://www.tu.no/artikler/her-kan-det-ligge-en-milliard-tonn-sjeldne-mineraler/520278?key=rvYuKDBP

[13] Jackie Northam, “Greenland Is Not For Sale. But It Has Rare Earth Minerals America Wants,” NPR, November 24, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/11/24/781598549/greenland-is-not-for-sale-but-it-has-the-rare-earth-minerals-america-wants.

[14] Yusuf Khan, “Why Processing Sweden’s Rare-Earth Haul Won’t Be Easy,“ The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 9, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-processing-swedens-rare-earth-haul-wont-be-easy-11675935006.

[15] U.S. Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity Summaries: Rare Earths,” January 2023, 2, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2023/mcs2023-rare-earths.pdf. 

[16] Tulio Cariello, Chinese Investments in Brazil – History, Trends and Global Challenges (2007-2020), (Rio de Janeiro: Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China, 2021): 18, 23, https://www.cebc.org.br/2021/08/05/investimentos-chineses-no-brasil-historico-tendencias-e-desafios-globais-2007-2020/.

[17] Rainbow Rare Earths Limited, A Strategic Source of Rare Earth Minerals for a Growing Market, (2021): 4-5, https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/LSE_RBW_2021.pdf.

[18] Elaine Dezenski and John C. Austin, “Rebuilding America’s economy and foreign policy with ‘ally-shoring,’”Brookings Institute, June 8, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2021/06/08/rebuilding-americas-economy-and-foreign-policy-with-ally-shoring/.

[19] Abraham, “Environmental Needs: Rare Metals Are Green,” in The Elements of Power, 135.

[20] Leah Burrows, “A clean way to extract rare earth metals,” Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, June 17, 2016, https://seas.harvard.edu/news/2016/06/clean-way-extract-rare-earth-metals

[21] C. Todd Lopez, “DARPA Looks to Microbes to Process Rare Earth Elements,” U.S. Department of Defense News, September 8, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2768268/darpa-looks-to-microbes-to-process-rare-earth-elements/.

For decades, Algerians have proudly chanted the slogan “One, Two, Three – Viva l’Algerie!” in the face of adversity. Yet even this slogan, which has come to represent Algerian patriotism and resilience, recalls memories of the country’s brutal experience as a French colony. Algeria won its independence in 1962 after 132 years of brutal French colonization and the massacre of nearly 1.5 million Algerians,¹ but the impact of French colonialism on Algerian culture, society, and politics is still felt today. French education dismantled the Algerian common nation, cultural identity, and homogenous society,² and French is still spoken by a third of the population and taught in Algerian elementary schools.³ 

After Algeria gained its independence in 1962, the country faced significant challenges in building a stable government and economy. The post-colonial government struggled to establish effective institutions and deal with the legacies of colonialism, such as poverty, illiteracy, and underdevelopment. In the absence of strong institutions and the rule of law, corruption became widespread, and elites used their power and connections to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. 

Following the 2019 resignation of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, social and political instability have ravaged the nation, with the revolutionary spirit at an all-time high as Algerians continue to protest their current corrupt government. Yet despite the nation’s valiant efforts to pick up the pieces of its broken democracy, France has simply stood by and watched. When presented with the perfect opportunity to begin to repair the tremendous damage it has wrought on Algeria, France has done nothing. 

Only once France takes full responsibility for their heinous colonization and offers amends to the Algerian people as well as French-colonized countries of Africa, should the Algerian government be open to relations and begin properly healing as a nation with the assistance of the French government. In the meantime, Algerians live with the memories of martyrs, mountains of skulls, and valleys of blood shed taken on the path towards its independence while the French President expresses little concern.

Les événements

The French conquest of Algeria, which began in 1830, was not merely a colonial venture, but rather an effort to extend French sovereignty over a territory that was subsequently considered an integral part of metropolitan France.⁴ The annexation of Algeria into French control was not limited to just political or economic influence, but also encompassed social and cultural integration with the French nation. This deep-rooted connection is emphasized through measures such as the implementation of French law and language, as well as the migration of French settlers to Algeria. The result was a colonial possession that was distinct from other French colonies, as it was viewed as a natural extension of French territory. French, Maltese, Italians, and other colonial powers all settled across Algeria, with a particular affinity for the sunny western region of Oran. It was a pleasant, comfortable way of living for many of these European settlers. However, the French characterized the groundwork for which they ruled Native Algerians through a long-standing tradition of “violence and mutual incomprehension.”⁵ Algerian nationalist parties, such as the Party of the Algerian People (Parti du Peuple Algérien), had existed for years prior to the revolution. It was only over time that they became increasingly more radical as they realized they wouldn’t be able to accomplish sovereignty by peaceful means. 

On October 31, 1954, Algeria’s war of independence began. The National Liberation Front (FLN) led it with the aim to restore freedom to the Algerian state and develop a social democracy once and for all. What followed was an exhausting journey towards autonomy, officially deemed as the Algerian War. Algerian nationalists fought primarily through guerilla warfare or diplomatic assistance abroad. After seven long years of battle and massacre, France and the leaders of the FLN signed a peace agreement⁷ to signal the end of the war. The most important fight for justice and restitution had begun. Algeria continues to fight the ghosts of its colonizers. 

The Ratonnade

There had been accounts of multiple instances in which the French exerted their authority through inhuman ways, both prior and throughout the war for Independence. Whether throughout the war or after its conclusion, the French have found endless ways to taunt Algerians and remind them of the struggles of their past. On October 17th, 1961, just as the war was approaching an end, nearly 30,000 Algerians took to the streets of France to protest against the prejudice curfew imposed onto Algerian Muslims. Authorities were determined to silence the protestors. Almost immediately after it began, police authorities began using brutal force, killing protesters and even dumping live bodies into the River Seine. Historians and officials have agreed that the death toll from that night reached well over 100.⁸ The French government has done little to apologize for the massacre. On its 60th anniversary, President Emmanuel Macron made an underwhelming attempt of recognition, saying the crimes done by the French police were “inexcusable.”⁹ Even more disturbing in this endeavor of “retribution” was the return of 24 Algerian skulls from the Musée de l’Homme in 2020. These skulls belonged to the freedom fighters of Algeria and their placement in a French museum serves as a reminder of the brutal colonial rule. In 2022, documents revealed that only six of those skulls belonged to resistance fighters,¹⁰ the remaining came from unknown origins. As expected, President Macron’s office declined to comment on the exchange. It appears the French government’s sadistic actions have now manifested as muddled political attempts at repatriation. 

Lazy Reparations

To witness the French government’s purportedly sincere and truly tolerant behavior as they attempt to restore relations with Algeria, one may observe the most recent statements made by President Macron. Just on January 12th, 2023, President Macron stated that he will not “ask for forgiveness” from Algeria for French colonization as “that word would break all of our ties.”¹¹ The painful scars left from French imperialism have been disregarded over Macron’s career. Macron’s words have no impact unless action is being taken alongside them. 

The French government is in an era where it’s aiming to reshape its relationships with the African countries it has colonized. In the midst of doing so, they’ve made lazy, hollow commitments to repatriate colonial-era artworks and remains. While current Algerian President Abdelmadjij Tebboune has granted France access to Algeria’s resources, France has cut the number of visas to its country. According to Algerian Islamist politician, Sheikh Ali Belhadj has called Macron’s 2022 visits a “A Soft Colonization, A Robbery Of The Resources Of The Algerian People.”¹² Algeria continues to suffer from the effects of colonization today. The lack of apology allows the French government to slowly creep back into the folds of Algerian politics and its rich resources. 

It is evident that France must take full responsibility for its heinous colonization and offer amends to Algeria and other French-colonized countries in Africa before any attempt at reconciliation can be made. President Macron’s recent statements regarding French colonization have been criticized as hollow, and Algeria continues to feel the lasting effects of its past.

References

[1]“The Algerian War of Independence.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. Accessed February 10, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/The-Algerian-War-of-Independence. 

[2]Hamitouche, Youcef. “Educational Policy of French Colonialism in Algeria and Its Impact on Algerian Culture and Society.” Home. Accessed February 10, 2023. https://nomadit.co.uk/conference/africaknows/paper/57571#:~:text=With%20the%20French%20colonization%2C%20Algeria,spreading%20French%20education%20in%20Algeria. 

[3]Caulcutt, Clea. “Algeria’s Move to English Signals Erosion of France’s Sway.” POLITICO. POLITICO, September 2, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/algerias-move-to-english-signals-erosion-of-frances-global-influence/#:~:text=Arabic%20and%20Tamazight%20are%20the,iby%20a%20third%20of%20Algerians. 

[4]Noor Al-Deen, Hana. “The Evolution of Rai Music – Hana Noor Al-Deen, 2005 – Sage Journals.” Accessed February 10, 2023. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021934704273906. 

[5]“Colonial Rule.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. Accessed February 10, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/Colonial-rule. 

[6]Ibid.,  “The Algerian War of Independence”. 

[7]“French-Algerian Truce – History.” Accessed February 10, 2023. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/french-algerian-truce. 

[8]Chemam, Melissa. “Paris Massacre: 60 Years on, France Must Face Its Colonial Past.” History | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, October 17, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/10/17/17-october-1961-60-years-on-france-must-face-its-colonial-past. 

[9]Rouaba, Ahmed. “How a Massacre of Algerians in Paris Was Covered Up.” BBC News. BBC, October 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58927939. 

