General Introduction

Recent events in the Middle East are reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape, signaling a departure from long-standing alignments and ushering in a multipolar recalibration of influence. As Iran and Russia grapple with economic strain, diplomatic isolation, and strategic miscalculations, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States are reasserting their roles as dominant players, forging new partnerships, redefining security frameworks, and raising the question: to what extent? These developments mark a significant moment in Middle Eastern affairs, one that reflects broader global trends in multipolar competition, energy realignment, and regional autonomy. 

This transformation cannot be understood in isolation; rather, it emerges from a confluence of patterns, economic pressures, and shifting ideological currents. This article series will explore the roles of these key players in shaping the future of the region. To assess their influence, four variables will be taken into consideration: trade and investments, arms exports, military deployment, and diplomatic activity.

The Decline of Iran’s Regional Hegemony

Iran has long positioned itself as a key player in the Middle East, exerting influence through a combination of military intervention, proxy networks, and ideological expansionism. However, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in December 2024 and Tehran’s subsequent retreat from the Levant mark a significant turning point in Iran’s regional strategy. While Iranian policymakers may frame this withdrawal as a calculated realignment, the reality is likely more troubling for Iran: its decade-long investment in Syria has crumbled, its proxies are under increasing strain, and its geopolitical standing is deteriorating in the face of coordinated countermeasures from the United States and Israel, and regional adversaries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This section examines the key dimensions of Iran’s strategic decline, analyzing its military setbacks, proxy vulnerabilities, economic constraints, and shifting diplomatic landscape.

Iran’s involvement in Syria has long been a cornerstone of its regional strategy. Since the onset of the Syrian Civil War, Iran invested an estimated $30-50 billion in supporting Assad’s regime, embedding itself within Syrian military structures like the National Defense Forces, the 4th Armored Division, and the Republican Guard. When the anti-Assad revolution broke out in 2011, the Assad regime was about to be toppled in 2012-2013 but was saved by direct Hezbollah intervention. These investments allowed Iran to turn Syria into a logistical hub for weapon transfers to Hezbollah and other militant groups, strengthening its presence on Israel’s northern border and expanding its “Axis of Resistance.” However, this strategy was severely undermined with Assad’s downfall and the collapse of vital strategic assets, such as the Qa’im-Bukamal border crossing between Syria and Iraq, which weakened Iran’s ability to maintain its arms supply network. 

Internally, Iran’s economic situation has continued to deteriorate, primarily due to international sanctions targeting its nuclear program, regional influence, and support for groups designated as terrorists, alongside domestic mismanagement. These sanctions have curtailed Iran’s ability to fund its regional operations, leading to limited funding resources for proxy groups and limiting its ability to reinvest in other areas, such as Iraq and Yemen, where it focuses its remaining efforts. Iran’s arms exports, a central component of its regional strategy, are severely restricted due to Israeli airstrikes on Iranian assets, U.S. interdictions, and the loss of strategic bases in Syria, significantly impairing its military capabilities. 

Iran’s reliance on proxy forces has been central to its asymmetric warfare strategy, but financial constraints and increased military opposition have placed growing pressure on these groups. Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthi militias are all under strain. Hezbollah’s political influence in Lebanon is waning, with the Israeli assassination of Nasrallah (Secretary General of Hezbollah)  and with the election of a new president backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S.. In Gaza and Yemen, Iranian-backed groups have faced heavy losses due to Israeli airstrikes and Saudi-led countermeasures, further weakening Iran’s regional power projection. The rapid offensive that led to Assad’s downfall shattered Iran’s long-term strategy. Unlike earlier crises- such as the pivotal battle for Aleppo in 2016, where Iran, along with Russian support, successfully helped the Assad regime recapture the city from rebel forces during the civil war- Iran was unable to mobilize reinforcements, especially when Iraqi authorities blocked Iran-backed militias. Additionally, Israeli airstrikes targeted key Iranian military commanders – including Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas- further eroded Iran’s command structure and exposed the limits of its ability to defend its allies in the region. Moreover, the growing alignment between Hamas and countries like Qatar and Turkey has reduced Tehran’s role in Gaza, leaving its once-dominant position in the region more fragile.

Iran’s military deployment in the region has shifted significantly, with its forces in Syria, led by the IRGC’s Quds Force (a covert branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), playing a key role in defending Assad’s regime. Iran is now refocusing its military efforts on Iraq and Yemen, strengthening ties with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq to bolster its influence ahead of the 2025 elections, sway electoral outcomes, and maintain regional dominance. In Yemen, Iran may increase support for the Houthis to maintain leverage over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a crucial maritime choke point. However, both Iraq and Yemen pose challenges for Iran. In Iraq, nationalist sentiment and political opposition from Sunni and Kurdish populations are limiting Iran’s influence, viewing the PMF as a threat to Iraq’s sovereignty and fear the country could become a client state of Iran. In Yemen, Saudi-led countermeasures, including airstrikes, naval blockades, support for Yemeni government forces, ground operations, and more, are containing Houthi operations.

Diplomatically, Iran faces significant setbacks as its relationships with regional powers become increasingly strained. Despite a temporary rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2023, facilitated by China, the broader regional environment remains unfavorable for Tehran, as Gulf states continue to align with the U.S. on security issues, further isolating Iran. The growing engagement between Gulf states and Israel further diminishes Iran’s diplomatic standing, making it harder to rally opposition against Israel. While Iran has attempted to deepen its ties with Russia and China, but these relationships have limits. Russia has provided some military cooperation, but remains cautious in its support due to its own strategic priorities, and China, focused on economic stability, is unlikely to confront the U.S. on Iran’s behalf, leaving it struggling to maintain influence in the region.

Iran’s strategic decline in the Middle East marks a profound shift in the region’s balance of power. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, coupled with the retreat of Iranian influence, has exposed the fragility of Tehran’s regional ambitions. Its once-dominant position, bolstered by military interventions, has been undermined by a combination of economic constraints, military setbacks, and regional opposition. With its ability to fund and support its proxy groups waning, Iran’s increasing influence in Iraq and Yemen is greatly challenged. Diplomatically, Iran’s regional isolation deepens as Gulf states align with the U.S. and engage with Israel, while its partnerships with Russia and China remain limited. As Iran retreats from the Levant, the Middle East enters a new era, one where the power dynamics are shifting, and players like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel are asserting themselves more prominently, signaling a changing balance of power that could redefine the region’s future.

​​This situation contains the seeds of future conflict. Will resistance be renewed to liberate the Syrian and Lebanese lands newly occupied by Israel, or will the new dominant powers find a solution before this happens? Will Iran mobilize its forces again to spread its regional influence, perhaps to protect its nuclear program from Israeli destruction, or will a new nuclear agreement and entente between the US and Iran defuse the situation? As long as no long-term solutions are found for the Middle Eastern problems, including a fair solution to the Palestinian question, and as Iran’s regional influence continues to wane, a new order is emerging—one that will be defined by shifting alliances and evolving power dynamics.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Iran Flag from Taleghani Park” by David Sandoz, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

Think of someone you disagree with the most — maybe you have even scuffled once or twice — and now you two must sit in a room together and agree on something. Even if you do succeed, how easily could this agreement be broken? That is the story of Israel and Lebanon.

However, the two countries have had cordial relations in the past. In 1949, Lebanon was the first Arab League country to sign an armistice agreement with Israel after the War of Independence. Lebanon did not take part in the Six-Day War in 1967 or the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Furthermore, the Lebanon-Israel border was peaceful until the early 1970s. The initial relations between the two were friendly, with Israeli students studying at the American University in Beirut and Zionists and Maronites working together to build their power against the Arab-Muslim world.

During World War II, Lebanese Zionism weakened due to French and British occupation of the country, which boosted the pro-Arab camp led by Bechara El Khoury. This camp believed peace was preferable to conflict between Arabism and Islam. In 1943, Lebanon gained independence, and El Khoury was elected president, leading to a negative popular attitude towards Israel in the years to follow. After Israel’s declaration of independence, Arab countries declared war and prepared forces to fight, but Lebanon, under El Khoury, only declared itself a belligerent instead of invading. Lebanon helped Arab armies and the Salvation Army in the south, as per the partition plan, which would share most of Lebanon’s southern border with an Arab country.

The armistice agreement between Lebanon and Israel didn’t specify the international border and relied on the border established during the British and French mandates in Syria and Lebanon. Israel conquered 14 villages and occupied Rosh HaNikra in Lebanon, but the Jewish population in Lebanon still grew after the establishment of Israel, unlike in other Arab countries.

In 1970, after the events of Black September, Palestinian terror groups established themselves in southern Lebanon, taking advantage of the weak Lebanese government, and carried out attacks on northern Israel.^[1] They also participated in the 1975 Lebanese civil war. To secure access to Beirut’s banks and port, Syria invaded Lebanon to stop the fighting and first targeted Palestinians, but later turned against Christians.^[2] In 1978, after a Palestinian attack on Israel, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) forces occupied southern Lebanon in Operation Litani. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was deployed to mediate between the terror groups and Israel, and IDF withdrew. The terror groups then obtained Katyusha rockets and 130 millimeter cannons, which they used to attack Israeli civilians.^[3]

1982 Lebanon War (Also known as “The 1^st Lebanon War” and/or “The Invasion”)

In the four years since the occupation of southern Lebanon, the terrorist organizations attacked Israeli citizens. These attacks ultimately led to the first Lebanon war in 1982, resulting in the expulsion of the PLO from southern Lebanon to Tunis, destruction of its infrastructure, and seizure of weapons by the IDF. The war also gave rise to the Iranian and Syrian backed Shiite organization, Hezbollah, in Lebanon, with the goal of violent resistance against the Israeli occupation.^[4]

On May 17, 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed the May 17 Agreement, which aimed to end hostilities and regulate relations between the countries while respecting each other’s territorial borders. The agreement called for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and a Lebanese commitment to prevent terror acts on its soil.^[5] However, the agreement was violated in February 1984 due to the breakdown of the Lebanese army, Syria’s refusal to withdraw forces, and Arab opposition to recognizing Israel. As a result, the Lebanese government cancelled the agreement on March 5, 1984.^[6]

Post-War Period and the 2006 Lebanon War (Also known as ”The 2nd Lebanon War” /“The July War”)

In the 1990s, Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon led to growing dissatisfaction, leading to a complete withdrawal of IDF forces on May 24, 2000. This ended 22 years of occupation.^[7] The SLA collapsed, and 6,000 members and their families fled.^[8] With the withdrawal of Israeli forces, calls for a review of the presence of Syrian forces, estimated at 25,000, increased.^[9]

After the withdrawal, terror attacks against Israeli citizens resumed with the Second Intifada, a violent Palestinian uprising that escalated the conflict to a level not seen in decades, causing thousands of casualties on both sides.^[10] On October 7, 2000, Hezbollah kidnapped three soldiers and Elhanan Tannenbaum was lured to Dubai and kidnapped.^[11] In 2004, Ariel Sharon released 400 prisoners in exchange for Tannenbaum and the bodies of the soldiers which inspired further attempts to kidnap IDF soldiers as bargaining chips.^[12] On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah attacked IDF vehicles, kidnapped two soldiers (Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev), thus sparking the Second Lebanon War.^[13] Since then, there have been no major conflicts due to Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, siding with Bashar-El-Assad.

