As refugees flee insecure environments and seek protection in other countries, the treatment of refugees emerges as a contentious issue in international law and cooperation. Countries can be hesitant towards the resettlement of refugees into their country due to domestic political backlash, cheap labor displacing domestic workers, and strains on welfare benefits. With governments fearing the effects of refugees, refugee management — the admittance of refugees into a state’s sovereign territory — is highly disputed. 

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recently released data finding that the number of forcibly displaced people grew from 41 million in 2010 to 78.5 million in 2021. With such a prevalence of refugees, the urgency of solving the cooperation problem of refugee management continues to grow. 

States often act in their own self-interest by not accepting refugees; rather, they count on a neighboring country to address the crisis for them. Oftentimes, the issue will end up being addressed by a country aiming to avoid international crises being born out of the initial threat of persecution the refugees faced in their home country. By acting uncooperatively, countries keep resources to their own citizens, avoid refugee resettlement costs which fall on taxpayers, and suppress domestic protests which hinge on terrorist stereotypes. Specifically, 82% of Hungarians surveyed by Pew Research state that their top concern of refugee crises was the economic shift in “jobs and social benefits,” followed by 76% who cited “the increased likelihood of terrorism in our country.” It is these views which motivate countries’ opposition to refugees. 

However, when countries act in their self-interest, the country whose borders are flooded are faced with unregulated unemployment and scarce resources. Countries who avoid this political and material cost to accepting refugees also face suboptimal conditions though. The Jordanian government, for example, faced domestic protests and international reputational costs regarding human rights crises after turning away 60,000 Syrian refugees. Denying refugees protection also causes greater future refugee crises. After the United States deported Salvadoran refugees in the 1990s, the resulting eruption of Salvadoran gangs against those who fled El Salvador has now led to even greater Salvadoran refugee populations seeking protection in the U.S. 

In the eyes of political scientists, the concern of refugee management can be framed as a tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons is a situation in which some cost of using a public good or common resource is internalized, hence market failure results from a public good being depleted or a common resource being underproduced. Put simply, no actor wants to be the contributor that incurs the cost of providing aid when everyone benefits from refugee management. International social stability and homeostasis among state borders is the underproduced public good in refugee management—states are unwilling to provide this non-excludable condition. International instability results from states acting in their own self-interest; for example, when claims of human rights violations were made after Greece rejected masses of Syrian refugees, Turkey then also neglected integration programs, leading to a proliferation of conflicts. Describing refugee management in terms of the free rider problem, issues with cooperation can be solved if the public good of international stability is provided by a hegemonic power or if free-riders are coerced into contributing. 

The recent refugee situation in Sweden as of 2012 reveals this international sense of failure which results from uncoordinated refugee management. As of 2012, the number of refugees making their way to Sweden increased to over 44,000 people. Swedish politicians accusingly claim that Sweden’s more liberal policies appeared exponentially more appealing to refugees when compared to the restrictions in neighboring European countries. While this shift in migratory flow may have left a greater population of refugees protected in Sweden, it has also left Sweden with rising unemployment and domestic riots against “open-door immigration policy.”¹⁰ Prior to civil unrest against refugee integration being seen in such numbers in Sweden, the government had not been as concerned about relative gains.⁶ However, once domestic attention centered on Sweden’s liberal take on refugees, the government too began to discuss power-maximizing ideas related to the theory of offensive realism where fear of other states drive competition and self-interest. As immigration spilt into domestic politics, Swedish policymakers adopted a harder front on refugees, hence removing itself as the country providing the public good of international stability. ¹⁰

Refugee management has long received international and national attention, hence multiple approaches to facilitate cooperation between states have been taken. The United Nations established the UNHCR in 1950 in response to the European refugee crisis of World War II, and delegated it the authority to “aid and protect refugees” as well as mandate the “local integration or resettlement to a third country.”⁷ Refugees have claimed to favor the authority of the UNHCR over that of a national government as this institution prioritized resettlement into a developed, wealthier “third country.” Refugees in Egypt have even gone as far to say that “we live in a country of UNHCR” after Egyptian authorities unjustly detained thousands of refugees seeking protection.⁸ With the UNHCR’s presence, human rights violations have declined. 

The work of the UNHCR continues to this day. With refugee management split between countries and the UNHCR, it is difficult to distinguish who is responsible for human rights violations. There have been concerns of bureaucratic pathologies as members of the UNHCR may prioritize donor money over refugee welfare, violating both states’ jurisdiction of refugees in their territory, all the while violating human rights. If these claims are true, the UNHCR may be intensifying refugee struggles, thereby demonstrating a failure in efforts to achieve cooperation. 

In one instance in 1967, the UNHCR expanded the 1951 convention to legal universal customary law for the treatment of refugees, inciting governments’ search for escape clauses. For example, Egypt and Israel have expanded refugee status to any forced migrant, hence legally making the entire international community responsible for these displaced people. Since 2012, as humanitarian emergencies continued to escalate in Syria, refugees have largely fled to Egypt. As Syrian civil wars continued and refugee influxes increased, Egypt tightened their refugee integration policies. Although Egypt is now one of 70 countries pledging to provide social programs (healthcare, education, etc.) to refugees, this country previously alienated refugee groups. By doing so, Egypt narrowed the zone of cooperative agreements for refugee crises. 

However, when the 1967 standard was drawn with a more global, flexible focus, compromises allowed governments more authority over certain refugee situations. Article 31 of the 1951 Convention also increased the UNHCR’s legalization as it delegated the ability to identify states as “safe” or “unsafe.” The first “safe” country a refugee enters is where they must seek asylum. This effectively addressed the cooperation problem of refugee management by obligating all “safe” countries to share responsibility for refugees’ protection. All “safe” states were coerced into contributing to international stability, rather than responsibility being claimed only by major powers such as the UK and US.Still, there are challenges associated with Article 31. States have complained that the UNHCR’s jurisdiction encourages states to exploit the flexible interpretation of “safe.” Firstly, UNHCR field offices collect information on refugee flows and human rights situations in each country it deems as either “safe” or “unsafe,” making countries question if UNHCR should have the jurisdiction to investigate or even gather this state information. Still, as states use the UNHCR’s list of countries to develop their own set of “safe” countries, they adopt a more flexible interpretation of Article 31; for example, France interprets a “safe” country as granting “uniformity” across gender while the UK does not.¹¹ While effective in standardizing global standards, the UNHCR has not had complete success over managing refugees because it fails to describe state obligations on how refugee crises should be handled. The convention simply states that refugee management “cannot be achieved without international-cooperation.” 

Still, proceeding organizations were established to better delineate the parameters of when states must accept refugees, namely the International Commission on Human Rights. This branch of the Organization of American States promotes human rights under their jurisdiction over 25 member states. Take, for example, the Sale vs Haitian Centers for Human Rights US Supreme Court of 1993. In 1993, the US denied protection to Haitian refugees who were illegally traveling in naval ships, stating that they never entered American waters, hence the 1951 Convention’s “non-refoulement principle” was not applicable. With the responsibility of monitoring refugee cases, the International Commission on Human Rights declared that the US was unable to file this rejection as it violated universal human rights.¹² This reveals the International Commission on Human Rights as an international organization whose monitoring system furthers solutions to this cooperation problem. 

To address the mistreatment and mismanagement of refugees, we must consider domestic politics, state sovereignty, and bureaucratic pathologies. While the UNHCR and the 1951 Convention on Refugee Status have had success in preventing many refugee crises, major shortcomings continue to exist. 

First, issues pertaining to the limited precision of the UNHCR’s and 1951 Convention’s scopes must be addressed. A more uniform definition of “refugee” in the 1951 Convention would decrease the likelihood of cases such as that between Haiti and the US because countries will have far more difficulty revealing escape clauses in the convention’s writing. If the entrance of refugees is standardized to the crossing of specific borders and pre-designed territories, country versus UNHCR disputes will be minimized. Additionally, if all countries were to have identical criteria for “safe” countries, they would then have the same expectations for refugee treatment. Not only would this better the living standards and integration of refugees, but it would also converge states’ expectations on which country is most likely to respond to a refugee crisis. 

For states concerned about their sovereignty, narrowing the scope of the convention via precision would also be seen as beneficial. Refugee situations would be either directly aligned with UNHCR definitions, or, rather, the state would adopt full responsibility over refugees. This immediate delineation of responsibility may even incentivize states to better address domestic refugee situations as they would not consider—or rely on—the potential involvement of an international institution. 

Works Cited 

 Definitions | refugees and migrants United Nations. United Nations. Available at: https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions

  Thorin M. Wright & Shweta Moorthy (2018) Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression*, International Interactions, 44:1, 132-155, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1273915

  Stephen Castles, International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Global Trends and Issues (International Social Science Journal, 2000), pp. 269-281

  Thorin M. Wright & Shweta Moorthy (2018) Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression*, International Interactions, 44:1, 132-155, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1273915

  Wike, Richard, and Katie Simmons. Europeans Fear Wave of Refigees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs. N.p.: Pew Research Center, 2016.

Alrababa’h, A. and Williamson, S. (2021) Analysis | Jordan shuts out 60,000 Syrian refugees – and then sees a backlash. This is why., The Washington Post. WP Company. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/20/when-jordan-closed-its-border-to-refugees-the-public-protested-heres-why/ 

 Schwartz, S. (2019) Sending refugees back makes the world more dangerous, Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/27/sending-refugees-back-makes-the-world-more-dangerous/

  Fahim, K. (2022) Turkey deports hundreds of Syrian refugees, Human Rights Watch says, The Washington Post. WP Company. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/24/syria-turkey-refugees-deportation/ 

  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014)

  Brett Line, Linda Poon, How Other Countries Handle Immigration (National Geographic, 2013)

  UNHCR. “Information for Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Stateless People.” UNHCR Refugee Agency. Last modified 2001. https://www.unhcr.org/.

 Refugee context in Egypt UNHCR Egypt. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/eg/about-us/refugee-context-in-egypt 

Abstract

The impact of the Syrian crisis had not only spilled over into neighboring countries, but other continents as well. As of December 2018, according to a Mercy Corps report, there were 5.6 million Syrian refugees around the world, and 6.2 million internally displaced people^[1]. This huge number has taken a toll on host countries and talks of ensuring safe return of Syrian refugees to their home countries have been instigated at the international level. This paper will explore the problems associated with the return of Syrian refugees and their reintegration into their home country. It will explore the social and economic dynamics of their return in line with international human rights law. This paper is not written for an organization but is a product of individual policy research on the problem. I will begin by exploring the nature of the problem and its major points then proceed to identify the stakeholders concerned with this policy problem. The data collection method is mainly a synthesis of existing literature and evidence on the issue, provided by international organizations and policy research groups. My target audience is international bodies actively working on the return of these refugees and providing the logistical support this process requires. I will provide recommendations based on the evidence I have found and the method of implementation. 