[10]Méheut, Constant. “France Returned 24 Skulls to Algeria. They Weren’t What They Seemed.” The New York Times. The New York Times, October 17, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/17/world/europe/france-algeria-restitution-skulls.html.

[11]“Macron Will Not Seek Algeria’s ‘Forgiveness’ for Colonialism.” Politics News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, January 12, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/12/macron-will-not-ask-algeria-for-forgiveness-over-colonialism. 

[12]“Algerian Islamists, Analysts, and Social Media Users Describe Macron’s Visit to Algeria as ‘Soft Colonization,’ Demand Apology and Reparations.” MEMRI. Middle East Media Research Institute, September 2, 2022. https://www.memri.org/reports/algerian-islamists-analysts-and-social-media-users-describe-macrons-visit-algeria-soft. 

On November 14, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden met in person with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping for the first time in his presidency.

This summit, conducted as a sideline event in the Group of Twenty (G20) gathering in Bali, was full of paradoxes: on the one hand, despite being described as a “candid exchange in depth,” it was obvious that both parties maintained two parallel narratives of policy and standing. As Biden commented, “we were very blunt with one another about places where we disagreed or where we were uncertain of each other’s position.”[1] The most substantial outcome, if not the meeting itself, was a planned visit by Secretary Blinken to Beijing and the promise to keep the communication channel open.

On the other hand, the effects of the summit were outstanding. It received a welcome and positive outlook from major news outlets, think tanks, and officials, with a focus on “setting the guardrail,” “a warmer tone,” and a “friendly atmosphere.”[2] Just as these abstract notions indicate, the meeting was mainly cherished for its symbolic role in the context of no breakthroughs that have been reached. The face-to-face diplomacy offered a credible signal about the possible improvement of bilateral relations.

It is not the first summit diplomacy has boosted and refreshed a frozen relationship between these two countries. In 1993, after the long-lasting disputes regarding the Tiananmen Square Protest, President Jiang Zemin’s first interaction with President Clinton was on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Some believe the meeting directly led to state visits between the two countries and the generally stable relationships in the 1990s. During the COVID-19 epidemic, Sino–U.S. relations often deteriorated in rounds of meetings, most of which were virtual and conducted by senior officials. A series of video conferences between Xi and Biden failed to prevent Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

As the social neuroscience theory illustrates, face-to-face interactions enable individuals to understand and empathize with each other’s emotions, intentions, and beliefs. This process reduces uncertainty and increases trust between leaders, even when they have conflicting interests or values.[3] In June 2013, then-President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping held a two-day summit at the Sunnylands estate in California. This informal, face-to-face meeting was a significant departure from the usual formal diplomatic encounters between the two countries. Both leaders built a personal rapport and engaged in candid discussions on various issues, including cybersecurity, climate change, and regional security. The informal nature of the meeting allowed for strong signalling from both sides. President Obama emphasized the importance of a cooperative relationship between the two nations, while President Xi Jinping stressed China’s commitment to peaceful development. The meeting also marked the beginning of the US-China climate change agreement, ultimately leading to the Paris Agreement in 2015. The Sunnylands Summit demonstrated the significance of face-to-face diplomacy in fostering understanding and collaboration between the world’s two largest economies.

However, “face-to-face” interactions have been fraught as well. In the U.S.–China talks in Alaska in 2021, the top diplomats from both sides publicly denounced each other to the media. Failed cases like this one prove the limitation of such exchanges bounded by the context, expectations, and goals of each meeting. However, based on successful cases and theory, one could argue that face-to-face diplomacy matters in summit diplomacy.

When state leaders meet face-to-face at the minor level, they engage in various interaction rituals that stimulate mirror neurons in the brain. These rituals include eye contact, facial expressions, body language, gestures, words, tone, humor, etc. The rituals create a feedback loop of mutual understanding and trust between leaders.[4]

This feedback loop generates a positive feeling of confidence, enthusiasm, and solidarity that arises from successful social interactions-the, the feeling  we refer to as “emotional energy.”[5] The energy could motivate leaders to cooperate and overcome obstacles. Shared emotion in face-to-face interactions helps accurately capture credibility cues by “mirroring,” where actors experience synchronous perceptions when they observe each other taking the same action or thinking the same thing. We could find the headline images of both leaders actively greeting each other with bright smiles and Biden touching Xi’s back to guide the direction, setting the tone for the conference and confirming each leader’s prediction about the other’s friendliness.

Furthermore, the feedback loop binds leaders to honour their commitments by creating a relational contract, an informal agreement based on trust and reciprocity enforced by social norms rather than legal rules. It is confusing to see why it is essential for leaders to just “agree” to keep discussing the future. Nevertheless, by doing this, leaders promise to invest and focus more on a relationship, and the effort itself is an active promise. Although the relational contract is a non-binding agreement on both sides to sustain a relationship, if both sides are willing to be locked in a long-lasting reciprocal relationship, they are both restrained based on a long-term expectation of returns. The Biden–Xi meeting lengthened the interactive ritual chains by presenting a clear timetable for the following exchange, thus leaving more wiggle room for trust probing. Therefore, the relational contract established through trusting, face-to-face interaction balances contemporary interests with future interests and emotions, lengthens the time horizon of the interactors and avoids impulse and short-sightedness.[6]

A future-focused relational contract also restrains opportunistic impulses. Regular face-to-face meetings can raise the relational costs of deceit and betrayal. In the early stage of face-to-face interaction, credibility is thin, and the deception cost is low. However, as the reciprocal relationship of face-to-face interaction continues to strengthen, it will have a chain reaction once deception is discovered, reducing the possibility of subsequent meetings. Realists believe face-to-face interaction is full of deceit and bravado and, therefore, not believable. The argument ignores the constraint force associated with the relationship, and the “long shadow in the future” in the multi-round game can change the decision maker’s preference.[7]

Domestic politics and low expectations have also contributed to the credibility of signals. The two presidents conducted their meetings just after sustaining their power in respective domestic politics, with Xi earning a historic third term and Biden defeating the expected “red wave.” Their acquisition of enough political capital could make their words count and offer confidence to mark this relationship via active engagement.

What makes the meeting successful is also straightforward: the standard for success is low. Following Pelosi’s visit, China retaliated by cutting the main channels and deploying unprecedented military drones across Taiwan. The United States intensified the situation in its National Security Strategy by positioning China as a country that “harbours the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”[8] The practices and perceptions of psychological conflict shape expectations of “building a floor,” as many Western media outlets portray. On a personal level, Biden and Xi addressed each other as “acquaintances,” as they met several times as vice presidents of their respective countries between 2011 and 2014. They also met briefly at a nuclear security summit in Washington in 2016.[9] The friendly and respectful relationship at that time softens the tone of the present messaging, unlike the confrontational encounter between the unfamiliar Yang Jiechi and Jake Sullivan in Alaska.

Cheap signals are made credible by the use of mirror neurons, the activation of social norms, and the creation of interpersonal bonds. What should the world expect after the United States and China have completed this simple but brave move? Does face-to-face diplomacy work? Modern U.S.–China relations originated from face-to-face diplomacy. Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to China in 1971 helped form a grand strategic design and ushered in an era of engagement. Equipped with a sense of timing and opportunity and a keen understanding of Chinese culture, history, psychology, and interests, the statesman successfully persuaded the former adversary to join the “united front” of containing the Soviets. The past relations between Kissinger and Mao held the same (if not more) opportunities for face-to-face diplomacy as the present relations between Biden and Xi. However, all of the substantial issues are yet to become a real game. Analyzing the signals carefully, taking pragmatic wisdom, and preparing for tough decision-making and real diplomacy will be necessary.

References:

• The White House. 2022. “Remarks by President Biden in a Press Conference | Bali, Indonesia | the White House.”  The White House. November 14, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-press-conference-bali-indonesia.

• See:小芳黄. 2022. “分析：中美关系趋缓 下来半年是设‘防护栏’关键窗口 | 早报.” Www.zaobao.com.sg. 联合早报. November 16, 2022. https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/world/story20221116-1333583. ; Rogers, Katie, and Chris Buckley. 2022. “With Tensions Mounting, Biden and Xi Try a Warmer Tone.” The New York Times, November 14, 2022, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/14/world/asia/biden-xi-bali-g20.html.

• Holmes, Marcus. 2013. “The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions.” International Organization 67 (4). Cambridge University Press: 829–61. doi:10.1017/S0020818313000234.

• Holmes, Marcus, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2020. “Social Bonding in Diplomacy.” International Theory 12 (1). Cambridge University Press: 133–61. doi:10.1017/S1752971919000162.

• Wong, Seanon S. 2015. “Emotions and the Communication of Intentions in Face-To-Face Diplomacy.” European Journal of International Relations 22 (1): 144–67. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115581059.

• Macneil, Ian R. 1980. The New Social Contract an Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press.

• Russett, Bruce, and Miles Lackey. 1987. “In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There’s No Tomorrow, Why Save Today?” Political Science Quarterly 102 (2): 259–72. https://doi.org/10.2307/2151352.

• The White House. 2022. “National Security Strategy.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2022. “President Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. President Joe Biden in Bali.” Www.fmprc.gov.cn. November 14, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202211/t20221114_10974686.html.

Amid the Green Revolution of the mid-20th century and the growing voice of global actors, innovations across the agricultural sector gave hope to the idea of ending the international hunger crisis. Of these innovations, genetically modified organisms, commonly known as GMOs, embodied the forefront in groundbreaking technology. A GMO refers to any living organism whose genetic makeup has been artificially manipulated through genetic engineering.[1] GMOs opened a new world of possibilities — genetic engineering now allowed for the existence of genes in organisms that would not occur through traditional crossbreeding methods. From glow-in-the-dark fish to goats that could spin spider webs,[2] genetic modification was touted among the scientific community as limitless in the scope and span of what it could achieve.