Maritime Border Dispute Background

The Israel-Lebanon maritime border negotiations began on Oct 14, 2020, and led to the first agreement negotiated between the two countries since 1983.[14] The agreement defined the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone and territorial waters, preserving the eastern five kilometers (the “buoyed line”) status until the land border is settled. The prior dispute between Lebanon and Israel centered around the maritime border location, both claiming exclusive economic rights to a 330 square kilometer triangular buffer zone and claiming natural gas reserves.[15]

The 1982 Law of the Sea defines territorial waters as 22 kilometers from the coastline.[16] The maritime area north of Rosh HaNikra, Israel’s northernmost coastal town, is Lebanese territory, while the same area south of it is Israeli territory. An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) allows a state to use natural resources such as gas, oil, and energy production up to 200 nautical miles from the coastline.[17] The dispute between Israel and Lebanon concerned the size of the angle along which the border line would extend from the edge of their temporary land border into the sea, mainly impacting the area of economic waters.

In 2007, Lebanon and Cyprus signed a maritime agreement that had six provisions, but it wasn’t submitted to the UN or made official. The southernmost point in the agreement was stated to be subject to change. In 2010, Israel signed a similar agreement with Cyprus that marked the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon starting at the aforementioned point. However, Lebanon disagreed and submitted a proposal to the UN, which included an 860 square kilometer strip more than what Israel proposed.[18] This difference in opinion arose as Lebanon believed the border should be determined according to the Law of the Sea, not Israel’s agreement with Cyprus. Both Israel and Lebanon submitted their versions to the UN in 2011 but could not reach a compromise from 2011 to 2021.

The dispute over the maritime boundary between Lebanon and Israel has been reignited due to the discovery of natural gas reserves in Israel, as well as Lebanon’s energy crisis. The negotiations were conducted indirectly and took place at the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, following three years of preparation and amidst various crises in Lebanon, including the explosion in Beirut’s port, the economic crisis, and ongoing protests.

Determining Maritime Borders

The determination of a maritime boundary involves considering several factors, and there are three recognized methods for doing so. The first method involves projecting a perpendicular line (90 degrees) from the coastline.[19] In 2000, Israel adopted this method unilaterally and established a 5 kilometer-long line of yellow buoys protected by the Navy.

The second method, adopted by the UN to represent the Lebanese position, involves continuing the land border line into the sea. However, this created a triangle of disagreement because the westernmost section of the land line turned west at 270 degrees.[20]

The third method, known as the “median method,” was proposed by the United States during its mediation efforts between Israel and Lebanon. This method is based on drawing a median line between the two countries, where each point has an equivalent value from the nearest points on the lines of origin. This method is preferred according to international law but can result in slight differences in measurement.[21] The dispute between Israel and Lebanon over the location of this line resulted in a much smaller triangle of disagreement compared to the first method, as both parties agreed to adopt the median method years before reaching an agreement in 2022.

The Negotiation

In the maritime border negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, General Joseph Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese army, initially demanded an additional 1,430 square kilometers of the economic waters of Israel.[22] This demand was based on the continuation of the border marked between Great Britain and France in the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement of 1923.[23] This claim of ownership would include the Karish gas field, which is owned by Energean. Israel refused to negotiate over areas south of the disputed area.

After three rounds of negotiations in November 2020, the talks were halted. After a period of inactivity, the Lebanese government announced in April 2021 that they were annexing all of the disputed territories, despite Israel’s opposition.[24] Two weeks later, negotiations resumed, but they were stopped again in May 2021 due to a conflict between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip.

After several months, the negotiations resumed in January 2022 with the appointment of a new American mediator, Amos Hochstein. Hochstein believed that there was a window of opportunity until the elections in Lebanon in May 2022, and he worked towards finding a solution. However, the emergence of the Karish rig, a natural gas platform located off the coast of Israel, and Hezbollah’s launch of drones towards the rig which were intercepted by the IDF, reignited the tension.[25] Nonetheless, Israel maintained its stance that gas production from Karish would commence regardless of the negotiations.

The American mediator’s proposal in September 2022, which attempted to resolve the dispute over the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon, sparked renewed hope for a resolution. After several rounds of discussions, both parties agreed to several key points in principle. During the UN General Assembly meeting, American mediators held separate discussions with both sides and presented an outline for marking the maritime border. The outline was eventually presented in a final version, which determined the “buoyed line” as the beginning of the border and its continuation based on line 23 proposed in 2010 at the UN. This agreement was deemed permanent and marked the end of the conflict over the disputed maritime area. The agreement also regulated the development of cross-border gas reservoirs in the area and ensured that any future disputes would be resolved with US assistance. An international corporation was designated to be responsible for paying Israel for its share of the reservoir, with strict requirements to ensure that the corporation would not be subject to international sanctions, harm US aid, or be an Israeli or Lebanese corporation.

On October 27, 2022, the then President of Lebanon Michel Aoun, and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, signed an agreement on the disputed maritime border between their countries. The agreement, presented by American mediator Amos Hochstein, was signed at a ceremony at the UN base in Naqoura and officially submitted to the United Nations.[26]

Winter is coming!

The demand for natural gas worldwide has risen, particularly in Europe. The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused a global supply shortage, as Russia is a major natural gas exporter and accounts for almost 45% of the natural gas imported to Europe.[27] The shortage of natural gas in Europe has become severe, with only 74% of working gas in storage, compared to 94% the previous year.[28] Europeans need to heat their homes during cold winters, but as they phase out coal, there is a higher demand for natural gas, which combined with a shortage has caused a surge in prices. If Israel and Lebanon start extracting and producing energy from Lebanese the Qana and Karish gas fields, they have the potential to resolve the energy shortage in Europe and make significant financial gains.

For Israel, the agreement and safe development of the Karish field could reinforce its position as a clean energy leader, as it already has an estimated 1,000 BCM of natural gas.[29]

In Lebanon, the financial aspect of the agreement is crucial. The country is in the fourth year of an economic crisis with no end in sight. GDP has dropped to $20.5 billion in 2021 from $55 billion in 2018; the Lebanese pound has lost 95% of its value, causing prices to soar and destroying purchasing power; 80% of the population is now considered poor; and banks have frozen depositors out of dollar accounts. The government estimates financial losses at $70 billion, expected to increase if the crisis goes unaddressed. Many Lebanese people, including doctors, have emigrated in what has become the largest exodus since the civil war. Hospitals are operating at 50% capacity and 40% of doctors and 30% of nurses have emigrated or are working part-time abroad. Shortages in power and fuel, along with soaring prices, have made daily life difficult.^[30] The Sidon-Qana gas field, which belongs to Lebanon, could contain up to 100 BCM, making this agreement to develop clean energy and export natural gas potentially transformative for the economy. ^[31]

Political Instability

Both Israel and Lebanon face political instability which may hinder the implementation of the natural gas exploration agreement. Israel has had recent political turmoil with five elections, three different prime ministers, and an indictment against a former prime minister. Despite being politically powerful, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to form a government, leading to a coalition of smaller parties opposing him. The then elected Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, served a two-year term rotating with another six-month term served by Yair Lapid. Since then, the situation in Israel, with the newly proposed judicial reform, has deteriorated and reached an extreme point as demonstrations are held on a biweekly basis and disrupt the peaceful day-to-day of Israeli citizens.[32]

The situation in Israel regarding the Maritime Border Agreement signed by former Prime Minister Lapid has become uncertain with the election of Netanyahu as Prime Minister. Upon the signing of the agreement, Netanyahu expressed his concern by calling it a “historic surrender.” And claimed it will be “neutralized.” This raises concerns about the future of the agreement and its implementation under Netanyahu’s leadership.[33]

In Lebanon, the political climate is more uncertain and could pose a risk to the implementation of the Maritime Border Agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon. The former President, Michel Aoun, resigned and the country has yet to elect a new President after multiple rounds of elections.[34] Members of the parliament have expressed concerns and criticism about the agreement, and the identity of the elected officials could also pose a threat to its implementation. The political instability in Lebanon adds to the uncertainty about the future of the agreement and its successful implementation.

Lebanese journalist Mohamad Barakat claims that this is a normalization agreement for Hezbollah:

“If any of us dare express criticism that is deemed out of place by someone, we would be immediately blamed for cooperation with the enemy, but that does not stop them [Hezbollah] from making a deal with the Israelis. This is the height of audacity; one side is making an agreement with Israel while accusing other people of cooperation.”[35]

Paula Yacoubian, former journalist and TV host and a current member of the Lebanese parliament, is a main critic of the deal. Yacoubian claims that it is her country’s defeat, and that the agreement must be submitted to parliament for approval, as follows:

“The Israelis received the treasury, and we were left with a lottery ticket… Today, instead of Lebanon examining how to receive compensation from the Karish gas field, we are those who must provide compensation from the Qana field…. This is due to this weak deal. We do not know for certain what there is in Qana, compared to Karish in which there is definitely gas. What we will receive according to the agreement, is unknown and unsure… This agreement is a deal made by someone who has been defeated, the reality of fixing the maritime border is a bitter one.”[36]

Samy Gemayel, a Christian parliament member in Lebanon and a known critic of Hezbollah, expressed agreement with the need to establish a clear border between Lebanon and Israel through the Maritime Border Agreement. However, he mentioned that the timing of the agreement was convenient for Hezbollah and expressed his intention to help the government not fulfill its obligations derived from the agreement.[37]

Conclusion

The Maritime Border Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, signed on October 27, 2022, is a significant diplomatic and economic achievement, but its implementation is facing numerous obstacles. Political instability and uncertainty in both countries, as well as opposition from some parliament members, could pose threats to its success. It may live up to its potential, surpassing previous agreements in its success. However, given the historically financial irrationality that which characterizes the tense and emotional relationship between the two nations, and the unstable political leadership on both sides, you can count me among the sceptics.

[1] Black September (also known as the Jordanian Civil War) is a nickname for the struggle that took place between the Jordanian army and Palestinian organizations (which were organized in the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO), from September 1970 to July 1971.; Fisk, Robert. 2002. Pity the Nation : The Abduction of Lebanon. New York Thunder Mouth Press. p. 74.

[2] Carter, Terry, Lara Dunston, and Andrew Humphreys. 2004. Syria & Lebanon. Footscray, Victoria ; Oakland, Ca: Lonely Planet Publications. p. 31.

[3] Cooley, John K. 1984. “The War over Water.” Foreign Policy, no. 54:3.