The Problem

The state of Syrian refugees in the past 2 years has been a central concern of many international and humanitarian organizations working to provide them with the means to continue their life sustainably. Syrian refugees are scattered around the world in countries like Turkey, Germany, Lebanon, and Jordan. The case in Lebanon is especially alarming because of the limited size and capacity of the country to sustain its own citizens, and due to the actual state of living of the refugees in Lebanon. According to the UNHCR, over 50% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in extreme poverty^[2].

In 2017, Hezbollah worked on the return of refugees from the Arsal border area. According to Mohammad Afif, Hezbollah’s media spokesperson: “Through mediators and under specific conditions, a certain amount of refugees will be returning to certain villages in the western Qalamoun”^[3]. However, this was an informal operation that occurred without the intervention of the Syrian and Lebanese governments, just between the party and the opposition groups. This posed a great danger on the rights of the refugees returning to their home countries, and the need for entities like the UNHCR to supervise such operations. Professor Hilal Khashan at the American University of Beirut expressed that this incident reveals the amicable relationship and networks of Hezbollah in Syria. President Michel Aoun expressed in the Arab summit in early 2019 the urgency of the need to return refugees from Lebanon to Syria due to the pressure their presence has had on the already struggling economic crisis in Lebanon^[4]. Lebanon’s Minister of State, Adel Afioni, said his country will follow the Russian strategy for the return of Syrian refugees. This strategy was produced after a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 16, 2018^[5]. It specifies 76 residential areas in Syria to enable the return of around 360,000 Syrian refugees as a first step. 

The second step is to ensure the rehabilitation of the houses to allow for the return of half a million more refugees within a period of two years. As of December of 2018, Lebanon has reported the return of 1000 Syrian refugees to their homeland under the supervision of the Lebanese General Security and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)^[6]. Russia’s interests in the return of refugees stretch beyond the concern for the refugees’ rights and liberties though. Russian interests lie in the urban and infrastructure reconstruction of Syria^[7]. The reconstruction of Syria will promote competition amongst the involved players as they will benefit from major economic bursts. Moreover, since Russia still maintains significant political influence over Assad, it is likely that Russia will win many contracts of such reconstruction.

The main dimensions of this case include the political, legal, social, and economic concerns that come with the return of refugees to their home country^[8]. This return should come hand in hand with preservation of rights, and a ‘voluntary’, ‘safe’, and ‘dignified’ return. The concept of safety, according to the UN and the EU^[9], implies that their return must be linked to credible security guarantees, not just the absence of direct war. Political, legal, social, and economic safety must be guaranteed before planning and launching an initiative like the return of refugees. The concept of ‘voluntary’ return is blurry and must be explicitly defined to avoid loopholes that can pose a potential threat to the rights of refugees. Voluntariness is not simply the consent-giving action of refugees but can be further divided into two indicators: information and lack of coercion. First, refugees wishing to go to Syria based on certain terms of return must have vital information about the nature of their return and their situation after the return. Information about the areas they are returning to must be provided for them to make informed and conscious decisions. The status of their housing, land, and property must be made clear to them. Their status in Syria and their fate is of major importance before returning these refugees. The risk of detention or forced displacement after their return also exists, and it should be communicated to them properly as well as the employment of measures to ensure these incidents do not occur. 

Second, the ‘consent’ of these refugees is not valid in cases where they feel direct and indirect pressure from country officials and certain political groups who have an interest in their return^[10]. In June and July of 2018, Bekaa Valley municipalities conducted an extensive return campaign. They contacted refugees across camps and asked them to fill out surveys about their stance on returning to Syria, asking why they have not returned yet. According to the information in the surveys, the questions were framed in a biased way to encourage return and Syrians felt threatened by this^[11]. Another study was conducted earlier this year in Germany, asking Syrian refugees their perspectives on returning to Syria, and addressing the concept of ‘voluntariness’. Syrian nationals were interviewed face to face as they entered and exited from refugee registration centers. The main hypotheses of this study were: a) refugees who experience direct safety threats during conflict are more likely to consider returning after the restoration of stability in their countries and b) refugees with higher education levels are more likely to return, only if their countries transition to democratic systems of government^[12]. The study examined the influences on refugee decisions to return to their home countries. The results supported the hypotheses and presented the importance of informed refugee decision making. However this study was limited by the absence of ethnic and religious identities from the data and evidence. These two factors are of major importance to individuals and can often be deciding factors. Ethnic and religious identities can be the causes of social distress for returning individuals. Attention must be paid to where refugees are returning and if their return is impacted by the social and cultural rights afforded to them in their home countries. 

Stakeholders

Such a mass scale problem is bound to have numerous stakeholders. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on stakeholders involved in the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon. Two clear stakeholders are the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Without their combined efforts and resources, the UNHCR and other humanitarian bodies cannot undergo the process of returning refugees home. Their material and political resources are of substantial value for the possibility of the safe return of refugees and the protection of their rights. However, some speculate that the return of Syrian refugees, from the perspective of the Assad regime, bolsters the claim that the regime won the war and is re-establishing control in the country. As a result, the Syrian regime benefits from this image of Syria being ‘safe’ and stable,’ establishing a positive international and local, political and military image. 

The United Nations is another very important stakeholder as it can be the medium of political discussions and negotiations between countries, with its political and human resources providing it with strong influence. The United Nations has the legitimacy needed to provide recommendations to host countries planning the return of Syrian refugees and pressure leaders to abide by international human rights law. The UN stated that conditions in Syria do not allow for large number of Syrians to return to their homes, even if the fighting has subsided^[13]. Organizations like SAWA for Development and Aid and Mercy Corps provide great sources of research and investigation on issues faced by refugees around the world, especially Syrian refugees. Such organizations and other civil society groups can help provide data and evidence as well as policy recommendations for decision makers and political leaders to take into consideration. Unfortunately, their power is somewhat limited to only human resources because they have little to no effect on how political decisions pan out at the end of the day, due to deep-rooted political interests in each country. 

Solutions

The primary data collection method I used for this paper was the synthesis of existing evidence from studies conducted on the prospects of returning refugees and the impact of returns on them on the long-term. I also conducted an individual face to face interview with a Syrian man living in Lebanon. The recent report produced by the UNHCR found that security is the single greatest factor that determines the return of refugees. ^[14]Refugees hoping for return are concerned with the basic services they need to live a healthy and developed life. Health, education and good infrastructure are the driving factors for return. In the report, 10% of the refugee population showed prospects of return if the rate of security doubled and the implementation of services tripled within the next five years. The report emphasized that voluntary return under good conditions can improve welfare while policies with focus only on maximizing the number of returns will reduce welfare. The report claimed that a more broad approach can have long-term positive impacts. This means that focusing on improving conditions for the Syrians and their host communities can increase the chance for voluntary return. 

On May 7^th, 2018, I interviewed a 28 year old Syrian refugee living and working in Lebanon. For the purpose of his privacy the alias Abbas will be used. Abbas fled Syria in 2014 amidst security threats to him and his family. He is originally from Der El Zor and his family owned 100 acres of land in the area. During the war, their house was partially destroyed and their farming and heavy machinery were destroyed. Property valued upwind of $100,000 was lost or destroyed and no prospect of life seemed possible. I asked Abbas what major factor would contribute to his return to Syria, and his response supported studies previously mentioned. Land and security are the two driving factors that would prompt Abbas and his family to return home to their village. Land is the significant economic factor here, and security is  a widely cited factor. I asked Abbas if he would return to a different town in Syria if it had economic potential for his family, and his response was one I had not heard before. He said: “absolutely not,” as social factors would burden him and his family because the new town would have different social/cultural tendencies. This prompted me to ask if he would consider migrating to a European or other Arab country and his response was again a negative. Abbas expressed urgent desire to return back home to his hometown and land, saying nothing else would replace that. “You either go back to where you belong, or you don’t at all” were the words Abbas chose. This however, is not the case for all Syrian refugees, particularly as some of the refugees’ hometowns are completely destroyed. But this draws attention to the importance of the social aspect of the problem, and the need for further investigation into the social reintegration of refugees into their communities. 

Implementation

The first and most important step in implementation is collecting the necessary information regarding refugees returning through self-organized methods. This poses a threat to their security but they do so because they distrust Lebanese authorities and all other involved actors. Second, little is known about the magnitude of the start-to-finish costs of implementing the return of refugees back to Syria. The General Security returns cost around $200 while others organized by local communities may cost $100^[15]. This does not include the arrangement of independent transport across the border. In terms of the role of the UNHCR, clarity should be provided because refugees are unaware of the exact role of the UNHCR, specifically on whether it covers the General Security costs or acts as an informal observer. Such information is key to the concept of ‘voluntary’ return. Without such information, refugees cannot make informed decisions. International humanitarian intervention should be limited to protecting the refugees’ post-return and ensuring safety conditions in the areas they will be returning to. Such a massive policy cannot be implemented abruptly, and a gradual approach may provide for better results in the long term. Refugees in urgent need for return should be prioritized based on criteria set by the Human Rights Watch and similar bodies to ensure fair and equal return of all refugees. 

Conclusion

According to the data synthesized in this paper, the major points of concern regarding the safe and dignified return of Syrian refugees rely on both voluntary return and security conditions post-return. Due to the territorial sovereignty of Syria, it will be difficult, yet not impossible, to implement security standards of protection for returning refugees. The UN can distribute humanitarian aid in the towns that need assistance the most and promote social cohesion between the returning population and the current residing Syrians. The research regarding this problem lacks the financial and logistical tactics needed to employ solutions. Financial experts on return and restructuring of cities must weigh in on the policy and provide the necessary expertise to ensure the effective implementation of this for the sake of long-term impacts. 

^[1]Quick Facts: What You Need to Know about the Syria Crisis.” Mercy Corps, August 26, 2019. https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis.

^[2]“Beirut, Damascus Working Together for Return of Syrian Refugees.” Press TV,2018.

^[3]Nazih Osseiran and Rhys Dubin. “Detained Lebanese ‘in Good Health’.” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon), 2017.

^[4]Lebanon Uses Arab Summit to Call for Syrian Refugees’ Return. Postmedia Network Inc, Toronto, 2019.

^[5]Aoun, Putin talk Russian role in Syrian refugee returns. Daily Star, Lebanon. Mar 26, 2019.