In the decades following the inception of genetic engineering, debates over solutions to Africa’s growing hunger crisis increasingly intertwined with that of GMO usage. Amid a now growing 264.2 million people facing undernourishment in Sub-Saharan Africa,[3] genetically modified (GM) crops pose an alluring solution to this challenge. Pest resilience, drought tolerance, increased yield, and longer shelf life were just some of the modifications that GM crops could achieve.[4] Yet despite its seemingly miraculous capabilities, GMOs have been curiously underutilized in Sub-Saharan countries. Out of the 54 countries in Africa, only five of them — Egypt, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Nigeria — allow for GM crops to be commercially grown.[5]

Several nuanced economic and political considerations underlie Africa’s firm stance against GMOs. To further delve into this issue, one must start with the intricate history of capitalism and monopolization within the global agriculture sector. At the same time that genetic engineering continued to advance, agribusinesses utilizing GM technology continued to consolidate. As of 2019, four seed companies control more than 75 percent of plant breeding research, 60 percent of the commercial seed market, and 76 percent of global agrochemical sales.[6] This number is likely to increase in the coming years, with large agribusiness corporations expanding their acquisitions by buying out small firms to accumulate intellectual property rights. Besides causing less variability of crops and higher food prices, this monopolization also engenders less innovation and stricter restrictions over seed usage.[7][8]

The consequences of this consolidation frequently manifest in current practice. In 2018, agribusiness company Bayer absorbed Monsanto following a $63 billion buyout.[9] The company has since gained control of 98 percent of trait markers for herbicide-resistant soybeans and 79 percent of trait markers for herbicide-resistant corn.[10] Such monopolies over a GM crop pose significant ramifications for biodiversity, food security, and democratic ideals. Monopolies decrease market variability, lending itself to price control autonomy and less innovation.[11] Bayer, for instance, holds patents for ‘genetic use restriction technology’ — genetically modified seeds that are sterile which farmers are unable to resow with.[12] Facing backlash that such technology was unethical, Bayer and similar companies instead began forcing  contracts onto farmers stating that they cannot save and replant patented seeds.[13] As a result, farmers must purchase new seeds from the agribusiness each season.

While critics may claim that this is done to protect the intellectual property of the company, full control of the seed creates a dangerous cycle of dependency between buyer and seller, especially in monopolized industries. Besides the publicity large corporations gain when they offer to donate to impoverished countries, these corporations also possess an economic incentive to donate, as the GM seeds donated require additional and expensive inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, or herbicides that must be bought from these corporations.[14] Other times, the GM seeds themselves may permanently change the soil quality,[15] causing non-GM seeds to not be able to grow in the soil in later seasons. Both these scenarios quickly lend themselves to codependency between farmer and agribusiness, allowing for the seed lenders to increase their prices when no other competition exists in the available market.

Despite this, ​for those that choose to go down this path, do the potential benefits of famine alleviation outweigh the hefty price tag of using GM crops? South Africa provides a relevant case study. The country is the largest producer of GM crops in Africa and the ninth largest worldwide.[16] South Africa began its usage of GM crops in 1996, starting with genetically modified maize and later progressing to cotton and soybean variants in the following years.[17] The country’s staple crop, maize, now has GM variations making up 80 percent of the maize consumed within the country.[18] While the country’s maize production has increased from 8.3 million tons in 1996 to an estimated 16.3 million tons in 2022,[19] famine and malnutrition have yet to be solved. From 1999 to 2008, those at risk of hunger in South Africa rose from 23 percent to 25 percent, amounting to nearly 15 million people.[20] At the same time, food insecurity in the present day still affects 46 percent of South African households, with 27 percent facing stunted growth and 44 percent being deficient of vital nutrients, vitamins, and minerals.[21]

 Thus, though GM crops have allowed for increased yield, millions of South Africans still face hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition. It is not a food shortage, then, but rather a misallocation of resources and economic instability — partly stemming from GMO usage — that contributes to the ongoing hunger epidemic. While countries like South Africa may produce enough food, the increase in prices from GMO agribusinesses causes many farmers to be unable to afford the seeds and associated inputs.[22] Empirical research also shows that trade liberalization and the increased presence of foreign industries in developing countries, like that of agribusiness, induces increased income inequality, slower decline in poverty, and lower consumption growth.[23] GMOs have demonstrated promise as an intrinsically beneficial technology; however, the rampant monopolization of corporations and corruption within governments unwilling to pass antitrust laws make its use inaccessible for both farmers and consumers alike.

While many reasons exist to explain why farmers are unwilling to use GMOs — such as misinformation, reliance on European trade, and uncertainty about long-term effects[24] — allowing for affordability remains the crucial first step that will help the livelihood of Sub-Saharan Africans. Agricultural companies specializing in genetic modification must be held responsible in adhering to fair market prices, environmental regulations, and health standards. The growing monopolization within the agriculture sector must be halted to ensure that farmers are able to adequately participate in the market for their own economic benefit as well as their communities’. This problem is not just endemic to the agriculture sector. To ensure that citizens continue to afford basic necessities like food, local governments and state institutions must protect their people’s place in the market system unburdened by foreign enterprises. In doing so, GMOs may finally achieve what they were envisioned to do over fifty years ago — ending the ongoing food crisis.

Works Cited

[1] Diaz, J. M. and Fridovich-Keil, Judith L., “genetically modified organism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, October 19, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/science/genetically-modified-organism.

[2] Tanya Lewis, “Genetically Modified Animal Experiments,” Business Insider, October 17, 2015, https://www.businessinsider.com/genetically-modified-animal-experiments-2015-10#glow-in-the-dark-mice-2.

[3] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2021. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all. Rome, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474en.

[4] Martignago, Damiano, Andrés Rico-Medina, David Blasco-Escámez, Juan B. Fontanet-Manzaneque, and Ana L. Caño-Delgado, “Drought Resistance by Engineering Plant Tissue-Specific Responses,” Frontiers, 2020, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpls.2019.01676/full.

[5] Sarah Eichstadt, “Pros and Cons of GMOs in Africa,” The Borgen Project, 2021, https://borgenproject.org/gmos-in-africa/.

[6] “GMOs & Seeds — Food & Power,” Food & Power, https://www.foodandpower.net/gmos-seeds.

[7] Thomas J. Holmes, David K. Levine, and James A. Schmitz, “Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 3 (2012): 1–33, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23249909.

[8] Taimoon Stewart, “The Functioning of Patent Monopoly Rights in Developing Economies: In Whose Interests?,” Social and Economic Studies 49, no. 1 (2000): 1–52, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27865179.

[9] Pharmaceutical Technology Editors. “Bayer Completes Monsanto Acquisition for $63 Billion,” PharmTech, 2018, https://www.pharmtech.com/view/bayer-completes-monsanto-acquisition-63-billion-0.

[10] “GMOs & Seeds — Food & Power”.

[11] Holmes, Thomas J., David K. Levine, and James A. Schmitz.

[12] Luca Lombardo, “Genetic use restriction technologies: a review,” Plant biotechnology journal vol. 12,8 (2014): 995-1005, doi:10.1111/pbi.12242.

[13] La Via Campesina, “Seed laws that criminalise farmers: resistance and fightback,” GRAIN, 2015, https://grain.org/article/entries/5142-seed-laws-that-criminalise-farmers-resistance-and-fightback.

[14] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Genetically Engineered Crops: Past Experience and Future Prospects, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Division on Earth and Life Studies, Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects, (N.p.: National Academies Press, 2016).

[15] Na Liu et al., “Effect on soil chemistry of genetically modified (GM) vs. non-GM maize,” GM crops vol. 1,3 (2010): 157-61, doi:10.4161/gmcr.1.3.12810.

[16] “Lessons from Africa’s largest producer of GMO crops – Route To Food,” Route to Food, 2018, https://routetofood.org/lessons-from-africas-largest-producer-of-gmo-crops/.

[17] Veslemøy Anderson, Genetically Modified and Irradiated Food: Controversial Issues: Facts Versus Perceptions, (London: Academic Press, 2020).

[18] Andrea Teagle, “SA’s genetically modified maize: Here’s what you should know about it,” Daily Maverick, 2015, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-07-15-sas-genetically-modified-maize-heres-what-you-should-know-about-it/.

[19] “Crop Explorer – World Agricultural Production (WAP) Briefs – Southern Africa,” n.d, International Production Assessment Division (IPAD) – USDA, https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/cropexplorer/pecad_stories.aspx?regionid=safrica&ftype=prodbriefs.

[20] Demetre Labadarios et al., “Food security in South Africa: a review of national surveys,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization vol. 89,12 (2011): 891-9, doi:10.2471/BLT.11.089243.

[21] Demetre Labadarios et al.

[22] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Genetically Engineered Crops: Past Experience and Future Prospects, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Division on Earth and Life Studies.

[23] Petia Topalova, “Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization: Evidence on Poverty from India,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 4 (2010): 1–41, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25760231.

[24] Jennifer A. Thomson, “Why is Africa reluctant to use GMO crops?,” The World Economic Forum, 2015, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/why-is-africa-reluctant-to-use-gmo-crops/.