[4] Robinson, Kali. 2022. “What Is Hezbollah?” Council on Foreign Relations. May 25, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah

[5] Kelly, James. 1983. “A House Divided.” Time. August 8, 1983. https://web.archive.org/web/20070930093214/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,955173-1,00.html

[6] Database, E. C. F. n.d. “Israel-Lebanon Treaty (1983).” https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/183

[7]Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain. 2000. “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?: Israel and Lebanon after the Withdrawal.” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3. September 2000, p. 17. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria00_eil01.html

[8] Id. P. 24.

[9] Id. P. 26.

[10] Pressman, Jeremy “The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”. Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (2003) : 114–141. https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/jcs/2003-v23-n2-jcs23_2/jcs23_2art07/

[11] The International Coalition of Missing Israeli Soldiers. http://www.mia.org.il/tannenbaum.html

[12] “Mid-East Prisoners Welcomed Home,” News.bbc.co.uk. January 29, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3442719.stm

[13] “Israel/Lebanon: Hizbullah’s Attacks on Northern Israel.” 2006. Amnesty International. September 13, 2006. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mde020252006en.pdf

[14] Stocker, James P. 2020. “Putting out to Sea: What the History of Lebanese-Israeli Negotiations Can Tell Us about Current Negotiations over a Maritime Boundary.” War on the Rocks. November 13, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/putting-out-to-sea-what-the-history-of-lebanese-israeli-negotiations-can-tell-us-about-current-negotiations-over-a-maritime-boundary/

[15] Henderson, Simon. 2021. “Lines in the Sea: The Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Dispute.” The Washington Institute. May 3, 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lines-sea-israel-lebanon-maritime-border-dispute

[16]  Churchill, R. R.. “Law of the Sea.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 11, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Law-of-the-Sea

[17] Metych, M.. “exclusive economic zone.” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 25, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/exclusive-economic-zone

[18] “Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation.” 2012. MEES. September 28, 2012. https://www.mees.com/2012/9/28/op-ed-documents/cyprus-lebanon-cyprus-israel-offshore-delimitation/f994d750-6d1a-11e7-9675-d5a0b0510107

[19] United Nations. Division For Ocean Affairs And The Law Of The Sea. 2000. Handbook on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries. P.56. New York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/publicationstexts/Handbook%20on%20the%20delimitation%20of%20maritime%20boundaries_Eng.pdf

[20] Id, p. 57.

[21] Id, p. 47.

[22] Haboush, Joseph. 2022. “Lebanon, Israel ‘Narrowing Gaps’ towards Deal on Maritime Border: US Diplomat.” Al Arabiya English. February 9, 2022. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2022/02/10/Lebanon-Israel-narrowing-gaps-towards-deal-on-maritime-border-US-diplomat

[23] League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 22, N°565, pp. 363-373. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2022/v22.pdf

[24] Zaken, Danny. 2021. “Israel and Lebanon to Resume Maritime Border Talks – Report.” Globes, April 29, 2021, sec. News. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-israel-lebanon-to-resume-maritime-border-talks-report-1001369332#!

[25] Orna Mizrahi, Yoram Schwietzer, David Siman-Tov, “Launching Drones at the Karish Gas Field: Hezbollah’s Message to Israel and to the Lebanese”, The Institute for National Security Studies, July 3, 2022. https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/launching-drones-at-the-karish-gas-field-hezbollahs-message-to-israel-and-to-the-lebanese/

[26] Staff, ToI, and AFP. 2022. “‘A New Era’: At Border Ceremony without Handshakes, Israel-Lebanon Deal Takes Effect.” Times of Israel, October 27, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-border-ceremony-without-handshakes-israel-lebanon-agreement-goes-into-effect/#:~:text=Israel%20and%20Lebanon’s%20landmark%20maritime,by%20the%20Hezbollah%20terror%20group.

[27] Yuksel, Firdevs, “All Eyes Turn to Russia’s Share of EU’s Gas Imports.” Anadolu Agency, July 29, 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/all-eyes-turn-to-russias-share-of-eus-gas-imports/2647905

[28] “Why Is There an Energy Crisis in Europe?” Euronews. February 3, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/2022/02/03/europe-s-energy-crisis-why-are-natural-gas-prices-soaring-and-how-will-it-affect-europeans#:~:text=A%20record%2Dhigh%20increase%20in,841)%20a%20year%20from%20April.

[29] Karish, Energean Official Website. https://www.energean.com/operations/israel/karish/?__cf_chl_tk=qsppgPwOROw3BhGs3EYs_QxtM9718UrhpJs9Z6N_pao-1680894974-0-gaNycGzNClA

[30] “Factbox: Just How Bad Is Lebanon’s Economic Crisis?” Reuters, September 14, 2022, sec. Middle East. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/just-how-bad-is-lebanons-economic-crisis-2022-09-14/#:~:text=*%20Gross%20domestic%20product%20plunged%20to,in%20the%20import%2Ddependent%20country.

[31] According to the agreement, Israel is entitled to 17% of profits from the Sidon-Qana gas field; Danny Zaken, “”Sidon-Qana gas field could contain 100BCM”, Globes, October 28, 2022. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-sidon-qana-gas-field-could-contain-100-bcm-1001428180#:~:text=If%20the%20Sidon%2DQana%20field,(at%20least%20470%20BCM).

[32] “Israel’s political instability is putting the nation in danger – editorial”, The Jerusalem Post, September 13, 2022 – https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-716983; Natasha Turak, ‘”Huge Uncertainty’ for investors and economy as Israel’s government pushes for controversial reforms”, CNBC, March 1, 2023. https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/01/israel-judicial-reforms-protests-against-netanyahu-risks-to-economy.html

[33] “Netanyahu wants to neutralize maritime border agreement with Lebanon”, The Cradle, October 31, 2022. https://thecradle.co/article-view/17614

[34] Mustafa Fahs, “Lebanon, Filling the Vacuum to Suit the Clique”, Asharq Al-Awsat March 10, 2023 – https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4204226/mustafa-fahs/lebanon-filling-vacuum-suit-clique; Patricia Karam, “A New Model for Presidential Elections in Lebanon”, Arab Center Washington DC, March 9^th, 2023. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-new-model-for-presidential-elections-in-lebanon/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Lebanese%20Constitution,simple%20majority%20in%20subsequent%20rounds.

[35] Daniel Salami, “Critics in Lebanon Say Hezbollah recognizes Israel by acknowledging maritime deal”, Ynet News October  13, 2022. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/rkmj11qsqj

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

In America’s increasingly social media-centered news ecosystem, only news of the explosion was widely shared. Yet focusing disproportionately on sensational and tragic events is both unfair and uninformative. A more accurate and less harmful practice is to place such tragic events in the context of larger societal problems or trends, and coverage to this end is quite common for domestic issues. Mass shootings, for instance, will provoke coverage not only of the event but of related issues like gun control or institutional racism. However, when it comes to the rest of the world, which all too often feels too distant and unimportant, the temptation is often to know the headline and nothing more.

It is fitting, then, to return to Lebanon after most of the world has forgotten about it and ask the more important questions. What led to these twin economic and social crises in the first place? What historical roots do they have? And what, if any, role did the explosion play in exacerbating them?

The Makings of Lebanon’s Financial Crisis

Lebanon imports much of its food and other necessities but has relatively few exports to balance them out. [2] Since it needs foreign currency to pay for these imports, and gets little from selling products of its own, the nation relies heavily on the foreign currency reserves of its central bank, the Banque du Liban (BdL), to exchange currencies. [3] The Lebanese pound, also known as the lira, has been pegged to the dollar at a rate of 1,500 to 1 since 1997. As long as the central bank had enough reserves, it was possible for companies and individuals to buy their goods abroad in dollars, sell them at home in lira, then exchange the lira back for dollars to pay for more imports. [4]

For twenty years after 1990, when Lebanon’s 15-year civil war finally ended, the BdL had few problems keeping enough dollars on hand to keep the economy running. Tourism, foreign aid, and remittances, sent home from millions of Lebanese working abroad, kept a steady flow of dollars into the country. [5] Even the financial crisis of 2008 saw a marked increase in dollars flowing into the country, as Lebanese savers sent dollars to banks back home when interest rates dropped elsewhere to combat the crisis. [6] But each of these supports slowly fell away as political tensions both within the country and the region as a whole escalated during the 2010s. [7]

In an attempt to save its falling reserves, the central bank introduced a controversial set of “financial engineering” policies in 2016, which journalists from the New York Times and Reuters have described as akin to a “state-sponsored Ponzi scheme.” [8] [9] The BdL offered enormous interest rates to other banks on dollar deposits, which encouraged commercial banks to give the central bank their dollars. However, the central bank could only pay this tremendous interest by taking out yet more loans, starting a vicious cycle. Investors eventually caught on to this fiscally risky strategy in 2019. [10] To make matters worse, the Lebanese government was spending irresponsibly itself. The government had had a debt/GDP ratio of around 150% since at least 2000, and it had repeatedly failed to meet necessary reforms to unlock conditional foreign aid packages. [11] [12] With large debts across the board and an unsustainable fiscal policy, Lebanon was teetering on the brink.

Then in November 2017, then-Prime Minister Hariri suddenly resigned and disappeared to Saudi Arabia, which had become increasingly frustrated with the Lebanese government’s handling of Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed military and political power in Lebanon. [13] While he eventually returned and re-assumed his position, many investors, fearing instability, had already withdrawn their funds and fled Lebanese banks, taking valuable foreign currency with them. [14] Critically short on dollars, the Lebanese economy was in dire straits.

Spillover to Political Crisis

Meanwhile, political grievances had been building throughout the country for some time. Ordinary citizens, especially young people, became increasingly frustrated with the government’s ineptitude. They saw the elite political class as corrupt and self-centered, standing by or bickering while the country deteriorated. [15] [16]

All of these factors came to a head in late 2019. As part of a variety of proposals to raise revenue, the government proposed a tax on WhatsApp calls which lit a fire under the already pent-up population. Many Lebanese citizens have family members who work overseas, those same people whose remittances helped keep Lebanon’s economy running for so many years, and WhatsApp is a cheap and reliable way to stay in touch. Against the backdrop of a society that is largely perceived as unfairly benefiting the rich and powerful, the tax felt like a step too far. [17]  

Protests broke out across the country, with tens of thousands taking to the streets, and many were brutally repressed by state security forces. [18] This was the final straw for foreign currency holders, and the BdL’s dollar supply collapsed. [19] While the lira was technically still pegged to the dollar at 1,500 to 1, it was impossible to obtain at this rate. [20] Since dollars were scarce relative to lira, inflation skyrocketed, with lira trading at 15,000 to one against the dollar on the black market. [21]

Prime Minister Hariri resigned in late 2019, and the country floundered through the beginning of 2020. The nation defaulted on its debt for the first time ever, inflation accelerated, driving up poverty and prices, the COVID-19 pandemic hit, and the now-infamous blast at Beirut drove yet another government to resign. [22]

Today

Today, Lebanon is struggling to overcome its various crises. Sectarian divisions, mostly on religious lines, have made it almost impossible to form a new government. Historically, the Lebanese government has split power between its most influential religious groups, specifically between the Maronite Christian, Shia Muslim, and Sunni Muslim communities. Yet today, despite pressure from forces as disparate as France and Hezbollah, the leaders representing the groups have been unable to agree on a balance of power moving forward, and the country has thus been operating under a caretaker regime since the explosion. [23] [24] [25] Hyperinflation is making the everyday lives of ordinary citizens exceedingly difficult. Grocery store owners report changing prices as often as three times a day, and consumers often leave with only the basic necessities, and sometimes not even that. [26] Half of the population is projected to fall into poverty in the next year. [27] Angry protesters, frustrated with the inaction of their political leaders, routinely block streets with piles of burning tires. [28]

Thus, Lebanon’s challenges stem from causes far beyond the explosion. The Beirut explosion last summer was merely one point of conflict among many in a country divided by issues of race and class. However, these are not reasons to look down on the country, as is often the impulse for countries in the Middle East. Rather, it is important to recognize that often problems in other nations are as complex and deserving of the serious attention given to those at home.