^[6]Lebanon to rely on Russian strategy for return of Syrian refugees: Minister (2019). . Tehran: SyndiGate Media Inc.

^[7]Anchal Vohra. Russia’s Payback Will Be Syria’s Reconstruction Money. Foreign Policy. May 5 2019

^[8]Mhaissen, 18

^[9]Reardon, Christopher. “Eight years on, Syrian refugees weigh thorny question of return”. UNHCR.  https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2019/3/5c83eafa4/eight-years-syrian-refugees-weigh-thorny-question-return.html

^[10]Mhaissen, 19

^[11]Mhaissen, 23

^[12]Serdar & Orchard, 5

^[13]Schlein, Lisa. UN warns against mass return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon. VOA News January 10, 2019 3:01 PM https://www.voanews.com/a/un-warns-against-mass-return-of-syrian-refugees-from-lebanon/4737514.html

^[14]Bank, World. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019. 8, 262.

^[15]Mhaissen, 26

Bibliography:

• Bank, World. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019. 
• “Beirut, Damascus Working Together for Return of Syrian Refugees.” Press TV, 2018. 
• Collard, Rebecca. “Syrian Refugees Return from Lebanon to an Uncertain Future.” FT.Com (2018).
• “Economic Projects to further Return of Syrian Refugees – Lavrov.” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire,2018. 
• Kaya, Serdar and Phil Orchard. “Prospects of Return: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Germany.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies (2019): 1-18. 
• “Lebanon to Rely on Russian Strategy for Return of Syrian Refugees: Minister.” Press TV,2019. 
• Lebanon Uses Arab Summit to Call for Syrian Refugees’ Return. Toronto: Postmedia Network Inc, 2019.
• Leiserson, Elizabeth. “Securing the Borders Against Syrian Refugees: When Non-Admission Means Return.” The Yale Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (2017): 185.
• Marks, Jesse. Syrian Refugees Face Growing Pressure to Return to Insecure Conditions. Here’s Why: With Resettlement and Integration Largely Off the Table, Return is Reduced to a Political Tool. Washington: WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington Post, 2019.
• Mhaissen, Rouba. Hodges, Elena. Unpacking Return: Syrian Refugees’ Conditions Concerns Sawa for Development and Aid. 2019
• Rhys Dubin and Nazih Osseiran. “Hezbollah Mediating Safe Return of Syrian Refugees.” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon),2017.
• Syria Arab republic, United States: End of fighting in Syria not enough for spontaneous return of Syrian refugees. MENA Report (2019). 
• Syrian Refugees Return Home from Lebanon. SyndiGate Media Inc, Tehran, 2019.
• “United Nations/Syria/Lebanon: UN Warns Against Mass Return of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon.” Asia News Monitor,2019.
• Vignal, Leïla. “Perspectives on the Return of Syrian Refugees.” Forced Migration Review no. 57 (2018): 69-71. 
• Yahya, Maha, Carnegie Middle East Center, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Unheard Voices: What Syrian Refugees Need to Return Home. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018.

“Friendship is indispensable to man for the proper function of his memory. Remembering our past, carrying it with us always, may be the necessary requirement for maintaining, as they say, the wholeness of the self. To ensure that the self doesn’t shrink, to see that it holds on to its volume, memories have to be watered like potted flowers, and the watering calls for regular contact with the witnesses of the past, that is to say, with friends. They are our mirror; our memory; we ask nothing of them but that they polish the mirror from time to time so we can look at ourselves in it.” ― Milan Kundera, Identity

INTRODUCTION

On a breezy day in late July, Abdul Sane bikes to a plot of land outside of Forte Di Acqui Park in Alessandria, Italy. The plot is flanked on both sides by vegetable gardens run by Caritas Diocesana of Alessandria, which distributes lots to economically vulnerable citizens for farming. Sane wears the top portion of a beekeeper’s suit and lights a hive smoker stuffed with dried grass. An experienced beekeeper of two years, he slips on a veil to protect his head and face, but forgoes gloves. He wanders over to an expansive apiary comprised of twenty bee hives. Surrounded by synchronized buzzing and puffing smoke along the way, he explains, “The smoke calms the bees, making my job easier.”^[1]

Sane is head beekeeper of the Bee My Job program established and managed by the Associazione di Sociale Promozione Cambalache (APS Cambalache). The mission of Bee My Job is to promote the social and economic integration of asylum-seekers and immigrants. It functions as a professional training program that teaches participants the art of beekeeping through month-long classes and visits to regional apicultural centers. The honey that is produced is sold locally, and the entire social enterprise is exclusively managed by its participants. The program also promotes sociocultural integration by requiring enrollment in courses on the Italian language, pathways to citizenship, and occupational safety. The program is geared toward asylum-seekers and immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, but any individual who has been granted some form of legal status is eligible for enrollment.

Bee My Job was established in response to the growing number of asylum-seekers arriving on Italian shores in 2014. That year, over 170,000 immigrants and asylum-seekers arrived by sea, a number approximately four times higher than in 2013.^[2] The majority were Syrians fleeing the violence of civil war, and others were Eritreans, Malians, Gambians, and Nigerians escaping combinations of dictatorship, armed conflict, and poverty.^[3] Most traveled through Libya, Egypt, and Turkey. Since its launch, Bee My Job has trained over 100 beekeepers and has placed upwards of 90 of them into long-term, rather than seasonal, employment. The program has been recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as a model for successful integration.

Sane fled the political instability and poverty of Senegal in 2015. Despite Senegal being lauded as one of the most stable democracies in post-colonial Africa, the ongoing separatist violence in the southwestern region of Casamance has produced a sizable population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2015, over a million refugees arrived in Europe by sea. Of the total registered, 84 percent came from the world’s top ten refugee producing countries, indicating that most were fleeing war or persecution.^[4] Italy received about 154,000 of these individuals, and approximately 6,000 were Senegalese asylum seekers.^[5] Sane has been granted refugee status in Italy but has no imminent plans to return to Senegal, as the situation has yet to stabilize. As of the beginning of 2018, it is estimated that there are currently 22,000 IDPs in Senegal.^[6]

He leaves behind his wife and family, for Sane is unwilling to ask them to undergo the same journey through Libya. He says, “Working with bees is easy compared to the slave labor I was forced to do in Libya, where I was given one piece of bread a day and tortured.”^[7] With his bare hands, he methodologically dismantles each beehive constructed out of upcycled wooden filing cabinets. Each cabinet is filled with metal reams that serve as scaffolding for honeycombs. As the bees buzz around him, Sane explains that he was trained as an electrician. When he arrived in southern Italy, he made his way north, and it was by chance that he received  an opportunity to realize his unknown dream of becoming a beekeeper.

Sane’s journey from his native country to Italy via boat is fairly common amongst most asylum-seekers and immigrants in Italy. What is less common, however, is that he has been granted a stable form of legal permanent residency and has been placed into an integration program that offers him opportunities for language acquisition, community and cultural engagement, housing, education, and gainful employment. Sane’s success exemplifies the best of the Italian asylum system that has struggled to accommodate the large waves of mass displacement and migration of recent years.

ECOSYSTEMS OF REFUGEE SUPPORT

Alessandria, Italy, is a mid-sized Italian town of a population of about 100,000 people. It is usually not a destination, but instead a stop along the way because of its strategic location an hour away from from the major hubs of Turin, Milan, and Genoa. However, in recent years, it has become a desirable resettlement city for asylum-seekers and immigrants seeking a quiet transition to Italian life largely due to its close-knit community and the plethora of social integration enterprises operating within the city’s boundaries.

Bee My Job and Il Chiostro Hostel are two of about thirty local integration projects in Alessandria that implement traditional integration methodologies through innovative social enterprises. They prioritize independent, sustainable, and integrated living for the asylum-seekers and immigrants by providing Italian classes, housing, employment training and placement, opportunities for cultural exchange, and support navigating the Italian immigration system.

Mara Alacqua, executive director and founding member of APS Cambalache, explains that civil society organizations have had the largest hand in integrating asylum-seekers and immigrants. APS Cambalache, upon its initial formation in 2012, was comprised of just Alacqua and a colleague, both eager to serve the asylum-seekers and immigrants struggling to navigate new societies. The organization’s mission is to “promote the social integration of vulnerable groups; active citizenship; the social and economic rights of marginal groups and of society as a whole.”^[8] The name of the organization is inspired by Alacqua’s time living and working as an immigrant in Argentina and Spain; it borrows from the Spanish word “cambalache,” meaning a swap or exchange and is also inspired by the Argentine tango song of same name that is critical of 20th century corruption.

Over the past six years, Alacqua has transformed APS Cambalache into an official integration organization funded by the Italian government. Its staff now includes an on-site psychotherapist, Italian teachers, a housing coordinator, a health coordinator, case managers, and administrators. APS Cambalache also manages seven apartments that house the 41 asylum-seekers and immigrants currently enrolled in their programs.

For Alacqua, community-based integration efforts are the best way to promote functional immigration policy. “We need more and more opportunities for NGOs to put people in proximity with each other,” she says.^[9] In addition to running the Bee My Job program, APS Cambalache oversees a small garden managed by program participants. The organization also plans cultural events in the community that provide local residents opportunities to interact with asylum-seekers and immigrants to break down cultural stigmas. In the past, some of these events have included art and dance classes, as well as in-home cooking celebrations.

Around the corner from the APS Cambalache office is the Il Chiostro Hostel, a social enterprise run by Marco Ciavaglioli and Vanda Manieri. In 2011, Ciavalioli and Manieri purchased and renovated an abandoned building that is now the only hostel operating in Alessandria. When the local police and government requested that they open their doors for asylum-seekers and immigrants in need of temporary housing, not only did they agree, but they also decided to incorporate this as an element of their enterprise. The hostel has since functioned as any traditional hostel does, providing affordable accommodation for travelers, while also doubling as a housing and integration project for asylum-seekers and immigrants. Il Chiostro is home to about 30 asylum-seekers and refugees who help manage the facilities while enrolled in Italian classes and employed. The large courtyard area is used as a community hub that facilitates cultural exchange, often through movie nights and community dialogues.