Amid the Green Revolution of the mid-20th century and the growing voice of global actors, innovations across the agricultural sector gave hope to the idea of ending the international  hunger crisis. Of these innovations, GMOs—formally known as genetically modified organisms—led the forefront in groundbreaking technology. Referring to any living organisms whose genetic makeup has been artificially manipulated through genetic engineering [1], GMOs opened up a new world of possibilities. Genetic engineering allowed for the existence of genes in organisms that wouldn’t occur through traditional crossbreeding methods. From glow-in-the-dark fish to goats that could spin spider webs [2], genetic modification was touted among the scientific community as limitless in the scope and span of what it could achieve. 

In the following decades of genetic engineering’s inception, of the world’s many problems, debates over solutions to Africa’s growing hunger crisis had been increasingly intermixed with that of GMO usage. Amidst a now growing 264.2 million people facing undernourishment in Sub-Saharan Africa [3], genetically modified (GM) crops pose an alluring solution to this challenge. Pest resilience, drought tolerance, increased yield, and longer shelf life were just some of the modifications that GM crops could achieve [4]. So, in spite of its seemingly miraculous capabilities, why has GMOs been so underutilized in Sub-Saharan countries both present-day and historically? Out of the 54 countries in Africa, only five of them—Egypt, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Nigeria—allow for GM crops to be commercially grown [5].

The answer to this question is rather nuanced, with several economic and political considerations affecting Africa’s firm stance against GMOs. To further delve into this issue, one must start with the mired history of capitalism and monopolization within the global agriculture sector. At the same time that genetic engineering continued to advance, agribusinesses utilizing GM technology continued to consolidate. In the present day, four seed companies control more than 75% of plant breeding research, 60% of the commercial seed market, and 76% of global agrochemical sales [6]. This number is likely to increase in coming years, with large agribusiness corporations expanding their acquisitions by buying out small firms to accumulate increased intellectual property rights. Besides causing less variability of crops and higher food prices, this monopolization also lends itself to less innovation and stricter restrictions over seed usage [7] [8]. 

We can see this effect in current practice. In 2018, agribusiness company Bayer absorbed Monsanto following a $63 billion buyout [9]. Since then, the company has gained control of 98% of trait markers for herbicide-resistant soybeans and 79% of trait markers for herbicide-resistant corn [10]. Consequently, the ability to control a monopoly over a GM crop poses significant ramifications for biodiversity, food security, and democratic ideals. Monopolies decrease market variability, lending itself to price control autonomy and less innovation [11]. Bayer, for instance, holds patents for ‘genetic use restriction technology—genetically modified seeds that are sterile which farmers are unable to resow with [12]. Amid backlash that such technology was unethical, Bayer and like companies instead now employ contracts onto farmers stating that they cannot save and replant patented seeds [13]. In turn, this means that farmers must purchase new seeds from the agribusiness each season. 

While critics may claim that this is done to protect the intellectual property of the company, full control of the seed creates a dangerous cycle of dependency between buyer and seller, especially in monopolized industries. Beyond the publicity large corporations gain when they offer to donate to impoverished countries, these corporations are also economically incentivized to do so as well. Sometimes, the GM seeds donated require additional and expensive inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, or herbicides that must be bought from these corporations [14]. Other times, the GM seeds themselves may permanently change the soil quality [15], causing non-GM seeds to not be able to grow in the soil in later seasons. Both these scenarios quickly lend themselves to codependency between farmer and agribusiness, allowing for the seed lenders to increase their prices when no other competition exists in the available market.

Despite this, ​for those that choose to go down this path, do the potential benefits of famine alleviation outweigh the hefty price tag of using GM crops? Looking at South Africa as a case study, the country itself is the largest producer of GM crops in Africa and the ninth largest worldwide [16]. South Africa began its usage of GM crops in 1996, starting with genetically modified maize and later progressing to cotton and soybean variants in following years [17]. In turn, the country’s staple crop, maize, now has GM variations making up 80% of the maize consumed within the country [18]. While the country’s maize production has increased from 8.3 million tons in 1996 to an estimated 16.3 million tons in 2022 [19], famine and malnutrition still have yet to be solved. From 1999 to 2008, those at risk of hunger rose from 23% to 25% [20]. At the same time, food insecurity in the present day still affects 46% of South African households with 27% facing stunted growth and 44% being deficient of vital nutrients, vitamins, and minerals [21]. 

So why is it that although GM crops may have allowed for increased yield, millions of South Africans still face hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition? In turn, it is not a food shortage, but rather a misallocation of resources and economic instability—partly stemming from GMO usage—that contributes to the ongoing hunger epidemic. While countries like South Africa may produce enough food, the increase in prices from GMO agribusinesses drive many farmers to be unable to afford the seeds and associated inputs [22]. At the same time, empirical research shows that trade liberalization and the increased presence of foreign industries in developing countries, like that of agribusiness, have caused increased income inequality, slower decline in poverty, and lower consumption growth [23]. GMOs have shown promise through a multitude of beneficial factors, however the gross monopolization of corporations and corruption within governments unwilling to pass antitrust laws make its use inaccessible for both farmers and consumers alike.

So, while there exist many reasons that farmers are unwilling to use GMOs—misinformation, reliance on European trade, uncertainty about long-term effects, etc. [24]—allowing for affordability may be the first step that will help the livelihood of Sub-Saharan Africans. Agricultural companies specializing in genetic modification must be held responsible in adhering to fair market prices, environmental regulations, and health standards. The growing monopolization within the agriculture sector must be halted to ensure that farmers are able to adequately participate in the market for themselves and their communities. This problem is not just endemic to the agriculture sector. To ensure economic stability so that citizens continue to afford basic necessities like food, local and state governments must ensure that their people continue to have a place in the market system unburdened by foreign enterprises. In doing so, GMOs may finally achieve what it was envisioned to do over fifty years ago—ending the ongoing food crisis.

References

[1] Diaz, J. M. and Fridovich-Keil, . Judith L. 2021. “genetically modified organism.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/science/genetically-modified-organism.

[2] Lewis, Tanya. 2015. “Genetically Modified Animal Experiments.” Business Insider. October 17, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/genetically-modified-animal-experiments-2015-10#glow-in-the-dark-mice-2.

[3] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2021. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all. Rome, FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474en.

[4] Martignago, Damiano, Andrés Rico-Medina, David Blasco-Escámez, Juan B. Fontanet-Manzaneque, and Ana L. Caño-Delgado. 2020. “Drought Resistance by Engineering Plant Tissue-Specific Responses.” Frontiers. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpls.2019.01676/full.

[5] Eichstadt, Sarah. 2021. “Pros and Cons of GMOs in Africa.” The Borgen Project. https://borgenproject.org/gmos-in-africa.

[6] “GMOs & Seeds — Food & Power.” n.d. Food & Power. https://www.foodandpower.net/gmos-seeds.

[7] Holmes, Thomas J., David K. Levine, and James A. Schmitz. 2012. “Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 3: 1–33. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23249909.

[8] Stewart, Taimoon. 2000. “The Functioning of Patent Monopoly Rights in Developing Economies: In Whose Interests?” Social and Economic Studies 49, no. 1: 1–52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27865179.

[9] Pharmaceutical Technology Editors. 2018. “Bayer Completes Monsanto Acquisition for $63 Billion.” PharmTech. https://www.pharmtech.com/view/bayer-completes-monsanto-acquisition-63-billion-0.

[10] Food and Power.

[11] Thomas J. Holmes, David K. Levine, and James A. Schmitz.

[12] Lombardo, Luca. 2014. “Genetic use restriction technologies: a review.” Plant biotechnology journal vol. 12,8: 995-1005. doi:10.1111/pbi.12242.

[13] La Via Campesina. 2015. “Seed laws that criminalise farmers: resistance and fightback.” GRAIN. https://grain.org/article/entries/5142-seed-laws-that-criminalise-farmers-resistance-and-fightback.

[14] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Genetically Engineered Crops: Past Experience and Future Prospects, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Division on Earth and Life Studies. 2016. Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects. N.p.: National Academies Press.

[15] Liu, Na et al. 2010. “Effect on soil chemistry of genetically modified (GM) vs. non-GM maize.” GM crops vol. 1,3: 157-61. doi:10.4161/gmcr.1.3.12810.

[16] “Lessons from Africa’s largest producer of GMO crops – Route To Food.” 2018. Route to Food. https://routetofood.org/lessons-from-africas-largest-producer-of-gmo-crops.

[17] Andersen, Veslemøy, ed. 2020. Genetically Modified and Irradiated Food: Controversial Issues: Facts Versus Perceptions. N.p.: Elsevier Science.

[18] Teagle, Andrea. 2015. “SA’s genetically modified maize: Here’s what you should know about it.” Daily Maverick. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-07-15-sas-genetically-modified-maize-heres-what-you-should-know-about-it.

[19] “Crop Explorer – World Agricultural Production (WAP) Briefs – Southern Africa.” n.d. International Production Assessment Division (IPAD) – USDA. https://ipad.fas.usda.gov/cropexplorer/pecad_stories.aspx?regionid=safrica&ftype=prodbriefs.

[20] Labadarios, Demetre et al. 2011. “Food security in South Africa: a review of national surveys.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization vol. 89,12: 891-9. doi:10.2471/BLT.11.089243

[21] Ibid.

[22] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Genetically Engineered Crops: Past Experience and Future Prospects, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources, and Division on Earth and Life Studies.

[23] Topalova, Petia. 2010. “Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization: Evidence on Poverty from India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 4: 1–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25760231.