References

[1] “Lebanon Crisis Escalates as Last-Ditch Cabinet Talks Fail to Form New Govt,” France 24, March 22, 2021, 24, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210322-lebanon-crisis-escalates-as-last-ditch-cabinet-talks-fail-to-form-new-govt.

[2] Chloe Cornish, “Currency Crisis Leaves Lebanese Cupboards Bare,” Financial Times, February 21, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/69e1e040-d8d7-494e-9a90-6f02f68f0bf7.

[3] Ben Hubbard, “Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Explodes, Threatening Decades of Prosperity,” The New York Times, May 10, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/world/middleeast/lebanon-economic-crisis.html.

[4] Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, “Lebanon’s Financial Collapse Hits Where It Hurts: The Grocery Store,” The New York Times, March 22, 2021, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/world/middleeast/lebanon-currency-groceries.html.

[5] Edmund Blair, “Explainer: Lebanon’s Financial Meltdown and How It Happened,” Reuters, September 17, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-lebanon-crisis-financial-explainer-idUKKBN268223.

[6] Ugo Panizza and Fadi Hassan, “Understanding the Lebanese Financial Crisis,” Financial Times, December 20, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/282eba28-9ed9-4b8f-8cc8-50d2096a400a.

[7] Blair, “Explainer.”

[8] Hubbard, “Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Explodes, Threatening Decades of Prosperity.”

[9] Blair, “Explainer.”

[10] Hubbard, “Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Explodes, Threatening Decades of Prosperity.”

[11] Panizza and Hassan, “Understanding the Lebanese Financial Crisis.”

[12] Hubbard and Saad, “Lebanon’s Financial Collapse Hits Where It Hurts.”

[13] Reuters Staff, “Timeline: Lebanon’s Ordeal from Civil War to Port Blast,” Reuters, December 24, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-crisis-turmoil-timeline-idUSKBN28Y0S1.

[14] Panizza and Hassan, “Understanding the Lebanese Financial Crisis.”

[15] “Lebanon: Why the Country Is in Crisis,” BBC News, August 5, 2020, sec. Middle East, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53390108.

[16] Hubbard and Saad, “Lebanon’s Financial Collapse Hits Where It Hurts.”

[17] Blair, “Explainer.”

[18] “The Unprecedented Mass Protests in Lebanon Explained,” Amnesty International, accessed March 31, 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/11/lebanon-protests-explained/.

[19] Blair, “Explainer.”

[20] Cornish, “Currency Crisis Leaves Lebanese Cupboards Bare.”

[21] Hubbard and Saad, “Lebanon’s Financial Collapse Hits Where It Hurts.”

[22] Reuters Staff, “Timeline.”

[23] “Lebanon.”

[24] “France Heightens Pressure on Lebanon to Form Government,” Aljazeera, accessed March 31, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/29/france-heightens-pressure-on-lebanon-to-form-government.

[25] Reuters Staff, “Hezbollah: Time to Allow Formation of New Lebanon Government,” Reuters, March 31, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/lebanon-crisis-hezbollah-int-idUSKBN2BN2NE.

[26] Hubbard, “Lebanon’s Economic Crisis Explodes, Threatening Decades of Prosperity.”

[27] Hubbard and Saad, “Lebanon’s Financial Collapse Hits Where It Hurts.”

[28] “Protesters in Lebanon Block Roads over Worsening Poverty,” France 24, March 9, 2021, 24, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210309-protesters-in-lebanon-block-roads-over-worsening-poverty.

Written by:

Since Thursday, October 17, protests have been raging across Lebanon. Here’s what you need to know:

What is happening?

On October 17, the Lebanese government announced plans to implement a tax reform plan that would place a tax on calls made through messaging apps, such as Whatsapp, which are widely used across the country. In a country with a 40% unemployment rate, disintegrating public infrastructure, a public debt over 150% of the country’s GDP, and few public services, the proposal proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back.^[1] Since the announcement, the Lebanese people have taken to the streets to protest widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, and other public to voice their other grievances. 

As of the Sunday before last, the protests were the largest the country had seen since 2005.^[2]

Why are people protesting?

The past few months have seen a spiral of dire economic circumstances in Lebanon. The country is plagued by high unemployment, negative GDP growth, the third-highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world, and debt surpassing the country’s GDP.^[3] The public blames these economic grievances on government corruption, and with the impetus of the now-defunct tax reforms, is protesting against large-scale political corruption.

Lebanon follows a sectarian system of government made up of 18 political sects, including Maronite Christians, Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Greek Orthodox, among others. This power-sharing agreement dates back to French colonial rule but was most recently renegotiated in the Taif Agreement, which ended the 1990 war that itself exacerbated by sectarian strife. Government positions are distributed among these sects—the president, for example, is always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister always a Sunni, the speaker of parliament always a Shia, and so forth.^[4] Parliamentary seats are also distributed along sectarian lines, but their allocation is far from representative of Lebanon’s present-day population, given that their allocation is based on a census conducted in 1932. Shi’a Muslims are estimated to make up the plurality of the Lebanese populations, but Maronite Christians overall enjoy disproportionately large political representation.^[5] The rigid system lends itself to political gridlock and strong foreign influence, often at the expense of the Lebanese people.

The public is not just seeking reforms to cure the economic crisis, but an overhaul of the entire system—that is, the resignation of the government, with provisional rule by apolitical judges until elections can be held.^[6] The movement is not politicized, for the protestors, who span all ages and sects, demand thoura, or revolution. One protestor putting it succinctly: “In the past, we used to protest for certain parties and groups. This time, we’re here because we’re Lebanese.”^[7]

How has the government responded?

Prime Minister Saad Hariri gave his coalition a 72-hour ultimatum on Friday to agree to a reform package.  On Monday, he announced the approval of economic reforms and a 2020 budget. The package includes significant salary cuts for the country’s three heads of state—the prime minister, president, and speaker of parliament—in half, a proposed law to restore stolen money from the state (another grievance protesters are holding politicians accountable for), and, perhaps most importantly, no new personal taxes.^[8]

“Those expressing their anger and demanding their dignity and their rights on the street: these decisions we took today may not fulfill your demands,” Hariri said in his announcement last Monday. “I’m not asking you to stop protesting your anger. That is a decision that you take.”^[9]

Things have changed since then— Saad Hariri announced his resignation on Tuesday, October 29, but protestors are demanding more. 

References

^[1] “Lebanon’s Leaders Move to Quell Huge Protests,” BBC News, October 21, 2019, sec. Middle East, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50118300.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Sarah Dadouch and Asser Khattab, “Lebanon’s Government Proposes Reforms as Huge Protests Hit Their Fifth Day,” Washington Post, accessed October 31, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/lebanons-politicians-rush-to-come-up-with-reforms-as-huge-protests-hit-their-fifth-day/2019/10/21/9171b656-f3f2-11e9-8cf0-4cc99f74d127_story.html.

^[4] “Why Lebanon Struggles to Form Governments,” The Economist, December 21, 2018, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/12/21/why-lebanon-struggles-to-form-governments.

^[5] “Census and Sensibility,” The Economist, November 5, 2016, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/11/05/census-and-sensibility.

^[6] “Lebanon Protests: All the Latest Updates,” accessed October 31, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/lebanon-protests-latest-updates-191021080734203.html.

^[7] Vivian Yee, “Lebanon Roiled by Second Day of Protests as Frustration Over Chronic Corruption Boils Over,” The New York Times, October 18, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests.html.

^[8] “Lebanon Protests.”

^[9] Dadouch and Khattab, “Lebanon’s Government Proposes Reforms as Huge Protests Hit Their Fifth Day.”

Written by: Natasha Mouawad, American University of Beirut

Introduction

Jurisprudence represents a constant and sincere attempt to provide a guiding utopian vision of human existence. Despite this purported idealism, jurisprudence has been defined by a masculinist vision. Women are often not aware of the existential choice this poses because they have been blinded by male power. Feminist jurisprudence aims at breaking down conceptual and political barriers to women’s freedom posed by this masculine and patriarchal jurisprudence. It aims at building a perfect legal system that will protect against harms as understood by all forms of life and will recognize values generated by all forms of being.

Having a masculinist jurisprudence means having laws written and understood by male standards, which poses an existential threat to women: the laws that govern every little detail in a woman’s life are male. These laws do not account for the experiences of women, often letting them down when the differences between the male and the female experience are the most at odds. This clash is best illustrated in cases of sexual violence. Often, the perpetrator is male, and the victim is female but the law that tries to understand this phenomenon is only male. Thus, when it comes to studying the case, the law understands only the perpetrator’s experience and not the victim’s experience. This provides some explanation as to why the numbers of reported cases of sexual assault and unreported cases are outrageously disproportionate: women don’t feel comfortable reporting their cases because they know that the law does not understand their subjective experiences as women. 

In Lebanon, this masculinist utopian vision rests in the honor discourse: it has built an intricate honor/shame system that revolves around sex and the men’s honor. Despite having its own characteristics, this Lebanese masculinist jurisprudence still poses an existential threat to women. Using a radical feminist lens, I will show how this male perspective in the Lebanese Penal Codes dealing with sexual violence oppresses women.

Radical Feminism

1. The Male Point of View

Catharine A. Mackinnon, an American professor of law and feminist theory,  writes “the male point of view forces itself upon the world as its way of apprehending it.” ^[1] What she means is that the male understanding, a hegemonic and systematic framework, shapes all forms of interaction and non-interaction that impact all aspects of societal life. In other words, the male point of view shapes existence itself. Men have seen themselves as being different from women, and indeed they are, because women have different physiologies and different experiences from them. 