Alacqua, Ciavalioili, and Manieri all remark that negative attitudes harbored by local residents towards asylum-seekers and immigrants are possibly related to past experiences of discrimination or feelings of jealousy. Alacqua, whose father is originally from Sicily, recounts the discrimination that Sicilians originally faced when migrating to northern Italy. Distinguished by the color of their skin and their labor-intensive skills sets, many landlords refused to rent to Sicilians, displaying signs that read “Housing, but not to Sicilians.”^[10] She says the phenomena has emerged once more, but in the form of “Housing, but not to immigrants, refugees, and Africans.”^[11]

Ironically for Alacqua, it is often previous groups of immigrants who are most hostile to new ones. Eastern Europeans immigrants who received little aid upon initial resettlement often resent asylum-seekers and immigrants, feeling as if they are unfairly benefiting from government welfare that was not offered to the immigrants of the past. Racial prejudices and biases against many of these newer arrivals only compound the hostility. While disavowing racist attitudes, Alacqua clarifies that the economic concerns of local residents should not be hastily dismissed; it is true that the recent influx of asylum-seekers and immigrants has created competition in the agricultural industry, as they are willing to work for lower wages.^[12]

Alacqua also emphasizes that it is hypocritical for Italians for seek the closure of their borders when so many immigrated to other countries for work or education. She says, “There are more Italians that go abroad for economic reasons than asylum-seekers who arrive here.” Alacqua is right. In 2015, one of the peak years for oceanic migration to Italy, nearly 2.5 million Italians were residing as foreign nationals in other countries.^[13] The top countries of residence were Germany, the United States, France, Canada, and Switzerland, which also coincide with the top destination countries of choice for many asylum-seekers and immigrants.^[14]

Elsewhere in Italy, civil society groups are taking more radical approaches to aid asylum-seekers and immigrants,even encouraging increased migration. On the outskirts of Rome, there exists an enclave of tents and makeshift homes located thirty minutes south of the Tiburtina railway station. The community of denizens consists of male asylum-seekers and immigrants whose applications for legal residency in Italy are pending or have been rejected, and who are reluctant to return to their countries of origin for reasons of persecution or substandard living conditions.

The encampment is essentially an occupation in the style of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests in New York City. The walls of the buildings alongside the south end of the encampment are painted with graffiti promoting open borders, world peace, and rights for all. Men lounging around the encampment are engaged in a variety of activities: some are listening to music and surfing the internet on their cellphones, others are invested in a competitive game of soccer, and a group of men are huddled around a pot simmering with goat stew. While some of these men have arrived in Rome with wives and children, they do not stay in the encampment and are instead prioritized for placements in city shelters. The residents do not equivocate when they say that neither their informal encampment nor formal refugee camps are safe places for women and children.

Though there is no name for the encampment itself, the collective that lives and volunteers there is known as the “Baobab Experience,” an homage to the deciduous tree native to many parts of Africa, the native continent of most camp residents. The collective formed in 2015 in response to an institutional void in the Italian capital. There was no resource hub for migrants, so volunteers stepped in to provide immediate resources and aid for migrants who stopped in Rome while making their journey to other parts of Europe. On a daily basis, volunteers coordinate daily dinners, activities for the residents, and provide material and legal aid.

The Baobab Experience has a fraught relationship with the Roman police, who are unsure of what to do with the them. Local authorities have evicted the collective over 20 times since its original launch, for fear that it was encouraging asylum-seekers and immigrants to stay in Rome. This fear is not entirely unfounded; to date, Baobab Experience has aided over 60,000 individuals, and volunteers remark that the organization functions as a sort of informal migration and integration corridor for many seeking to journey to Europe.^[15]

The new location for the encampment is secluded from the busiest parts of Rome,tucked away between an enclave of trees to disincentive further police raids. Volunteers believe they have finally found a safe location, as it is unlikely the police would travel so out of their way to execute another eviction. Make no mistake, the police are aware of the new location, but are making a compromise: the alternative would be for the collective’s inhabitants to be visible and homeless on the streets of Rome, public nuisances in one of the world’s most popular tourist destinations.

Despite the optimism of the volunteers, feelings of frustration and hopelessness with the dead ends of Italian and international immigration policy permeate the camp. Upon entry into the encampment, there is a tattered cloth poster that hangs on a chain link fence, reading “Love us as you love [yourselves]. We are not the problem. We are your mirror. The future of all will become a big problem if we don’t generate love. No love. No peace.”^[16]

THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Liberal western democracies across Europe and North America are confronting alt-right populist extremism stoked by anxieties about economic disenfranchisement and ethnocentric attitudes. Italy is no exception to this, and the political shift has played a large role in the formation of immigration policy fueled by xenophobia, racism, and fear. In June 2018, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (MS5) party and the hard-right Lega party struck a deal to form a new coalition government.

M5S launched in the wake of the Eurozone crisis in 2009 as an anti-European Union, anti-establishment party railing against the corruption of the Italian political elite. Lega was originally established as “Lega Nord,” or the Northern League, a regional party that distinguished itself from Southern Italians through racism and classism, and pushed for the secession of the more prosperous and historically homogeneous northern industrial Italian territories. The party recently dropped the regional label in order to more towards a more inclusive platform, bettering the chances of electoral victory. However, the boundaries of their inclusivity end at Italy’s borders. As part of their rebranding, Lega has championed an “Italy First” platform centered around opposing  immigration and European unity.

An incident in the northern Italian town of Macerata in February 2018, ahead of the March general elections, pushed immigration to the forefront of public discourse. On February 1st, the body of 18-year-old Pamela Mastropietro, an Italian native battling drug addiction, was found dismembered in two suitcases. She was reported missing from her drug rehabilitation program two days prior. The investigation has yet to conclude whether she died as the result of a drug overdose at the house of her dealer, a documented Nigerian immigrant, or whether she was murdered. Despite the legal status of her dealer, the event became a flashpoint amidst rising anxiety about an invasion of undocumented foreigners, evoking fierce public protest.

In retaliation for Mastropietro’s murder, Lt. Col. Michele Roberti, the local commander of Italy’s elite police force, the Carabinieri, drove through the streets of Macerata and fired about 30 shots over the course of 90 minutes.^[17] He targeted dark-skinned pedestrians, wounding six African asylum-seekers and immigrants with non-life threatening injuries. Roberti was once a candidate for the Northern League, and upon his arrest on the steps of Macerata’s Fascist-era war memorial, bore the Italian flag draped around his shoulders.^[18] After this attack, nearly every immigrant moved away from Macerata for fear of further violence.

During the 2018 March elections, MS5 captured 222 seats in parliament, the most of any party, while Lega won 124 seats. Together, their coalition captured more than the 316 seats needed to have a majority. Many Italians believe that the events in Macerata were the tipping point for undecided Italian voters. After the elections, Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, a Lega party member, pledged to deport 500,000 undocumented asylum-seekers immigrants to the fanfare of many.^[19] At a rally in northern Italy, he commanded asylum-seekers and immigrants to “get ready to pack [their] bags.” ^[20] This aggressively anti-immigration rhetoric contributed to the increase of Lega’s poll ratings up to 26% from less than 18% at the time of the general elections in March 2018.^[21]

TRAGEDY, THEN FARCE

Historically, Italy has been no stranger to migration, both regular and irregular. According to Enrico Pugliese, a sociologist at Sapienza University of Rome who studies influxes of immigration into Italy, the major migration waves of the mid-twentieth century were beneficial to the economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, Tunisians came to Apulia to work as fisherman, farm hands, and construction workers. They were followed by women leaving Catholic countries in Africa and South America to work as waitresses.^[22] In 1976, Yugoslavians immigrated to Italy to help with reconstruction work in the northeastern region of Friuli after a 6.5 magnitude earthquake.^[23] With the exception of the Yugoslavians, most immigrants were undocumented and settled throughout southern Italy, as most arrived by sea.

A marked shift in the occupational patterns of immigrants occurred in the 1980s, a period of increased investment in the southern Italian economy that led to rapid economic growth. Immigrants, primarily from Senegal and Morocco, assumed the roles of street vendors, a class called the “vu’ cumprà,” which translates to “Would you like to buy?”^[24] The term has become fixed in the Italian lexicon with racist and derogatory connotations and still remains in use. Throughout the 1980s, women continued to arrive in Italy from Catholic countries in South America, the Horn of Africa, and the Philippines, primarily working as domestic workers.^[25]

Everything changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing economic crisis in former Eastern Bloc countries. In Albania, inflation peaked at over 350 percent and the annual GDP decreased by over 50 percent annually.^[26] For the average Albanian, this manifested in unemployment, food shortages, and social unrest. Cargo ships would transport tens of thousands of Albanian emigrants to Italy; in 1991,  Albanians began arriving on the shores of southern Italy.^[27] On March 7th, 1991 alone, 20,000 disembarked from one ship in the southeastern port of Bari.^[28]

At the onset of the migration, the Albanian migrants were welcomed by local residents and were offered temporary shelter by the government. However, officials in Rome quickly changed course upon realizing they were effectively opening a migration rather than a humanitarian corridor. The main point of contention, which is still present in contemporary immigration debates, was one of classification: Were Albanians official refugees, as defined by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, or not? Qualifying individuals must be able to prove a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” in their country of origin “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”^[29] The official Italian position was that, as their country was experiencing a transition to democracy, the Albanian arrivals were not political refugees, but rather “illegal economic migrants.”^[30]

Following this pivot in immigration policy, military and police units were dispatched to deport as many individuals as they could via plane or ferry. Those who could not be deported immediately were rounded up in sports stadiums, which served either as detention or reception centers depending on what authorities decided for each individual. These migration flows leveled off until 1997, when the outbreak of the Albanian Civil War forcibly displaced Albanians who the international community undisputedly considered official, legal refugees. Italy, however, did not change course. The Italian Navy engaged in a proactive and preventative immigration enforcement campaign, effectively blockading any maritime vessels transporting Albanian refugees.

The criminalization of Albanian immigrants nearly thirty years ago has created a long-lasting irregular migration issue that largely remains unresolved. Most Albanian immigrants who arrived between 1990-1998 and who managed to remain in the country were undocumented. It is estimated that out of about 150,000 Albanian immigrants in Italy in 1998, only about 82,000 were registered with authorities. Even after the Italian government undertook efforts to legalize the status of most undocumented immigrants after 1999, a sizable undocumented Albanian population remained. In 2003, about one-fifth of all Albanians in Italy lacked legal documentation, indicating that the government’s hardline immigration policies to control “illegal economic migrants” have largely been ineffective. ^[31] These policies fail to expel individuals and offer pathways to legal status, perpetuating irregular migration and dysfunctional immigration policies.