[24] Thomson, Jennifer A. 2015. “Why is Africa reluctant to use GMO crops?” The World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/why-is-africa-reluctant-to-use-gmo-crops.

Introduction:

“The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government” (Jefferson 1809). The critical analysis of the degree, characteristics, and sustainability of countries’ achievements or ‘objects’, has been the subject of political academia for many years, with several pieces of scholarship being written on the concept. Less discussed in political circles, but just as imperative to realising political scholarship’s aim to specify and expand upon “legitimate object(s) of good government,” (Jefferson 1809), are the influences on government behaviour, and to what extent they inform and determine a government’s achievements. The most prolific of these ‘influences’ are the goals a government pursues, the structure of the state, and the power of organised interests within the country, and this essay will aim to analyse which of these influences is more imperative in determining what governments achieve. The context through which these concepts will be assessed and compared is that of the present South African government and state. This choice was made in order to provide a case study with which to observe the real-life application of these concepts, so as to provide a deeper understanding of the degree of their effect on governments, as well as to offer more literature in areas where this essay’s analysis of the government influences seemed academically lacking (for example, the ‘goals’ a government pursues is entirely dependent on the government itself, so there appears to be a shortage of academia that provide specific parameters for this concept). Before delving into the main argument, it is important to note that the frequently used term ‘government achievements’ will for the purposes of this essay, broadly be defined as ‘all behaviour of government, as well as all its interactions with the political environment it exists in’; policymaking, government programmes, strategy implementation, to name but a few examples.

The goals a government pursues:

To clarify exactly what the ‘goals a government pursues’ refers to, it can be classified as any situation, state, or statistic a country aims to achieve or obtain. As stated above, the goals a country’s government pursues are dictated by the specific political characteristics of the country and government itself. It is reasonable to assume that there might be general goals that all governments should strive towards, for example a developing country might aim to achieve goals in the field of economic growth, redistribution of income, and employment rates (Chand 2018), but not the existence of strict codes or guidelines.  

Ideally, the goals a government sets should be the ultimate dictator of what they achieve, as the former sets the theoretical parameters with which the latter is measured against. In practice though, governments’ goals act only as a façade of capability and competence, and often offer little to no guarantee of delivering progress or development in any of the aspects of society addressed. There exist several exemplary futile illustrations of these goal strategies in South Africa. The outcomes approach, the government’s plan to address five priority areas identified in the socio-economic landscape of South Africa, “decent work and sustainable livelihoods, education, health, rural development, food security and land reform and the fight against crime and corruption,” (South African Government 2019), within the period of 2014 to 2019. From the time of writing, all five areas of need identified within this framework, have seen little to no improvement, with food security substantially decreasing to the lowest it has been since the birth of the South African democracy (IPC 2020). Similar examples are present in more times, perhaps the most prevalent of them being the National Development Plan 2030. Implemented in 2013, it details a step-by-step approach to the grandiose goal of completely “eliminating poverty and reducing inequality” (South African Government  2013) by the year 2030. Eight years after the NDP’s initial formation, South Africa’s former statistician-general Dr. Pali Lehohla is quoted as having said “The NDP was never implemented; it was left on the shelves” (Sibanyoni 2021). This serves to prove that goal setting, in a South African context, has no effect on what the government achieves, and rather acts as a projection of the potential intentions of government, as opposed to committed promises and guarantees.

The structure of the state:

State structure can be defined as “the organizational form of the state, i.e. the distribution of power among agencies, the working of these agencies, and the underlying self-perception influencing the exchange between these agencies as well as between the government and society at large” (Cante 2016). The formation of the state directly informs the power dynamic between state agencies, the processes of accountability state agencies are liable to, and finally the relationship between state agencies themselves (Cante 2016). The government, being one of the aforementioned ‘state players’ is therefore directly affected the state structure.

There are different types of state structures, that each inform the dynamic between the state agencies in their own unique manner. The United States of America, for example, employs federalism, a state structure that dictates the national government and the state government be two individual sovereign powers, for the purpose of creating a distinct separation of powers (Norton 2020). Similarly, South Africa organises its state into the legislative branch, the judicial branch, and the executive branch, also to broaden the spread of power (South African Government 2021).  The legislative authority controls the creation of legislation, and is presented as the South African parliament system, the exectuive authority, who are in charge of implementation of legislation and governance and who are represented as the President, his Deputy and Minisiters, and finally the judicial authority, who enforce the compliance with the country’s laws both on an individual and state agency level and who are represented by the South African court systems (South African Government 2021). There are also several more separate state institutions in South Africa, whose main aim is to support and enforce democratic practices, such as the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Auditor-General of South Africa, and the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (South African Government 2021). All of the aforementioned branches of state power and state institutions, act as state agencies and thus interact with other state agencies, i.e. the government. It would be then reasonable to conclude, that the structure of the state has the most considerable and substantial affect on what a government achieves (out of the list provided by this essay), purely based on the number of state agencies with a considerable, if not, an equal amount of power in the South African political landscape. For example, the public protector has been integral in exposing the corruption of the South African government and its involvement with the infamous Gupta family, and the judicial and executive branches of state power went at a figurative ‘head-to-head’ when the constitutional court sentenced former president Jacob Zuma to jail, earlier this year.

Power of organised interests in South Africa:

Interest groups are defined as “any association of individuals or organizations, usually formally organized, that, on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence public policy in its favour,” (Thomas 2021). The extent to which interest groups influence government behaviour depends equally on the strength of the interest group, as well as the willingness of the government in question. The National Rifle Association for example, an interest group in the United States of America, has been so successful in its attempts to affect public policy to represent its own ethics and affiliations, that despite having one of the highest rates of gun violence in the world, the NRA has successfully defeated every single attempt at institutionalising even the most basic gun control, with an unprecedented level of influence of the American government (Hammer 2010).

While South Africa possesses no interest group with that level of influence and power currently, there are a few that certainly have become a strong political entity in their own right. COSATU, or the Congress of South African Trade Unions, is perhaps the most prevalent example of a powerful interest group within South Africa. A congress of trade unions that include mine workers, teachers, policemen and allied health workers, it has played both a significant role in South Africa’s history and current times, being both instrumental in mobilising black workers in the Apartheid era, as well as currently fighting and negotiating with the government on behalf of the workers it represents (most often the mine and public service workers) (COSATU 2021). While there is a certain amount of government influence employed by COSATU,  it does not exist in any extreme degrees, and is therefore not as consequential as other influences this essay has tackled. 

Conclusion:

This essay aimed to critically analyse three possible sources of government influence, the goals a government pursues, the structure of the state, and the power of organised interests, through the perspective of South Africa’s complex socio-political climate, to identify which of these concepts had the greatest affect on what the government achieves/how it behaves in South Africa. It has concluded that, in South Africa, the structure of the state has the most affect on what a government achieves, with the power of organised interests coming second, and the goals a government pursues ranking having the least influence on what the South African government achieves.

Works Cited:

South African Government . 2019. The Outcomes Approach. Johannesburg: South African Government .

Cante, F. 2016. Handbook of Research on Transitional Justice and Peace Building in Turbulent Regions. Colombia : Universidad del Rosario.

Chand, S. 2018. “5 Main Aims of Government for Economy Development – Discussed.” Your Article Library , January 3: 1.

COSATU. 2021. “Congress of South African Trade Unions .” Johannesburg .

Hammer, S. 2010. Interest groups in the USA – The National Rifle Association. Washington: Martin Luther University .

IPC. 2020. South Africa: Acute Food Insecurity Situation September – December 2020 and Projection for January – March 2021. Cape Town: IPC analysis portal .

Jefferson, T. 1809. Thomas Jefferson to the Republicans of Washington County, Maryland, 31 March 1809. Washington : Maryland Herald .

Norton, W. 2020 . Federalism and the separation of powers . Chicago : Norton and Company .

Sibanyoni, M. 2021. NDP 2030 Targets: SA’s targets vs reality. Cape Town: SABC.

South African Government . 2013. The National Development Plan 2030. Pretoria : South African Government .

South African Government . 2021. The South African Government structure and functions . South African Government .

Thomas, C. 2021. Britannica. Accessed November 1, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/topic/interest-group.

Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrated with the invasion of Ukraine in February of this year that he will go to extreme lengths to preserve, even reinvigorate, what he considers the rightful legacy of the Russian Empire.^[1] However, Tsar Putin’s^[2] seemingly countless military setbacks in Ukraine^[3][4] point towards a truth not as broadly apparent until this year: Russia is in full decline as a political power. Nowhere is a better example than Central Asia. With little fanfare, the dominant power in Central Asia has already changed. Russia is out, and China is in. Through a combination of China’s targeted infrastructure investment into the region,^[5][6][7][8] Russian economic deterioration,^[9][10] and China’s meteoric economic rise,^[11] the states of Central Asia underwent a decades-long shift that brought them out of the Russian orbit and into that of China. Russia now stands as a weakened state, and China is stepping into the vacuum, reaping the benefits in the process

A History of Dominion

The region commonly referred to as Central Asia encompasses the states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan^[12] – a swath of territory spanning over three million square kilometers with just over 70 million inhabitants.^[13] Residents from these countries have long lived at the crossroads of great empires and are as diverse in language and culture as their historical occupiers. Notably, the arid steppes nd mountains of Central Asia conceal vast natural resources, the foundation of the region’s primarily export based economy.^[14]  Over the last century and a half, Central Asia has primarily been the domain of Russia, first under the rule of the Tsars as a part of the Russian Empire and then as member states of the Russian-dominated Soviet Union.^[15] However, Odd Arne Westad, Elihu Professor of History and Global Affairs at Yale’s Jackson School of Global Affairs, says, “the period of Russian ascendancy has been a kind of aberration in a broader historical pattern.”^[16] Professor Westad, who specializes in the history of the Cold War and China-Russia relations, says that Central Asia had been the realm of various Chinese empires up until the late 19th century, when the Russian Empire expanded eastward.^[17] The close proximity of the Soviet Union’s Central Asian holdings to China’s western frontier, Xinjiang, and Mongolia (a key buffer state between the two countries) contributed to rising tensions between the two communist superpowers in the mid-20th century.^[18] “China clearly regarded Soviet domination in Central Asia, including Soviet Central Asia… as being illegitimate, and underlined the need of these peoples to have their own states and their own futures,” Westad states, describing a fundamental opposition in China held during the 20th century over Russian control of the region.^[19]

China Steps In

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian states found themselves in a new regional order very similar to the last.^[20] Russia remained the dominant economic power early in the century, purchasing a plurality of Central Asian exports and contributing billions to the economies of Central Asia both in direct investment and remittances from migrant workers.^[21] But even as Russian investment kept flowing into the region, the Russian domestic economic situation fluctuated greatly, subject to downturns as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and instability in the oil markets.^[22] While undergoing slight economic growth throughout this period, the Russian economy lagged behind increasingly prosperous neighbors in Eastern Europe, and, more importantly, China.^[23][24] This relative decline opened up an opportunity for China to replace Russia as the dominant economic partner for the region.

It is no secret that China has undergone explosive economic development over the past several decades.^[25][26] A combination of increased free market regulations domestically and a surge in the demand for cheap manufacturing produced overseas allowed the Chinese economy to take off with unprecedented growth.^[27] China’s growing economy has expanded trade on all fronts, including in Central Asia. By 2016, China had traded more yearly with four of the five Central Asian states than Russia did.^[28] China was also the number one trading partner for three of these states.^[29] This illustrates a level of economic supremacy in the region that has superseded Russia’s. China has not only increased trade with the region but has placed special emphasis on direct investment and support of infrastructure projects in Central Asia. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China’s new “One Belt One Road” initiative in 2013, or more simply the Belt and Road Initiative,^[30] a program with specific emphasis on developing infrastructure in Africa, Central Asia, and other parts of the globe.^[31] China has since spent billions of dollars in direct investment payments to Central Asia. This includes working on projects from a China-Central Asia Pipeline^[32] to rail and highway linkages between China and Europe across Central Asia.^[33] The nations of Central Asia have also increasingly racked up larger and larger amounts of debt owed to China in large part because of these projects. China holds almost half the debt of Tajikistan, and billions of dollars more in the other states.^[34] The near uniform decline of Russian economic power in Central Asian states combined with military weakening due to the war in Ukraine has begun to lead to the diminution of Russian political dominance in the region as well.^[35] This is a trend that will only continue as Russian authority in the region continues to deteriorate.

But Russian influence in the region is not entirely diminished. Take the crisis earlier this year in Kazakhstan. When widespread protests threatened the survival of the regime there, Russian troops poured across the border to intervene.^[36] The presence of Russian soldiers played a large part in quelling the dissent and demonstrates the hard power the Kremlin still has in the region. However, this military action should be seen as a remnant of the past political order in the region, not an indicator of continued Russian dominance, Arne Westad argues.^[37] “If you look at everything, starting with economic relations but also now moving into political and strategic relations, it’s pretty clear that China is the one on the ascendancy” he asserts.^[38] China’s grip on Central Asia is only more likely to solidify as Russian soldiers remain bogged down in Ukraine and sanctions limit Russia’s ability to exert significant economic influence beyond its borders.

The Central Asian Perspective

China’s replacement of Russia has been met with mixed reactions by the people of Central Asia. A key concern held by some people in Central Asian is China’s pattern of human rights abuse in Xinjiang.^[39] The people of Central Asia share deep cultural connections with the Uyghur people of China’s westernmost province.^[40] This has inspired much citizen activism in drawing attention to the indoctrination camps in Xinjiang, which also imprison numerous people of non-Uyghur Central Asian ethnicity, such as Kazakhs.^[41] Central Asian governments, afraid of angering China, have responded to citizen attempts to draw attention to the abuses by harassing and suppressing activists looking to draw attention to this issue.^[42] Much like the Chinese government, the Central Asian states are largely regarded as authoritarian and engage in their own human rights abuses.^[43] The regional realignment with another authoritarian power is likely only to reinforce this status quo.

There is also alarm in the region about how two-sided an economic relationship with China these states can expect. Some fear that China’s economic policies will be purely extractive, looking to direct as many natural resources as possible into China’s growth, failing to make substantial investments in the long-term health and development of the region.^[44] Also of concern is that these countries will become entirely dependent on China economically.^[45] China would have such influence, the worry goes, that it would be able to effectively control how the states act—regardless of the states’ own interests.^[46] The people of Central Asia are likewise concerned about the increased role of Chinese business eroding their own economic and cultural standing.^[47] The people have responded with waves of Sinophobia and protest;^[48][49] however, this has not dissuaded Central Asian leaders from continuing towards the path of economic growth offered by Chinese involvement.^[50] This wealth, while enriching the elite and governments of these states, is unlikely to generate substantial improvement in socioeconomic problems that affect the region.^[51]

A New Future for Central Asia

As it stands, the Central Asian states will continue their turn towards China – with seemingly little alternative.^[52]  Fears of Chinese dominance and exploitation in the region have been set aside (for now) in favor of dreams of a prosperity that Chinese trade will provide.^[53] China, for its part, has added guaranteed itself even more global influence, bringing the Central Asian states – and their abundance of resources – into the Chinese sphere. Central Asia has the resources to fuel the economic heartbeat of the Chinese political machine,^[54] making China’s dream of becoming a global superpower^[55] a very near reality. And where is Russia? Trapped in Ukraine, with a struggling economy that stands no chance of catching up with the Chinese juggernaut. The region is all but uncontested: Central Asia has officially left the Russian Empire and has walked right into China’s open arms.

References:

[1] Berman, Paul. “The Intellectual Catastrophe of Vladimir Putin.” Foreign Policy, March 13, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/13/putin-russia-war-ukraine-rhetoric-history/.

[2] Troianovski, Anton. “Putin the Great? Russia’s President Likens Himself to Famous Czar.” The New York Times, June 9, 2022, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/world/europe/putin-peter-the-great.html.

[3] Washington Post. “Ukraine Hammers Russian Forces into Retreat on East and South Fronts.” October 4, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/04/russia-retreat-kherson-lyman-ukraine/.

[4] “After Battlefield Setbacks in Ukraine, Putin Orders Mobilisation.” Al Jazeera. September 21, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/21/russia-reacts-to-ukraine-success-mobilisation-polls-and-threats.

[5] Snow, Shawn. “Central Asia’s Lukewarm Pivot to China.” The Diplomat, August 16, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/central-asias-lukewarm-pivot-to-china/.

[6] Nurgozhayeva, Roza. “How Is China’s Belt and Road Changing Central Asia?” July 9, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/how-is-chinas-belt-and-road-changing-central-asia/.

[7] Aminjonov, Farkhod, Alina Abylkasymova, Anna Aimée, Bahtiyor Eshchanov, Daniyar Moldokanov, Indra Overland, and Roman Vakulchuk. “BRI in Central Asia: Rail and Road Connectivity Projects.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY, 2019. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3505258.

[8] Global Times. “New China-Turkmenistan Natural Gas Field in Operation.” Global Times, June 20, 2022. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1268601.html.

[9] Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov. “The Coming Deluge: Russia’s Looming Lost Decade of Unpaid Bills and Economic Stagnation.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. November 21, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/24/coming-deluge-russia-s-looming-lost-decade-of-unpaid-bills-and-economic-stagnation-pub-85852.

[10] Ben Aris and Ivan Tkachev. “Long Read: 20 Years of Russia’s Economy Under Putin, in Numbers.” The Moscow Times, August 19, 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/19/long-read-russias-economy-under-putin-in-numbers-a66924.

[11] Raiser, Martin. “China’s Rise Fits Every Development Model.” Brookings, October 17. 2019.

[12] Uuriintuya Batsaikhan and Marek Dabrowski. “Central Asia — Twenty-Five Years after the Breakup of the USSR.” Russian Journal of Economics 3, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 296–320. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2017.09.005.

[13] Batsaikhan, “Twenty-Five Years.”

[14] Batsaikhan.

[15] Dubnov, Arkady. “Reflecting on a Quarter Century of Russia’s Relations With Central Asia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April 19, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/19/reflecting-on-quarter-century-of-russia-s-relations-with-central-asia-pub-76117.

[16] Odd Arne Westad (Elihu Professor of History and Global Affairs, Jackson School of Global Affairs, Yale University), in discussion with the author, Jackson School of Global Affairs, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, October 5, 2022.

[17] Westad, discussion with the author.

[18] Westad.

[19] Westad.

[20] Dubnov, “Reflecting on Russia’s Relations.”

[21] Batsaikhan, “Twenty-Five Years.”

[22] Andre Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov. “The Coming Deluge: Russia’s Looming Lost Decade of Unpaid Bills and Economic Stagnation.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. November 24, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/24/coming-deluge-russia-s-looming-lost-decade-of-unpaid-bills-and-economic-stagnation-pub-85852.

[23] Kolesnikov and Volkov, “The Coming Deluge.”