One of the spheres that the male perspective has shaped is the legal sphere. MacKinnon says that the state is male,^[2]and that the law sees and treats women the way men see and treat women.^[3] This form of male dominance is one of the most insidious and pervasive systems of power because it is almost metaphysically perfect. MacKinnon claims that the male’s point-of-viewness in the law is the “standard point-of-viewlessness” which dangerously rationalizes, legitimizes, and imposes the male objectivity and completely irrationalizes women’s subjectivity. By doing so, authoritatively and coercively, the law creates a social order in the interest of the male gender through “embodying and ensuring male control over women’s sexuality at every level, occasionally cushioning, qualifying, or de jure prohibiting its excesses when necessary to its normalisation. […] To the extent possession is the point of sex, rape is sex with a woman who is not yours.”^[4] What men have done systematically and thoroughly is distance themselves from women, objectify them and construct different property values about the objectified women in order to control and dominate them in their own interests. It has permeated all spheres and has leveraged the law in an effort to consolidate and legitimise their dominance over women based on their own constructed values. In this sense, the law doesn’t protect women, it protects men’s values concerning women.  For example, rape, as defined by the law, centers upon a male-defined loss: the loss of “exclusive access.” As MacKinnon puts it, whenever a rape case “most closely conforms to precedent, to ‘facts,’ to legislative intent, it will most closely enforce social male norms.” 

Laws concerning sexual violence require a new perspective, one based in the “female point-of-view”, and a new relation between life and law in order to achieve a form of justice. This will not be possible until the Male Dominance apparatus is dismantled.

2. The Existential Dilemma of the Male Experience

Robin L. West, a leading feminist legal theorist, argues that modern jurisprudence is “masculine” and proposes two ideas in Jurisprudence and Gender.^[5] The first idea aligns with Mackinnon’s proposition that jurisprudence is dominated by the male-perspective. She explains that the “fundamental contradiction” that characterises women’s lives, the values, and the dangers are not reflected at any level whatsoever in contract law, torts, constitutional law, or any other legal subfield.^[6] Women have values that flow from their potential and physical connection that are not recognised as values by the rule of law, and the dangers that women face are also not recognised as dangers by the rule of law.^[7]

The second idea says that the rule of law is a coherent reaction to the existential dilemma that follows the description of the male experience in legal liberalism of material separation from the other. West explains that the existential condition of being a man is the fear of annihilation and the value of autonomy. In contrast, the existential condition of being a woman is the fear of separation and the value of intimacy. What the rule of law is doing, as West explains, is taking the male experience of material separation from the other and shaping itself accordingly. Thus, the rule of law acknowledges the danger of annihilation and the rule of law protects the value of autonomy, but it neither recognises nor values intimacy, and neither recognises nor protects against separation.^[8] When it comes to rape, West says that it is “understood to be a harm, and is criminalised as such, only when it involves some other harm,” a form of harm that men can understand. This aligns perfectly with Mackinnon’s idea that rape is a male-defined loss: “sex with a woman that is not yours”.

When laws are reformed with the goal of bettering the situation of women, they are often reformed by characterizing women’s injuries as analogous, if not identical with, men’s official values. They might be progressive in one way or another, but as Mackinnon points out, “how is it empowering in the feminist sense?”. What remains unconfronted is why women are raped, as well as the question of what conditions produce men who systematically express themselves in violent ways towards women.^[9]

3. Gender Relations in Contemporary Arab Societies

Lama Abu-Odeh, a Palestinian-American professor of law who wrote extensively on Islamic law, family law and feminism,  argues about the production and reproduction of gender relations in contemporary Arab life.^[10] An idealized model of gender is imposed on Arab women: they are expected to abstain from any kind of sexual practice before marriage. In this heterosexual, honor/shame-based society, men attribute values to women and their virginity. Abu-Odeh discusses the significance of the hymen and says that it “becomes the socio-physical sign that signifies virginity and gives the woman a stamp of respectability and virtue.”^[11] An idea of virginal femaleness is created by men and is then expected to be upheld by women. 

The family is a core social unit in Arab society. Because of this, men’s respectability and honor are affected by their family member’s respectability and honor, especially the female ones. Abu-Odeh says “to be an Arab man is to engage in daily practices, an important part of which is to assure the virginity of the unmarried women in your family.”^[12] To have a sister that lost her virginity before getting married brings shame to the family and thus brings shame to the brother or father as an individual, which can only be regained if the men avenge their loss of honor by killing the female.^[13] Men are not just threatened by their female family members but also by other men approaching their own female family members. This is because the one thing that needs to be physically protected is not the woman, but instead her hymen. The physicality of the hymen, and thus the physicality of honor itself made the brothers and fathers of women hyperaware about the fragility of their honor. Abu Odeh shows that this made the men fear other men’s approaches on the women of their family: “as women have internalized the censoring look of men, so have men internalized the censoring look of other men.”

Abu-Odeh brings up the role of “deal-making” to prevent losing one’s honor. Men promise each other that they will not approach their friend’s women because it would firstly and most importantly bring shame on the friend and secondly betray the friend’s trust. This deal has a double function of “nurturing their brotherly bonds and creating a certain camaraderie between them in their hunt for other women.”

Male Domination of The Lebanese Penal Code

Abu-Odeh’s theory of production and reproduction of gender relations in contemporary Arab life links this theoretical framework to the observable male dominance in the legal frameworks of Arab Societies and, more specifically, Lebanon’s Penal Code. Drawing on West’s idea of material separation from the other, the Arab man’s existential condition lays in his honor, the fear of its annihilation and thus his annihilation, and the value of its autonomy and his own autonomy from it. To be an Arab man is to have honor, but it is also to be free from eternally guarding his honor. To achieve such a balance, MacKinnon explains that men have to authoritatively and coercively enforce their values in their jurisdiction. Indeed the law focuses on honor and understands well what constitutes a violation of honor in Lebanon. The law in Lebanon constitutes the authoritative social order in the interest of men as a gender through “embodying and ensuring male control over women’s sexuality at every level, occasionally cushioning, qualifying, or de jure prohibiting its excesses when necessary to its normalization. […] To the extent possession is the point of sex, rape is sex with a woman who is not yours.”^[14]

The law does not protect women, but rather protects men’s values concerning women. Consequently, the Arab man would have achieved the best outcome out of his existential condition by imposing his values in the law through masculinist jurisprudence. The law protects his honor so that he does not have to do so himself. The law absolutely protects the fear of his honor’s annihilation, thus his own annihilation, and his value of his autonomy from women’s honor. This perfectly aligns with Abu-Odeh’s explanation of “deal-making.” The law enshrines individual-level deals and applies them to every man: “the function of these prohibitive demands is not only the preservation of actual virginity but the production of the public effect of virginity,”^[15] and thus the protects men’s honor at the expense of women’s experiences.

The Laws in the Lebanese Penal Code

The Lebanese Penal Code does not recognise sexual violence as a crime committed against people but rather a crime against the values and morals of society. In fact, laws concerning sexual violence are not found in the Penal Code’s section for crimes and offenses against an individual’s life and integrity. Rather, they are found in a different section: attacks on morals.^[16] The Penal Code also fails to enumerate or identify other forms of sexual violence such as sexual assault and abuse. In fact, it does not clearly define sexual assault as a violation of physical safety and sexual independence, although these acts can be punishable as indecent. These laws hint towards the protection of honor rather than the victim.

In my research I have found that Articles 503, 507, and 512 of the Penal Code have been the most used in cases of sexual violence:

Cases of sexual assault revolve around the concept of virginity and the physicality of the hymen. Therefore, medical examiners usually conduct medical examinations in order to prove or disprove the virginity of the victim. The resulting medical reports are a crucial element in rape cases because they represent the physical breaking of social morals. I have selected three different cases in order to highlight the importance of the medical report and the hymen in Lebanese jurisprudence. 

Court Cases

Case File n° 2016/106 ^[17]

Court: Criminal Court
Number: 106
Year: 2016
Date of Hearing: 23/03/2016
Presiding Judge: Faysal Hadid
Counsellor Judges: El Khoury – Al Qossais 
Decision Number: 2016/106

Facts: On the 8^th of April 2010, the plaintiff Lana Antoun Sidi filed a lawsuit against her husband Henry Abdel Karim and the Nepalese migrant domestic worker Sanu Peltamanuk, accusing them of adultery.^[18] Sanu testified and said that her husband forced her to have sex with him multiple times using violence and threats, raping her in a “brutally inhuman way”.^[19] The prosecution brought Larissa Mamadou Go, a previous migrant domestic worker from the Ivory Coast, to testify in court against the accused. Mamadou’s testimony resembled Peltamanuk’s: she said that the accused raped her and sexually abused her as well. The accused denied having raped the two women and said that the true reason behind this case is that the plaintiff, his wife, wanted to get a divorce and that the Evangelical Church, to which they belong to and got married in, does not allow divorce in the exception of the case of adultery. He added that his wife was in a relationship with another man.

Decision: The court accepted the appeal filed by the defendant on the basis of changing the nature of the motive of lawsuit.

Reason: In this case, no medical reports were submitted by the plaintiff to prove the non-virginity of the victims. The testimonies of the two women were rejected by the accused’s negation of the crimes and no other evidence was presented in court. Thus, the decision was based on believing the defendant’s testimony over that of the women.

Case File n° 2015/302 ^[20]

Court: Criminal Court
Number: 302
Year: 2015
Date of Hearing: 17/06/2015
Presiding Judge: Jocelyn Matta
Counsellor Judges: Howayek – Abdallah 
Decision Number: 2015/302

Facts: In 2014, the plaintiff filed a suit against her husband, accusing him of the crime of attempted rape and sexual harassment of her three underage children, all between the ages of 10 and 14. All three children testified against their father. Dr. Bilal Sablouh, the medical examiner, conducted three medical reports that prove anal penetration in all three girls. The accused consistently denied the crime and stated that his wife was promiscuous, having been in multiple relationships with multiple other men. The public prosecutor asked for the conviction of the accused, who asked for “acquittal, pity and mercy”.^[21]

Proving the perpetration of such crime requires concrete evidence that amounts to a recognition of the perpetration of the crime itself. This medical examination does not prove the perpetration of the crime and is not considered concrete enough. No new additional evidence has been submitted to the court by the prosecution.  

Decision: The court acquitted the accused of the crime of rape as defined in Article 507,^[22] supported by Article 511,^[23] on the basis of failure of proving the perpetration of the indecent act and the sex with his minor daughters by threat of violence, and insufficient evidence. His kids’ and wife’s testimonies were not taken as proof. 

Reason: Medical reports are usually needed in order to prove sexual harassment and rape. What is being measured in these medical reports is the virginity of the victim: if the victim lost her virginity, then the act is criminal; if it cannot be proven that the victim lost her virginity because of the act committed, then it can’t be used as proof of crime. In this case, the medical report clearly shows that there has been anal penetration of all three girls, but the court decided that the medical report was not enough proof. The defendant only had to deny the accusations in order to be acquitted, despite the fact that three testimonies were brought against him backed by medical proof.