The case of Albanian immigrants and asylum-seekers attempting to resettle in Italy in the 1990s echoes accounts of what has transpired on the Italian coast in the last decade. From 2000 to September 2018, over 977,000 asylum-seekers and immigrants from internationalized conflicts, such as the Syrian Civil War and the Arab Spring, reached Italy by boat via Libya.^[32] The migration influx has steadily continued despite the hardline, security-oriented enforcement policies of criminalization and deportation that have remained in place and only expanded. While the Italian military and police are no longer being dispatched to physically round asylum-seekers up for deportation, the effective criminalization of these individuals has continued via the consequences of a dysfunctional asylum system beyond capacity and maritime immigration enforcement efforts.

These enforcement policies ignore the reality that migration will continue while failing to offer humane and lawful solutions for asylum-seekers and immigrants already present. They also fail to address the most pressing questions of contemporary Italian society: What should be done about established asylum-seekers and undocumented immigrants without pathways to legalization, without guarantees of safety and stability in their native countries, and without the means to go elsewhere?

ITALIAN ASYLUM LAW AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Italy has a complex legal schema for adjudicating asylum claims that has developed substantively over the past few decades. It is bound by legal obligations to asylum-seekers at the supranational, regional, national, and local levels. In spite of such extensive legal obligations, the system has failed some asylum-seekers because of conflicting regional interests, changing public opinions, inadequacies within asylum law itself, capacity limitations, and of course, debates over immigration policy.

At the supranational level, Italy has ratified the most important international treaties designed to protect the rights of asylum-seekers and the principle of family reunification. It is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, whose Article 14 enshrines “the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”^[33] Italy has also ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which established the principle of non-refoulement, thereby prohibiting the expulsion or repatriation of a refugee in the event their “life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”^[34]

However, the 1951 Convention also includes a provision that relinquishes countries from the aforementioned obligation for cases where there are reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee as “a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”^[35] The broad scope and ambiguity in this provision leaves some asylum-seekers and immigrants at the mercy of narrow and politicized interpretations of international law. This provision fails to anticipate the contemporary political environment in which the rhetoric surrounding immigration has largely not been about upholding the rights of asylum-seekers and immigrants, but rather about expelling them as expediently as possible because of hypothetical and unfounded threats to public safety.

What makes Italy unique from other signatories of the United Nations’ legislation on asylum policy and from its members states in the European Union is that its national constitution guarantees a universal right of asylum. Article 10 of the Italian Constitution proclaims that “[a] foreigner who, in his home country, is denied the actual exercise of the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian constitution shall be entitled to the right of asylum under the conditions established by law.”^[36] To uphold this principle, the Italian government has created national and regional agencies to provide material and legal aid to asylum-seekers, to process and review their applications, and to monitor their status. Once an asylum-seeker is granted refugee status by the Italian government, they are entitled to access the same benefits as all Italian citizens.

However, the way in which the Italian asylum system operates has not always been orderly and within the bounds of due process. As the country has faced overwhelming influxes of sea arrivals and asylum-requests in recent decades, the scaffolding for the asylum framework has been built and modified as needed.

In its most recent iteration, the Italian asylum system has functioned through a two-step process. Upon arrival, asylum-seekers are to receive first-aid and assistance in centers at points of entry. The legal status of asylum-seekers is supposed to be determined at these centers, and they are only to spend the amount of time necessary for their processing to be completed. Three types of these centers exist, based on demand: First Aid and Reception Centers, also known as “hotspots”; Collective Centers run by the government; and Temporary Reception Centers run by local prefectures. In theory, the first two centers should be adequate for housing all asylum-seekers at any given time, and the third type of center is an emergency measure if the first two asylum reception centers are overwhelmed. 

Once asylum-seekers are processed and granted some form of protection, they are transferred to the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR), which coordinates their resettlement and integration processes. In 2002, SPRAR grew out of the National Asylum Program (NAP), an asylum-seeker reception system originally conceived by Ngô Đình Lệ Quyên. Ngô Đình designed the program during her tenure at the Catholic humanitarian NGO, Caritas Italy. She was a human rights lawyer, the niece of South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm, and a refugee herself.

SPRAR is a publicly-funded network of local authorities and NGOs, which collaborate to foster long-term integration through small-scale, high-impact projects. As of February 2018, there were 876 SPRAR projects, including Bee My Job and Il Chiostro Hostel. Asylum-seekers whose initial applications are rejected are entitled to two appeals processes, during which they can continue to receive government aid.

However, the lack of places in Temporary Reception Centers has created a bottleneck effect in the asylum system, causing massive dysfunction. Instead of prioritizing the processing of asylum-applications, immigration officials instead must scramble to accommodate arrivals. In effect, many asylum-seekers have experienced wait times of years for asylum decisions. Many, unwilling to create a life in light of uncertainty, seek asylum elsewhere, disrupting the regional EU protocols for tracking asylum applications.

The failure of the Italian asylum system because of capacity limitations has affected not only the lives of immigration officials and asylum-seekers, but also Italian society as whole. The dysfunction has falsely confirmed for some native Italians that asylum-seekers bring chaos and disorder to society, and that there is no place for them in Italy. These illusory falsehoods create a positive feedback loop in which Italian authorities and public opinion criminalize asylum-seekers for systemic failures beyond their control, disincentivizing politicians from reforming a dysfunctional system. The dynamic between the Baobab Experience and Roman authorities exemplifies this dynamic.

Still, the spirit of Italy’s constitution and laws as well as its commitments to international human rights law is one of supporting asylum-seekers. If the capacity of Italy’s asylum system was adequate to address the large influxes of arrivals in recent years, it is unlikely that immigration would continue to be as controversial as it has become.

PUSHING BORDERS BEYOND BORDERS

In 2017, Italy received the second-highest number of asylum requests behind Germany.^[37] That year, only 41.8 percent of all applications for some form of immediate protection, or “first instance applications,” were granted.^[38] Of 130,119 applicants, 75,730 were denied permission to remain in Italy, though it is unclear how many of the latter group have left.^[39] As an EU member state, Italy should not be solely responsible for managing the mass migration to its shores. The unwillingness of other EU nations to provide monetary support and to offer refugee resettlement placements has contributed to the development of Italian immigration policies that needlessly endanger lives. Since 2014, Italy’s immigration policy has pivoted to focus on the externalization of its borders to deter oceanic journeys from earlier inception points.

The motivation to prevent arrivals is to clandestinely rid the country of having to fulfill the obligations of the EU’s Dublin Regulation, which assigns the responsibility for processing the claims of asylum-seekers and immigrants based on the country of first arrival. Once individuals disembark on Italian shores, they are entitled to due process regarding any asylum claims, and the Italian government must ensure its completion. While asylum claims are being processed and adjudicated, Italy has the sole obligation to house applicants in a reception center.

Critics of the Dublin Regulation often claim that there needs to be more responsibility-sharing when it comes to mass migration. Without regional agreements that would systemically resettle asylum-seekers and immigrants in other countries, the coastal EU countries remain disproportionately affected by irregular migration and its corollary responsibilities and costs.

For this reason, the Italian aversion to immigration has manifested in maritime interception efforts, obstruction of humanitarian rescue ships from docking, and the domestic legal criminalization of arrivals. The governments of Italy, Tunisia, and Libya have also cooperated to intercept ships of asylum-seekers and immigrants headed for Italy, often interfering with the efforts of humanitarian rescue operations and jeopardizing lives. Rescue ships that have reached Italian shores have been held up for days and weeks before being turned away and directed to have the migrants disembark in other countries.

In the fall of 2013, the Italian government launched the year-long Operation Mare Nostrum with the mandate of decreasing the number of oceanic deaths. It was a direct response to the capsizing of two boats off the coast of Lampedusa, where over 600 individuals died.^[40] The Italian Navy, with the EU’s border security agency, Frontex, rescued over 150,000 asylum-seekers and immigrants. However, critics argued that it was incentivizing migration and too costly: the European Commission provided €1.8 million to run the operation for a year.^[41]

The Frontex-led Operation Triton replaced Operation Mare Nostrum to the concern of many human rights advocates because it prioritized “border control and surveillance” rather than search and rescue.^[42] Fifteen EU member states contributed to a much more limited effort: unlike Mare Nostrum, which patrolled waters right up to the Libyan coast, Triton’s ships only patrolled within 30 nautical miles of the Italian coast.^[43] The objective of decreasing sea arrivals to Italy was achieved, but at an extremely high cost: the International Organization for Migration reported that deaths at sea in the Mediterranean region increased ninefold after the end of Operation Mare Nostrum.^[44]

Other efforts to control and halt immigration have varied in success depending on the enforcement capacity of Tunisia and Libya. Detention centers have been constructed by both governments, with support from the European Union (EU), to control the influx of asylum-seekers and immigrants. Italy and Libya have faced a barrage of legal challenges as a result of their cooperation, with allegations of violating international and regional asylum and refugee law.

The looming question for Italian policymakers—spanning back to the Albanian asylum-seekers and immigrants of the 1990s—is what to do with those rejected for legal residence. Up until this point, there still has not been a large-scale campaign of detention and deportation in Italy, as with Albanian immigrants.

Under Salvini’s helm, that may soon change as he plans large-scale, systemic detention and deportation for all asylum-seekers and immigrants. His promise to deport 500,000 people from Italy may placate the worries of Italian citizens, but it is likely unviable because Italy does not have the infrastructure to deporting asylum-seekers and immigrants en masse. In 2017, Italy deported 6,514 migrants, and 5,817 in 2016.^[45]

According to Federico Soda, the director of the International Office of Migration’s Mediterranean office, if Italy wants to increase these numbers substantially, the government would have to form deportation agreements with each migrant’s country of origin.^[46] This would be a difficult task as many countries have no incentive to form these agreements. And, in 2017 alone, over 60 countries of origin were recorded at Italian ports.^[47]

Not only will large-scale deportations be unfeasible, but they will also prove costly endeavors. According to Italian law, two government agents have to accompany each deportee as they travel back to their country of origin.^[48] It is estimated that for a recent deportation flight involving 29 Tunisians, 74 government agents, including doctors, nurses, and policy officers, had to accompany the deportees. ^[49] The cost of the operation is estimated at $135,000, or $4,600 per deportee.^[50] If Italy plans to deport 500,000 people, it could cost the Italian government nearly $2.3 billion.

Michael Flynn, executive director of the Global Detention Project, notes that money is not the only cost of such a policy, as deportation would “do irreparable physical and psychological damage to thousands of people, many of whom have already suffered unspeakable tragedy and trauma.”^[51] Alacqua raised the point that while it is true some originally do not leave their countries as refugees, but as economic migrants, they may acquire refugee status during their journey based on the harsh conditions they endure. Furthermore, the weaponization of deportation as a politically expedient tool could cost Italy its  credibility as a liberal democracy that is committed to upholding international and regional human rights law and policy.