[24] Raiser, “China’s Rise.”

[25] Raiser.

[26] Congressional Research Service, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States. June 25, 2019.

[27] Congressional Research Service, China’s Economic Rise

[28] Dubnov, “Reflecting on Russia’s Relations.”

[29] Dubnov.

[30] Snow, “Lukewarm Pivot.”

[31] Nurgozhayeva, “Changing Central Asia.”

[32] Global Times, “China-Turkmenistan Natural Gas.”

[33] Aminjonov et al., “BRI in Central Asia.”

[34] Dubnov, “Reflecting on Russia’s Relations.”

[35] Auyezov, Olzhas. “‘We Want Respect’: Putin’s Authority Tested in Central Asia.” Reuters, October 18, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/we-want-respect-putins-authority-tested-central-asia-2022-10-18/.

[36] Chausovsky, Eugene. “Why Russia Sent Troops Into Kazakhstan.” Foreign Policy. January 7, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/kazakhstan-russia-troops-csto/.

[37] Westad, discussion with the author.

[38] Westad.

[39] Bradsher, Keith. “In the ‘Great Game’ of Central Asia, China’s Leader Seeks the Advantage.” The New York Times, September 16, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/asia/china-xi-central-asia.html.

[40] Bradsher, “In the ‘Great Game.’”

[41] Ramzy, Austin. “Critic Who Exposed China’s Muslim Camps Is Detained, Even Across the Border.” The New York Times, March 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/world/asia/china-kazakh-activist-camps-xinjiang-muslims.html.

[42] Ramzy, “Exposed China’s Muslim Camps.”

[43] Nurgozhayeva, “Changing Central Asia.”

[44] Snow, “Central Asia’s Lukewarm Pivot.”

[45] Bradsher, “In the ‘Great Game.’”

[46] Nurgozhayeva, “Changing Central Asia.”

[47] Snow, “Central Asia’s Lukewarm Pivot.”

[48] Snow.

[49] Nurgozhayeva, “Changing Central Asia.”

[50] Snow, “Central Asia’s Lukewarm Pivot.”

[51] Nurgozhayeva, “Changing Central Asia.”

[52] Snow, “Central Asia’s Lukewarm Pivot.”

[53] Snow.

[54] Bradsher, “In the ‘Great Game.’”

[55] Jake Sullivan and Hal Brands. “China Has Two Paths To Global Domination.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 22, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908.

As Frank Schimmelfennig, Professor of European Politics at ETH Zurich, contended in 2018, in relation to the European Union (EU) “crises are open decision-making situations … and present a manifest threat and a perceived significant probability of (dis)integration, but may also trigger reform activities leading to more integration” Schimmelfennig (2018). Although Schimmelfennig’s contention was not focused on the United Kingdom’s (UK) exit from the EU, his assertion perfectly characterizes the decision-making crisis that the EU faced following the 2016 Brexit leave referendum. Now, six years since it took place, we can appropriately reflect upon whether the Brexit referendum and the socio-political movements it induced stood as a catalyst for the (dis)integration or, conversely, the further integration of the EU. Vitally, current literature in comparative politics and European studies, as well as primary polling data and Gastinger’s (2021) EU exit index, provides an opportunity to explore the dynamics of integration and domestic stay or leave sentiments. While research on Brexit-related public opinion has burgeoned in recent years, most inquiries have focused exclusively on British integration perspectives and voting behavior in the Brexit referendum, while Brexit’s effect on integration and voter choice in EU-27 states, especially surrounding domestic stay or leave sentiments, have been relatively ignored. 

As the only EU crisis created by internal socio-political factors, Brexit has had a significant effect on the dynamics of European integration, foremost acting as a force for European unity. The 2016 leave referendum fundamentally altered “European integration, not only in terms of material capabilities…but also its ideational pillars, through the revision of the principles and priorities of the EU” (Szucko, 2020). Prior to the referendum, there was a widespread opinion that Brexit signaled the beginning of Europe’s (dis)integration, with more departures an inevitability. However, instead of bowing to (dis)integration sentiment, the EU deliberated on its accomplishments and failings, using Brexit as a pretext to fall back on its European identity and unite the Union. As Hobolt and de Vries (2016) contended, “gone are the days when élites pursued European integration with no regard to public opinion.” Rather, there is now a common belief amongst European leaders that the EU’s future “hinges more than ever on citizens’ support for the European integration project” (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). Thus, retrospectively, Brexit served as something no one expected, a catalyst for advancing European integration.

In 2017, at the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, then president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, contended that “only a unified Europe would be able to protect its sovereignty, and vitally, be capable of combatting external threats” (Tusk, 2017). Such a contention, beyond simple rhetoric, characterizes the reformulation of European integration. Following Brexit, European institutions have made a concerted effort to re-evaluate the objectives and processes of integration and, more broadly, to redefine the values of the EU. As Butorina (2020) accurately notes, “the first merit of Brexit is the awakening of the European elites from a state of ideological conformism and inaction.” Under this new agenda, the EU has attempted to strengthen its international standing and reorganize around the common grounds that support the Union. Specifically, the EU has sought to promote dialogue surrounding reform amongst member states whilst implementing new policies surrounding digitization and climate change in an effort to increase internal bloc support. In this sense, Brexit has pushed the EU to implement a new agenda and in doing so, has forced “Brussels to not only postulate its values and norms but also substantiate them” (Butorina, 2020).

As part of the reformulation of European integration, there has been an internal shift within the EU towards addressing Europe’s political schisms. Following the Brexit referendum, many EU citizens were concerned that more member states would follow the UK’s example. However, throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, the issue of state withdrawals, and Brexit as a whole, has been less prevalent. Specifically, in less developed nations, a huge economic shock like that from Covid-19 might push a disgruntled population to seek major political change. However, thanks primarily to the stable internal structures of European institutions, the pandemic has simply served to occupy and move popular discourses away from the question of leaving the Union. In this sense, as Codogno (2022) asserts, “of the many problems the EU is currently facing, Brexit has happily receded from the foreground,” with the pandemic, international relations challenges, and economic recovery replacing Brexit as the criteria for judging the utility of EU membership. Thus, it can be argued that the neoliberal promise of perpetual European integration that underpinned the EU’s actions prior to Brexit no longer holds. Rather, the EU is acutely aware that future European integration and unity are far from guaranteed and that the popularity of leaving the EU is influenced by the Union’s capacity to address its current challenges successfully.

Concomitantly, Brexit has substantially influenced the national attitudes within the EU-27, discouraging additional departures thanks to both the EU’s harsh bargaining position during exit negotiations and how leaving the Union has subverted British national interests. Prior to Brexit, there was a history of smaller nations reconsidering their EU membership on the grounds that they would be better served to have complete autonomy over their domestic legislation. However, following Brexit, the remaining EU-27 have observed the destabilizing impact that the referendum decision has had on the British economy and its politics, which has served to inoculate them against the desire to secede from the EU. Markedly, even Eurosceptic national-populist parties have softened their anti-EU rhetoric, claiming to want to alter the EU from the inside rather than destroy it. As Hobolt et al. (2021) conclusively contended, “there has been a significant decline in hypothetical leave voting since the Brexit referendum.” In this sense, the political and economic fallout after the Brexit referendum has broadly undermined European people’s desire to leave the EU and, if anything, brought the remaining EU member states closer together.

From the UK’s perspective, Brexit continues to symbolize a process of disintegration; however, its impacts on the European project have been contradictory, fueling integrative pressures that have furthered pro-EU domestic sentiments. A Pew Research poll found that Greece had seen a “26 percentage point surge in favorable views of the EU from late 2016 to 2019” (Wike et al., 2019), with similar increases in Spain and France. This was a significant shift from early 2016, when another Pew Research poll indicated that “42 percent of EU citizens wanted greater authority restored to their national capitals” (Stokes, 2016), with the EU overall experiencing a sharp dip in public support. Notably, these polls reveal that the EU public is aware of the potential repercussions of another leave movement, with voters instead expressing a clear preference for maintaining the status quo and preserving European integration values. In this sense, Brexit has functioned as a measure for citizens’ perceptions of their nation’s continued membership in the EU-27.

Markedly, Brexit’s function as a sort of ‘litmus test’ for leave sentiments can be applied to see whether another EU exit is likely in the short term and long term. The ‘EU exit index’ proposed by Gastinger (2021) stands as a valuable way to judge short term support for leave movements, assessing each EU member state’s inclination to leave the Union through a set of discrete variables. Valuably, as Gastinger (2021) notes, other departures are unlikely in the short term, with no “indicators pointing in the direction of future exits,” as most countries’ exit propensities dropped after the Brexit referendum. However, in the longer term, Brexit’s position as a deterrent against future leave movements may waver, especially if a less chaotic exit boosts support for leaving among the existing EU-27 states. In this regard, the most serious threat to Europe’s future integration is a more successful member state succession, for although Brexit may be viewed as a ‘one-time occurrence,’ multiple exits would represent a significant setback to the European project.

Thus, there is demonstratable evidence to support the assertion that Brexit has substantially influenced the dynamics of European integration, serving as a centripetal force for European unity. Moreover, Brexit has changed national perspectives inside EU-27 countries, undermined European people’s desire to leave the Union and dissuaded further withdrawals. That being said, while Brexit has not resulted in (dis)integration, further state departures could enhance anti-EU support and represent a concerted threat to European integration.