Case File n°2016/204 ^[24]

Court: Criminal Court
Number: 204
Year: 2016
Date of Hearing: 16/03/2016
Presiding Judge: Mohammed Mathloum 
Counsellor Judges: Al Habal – Al Hajj 
Decision Number: 2015/302

Facts: On the 9th of November 2009 the plaintiff Nabil Mounir Yamout filed a suit against Hassan Mahmoud Meri accusing him of raping his daughter (N.Y). Nabil Mounir Yamout had legal guardianship of his underage daughter N.Y which is why he was able to prosecute the accused on behalf of the victim. The victim testified against the accused, describing how he raped her and how she lost her virginity. Dr. K.J., the medical examiner, provided a medical report that showed that the victim indeed lost her virginity. The accused stated that he knew the girl N.Y, and he had the intention of marrying her,^[25] but denied the accusation of having raped her. The prosecutor asked for the conviction of the accused and asked for $30,000 USD as reparation for damages caused by the assault. The defence asked for the acquittal of the accused on the basis of lack of evidence.

Decision: The court charged the accused under Article 503^[26] of the Penal Code and supported by Article 512^[27] of the Penal Code as a result of ascertaining the victim’s testimony that the accused raped her by means of violence and threat. The accused stripped her of her honor at the time when she was still underage, evidenced in the light of the medical report’s findings. Secondly, the court stipulated that the convicted pay 25,000,000 LBP to the family for damages.

Reason: In this case, the medical report clearly shows that the victim lost her virginity, which the court refers to as honor and dignity. The perpetrator was the cause of that loss and the medical report evidences it. The court understood the loss of dignity through rape as a grave crime, which is why it not only convicted the criminal but also made him pay LBP 25,000,000 for damages.

The Male Point-of-View in The Law

The Lebanese Penal Code is shaped by the male point-of-view: it constructs social order in the interest of the male gender. Male values are enshrined in legal codes which consequently rationalises a patriarchal ideology and poses an existential threat to women as a gender.^[28] In reviewing cases of sexual violence, two elements have proven to be of great importance: the hymen and the medical report. 

1. The Hymen and The Law

The fact that the Lebanese laws concerning sexual violence are not found in the Penal Code’s section for crimes and offenses against an individual’s life and integrity but are found instead under the attacks on morals section^[29] shows how cases of sexual assault revolve around the concept of morals. An idea of virginal femaleness is created by male morality and is expected to be upheld by women. The law is then constructed to protect male morals using a male understanding of existence,^[30] while the virginal femaleness becomes a protected idea in the law. 

Indeed, as the selected case studies have shown, a crime of sexual violence is only committed when there is medical proof that the hymen has been broken. Otherwise, the nature of the assault becomes hard to understand, because no attack on society’s morals has been committed. What is being protected by the Lebanese Penal Code is not women, it is their virginity, and more specifically the hymen itself. The Lebanese male’s point-of-view has authoritatively enforced its values in jurisdiction, it has become the “standard point-of-viewlessness”^[31] which dangerously rationalises, legitimises, and imposes the male objectivity and irrationalises women’s subjectivity. The rational and legitimate proof of crime here is the medical report: the report proving the loss of virginity is a crucial element in rape cases because it represents a physical manifestation of the breaking of social morals.

2. The Medical Report and The Effect of Rational “Point-of-Viewlessness”

MacKinnon explains that men have to authoritatively and coercively enforce their values. Indeed, Lebanese law focuses on honor and understands very well violations of honor in Lebanon. The male’s point-of-view in the law has become the unquestioned “standard point-of-viewlessness.”^[32]

The “standard point-of-viewlessness” that the Lebanese male point-of-view has subtly enforced in the law can be seen in the legal system’s overreliance on medical reports in sexual violence cases. The medical report has the function of providing logical and rational proof in cases of rape and other cases of sexual violence. To someone whose goal is to protect virginity, this medical report makes perfect sense as it analyses the physical shape of the hymen and proves whether it has been broken or not. The medical report thus signifies male objectivity in the law. But to someone whose goal is to bring justice to sexual assault survivors, this medical report is useless and sometimes even inimical to their case. In fact, instances of sexual assault often surpass the definition that the law gives it, making it almost impossible to get justice when the law has such a narrow definition and understanding of sexual assault. The Office on Women’s Health gives a list of types of sexual assault which includes: “fondling or unwanted touching above or under clothes, voyeurism, exhibitionism, sexual harassments or threats, forcing someone to pose for sexual pictures, texting unwanted photos or messages, etc.…”. Because these acts of sexual assaults do not revolve around the hymen and honor the Lebanese Penal Code does not recognize them as punishable acts.  Women’s subjectivity is not recognized by the law. Instead the law protects men’s honor at the expense of women’s experiences.

Conclusion

As the sexual violence cases have shown us, those who win in court, whether they be the prosecutors or the defendants, are the men protecting their honor. In Case File n° 2016/106^[33], the defendant Abdel Karim’s appeal was accepted by the court, and his honor was thus defended by denying the accusations. In Case File n° 2015/302^[34], the defendant (R.T) was able to save his honor by denying the accusations and the medical report in this case did not prove the breaking of the hymen of the three girls. Because the medical report did not prove the breaking of the socio-physical sign of morals under Lebanese law meant that no crime had been proven.^[35] In Case File n° 2016/204^[36], the plaintiff Nabil Mounir Yamout was able to restore his honor by winning a case against his daughter’s rapist. He initially lost his honor when his daughter was raped by Hassan Mahmoud Meri, but proving that rape happened and that his daughter lost her virginity—proven by the medical report—the plaintiff Nabil Mounir Yamout restored his honor when the defendant was charged with rape. 

Angela Davis said “as you further shape the theoretical foundations of this movement and as you implement practical tasks, remind yourselves as often as possible that even as individual victories are claimed, the ultimate elimination of sexist violence will depend on our ability to build a new and revolutionary global order, in which every form of oppression and violence against humankind is obliterated.” ^[37]  Feminism’s role in jurisprudence is to uncover how the patriarchy has subtly but systematically shaped the laws to enforce male standards and definitions of existence that consequently oppress women, and challenge this male apparatus. It should also aim to transform male jurisprudence and replace it with a humanist jurisprudence. In Lebanon, feminist NGOs have been challenging the dominant patriarchal jurisdiction and have had a few victories.  Despite those small victories, masculinist jurisprudence still poses an existential threat to women in Lebanon. The honor/shame system that plagues the legal system needs to be addressed and male values, enshrined in the law since the Ottoman era, need to be revised. The feminist movement in Lebanon has started this discussion, but it still needs to hold on to its utopian vision and stand its ground in the face of conservative opposition.” 

Works Cited:

^[1] Mackinnon, Catharine A. Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 635-658

^[2] Susan Rae Peterson, “Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket,” in Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1977), pp. 360-71; Janet Rifkin, “Toward a Theory of Law Patriarchy,” Harvard Women’s Law Journal 3 (Spring 1980): 83-92

^[3] Mackinnon, Catharine A. Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 635-658

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] West, Robin. Jurisprudence and Gender. Chicago: The University of Chicago Law Review, 1988, pp1-24 

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Mackinnon, Catharine A. Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 643

^[10] Abu Odeh, Lama. Honor Killings and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies. D.C: Georgetown University Law Center, 2010, pp. 911-952

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Ibid.

^[13] Lama Abu Odeh talks about honor killing in her paper Honor Killings and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies

^[14] Mackinnon, Catharine A. Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 635-658

^[15] Abu Odeh, Lama. Honor Killings and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies. D.C: Georgetown University Law Center, 2010, pp. 911-952

^[16]  Lebanese Criminal, Code C. pén. Libanais

^[17] Lana Antoun Sidi v. Henry Abdel Karim (2010) case number 2010/106 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=122501&selection=

^[18] Articles 487-489 punishes a woman who commits adultery with a prison sentence from three months to two years. She is found guilty if the act takes place inside or outside her home. A man committing adultery, however, has to be caught in the act in his own home or be known by others to be conducting an illicit affair to be sentenced to prison for one month to a year. A woman is required to have the testimony of witnesses to prove her innocence, whereas a man can be proven innocent based on lack of material evidence, such as incriminating letters or documents.

^[19] Details of the testimony can be found in the case report pp. 2: Lana Antoun Sidi v. Henry Abdel Karim  (2010) case number 2010/106 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=122501&selection=

^[20] K.T v. R.T (2015) case number 2015/302 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=111527&selection=

^[21] Ibid.

^[22] Article 507: Whoever, with the help of violence or threats, has forced a person to undergo or to do an act contrary to modesty, will be punished with hard labour for a duration not inferior to 4 years. The minimum of the punishment will be of 10 years if the victim didn’t have 15 years.

^[23] Article 511: The punishments detailed In articles 503 to 505 and 507 to 509 will be elevated if the accused is one of the people described in article 506.

^[24]Nabil Mounir Yamout v. Hassan Mahmoud Meri (2016) case number 2016/204 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=121294&selection=

^[25] At the time of the case, article 522 of the penal code wasn’t repealed yet. This article gives the rapist a chance of evading prosecution and sentencing in case he marries the victim, which might’ve been an option for the defense in this case.

^[26] Article 503: Whoever, with the use of violence or threats, has forced a person in a sexual act outside marriage will be punished with not be less than 5 years of prison. The punishment will not be less than 7 years if the victim was younger than 15 years old. 

^[27] Article 512: Whoever has laid hand in an impudent manner or has committed an analogue act of impudicity on a minor of either sex younger than 15, or on a woman or girl of 15 years or more without her consent, will be punished with imprisonment that will not exceed 6 months.

^[28] When I say ‘doesn’t make sense to women’ I mean the idea of being a woman. Obviously, there are women who believe deeply in the patriarchal ideology and blindly accept it, and often reject any criticism of it on the basis of morals and tradition.

^[29]  Lebanese Criminal, Code C. pén. Libanais

^[30] MacKinnon explains that men have to authoritatively and coercively enforce their values in jurisdiction.

^[31] Mackinnon, Catharine A. Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 635-658

^[32] Mackinnon, Catharine A. Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 635-658

^[33] Lana Antoun Sidi v. Henry Abdel Karim  (2010) case number 2010/106 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=122501&selection=

^[34] K.T v. R.T (2015) case number 2015/302 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=111527&selection=

^[35] The defendant was acquitted of his crimes on basis of lack of evidence. 

^[36]Nabil Mounir Yamout v. Hassan Mahmoud Meri (2016) case number 2016/204 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=121294&selection=

^[37] Angela Y. Davis. Violence against women and the ongoing challenge to racism. Florida: Florida State University. Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1985.

Bibliography:

Abu Odeh, Lama. Honor Killings and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies. D.C: Georgetown University Law Center, 2010

Lebanese Criminal, Code C. pén. Libanais

Mackinnon, Catharine A. Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Susan Rae Peterson, “Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket,” in Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1977), pp. 360-71; Janet Rifkin, “Toward a Theory of Law Patriarchy,” Harvard Women’s Law Journal 3 (Spring 1980): 83-92

West, Robin. Jurisprudence and Gender. Chicago: The University of Chicago Law Review, 1988

Sources:

“1 In 3 American Women Has Experienced Some Type of Sexual Violence.” Womenshealth.gov, 14 Mar. 2019, www.womenshealth.gov/relationships-and-safety/sexual-assault-and-rape/sexual-assault.