However, this is only important insofar as Salvini and other Italian leaders care about belonging to a comity of liberal democracies, which is doubtful. Salvini has proven that he will go to potentially criminal lengths to uphold his hard-line immigration aspirations. In August 2018, Salvini stalled the Ubaldo Diciott rescue ship carrying 177 asylum-seekers and immigrants onboard from disembarking in Catania, where it docked after being stranded at sea for five days.

Before disembarkation, which occurred six days into the confrontation, Salvini wanted assurance that other nations would resettle the migrants . As a result, an Italian court launched an investigation into whether he could be tried on charges of kidnapping, illegal confinement and abuse of power. Despite the court recommendation that he stand trial, Salvini doubled down on his actions, stating, “I did it, and I’d do it again.”^[52] The Italian Senate eventually voted to halt the investigation in February 2019, against warnings from the International Court of Justice that this could undermine the rule of law.

NEW FRONTIERS: BALANCING RIGHTS AND REALITIES

The one consistent fact that has persisted throughout Italian history is the consistency of migration. Regardless of the political party in power, the public opinion of foreigners, and the demographic makeup of Italy, people have always arrived on Italian shores seeking new lives free from persecution and fear. However, in this political moment, Italy has the possibility to guide the course of Italian asylum and immigration policy for years to come. The deterrence campaign undertaken by Frontex has proven to be effective in deterring sea arrivals, which have significantly decreased in 2018 compared to 2017.^[53] If Salvini delivers on his threat to undertake a massive detention and deportation campaign, sea arrivals will continue to decline.

Yet, what does “effective” immigration policy look like regionally or globally? Surely it cannot only mean the expedient and technocratic efficiency with which a country could process asylum applications, only to deny and deport those who have filed them. Effective immigration policy cannot be formulated without referring to ideas of equality and human rights: ideas member states of the European Union are committed to and champion as a moral foil to illiberal and authoritarian regimes. Decreasing deaths at sea is a first step towards effective immigration policy, but then how will these countries substantiate human rights for immobile refugees and immigrants experiencing violence and uninhabitable conditions? Italy and other developed nations have been attempting to treat the symptom of irregular and undocumented migration, rather than the inequality that is its root cause.

Very few would challenge that generalized conditions of violence and extreme poverty are justifiable reasons to exit one’s country, but many wonder why asylum-seekers and immigrants do not seek to do this through institutional and legal means. Regarding asylum-seekers, it is important to emphasize that the asylum process entails presenting one’s self at a port of entry in order to claim asylum. Within the bounds of the asylum process, there is nothing illegal about entering a country unexpectedly and unannounced: that is precisely the point. The process is designed so that individuals can immediately and expediently remove themselves from harm’s way before undertaking the bureaucratic processes of legalization that usually spans years.

It is true that some individuals who claim asylum are actually economic migrants. At the heart of this contention is a definitional category that was established in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention nearly 70 years ago. The Convention was responding to a different historical context with a unique set of challenges, precisely the persecution and genocide of Jews. The promulgators of that document could not have foreseen that its protections would have to be expanded in order to include today’s over 68 million displaced people in the world. Neither could they have anticipated just how dire the predicament of global inequality would become, nor the desperate lengths to which individuals would go to escape it. As the world grapples with mass migration in Italy and everywhere, the capaciousness of the Convention will have to be revisited, and ideally, expanded. The risk, however, is that if the Convention were to be made open to revision again, the exact opposite would happen.

Still, even for those seeking to be legal economic immigrants, the fact is that the process of obtaining an EU work visa is costly and complicated, favoring the wealthy and well-educated. For most EU nations, the requirements include: application forms, professional photos, a valid passport, roundtrip flight reservations, travel insurance, proof of accommodation, an employment contract, proof of academic qualifications, and proof of language proficiency. These EU work visas are specific for the member state to which one is applying, and employment must be secured in advance.

Germany has recently loosened their stringent visa requirements as a partial solution to large irregular migration flows. With the backing of business leaders, the German government passed an immigration law—Fachkräftezuwanderungsgesetz—at the end of 2018 that promotes the recruitment of non-EU labor to fill 1.2 million skilled jobs.^[54] While this law does not apply to all economic migrants, it allows skilled, asylum-seekers and immigrants who have failed to obtain status a legal pathway to residency. Many EU member states are likely to be receptive to opening their borders in a similar fashion to skilled asylum-seekers and immigrants, who they view as more likely to integrate and provide economic benefit to the country. However, this line of thinking once again substitutes the logic of human rights for that of utilitarian transactionalism. It also fails to grapple with the reality that most immigrants are unskilled non-EU immigrants whose migration would be mostly regulated if a general Schengen visa existed.

If a general Schengen visa was designed with unskilled economic immigration in mind, and without onerous requirements, irregular migration would decrease substantially. Most economic migrants undertaking  the sea journey are unskilled workers, who are not seeking to arrive to Europe to benefit from welfare systems, but rather to acquire jobs that will allow them to make a modest living and send income back to their native countries. Some do not plan to stay in Europe forever, but rather to return home once conflicts have settled or they have earned enough to make a substantial difference in the lives of their families.

The immigrants who have arrived and are unable to both legalize their status and find employment are in the most precarious position of all: they are unwilling to avail themselves to Italian authorities for fear of detention, or deportation to Libya rather than their native country. Many resort to gang membership and prostitution in order to survive. As Nigerian gangs and Italian crime syndicates forge alliances, particularly in southern Italy, the hesitance to address a crisis of status legalization, rather than migration, is creating a problem of crime that did not exist previously. An accessible Schengen visa would ensure that individuals could safely have the opportunity to travel to Europe to find work, and a safe journey home if they were unsuccessful.      

Shifting not only the opinion of the Italian public, but also of Italian politicians to comply with commitments expressed in constitutional international human rights law is no easy feat. It will involve a reckoning with the critical and marginal histories of the past. Advocates, activists, and aid workers are already at work, catalyzing honest conversations about how integral migration has been to the culture and development of Italy. Some defiant Italian mayors have already y issued proclamations of sanctuary, resisting immigration enforcement mandates and allowing rescue ships to safely and illegally dock in their ports. Italians cannot expect to understand the present moment without reflecting on moments past, intertwined with the migrations of the Other who was the Southern Italian, the Northern Italian, the Armenian.

The reality of the global political situation is that there is an ever-widening gap between the aspirations of asylum law and policy and the willingness of nations to open their borders. The urge to collapse conversations about migration solely into matters of economic benefit and procedural expediency must be resisted, because what is fundamentally at stake are liberal democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The question comes down to how willing nations are to understand themselves. When Italians look in the mirror, what do they want to see? A country alienated from its own history, fearfully in denial about how its development has been intertwined with the arrival of the migrant Other, or a country confidently ready to take on the migrations and mobilities of the era in stride?

Migration has always been a fact, but it has always been a problem somewhere, somehow. It is clear that the demands of human rights and the claims for economic justice must converge to generate global law and policy that allow for a common world where all can travel  for any reason without the risk of drowning in the sea. In the words of Elise Domenico, psychotherapist at APS Cambalache, “Italians cry because people leave, they cry because someone arrives. They’re always crying.”

About the Author

Trinh Q. Truong is a senior Political Science major focusing on theories and practices of migration, displacement, and citizenship. She is also a member of the Multidisciplinary Academic Program in Human Rights. Outside of the classroom, she is an anti-deportation advocate and does refugee integration research. Truong is originally a political refugee from Vietnam.

Endnotes

^[1] “Interview with Abdul Sane,” interview by author, August 1, 2018.

^[2] “Migrant Arrivals by Sea in Italy Top 170,000 in 2014,” International Organization for Migration, September 04, 2017, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.iom.int/news/migrant-arrivals-sea-italy-top-170000-2014.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Jonathan Clayton and Hereward Holland, “Over One Million Sea Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015,” UNHCR, December 30, 2015, , accessed October 15, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html.

^[5] “Refugee & Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2017,” Refugee & Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2017, January 2018, , accessed October 14, 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/62023.

^[6] “Senegal,” Senegal | IDMC, , accessed October 15, 2018, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/senegal.

^[7] “Interview with Abdul Sane,” interview by author, August 1, 2018.

^[8] Mara Alacqua, “Homepage,” APS Cambalache, , accessed October 14, 2018, https://www.cambalache.it/.

^[9] “Interview with Mara Alacqua,” interview by author, August 1, 2018.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Ibid.

^[13] Angelo Scotto, “From Emigration to Asylum Destination, Italy Navigates Shifting Migration Tides,” Migrationpolicy.org, July 10, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/emigration-asylum-destination-italy-navigates-shifting-migration-tides.

^[14] Ibid.

^[15] “Interview: Baobab Experience to Fill an Institutional Void in the Italian Capital,” interview by Giadi Negri, European Civic Forum, January 26, 2018, , accessed October 14, 2018, http://civic-forum.eu/civic-space/interview-baobab-experience-to-fill-an-institutional-void-in-the-italian-capital.

^[16] Photo of a cloth sign at Baobab Experience encampment, Rome, Italy, personal photograph by author, August 11, 2018.

^[17] Griff Witte and Stefano Pitrelli, “A Gruesome Murder. A Hate-filled Shooting Rampage. And a Reckoning with Immigration before Italy Votes.,” The Washington Post, February 06, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-gruesome-murder-a-hate-filled-shooting-spree-and-a-reckoning-with-immigration-before-italy-votes/2018/02/06/d34f8598-0aa7-11e8-998c-96deb18cca19_story.html?utm_term=.9f10ef01a13e.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] Holly Ellyatt, “Italy’s New Leaders Vowed to Expel 500,000 Illegal Migrants – but It’ll Cost Them,” CNBC, June 05, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/pack-your-bags-italys-new-leaders-tell-500000-illegal-migrants–but-itll-cost-them.html.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] “Italy’s New Government Wants to Deport 500,000 People,” The Economist, June 07, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/06/07/italys-new-government-wants-to-deport-500000-people.

^[22] “Immigration to Italy: How It Has Changed over the Last Half-century,” interview by Alessandro Lanni, Open Migration, May 30, 2016, , accessed October 14, 2018, https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/immigration-to-italy-how-it-has-changed-over-the-last-half-century/.

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] Ibid.

^[25] Ibid.

^[26] Kosta Barjaba, “Albania: Looking Beyond Borders,” Migrationpolicy.org, March 02, 2017, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/albania-looking-beyond-borders/.

^[27] Alan Cowell, “Italy Starts to Turn Back Albanian Wave,” The New York Times, August 10, 1991, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/10/world/italy-starts-to-turn-back-albanian-wave.html.