References:

Butorina, O. (2020). The Shrinking of the European Union and Its Integration Potential. Herald Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences, 90(6), 680-687. https://doi.org/10.1134/s1019331620060040

Codogno, L. (2022). The EU is facing many difficulties, but Brexit isn’t one of them. The Guardian. Retrieved 11 February 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/01/eu-facing-difficulties-brexit-britain-trade.

Gastinger, M. (2021). Introducing the EU exit index measuring each member state’s propensity to leave the European Union. European Union Politics, 22(3), 566-585. https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165211000138

Hobolt, S., & de Vries, C. (2016). Public Support for European Integration. Annual Review Of Political Science, 19(1), 413-432. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042214-044157

Hobolt, S., Popa, S., Van der Brug, W., & Schmitt, H. (2021). The Brexit deterrent? How member state exit shapes public support for the European Union. European Union Politics, 23(1), 100-119. https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165211032766

Schimmelfennig, F. (2018). European integration (theory) in times of crisis. A comparison of the euro and Schengen crises. Journal Of European Public Policy, 25(7), 969-989. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1421252

Stokes, B. (2016). How European Countries View Brexit. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Retrieved 11 February 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/.

Szucko, A. (2020). Brexit and the Differentiated European (Dis)Integration. Contexto Internacional, 42(3), 621-646. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.2019420300005

Tusk, D. (2017). Speech by President Donald Tusk at the ceremony of the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. Consilium.europa.eu. Retrieved 11 February 2022, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/tusk-ceremony-rome-speech/.

Wike, R., Poushter, J., Silver, L., Delvin, K., Fetterolf, J., Castillo, A., & Huang, C. (2019). Views on the European Union across Europe. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Retrieved 11 February 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/the-european-union/.

***CONTENT WARNING: This Article Discusses Sexual Assault and Rape***

In a surprise announcement this past Thursday, the Ethiopian government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—who came to power in Ethiopia in 2018 after almost three decades of rule by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—declared a “humanitarian truce” to allow aid into the war-torn Tigray region in Northern Ethiopia[1]. The government has also called on the Tigrayan rebels to “desist from all acts of further aggression and withdraw from areas they have occupied in neighboring regions” [2]. The Tigrayan forces agreed that they would agree to ending the hostilities immediately if humanitarian aid arrived in the region “within a reasonable timeframe” [3]. This cease-fire agreement follows almost 17 months of conflict between the TPLF and forces led by Ahmed’s national government. The conflict broke out in early November of 2020 after existing political and ethnic tensions between the TPLF and Ahmed’s central government in Addis Ababa escalated into military confrontation when government forces moved into the Tigray region after accusing the TPLF of raiding government garrisons and taking prisoners. 

The conflict has, according to the U.N., has led to the displacement of over 400,00 people within the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia—tens of thousands of whom have fled to Sudan, fueling a refugee crisis in the neighboring country—as well as a dire humanitarian situation for residents who have remained in Tigray and surrounding regions[4]. Some 400,000 people have been plunged into famine due to the conflict, and almost 2 million more are on the brink of famine-like conditions and in critical need of food and aid according to Reuters[5]. The Ethiopian government has been accused of creating a “de facto blockade” of the Tigray region that has prevented humanitarian aid from entering the region since December 2021[6], but the government has placed the blame on the Tigrayan rebels and asserted that they are responsible for blocking the access to aid in the region, not government forces[7]. 

Both the TPLF and the Ethiopian government—which is aided by Eritrean soldiers and militia forces from the Amhara region West of Tigray—have been accused of human rights abuses that “may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity”[8] that include but are not limited to extrajudicial executions, torture, rape, and attacking of refugees and/or civilians[9]. While all sides have participated in human rights abuses, the Eritrean forces have been the most egregious violators of human rights. as they hold a grudge against the TPLF for the bloody border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia from 1998-2000 when the TPLF were in power in Ethiopia[10]. The Eritrean government, led by president Isaias Afwerki, views the TPLF as “an existential threat” to Eritrea[11]. Eritrean soldiers have been accused of attempting to eliminate Tigrayans, and there are documented cases of Eritrean soldiers slaughtering hundreds of unarmed civilians in a “massacre[s] that may amount to…crime[s] against humanity” [12]. The Tigrayan rebels are not free of guilt, however. Forces from Tigray and Amhara, neighboring regions in Ethiopia home to different ethnic groups, have been accused of revenge killing civilians and possibly ethnic cleansing during the war as the Amhara region and areas in Tigray have swapped hands between Tigrayan forces and Amhara militias during the war[13]. The University of Ghent has estimated that the war has led to at least 10,000 deaths with at least 230 massacres[14].

Some of the most concerning human rights violations during the war have been the rampant sexual violence from all sides of the conflict. U.N. Aid Chief Mark Lowcock informed the U.N. Security Council that “there is no doubt that sexual violence is being used in this conflict as a weapon of war,”[15] and Amnesty International reported that rape is being used as “a weapon of war to inflict lasting and psychological damage” [16]. Ethiopian and Eritrean troops have been accused of targeting women and young girls in Tigray, and the TPLF has also been accused of mass sexual assault and rape in Amhara. Thousands of women and young girls have reported sexual abuse at the hands of fighting forces with 2,200 cases of sexual assault or rape in Tigray and 940 cases in Amhara reported in the first 8 months of the war [17]. A group of experts from the U.N.’s Human Rights Council believes the existing estimates are “an underestimation of the true extent”[18] of the widespread use of sexual violence, and a BBC interview with an unidentified woman in Tigray corroborates this theory as the woman stated that she knows of many women and girls who were sexual assaulted and did not come forward[19].

Ethiopia is the second-most-populated country in Africa, and it is critical for stability in the Horn of Africa, so the international community is watching the conflict unfolding in Ethiopia with interest in its peaceful conclusion. The biggest fear that the international community holds is that the ethnic lines Ethiopia was divided along during the TPLF rule would cause the country to fracture along ethnic identities and destabilize the entire region. Last June, those fears were almost realized with Tigrayan rebels only 200 kilometers from the capital. Although the rebels were eventually repulsed by government forces, Tigrayan rebels have allied themselves with other ethnically based rebel groups combating the federal government, and there has been an alarming rise in social media posts advocating for ethnic violence and an adjacent proliferation of hate speech[20].

Western countries and the U.N. are supportive but also skeptical of the truce, and hope that the truce can be a stepping-stone toward eventual peace between the two parties. The Ethiopian government originally rejected calls for peace-talks from Western countries, the U.N. and the African Union because it saw its operation in Tigray as a “law-enforcement operation” that was expected to last only a few weeks, but the comparable military power of both parties in the conflict has led to protraction of the conflict[21]. There had been one ceasefire earlier in the conflict in June 2021 when the Tigrayan rebels retook the Tigray regional capital of Mekelle from government forces, but fighting quickly resumed in July 2021[22]. Despite the success, or lack thereof, of the first ceasefire, the United Nations hopes that the most recent  truce will “translate into an effective cessation of hostilities, respected by all parties in this conflict, to allow for effective humanitarian access for all who need it” [23]. But whether this ceasefire can transform into large peace negotiations to end the bloody conflict remains to be seen.

Works Cited:

1. Dahir, Abdi Latif, and Simon Marks. “Ethiopia Declares ‘Humanitarian Truce’ in War-Ravaged Tigray Region.” The New York Times, March 24, 2022, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-truce.html
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. BBC. “Ethiopia’s Tigray War: The Short, Medium and Long Story.” BBC News, June 29, 2021, sec. Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378.
5.  Matthew Green. “Civil War Has Pushed Ethiopia to the Brink”
6. Al Jazeera. “Ethiopia Declares Unilateral Truce to Allow Aid into Tigray,” March 24, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/24/ethiopia-declares-truce-to-allow-aid-into-tigray  Abdi Latif Dahir and Simon Marks. “Ethiopia Declares ‘Humanitarian Truce’”
7. Al Jazeera. “Ethiopia Declares Unilateral Truce to Allow Aid into Tigray,”
8. Green, Matthew. “Civil War Has Pushed Ethiopia to the Brink. Its Future Is at Stake.” Reuters. Accessed April 1, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-fractured/
9. Scott Neuman and Eyder Peralta. “Rebels Are Closing in on Ethiopia’s Capital”
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. Scott Neuman and Eyder Peralta. “Rebels Are Closing in on Ethiopia’s Capital”
13. Matthew Green. “Civil War Has Pushed Ethiopia to the Brink”
14.  BBC. “Ethiopia’s Tigray War”
15. Matthew Green. “Civil War Has Pushed Ethiopia to the Brink”
16. BBC News. “Ethiopia’s Civil War: The Women Who Paid the Price,” March 26, 2022, sec. Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60648163.
17. Ibid
18. Ibid
19. Ibid
20. Scott Neuman and Eyder Peralta. “Rebels Are Closing in on Ethiopia’s Capital” Matthew Green. “Civil War Has Pushed Ethiopia to the Brink”
21. Al Jazeera. “Ethiopia’s PM Abiy Promises ‘Final’ Offensive in Tigray,” November 17, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/17/ethiopias-pm-abiy-vows-final-offensive-into-tigray.
22. Scott Neuman and Eyder Peralta. “Rebels Are Closing in on Ethiopia’s Capital” Al Jazeera. “Ethiopia Declares Unilateral Truce to Allow Aid into Tigray,” 
23. Al Jazeera. “Ethiopia: Tigrayan Fighters Agree to ‘Cessation of Hostilities,’” March 25, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/25/ethiopia-tigrayan-fighters-agree-to-cessation-of-hostilities.