K.T v. R.T (2015) case number 2015/302 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=111527&selection=

Lana Antoun Sidi v. Henry Abdel Karim (2010) case number 2010/106 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=122501&selection=

Nabil Mounir Yamout v. Hassan Mahmoud Meri (2016) case number 2016/204 (Court of Appeal, Lebanese Criminal Court). Court decision transcript can be found online in Arabic: http://legiliban.ul.edu.lb/ViewRulePage.aspx?ID=121294&selection=

Abstract

The impact of the Syrian crisis had not only spilled over into neighboring countries, but other continents as well. As of December 2018, according to a Mercy Corps report, there were 5.6 million Syrian refugees around the world, and 6.2 million internally displaced people^[1]. This huge number has taken a toll on host countries and talks of ensuring safe return of Syrian refugees to their home countries have been instigated at the international level. This paper will explore the problems associated with the return of Syrian refugees and their reintegration into their home country. It will explore the social and economic dynamics of their return in line with international human rights law. This paper is not written for an organization but is a product of individual policy research on the problem. I will begin by exploring the nature of the problem and its major points then proceed to identify the stakeholders concerned with this policy problem. The data collection method is mainly a synthesis of existing literature and evidence on the issue, provided by international organizations and policy research groups. My target audience is international bodies actively working on the return of these refugees and providing the logistical support this process requires. I will provide recommendations based on the evidence I have found and the method of implementation. 

The Problem

The state of Syrian refugees in the past 2 years has been a central concern of many international and humanitarian organizations working to provide them with the means to continue their life sustainably. Syrian refugees are scattered around the world in countries like Turkey, Germany, Lebanon, and Jordan. The case in Lebanon is especially alarming because of the limited size and capacity of the country to sustain its own citizens, and due to the actual state of living of the refugees in Lebanon. According to the UNHCR, over 50% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in extreme poverty^[2].

In 2017, Hezbollah worked on the return of refugees from the Arsal border area. According to Mohammad Afif, Hezbollah’s media spokesperson: “Through mediators and under specific conditions, a certain amount of refugees will be returning to certain villages in the western Qalamoun”^[3]. However, this was an informal operation that occurred without the intervention of the Syrian and Lebanese governments, just between the party and the opposition groups. This posed a great danger on the rights of the refugees returning to their home countries, and the need for entities like the UNHCR to supervise such operations. Professor Hilal Khashan at the American University of Beirut expressed that this incident reveals the amicable relationship and networks of Hezbollah in Syria. President Michel Aoun expressed in the Arab summit in early 2019 the urgency of the need to return refugees from Lebanon to Syria due to the pressure their presence has had on the already struggling economic crisis in Lebanon^[4]. Lebanon’s Minister of State, Adel Afioni, said his country will follow the Russian strategy for the return of Syrian refugees. This strategy was produced after a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 16, 2018^[5]. It specifies 76 residential areas in Syria to enable the return of around 360,000 Syrian refugees as a first step. 

The second step is to ensure the rehabilitation of the houses to allow for the return of half a million more refugees within a period of two years. As of December of 2018, Lebanon has reported the return of 1000 Syrian refugees to their homeland under the supervision of the Lebanese General Security and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)^[6]. Russia’s interests in the return of refugees stretch beyond the concern for the refugees’ rights and liberties though. Russian interests lie in the urban and infrastructure reconstruction of Syria^[7]. The reconstruction of Syria will promote competition amongst the involved players as they will benefit from major economic bursts. Moreover, since Russia still maintains significant political influence over Assad, it is likely that Russia will win many contracts of such reconstruction.

The main dimensions of this case include the political, legal, social, and economic concerns that come with the return of refugees to their home country^[8]. This return should come hand in hand with preservation of rights, and a ‘voluntary’, ‘safe’, and ‘dignified’ return. The concept of safety, according to the UN and the EU^[9], implies that their return must be linked to credible security guarantees, not just the absence of direct war. Political, legal, social, and economic safety must be guaranteed before planning and launching an initiative like the return of refugees. The concept of ‘voluntary’ return is blurry and must be explicitly defined to avoid loopholes that can pose a potential threat to the rights of refugees. Voluntariness is not simply the consent-giving action of refugees but can be further divided into two indicators: information and lack of coercion. First, refugees wishing to go to Syria based on certain terms of return must have vital information about the nature of their return and their situation after the return. Information about the areas they are returning to must be provided for them to make informed and conscious decisions. The status of their housing, land, and property must be made clear to them. Their status in Syria and their fate is of major importance before returning these refugees. The risk of detention or forced displacement after their return also exists, and it should be communicated to them properly as well as the employment of measures to ensure these incidents do not occur. 

Second, the ‘consent’ of these refugees is not valid in cases where they feel direct and indirect pressure from country officials and certain political groups who have an interest in their return^[10]. In June and July of 2018, Bekaa Valley municipalities conducted an extensive return campaign. They contacted refugees across camps and asked them to fill out surveys about their stance on returning to Syria, asking why they have not returned yet. According to the information in the surveys, the questions were framed in a biased way to encourage return and Syrians felt threatened by this^[11]. Another study was conducted earlier this year in Germany, asking Syrian refugees their perspectives on returning to Syria, and addressing the concept of ‘voluntariness’. Syrian nationals were interviewed face to face as they entered and exited from refugee registration centers. The main hypotheses of this study were: a) refugees who experience direct safety threats during conflict are more likely to consider returning after the restoration of stability in their countries and b) refugees with higher education levels are more likely to return, only if their countries transition to democratic systems of government^[12]. The study examined the influences on refugee decisions to return to their home countries. The results supported the hypotheses and presented the importance of informed refugee decision making. However this study was limited by the absence of ethnic and religious identities from the data and evidence. These two factors are of major importance to individuals and can often be deciding factors. Ethnic and religious identities can be the causes of social distress for returning individuals. Attention must be paid to where refugees are returning and if their return is impacted by the social and cultural rights afforded to them in their home countries. 

Stakeholders

Such a mass scale problem is bound to have numerous stakeholders. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on stakeholders involved in the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon. Two clear stakeholders are the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Without their combined efforts and resources, the UNHCR and other humanitarian bodies cannot undergo the process of returning refugees home. Their material and political resources are of substantial value for the possibility of the safe return of refugees and the protection of their rights. However, some speculate that the return of Syrian refugees, from the perspective of the Assad regime, bolsters the claim that the regime won the war and is re-establishing control in the country. As a result, the Syrian regime benefits from this image of Syria being ‘safe’ and stable,’ establishing a positive international and local, political and military image. 

The United Nations is another very important stakeholder as it can be the medium of political discussions and negotiations between countries, with its political and human resources providing it with strong influence. The United Nations has the legitimacy needed to provide recommendations to host countries planning the return of Syrian refugees and pressure leaders to abide by international human rights law. The UN stated that conditions in Syria do not allow for large number of Syrians to return to their homes, even if the fighting has subsided^[13]. Organizations like SAWA for Development and Aid and Mercy Corps provide great sources of research and investigation on issues faced by refugees around the world, especially Syrian refugees. Such organizations and other civil society groups can help provide data and evidence as well as policy recommendations for decision makers and political leaders to take into consideration. Unfortunately, their power is somewhat limited to only human resources because they have little to no effect on how political decisions pan out at the end of the day, due to deep-rooted political interests in each country. 

Solutions

The primary data collection method I used for this paper was the synthesis of existing evidence from studies conducted on the prospects of returning refugees and the impact of returns on them on the long-term. I also conducted an individual face to face interview with a Syrian man living in Lebanon. The recent report produced by the UNHCR found that security is the single greatest factor that determines the return of refugees. ^[14]Refugees hoping for return are concerned with the basic services they need to live a healthy and developed life. Health, education and good infrastructure are the driving factors for return. In the report, 10% of the refugee population showed prospects of return if the rate of security doubled and the implementation of services tripled within the next five years. The report emphasized that voluntary return under good conditions can improve welfare while policies with focus only on maximizing the number of returns will reduce welfare. The report claimed that a more broad approach can have long-term positive impacts. This means that focusing on improving conditions for the Syrians and their host communities can increase the chance for voluntary return. 

On May 7^th, 2018, I interviewed a 28 year old Syrian refugee living and working in Lebanon. For the purpose of his privacy the alias Abbas will be used. Abbas fled Syria in 2014 amidst security threats to him and his family. He is originally from Der El Zor and his family owned 100 acres of land in the area. During the war, their house was partially destroyed and their farming and heavy machinery were destroyed. Property valued upwind of $100,000 was lost or destroyed and no prospect of life seemed possible. I asked Abbas what major factor would contribute to his return to Syria, and his response supported studies previously mentioned. Land and security are the two driving factors that would prompt Abbas and his family to return home to their village. Land is the significant economic factor here, and security is  a widely cited factor. I asked Abbas if he would return to a different town in Syria if it had economic potential for his family, and his response was one I had not heard before. He said: “absolutely not,” as social factors would burden him and his family because the new town would have different social/cultural tendencies. This prompted me to ask if he would consider migrating to a European or other Arab country and his response was again a negative. Abbas expressed urgent desire to return back home to his hometown and land, saying nothing else would replace that. “You either go back to where you belong, or you don’t at all” were the words Abbas chose. This however, is not the case for all Syrian refugees, particularly as some of the refugees’ hometowns are completely destroyed. But this draws attention to the importance of the social aspect of the problem, and the need for further investigation into the social reintegration of refugees into their communities. 

Implementation

The first and most important step in implementation is collecting the necessary information regarding refugees returning through self-organized methods. This poses a threat to their security but they do so because they distrust Lebanese authorities and all other involved actors. Second, little is known about the magnitude of the start-to-finish costs of implementing the return of refugees back to Syria. The General Security returns cost around $200 while others organized by local communities may cost $100^[15]. This does not include the arrangement of independent transport across the border. In terms of the role of the UNHCR, clarity should be provided because refugees are unaware of the exact role of the UNHCR, specifically on whether it covers the General Security costs or acts as an informal observer. Such information is key to the concept of ‘voluntary’ return. Without such information, refugees cannot make informed decisions. International humanitarian intervention should be limited to protecting the refugees’ post-return and ensuring safety conditions in the areas they will be returning to. Such a massive policy cannot be implemented abruptly, and a gradual approach may provide for better results in the long term. Refugees in urgent need for return should be prioritized based on criteria set by the Human Rights Watch and similar bodies to ensure fair and equal return of all refugees. 

Conclusion

According to the data synthesized in this paper, the major points of concern regarding the safe and dignified return of Syrian refugees rely on both voluntary return and security conditions post-return. Due to the territorial sovereignty of Syria, it will be difficult, yet not impossible, to implement security standards of protection for returning refugees. The UN can distribute humanitarian aid in the towns that need assistance the most and promote social cohesion between the returning population and the current residing Syrians. The research regarding this problem lacks the financial and logistical tactics needed to employ solutions. Financial experts on return and restructuring of cities must weigh in on the policy and provide the necessary expertise to ensure the effective implementation of this for the sake of long-term impacts. 