^[28] Alan Cowell, “Italy Starts to Turn Back Albanian Wave,” The New York Times, August 10, 1991, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/10/world/italy-starts-to-turn-back-albanian-wave.html.

^[29] United Nations, “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” UNHCR, 3, accessed October 15, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.

^[30] Kosta Barjaba, “Albania: Looking Beyond Borders,” Migrationpolicy.org, March 02, 2017, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/albania-looking-beyond-borders/.

^[31] Ibid.

^[32] “Irregolari E Sbarchi in Europa E in Italia – Presenze,” Fondazione ISMU, , accessed October 15, 2018, http://www.ismu.org/irregolari-e-sbarchi-presenze/.

^[33] “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, , accessed October 15, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html.

^[34] Ibid.

^[35] Ibid.

^[36] Italy, Parliamentary Information, Archives and Publications Office of the Senate Service for Official Reports and Communication, 6.

^[37] The Local, “Italy Received More Asylum Requests in 2017 than Any Other EU Country except Germany,” The Local, March 20, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.thelocal.it/20180320/italy-2017-asylum-requests.

^[38] ASGI, “Statistics,” Statistics – Italy | Asylum Information Database, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/statistics.

^[39] Ibid.

^[40] United Nations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Concerned over Ending of Rescue Operation in the Mediterranean,” news release, October 17, 2014, UNHCR, accessed April 8, 2019, ttps://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2014/10/5440ffa16/unhcr-concerned-ending-rescue-operation-mediterranean.html.

^[41] European Commission, “Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ – Concerted Efforts to Manage Migration in the Central Mediterranean,” news release, October 7, 2014, European Commission, accessed April 8, 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-566_en.htm.

^[42] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30039044

^[43] “Operation Triton: Europe’s Mediterranean Border Patrol,” BBC News, November 13, 2014, , accessed April 09, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30039044.

^[44] United Nations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Concerned over Ending of Rescue Operation in the Mediterranean,” news release, October 17, 2014, UNHCR, accessed April 8, 2019, ttps://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2014/10/5440ffa16/unhcr-concerned-ending-rescue-operation-mediterranean.html.

^[45] Holly Ellyatt, “Italy’s New Leaders Vowed to Expel 500,000 Illegal Migrants – but It’ll Cost Them,” CNBC, June 05, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/pack-your-bags-italys-new-leaders-tell-500000-illegal-migrants–but-itll-cost-them.html.

^[46] ASGI, “Statistics,” Statistics – Italy | Asylum Information Database, accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/statistics.

^[47] Ibid.

^[48]Soeren Kern, “Italy: “The Party Is Over” for Illegal Migrants,” Gatestone Institute, June 4, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12448/italy-illegal-migrants.

^[49] Ibid.

^[50] Ibid.

^[51] Holly Ellyatt, “Italy’s New Leaders Vowed to Expel 500,000 Illegal Migrants – but It’ll Cost Them,” CNBC, June 05, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/pack-your-bags-italys-new-leaders-tell-500000-illegal-migrants–but-itll-cost-them.html.

^[52] Tim Hume, “”I Did It, and I’d Do It Again,” Says Italy’s Matteo Salvini about Kidnapping Migrants,” VICE News, January 25, 2019, , accessed March 26, 2019, https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/yw8gkm/italys-matteo-salvini-defiant-over-possible-kidnapping-charges.

^[53] “Migrant Arrivals in Europe Significantly Down Despite Aquarius Controversy,” International Organization for Migration, June 14, 2018, , accessed October 15, 2018, https://www.iom.int/news/migrant-arrivals-europe-significantly-down-despite-aquarius-controversy.

^[54] Kate Connolly, “Germany Passes Immigration Law to Lure Non-EU Skilled Workers,” The Guardian, December 19, 2018, , accessed April 09, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/19/germany-passes-immigration-law-to-lure-non-eu-skilled-workers.

Viet Thanh Nguyen (pronounced “Viet Tang When”) set a high standard for himself after his first novel The Sympathizer won the Pulitzer Prize in 2016. Fortunately, his first short story collection The Refugees upholds his reputation as a tactful storyteller. Each story in The Refugees studies what it means and especially how it feels to be a refugee through the lens of very different characters all bound to Vietnam in one way or another.

The first story, titled “Black-Eyed Women,” explores the experience of a Vietnamese ghostwriter living with her mother when both of them encounter the ghost of the narrator’s brother. It is revealed that after being killed by pirates during the family’s attempt to flee Vietnam (both the narrator and her mother are refugees), the narrator’s brother continued to swim across the Pacific Ocean to finally rest his soul with his mother and sister. While the book is in no way a collection of suspense stories, this story is the first to showcase Nguyen’s talent for maneuvering the timing and information revealed to keep readers engaged with the lives of the fairly mundane characters.

While the stories mainly focus on Vietnamese citizens, Nguyen also writes from the perspective of non-Vietnamese individuals experience in Vietnam or interacting with Vietnamese citizens, such as the aptly named “The Americans.” This story briefly chronicles an African-American war veteran’s experience visiting his daughter, who was teaching English in Vietnam. Here, Nguyen’s ability to sympathize with others aided him in deftly conveying the complicated uneasiness felt by the narrator, who had not seen to the country since his time in the war as an American bomber pilot.

While certainly not a breezy beach read, Nguyen’s simple yet eloquent writing style invites readers of nearly any background to inhale and then simmer on the message of The Refugees. The dedication at the beginning of the book reads “For all refugees, everywhere,” and despite Nguyen’s Vietnamese-American identity likely informing his decision to connect all of his characters with Vietnam, the humanity inherent in each story is unaffected. The immigration of refugees and asylum-seekers has been an especially hot button issue for the past few years in this country. However, for many, the high-level politicization has detached the issue from the human beings affected. Nguyen asks readers not to pity his characters, but instead take a step back from the back-and-forth of media coverage and see his characters–and hopefully by extension, all refugees–as human beings simply seeking to be understood.

On Friday, April 5, the Yale Law School hosted a panel discussing the rise of multilateralism as states seek to evade their legal obligations to provide refugee protections. The panel, part of the 2-day Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Symposium, included panelists Bill Frelick, the director of the Refugee Rights Program at Human Rights Watch; Sana Mustafa, a consultant and co-founder of Network for Refugee Voices; and Leah Zamore LAW ‘14, the head of the Humanitarian Crisis Program at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation

Frelick opened the panel by offering an overview of the discussion topic. States, he explained, are embracing “externalization,” a concept he defines as “extraterritorial state actions to prevent migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of destination countries or regions, or making them legally inadmissible without individually considering the merits of their protection claims.” Put simply, externalization is any extraterritorial measure a state takes to prevent migrants from setting foot in their jurisdiction, where they avail themselves of rights. According to Frelick, externalization is often deceptively framed as a “lifesaving humanitarian endeavor” meant to “protect migrants from dangerous journeys” rather than a tool for migration containment.

He then cited examples of externalization in practice. He focused on European and American immigration policies, especially after 2015, which is commonly cited as the starting year of the worldwide refugee crisis fueled by ongoing humanitarian crises across the globe.

According to Frelick, externalization has been a “central plank of European migration policy” since the mass influx of migrants into Europe in 2015. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa put 3.4 billion euros forward in scrambling to address the crisis. Much of that money came from the European Development Fund, which is typically used for general development purposes but was then repurposed to stem migration. He went on to say that today, 80% of humanitarian aid is “engaged with forced displacement.” Moreover, only 1% of this funding is used to provide “safe and legal channels for entry into the European Union,” while the bulk of the money is conditionality— that is, a bargaining chip to encourage states seeking development assistance to cooperate on migration controls. This money often goes to maintaining and entrenching oppressive regimes which create the conditions for mass emigration in the first place.

Frelick specifically cited the issue of Libyan migration, stating that 42.4 million euros has been directed to Libyan border coast guards to enhance their capacity to manage the border, which, in turn, stems migration both into Libya and from Libya into the European Union. He also referred to the EU – Turkey deal from March 2016, which gave the Turkish government 6 million euros to host immigrants (particularly from Syria) and prevent onward migration. Apart from granting Turkey funding, the deal, greenlighted Turkey to create safe zones in Syria to prevent migrants from entering Turkey at all.

Frelick went on to discuss externalization policies employed by the United States, especially with regard to immigration from Mexico. Under the Obama administration, the US funneled money into the development of immigration enforcement agencies in Mexico, to great effect— the number of migrants entering the US from the southern border dropped by 57%, while the number deported from Mexico into Central America increased by 75%. President Trump has moved away from the externalization approach, cutting development funds to the US’ southern neighbors and claiming that Mexico has done “nothing to prevent migration,” which Frelick says is “absolutely not the case.”

Zamore spoke next, reframing the discussion in two talking points: first, that “access is not the human right that is most imperiled,” and second, that “refugees stay as refugees for a very long time.”

Elaborating on her first point, Zamore noted that most refugees live in developing countries like Chad, Uganda, and Ethiopia, where the governments largely keep their borders open. She spoke specifically about Lebanon, where the government has closed its borders after having accepted 1 million Syrian refugees, meaning 1 in 4 people in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee— the equivalent of the US having accepted 82.5 million refugees. Consequently, the burden of the worldwide refugee crisis is not globally shared, as ten of the world’s developing countries host most of the globe’s refugee population.

Addressing her second point, Zamore remarked that, although refugees often stay as such for extended periods of time, the humanitarian system (the international community’s default response to refugee crises) operates on short-term budgets. She noted that there are now three generations of Somali refugees living in the Kenyan refugee camp of Dadaab. This means that those who originally fled Somalia are now grandparents to the newest generation of Somali refugees in Dadaab.

Zamore then discussed what she called the “new liberal consensus,” which acknowledges that refugees remain refugees for long periods of time and largely occupy developing countries; as such, countries with large refugee populations should be the recipients of development aid rather than exclusively short-term humanitarian aid. Thus, refugees can incorporate themselves into labor markets and out of camps, ensuring freedom of movement and the right to work. This approach is slowly emerging among the international community— for example, the World Bank has created a “refugee sub-window” of its International Development Association fund, meaning $2 billion is now directed toward governments and communities hosting the most refugees, making the transition out of temporary infrastructures a reality.