^[1]Quick Facts: What You Need to Know about the Syria Crisis.” Mercy Corps, August 26, 2019. https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis.

^[2]“Beirut, Damascus Working Together for Return of Syrian Refugees.” Press TV,2018.

^[3]Nazih Osseiran and Rhys Dubin. “Detained Lebanese ‘in Good Health’.” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon), 2017.

^[4]Lebanon Uses Arab Summit to Call for Syrian Refugees’ Return. Postmedia Network Inc, Toronto, 2019.

^[5]Aoun, Putin talk Russian role in Syrian refugee returns. Daily Star, Lebanon. Mar 26, 2019.

^[6]Lebanon to rely on Russian strategy for return of Syrian refugees: Minister (2019). . Tehran: SyndiGate Media Inc.

^[7]Anchal Vohra. Russia’s Payback Will Be Syria’s Reconstruction Money. Foreign Policy. May 5 2019

^[8]Mhaissen, 18

^[9]Reardon, Christopher. “Eight years on, Syrian refugees weigh thorny question of return”. UNHCR.  https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2019/3/5c83eafa4/eight-years-syrian-refugees-weigh-thorny-question-return.html

^[10]Mhaissen, 19

^[11]Mhaissen, 23

^[12]Serdar & Orchard, 5

^[13]Schlein, Lisa. UN warns against mass return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon. VOA News January 10, 2019 3:01 PM https://www.voanews.com/a/un-warns-against-mass-return-of-syrian-refugees-from-lebanon/4737514.html

^[14]Bank, World. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019. 8, 262.

^[15]Mhaissen, 26

Bibliography:

• Bank, World. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019. 
• “Beirut, Damascus Working Together for Return of Syrian Refugees.” Press TV, 2018. 
• Collard, Rebecca. “Syrian Refugees Return from Lebanon to an Uncertain Future.” FT.Com (2018).
• “Economic Projects to further Return of Syrian Refugees – Lavrov.” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire,2018. 
• Kaya, Serdar and Phil Orchard. “Prospects of Return: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Germany.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies (2019): 1-18. 
• “Lebanon to Rely on Russian Strategy for Return of Syrian Refugees: Minister.” Press TV,2019. 
• Lebanon Uses Arab Summit to Call for Syrian Refugees’ Return. Toronto: Postmedia Network Inc, 2019.
• Leiserson, Elizabeth. “Securing the Borders Against Syrian Refugees: When Non-Admission Means Return.” The Yale Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (2017): 185.
• Marks, Jesse. Syrian Refugees Face Growing Pressure to Return to Insecure Conditions. Here’s Why: With Resettlement and Integration Largely Off the Table, Return is Reduced to a Political Tool. Washington: WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington Post, 2019.
• Mhaissen, Rouba. Hodges, Elena. Unpacking Return: Syrian Refugees’ Conditions Concerns Sawa for Development and Aid. 2019
• Rhys Dubin and Nazih Osseiran. “Hezbollah Mediating Safe Return of Syrian Refugees.” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon),2017.
• Syria Arab republic, United States: End of fighting in Syria not enough for spontaneous return of Syrian refugees. MENA Report (2019). 
• Syrian Refugees Return Home from Lebanon. SyndiGate Media Inc, Tehran, 2019.
• “United Nations/Syria/Lebanon: UN Warns Against Mass Return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon.” Asia News Monitor,2019.
• Vignal, Leïla. “Perspectives on the Return of Syrian Refugees.” Forced Migration Review no. 57 (2018): 69-71. 
• Yahya, Maha, Carnegie Middle East Center, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018.

On Friday, April 5, the Yale Law School hosted a panel discussing the rise of multilateralism as states seek to evade their legal obligations to provide refugee protections. The panel, part of the 2-day Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Symposium, included panelists Bill Frelick, the director of the Refugee Rights Program at Human Rights Watch; Sana Mustafa, a consultant and co-founder of Network for Refugee Voices; and Leah Zamore LAW ‘14, the head of the Humanitarian Crisis Program at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation

Frelick opened the panel by offering an overview of the discussion topic. States, he explained, are embracing “externalization,” a concept he defines as “extraterritorial state actions to prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries or regions, or making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims.” Put simply, externalization is any extraterritorial measure a state takes to prevent migrants from setting foot in their jurisdiction, where they avail themselves of rights. According to Frelick, externalization is often deceptively framed as a “lifesaving humanitarian endeavor” meant to “protect migrants from dangerous journeys” rather than a tool for migration containment.

He then cited examples of externalization in practice. He focused on European and American immigration policies, especially after 2015, which is commonly cited as the starting year of the worldwide refugee crisis fueled by ongoing humanitarian crises across the globe.

According to Frelick, externalization has been a “central plank of European migration policy” since the mass influx of migrants into Europe in 2015. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa put 3.4 billion euros forward in scrambling to address the crisis. Much of that money came from the European Development Fund, which is typically used for general development purposes but was then repurposed to stem migration. He went on to say that today, 80% of humanitarian aid is “engaged with forced displacement.” Moreover, only 1% of this funding is used to provide “safe and legal channels for entry into the European Union,” while the bulk of the money is conditionality— that is, a bargaining chip to encourage states seeking development assistance to cooperate on migration controls. This money often goes to maintaining and entrenching oppressive regimes which create the conditions for mass emigration in the first place.

Frelick specifically cited the issue of Libyan migration, stating that 42.4 million euros has been directed to Libyan border coast guards to enhance their capacity to manage the border, which, in turn, stems migration both into Libya and from Libya into the European Union. He also referred to the EU – Turkey deal from March 2016, which gave the Turkish government 6 million euros to host immigrants (particularly from Syria) and prevent onward migration. Apart from granting Turkey funding, the deal, greenlighted Turkey to create safe zones in Syria to prevent migrants from entering Turkey at all.

Frelick went on to discuss externalization policies employed by the United States, especially with regard to immigration from Mexico. Under the Obama administration, the US funneled money into the development of immigration enforcement agencies in Mexico, to great effect— the number of migrants entering the US from the southern border dropped by 57%, while the number deported from Mexico into Central America increased by 75%. President Trump has moved away from the externalization approach, cutting development funds to the US’ southern neighbors and claiming that Mexico has done “nothing to prevent migration,” which Frelick says is “absolutely not the case.”

Zamore spoke next, reframing the discussion in two talking points: first, that “access is not the human right that is most imperiled,” and second, that “refugees stay as refugees for a very long time.”

Elaborating on her first point, Zamore noted that most refugees live in developing countries like Chad, Uganda, and Ethiopia, where the governments largely keep their borders open. She spoke specifically about Lebanon, where the government has closed its borders after having accepted 1 million Syrian refugees, meaning 1 in 4 people in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee— the equivalent of the US having accepted 82.5 million refugees. Consequently, the burden of the worldwide refugee crisis is not globally shared, as ten of the world’s developing countries host most of the globe’s refugee population.

Addressing her second point, Zamore remarked that, although refugees often stay as such for extended periods of time, the humanitarian system (the international community’s default response to refugee crises) operates on short-term budgets. She noted that there are now three generations of Somali refugees living in the Kenyan refugee camp of Dadaab. This means that those who originally fled Somalia are now grandparents to the newest generation of Somali refugees in Dadaab.

Zamore then discussed what she called the “new liberal consensus,” which acknowledges that refugees remain refugees for long periods of time and largely occupy developing countries; as such, countries with large refugee populations should be the recipients of development aid rather than exclusively short-term humanitarian aid. Thus, refugees can incorporate themselves into labor markets and out of camps, ensuring freedom of movement and the right to work. This approach is slowly emerging among the international community— for example, the World Bank has created a “refugee sub-window” of its International Development Association fund, meaning $2 billion is now directed toward governments and communities hosting the most refugees, making the transition out of temporary infrastructures a reality.

According to Zamore, there is nothing new about this approach. In the 1960s and 70s, the so-called “golden age of asylum,” the progressive developmental state model created a welfare state into which refugees were incorporated. In the 1980s, the system transitioned to a largely unsuccessful new development model emphasizing deregulation, privatization, and minimal safety nets for the poorest of the poor. Zamore describes this model, imposed on host countries for the past few decades (though with time, becoming increasingly concerned with inequality and welfare), as “fundamentally incompatible with refugee rights” and names it “largely responsible for the impoverishment of refugees and host communities in these countries.” She cites Somalia, where the per-capita income is 40% lower than that in 1970, and Afghanistan, where the per-capita income just reached its 1970-level.

Zamore emphasized the role the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays in this failed development model, calling it the “biggest player affecting refugees today” despite being uninvolved with discussions surrounding refugees. In countless states, IMF programs require governments to pay “obscene” debts, which draws the focus away from development or refugee protection. Meanwhile, with the emergence of this new liberal consensus, the international system asks these countries to incorporate refugees into their school and healthcare systems, which pulls host governments in two opposite directions. In Jordan, for example, which is host to 600,000 Syrian refugees, the IMF program states that Jordan’s first priority for 2020 is lowering its debt by 17% percent. Jordan has thus cut refugees out of its public subsidized healthcare programs in an attempt to rid itself of debt. In her closing, Zamore offered more positive news, noting that the debt conversation has picked up since her entrance to the discussion, and that more “critical voices” are being incorporated into these discussions.

Fittingly, Mustafa— a Syrian refugee herself— closed the panel by emphasizing the need for refugee inclusion in discussions about the worldwide refugee crisis. She first made it clear that, though the influx of Syrians into Europe in 2015 is widely considered the starting point of the refugee crisis, Syrians first started fleeing in 2011, though they stayed in neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Because the Middle East as a region fraught with refugee crises is a normalized image, the international community only regarded the issue as a “crisis” once the Syrians began “reaching the white land.”

Mustafa maintains that the current system seeks to force refugees to maintain as such. Policies working toward giving refugees long-term legal status are not being considered, which, it appears, only perpetuates the crisis. Mustafa criticized the idea that giving refugees legal status prevents them from returning home, stating that the lack of legal status for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey is the reason why Syrians fled to Europe in the first place.

She further emphasized the lack of dialogue between development initiatives and policymaking, citing fear of politicization as the reason why development agencies and policymakers fail to collaborate. This, Mustafa says, is the root cause of the perpetuation of the crisis: why give refugees job training through development programs if no policy exists to give them the right to work? Moreover, the longevity of the international community’s failure to effectively address refugee crises has given rise to problems that did not previously exist, like lack of resources and donor fatigue.

According to Mustafa, the inclusion of the refugee perspective into these discussions is a necessary step toward finding a solution. After founding Network for Refugee Voices, Mustafa has engaged in diplomatic fights with governments to get herself a seat at the table. She was granted an observer seat at the Global Compact on Refugees and managed to make the Compact’s final document draft acknowledge refugee participation.

Ultimately, the panel offered a broad overview into the international community’s engagement with refugees worldwide, though offered no final thoughts on what it might take to effectively manage a global refugee crisis that continues to expand. In Frelick’s words, “we’ve got some heavy lifting before us.”