According to Zamore, there is nothing new about this approach. In the 1960s and 70s, the so-called “golden age of asylum,” the progressive developmental state model created a welfare state into which refugees were incorporated. In the 1980s, the system transitioned to a largely unsuccessful new development model emphasizing deregulation, privatization, and minimal safety nets for the poorest of the poor. Zamore describes this model, imposed on host countries for the past few decades (though with time, becoming increasingly concerned with inequality and welfare), as “fundamentally incompatible with refugee rights” and names it “largely responsible for the impoverishment of refugees and host communities in these countries.” She cites Somalia, where the per-capita income is 40% lower than that in 1970, and Afghanistan, where the per-capita income just reached its 1970-level.

Zamore emphasized the role the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays in this failed development model, calling it the “biggest player affecting refugees today” despite being uninvolved with discussions surrounding refugees. In countless states, IMF programs require governments to pay “obscene” debts, which draws the focus away from development or refugee protection. Meanwhile, with the emergence of this new liberal consensus, the international system asks these countries to incorporate refugees into their school and healthcare systems, which pulls host governments in two opposite directions. In Jordan, for example, which is host to 600,000 Syrian refugees, the IMF program states that Jordan’s first priority for 2020 is lowering its debt by 17% percent. Jordan has thus cut refugees out of its public subsidized healthcare programs in an attempt to rid itself of debt. In her closing, Zamore offered more positive news, noting that the debt conversation has picked up since her entrance to the discussion, and that more “critical voices” are being incorporated into these discussions.

Fittingly, Mustafa— a Syrian refugee herself— closed the panel by emphasizing the need for refugee inclusion in discussions about the worldwide refugee crisis. She first made it clear that, though the influx of Syrians into Europe in 2015 is widely considered the starting point of the refugee crisis, Syrians first started fleeing in 2011, though they stayed in neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Because the Middle East as a region fraught with refugee crises is a normalized image, the international community only regarded the issue as a “crisis” once the Syrians began “reaching the white land.”

Mustafa maintains that the current system seeks to force refugees to maintain as such. Policies working toward giving refugees long-term legal status are not being considered, which, it appears, only perpetuates the crisis. Mustafa criticized the idea that giving refugees legal status prevents them from returning home, stating that the lack of legal status for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey is the reason why Syrians fled to Europe in the first place.

She further emphasized the lack of dialogue between development initiatives and policymaking, citing fear of politicization as the reason why development agencies and policymakers fail to collaborate. This, Mustafa says, is the root cause of the perpetuation of the crisis: why give refugees job training through development programs if no policy exists to give them the right to work? Moreover, the longevity of the international community’s failure to effectively address refugee crises has given rise to problems that did not previously exist, like lack of resources and donor fatigue.

According to Mustafa, the inclusion of the refugee perspective into these discussions is a necessary step toward finding a solution. After founding Network for Refugee Voices, Mustafa has engaged in diplomatic fights with governments to get herself a seat at the table. She was granted an observer seat at the Global Compact on Refugees and managed to make the Compact’s final document draft acknowledge refugee participation.

Ultimately, the panel offered a broad overview into the international community’s engagement with refugees worldwide, though offered no final thoughts on what it might take to effectively manage a global refugee crisis that continues to expand. In Frelick’s words, “we’ve got some heavy lifting before us.”

Earlier this year, nearly 500 Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at JeJu, a resort island in South Korea. At the end of 2018, only two people— journalists who put their lives at risk if they returned—received official refugee status. Even though a vast majority obtained temporary humanitarian visas, the refugees are expected to return to Yemen once circumstances in the war-ravaged country become no longer life-threatening.

The government’s failure to aid asylum seekers reveals one paradox in Korea’s current cultural and political practices: while many facets of Korean culture, such as the entertainment industry, have made a strong global impact in the past several years, a strong sense of nationalism rooted in a desire to preserve the country’s cultural homogeneity is still ingrained among many Koreans—even the younger generation. The treatment of Yemeni refugees is one manifestation of this phenomenon.

The influx of refugees from Yemen to Korea stems from years of warfare in an already poverty-stricken country. The civil war in Yemen, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and displacement of millions of people from their homes, began when Houthi rebels from northern Yemen sought to overthrow the government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Subsequently, the government was forced into exile. In March 2015, the Houthi regime faced severe pushback as Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations joined in the hopes of reinstating the exiled government. Yemen has thus turned into a battleground between the Houthi regime, backed by Iran, and the Hadi government, backed by Saudi Arabia. Ever since then, airstrikes from Saudi Arabia’s military coalitions have killed innocent civilians, ruined infrastructure such as factories and hospitals, and made it more difficult for people to receive humanitarian aid. Indeed, according to the World Food Program, sixty percent of the 29.3 million people in Yemen are classified as food insecure.

The extremely dire circumstances in Yemen have led many to flee from their home country. Around 500 of them ended up in JeJu, mostly because the island did not demand advance visas from Yemeni refugees at the time. Hardly an expected destination for displaced refugees, JeJu is renowned for its beaches, turquoise seas, and frequent sightings of newlyweds on their honeymoon. Therefore, when the Yemeni refugees stepped foot on the island, opposition was immediate and vociferous. Throughout the summer, protests erupted not only at JeJu, but also in cities on the mainland, such as Seoul. Online petitions calling for the removal of the refugees garnered hundreds of thousands of signatures. Thus began Korea’s first organized anti-asylum movement.

Nevertheless, it is important to realize that opposition towards refugees in Korea did not simply begin with the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers. More than 1,200 Syrians who currently hold humanitarian permits still lack adequate health care coverage and access to education. Lee Il, a human rights lawyer with the Seoul-based Refugee Rights Network, states that refugee status is granted only to one percent of applicants annually, an incredibly low rate for an already developed country. Even North Koreans, who have the highest rate of acceptance when applying for refugee status, often face a myriad of challenges integrating into South Korean society.

While the idea that xenophobia is a driving factor in the treatment of Yemeni refugees holds some truth, it should be explained within the economic, political, and cultural context in Korea. Monoculturalism, coupled with a history of foreign occupation, has instilled in many people a fear of outsiders. Consequently, foreigners in Korea still make up less than five percent of the entire population today. Furthermore, because economic circumstances have worsened over the past few years, the unemployment rate among the younger generation has risen to ten percent. This explains the surprisingly high rate of opposition to the incoming refugees among those in their twenties and thirties. While 49% to 56% of the general population are against admitting refugees, 70% of the people in their twenties object to the idea.

Further fueling the resistance is the prevailing belief that a large population of Yemeni men will threaten the stability of Korean society. As one female rural worker, Oh Mi-jin, said, “If Jeju is breached, South Korea will be breached.” She resents the government for putting people like her, who often work alone in fields, in danger. While many fears may be unfounded, they stem from the country’s lack of ethnic and cultural diversity. Therefore, Esmail al-Qublani, a 31-year-old Yemeni refugee who arrived on JeJu this year, sought to defend himself and his countrymen. He explains, “We are only humans. We are refugees from a war. If they can get to know us, they will come to understand our reality by getting to know us one by one—if they want. We’re easy to make friends with.”

On the other side, criticism abounds against the government’s procedure in screening applicants and its refusal to allow more refugees to remain in the country. Choi Young-ae, chairwoman of the National Human Rights Commission in South Korea, denounced the government for acting “in an indiscriminate manner to mitigate the public sentiments” against the Yemeni refugees. Needless to say, South Korea’s current practices—or lack thereof—of granting asylum to refugees does not bode well for its status as a developed country in a world that is arguably becoming more inclusive, albeit with reluctance from some.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/yemen-refugees-south-korea-jeju-island.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/opinion/south-korea-racism.htm

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/23/world/middleeast/yemen-cholera-humanitarian-crisis.html?module=inline

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/south-korea-denies-refugee-status-to-hundreds-of-yemenis-fleeing-war/2018/10/17/5d554d1e-d207-11e8-8c22-fa2ef74bd6d6_story.html?utm_term=.fbf0529b13be

YRIS: Israel has been in the news lately for its treatment of African refugees, namely from Sudan and Eritrea. Asylum seekers report being offered a stipend to relocate to Rwanda or Uganda as an alternative to detention. What principles of refugee law does this violate exactly?

TK: The asylum seekers from Eritrea and Sudan are people who are lawfully staying in Israel by the virtue of them being admitted to some degree and are allowed to stay there under temporary arrangements for a long period of time. Removing them forcibly to either of those countries would be forced expulsion which is a violation of article 32 of the refugee convention. Since both of those countries don’t really give them any long term protection or rights they are not safe in those countries and have to engage in onward migration and therefore its also a violation of the non-refoulement principle in article 33 of the convention. 

YRIS: Many Eritrean men have fled conscription in the Eritrean army, which is known to be an abusive and indefinite service akin to modern day slavery. Yet Israel does not recognize this as a grounds for asylum. Is this fair on Israel’s part?

TK: I don’t think so — It goes against the UNHCR position in this context. In fact, in the last few weeks there was a decision given in the lower appellate court that Israel should not reject people whose asylum application is based on the fact that they fled service in the army in Eritrea. The government just yesterday requested a repeal of that decision because it is not willing to grant such persons asylum. But I think failure to granting draft evaders refugee protection is a violation of the refugee convention as it is broadly understood in most western countries.

YRIS: How heavily does Israel’s desire to remain a predominately Jewish state play into their refugee dealings?

TK: I think that’s a big part of why Israel is behaving to refugees as it is. There’s some irony in that because in the 1950s when the refugee convention was drafted, Israel was really active in the drafting process because it had an interest in protecting Jewish refugees. But now when it’s Israel’s turn to give back and protect non-Jewish refugees, it’s not really fulfilling its legal obligations.

YRIS: Is there support for these asylum seekers from Israeli civil society?

TK: The Israeli civil society has been very engaged in finding deportations and helping refugees and asylum seekers throughout the various stages of their battles in Israel. Practically every abusive step that the Israeli government tried to implement toward refugees and asylum seekers was challenged by the civil society in the courts. Some of the NGOS are basically doing what the government should be doing— offering social services, medical care or legal aid to the refugees and asylum seekers.

YRIS: What is the largest shortcoming of the refugee convention revealed by this controversy in your opinion?

TK: One problem with it is the lack of enforcement. When a country is clearly violating its obligations under the convention there is really very little that the UNHCR can do. The other problem is the vague nature of the commitment under the convention which basically allows Israel to interpret the convention very differently than basically all other western democracies and still pretend that it’s not violating the obligations.

YRIS: What do you think is the future of refugee law? Is it similar or vastly different to how it is now?

TK: I do think it needs to change. The category of refugee is too narrow. There are other people fleeing their countries because they can not stay in them and their reasons for doing so are not covered under the refugee convention, so I think it ought to be expanded. I also think a lot of the elements right now that are grounded in soft law, such as prohibitions on detention, should be grounded in legally binding norms more substantively.