Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has dominated contemporary strategic and war studies. Its territory has been mapped in detail, military operations scrutinized, and battles narrated in real time. Yet beneath the daily reporting lies an equally urgent, if less visible, struggle: Ukraine is not only fighting for its territory, but for its future minds. Millions of Ukraine’s active citizens, skilled workers, students, scholars, and emerging professionals have fled war and uncertainty, creating a quiet crisis that could shape the nation’s future for generations.

Ukraine’s wartime displacement has reached an unprecedented scale. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, 6.9 million Ukrainian refugees have been recorded worldwide—many of them women, children, and, most notably, young people. Around 1.3 million minors have EU temporary protection, and 700,000 attend EU schools, while over 85,000 Ukrainian university students study abroad. The issue is becoming increasingly pressing as the war shows no sign of ending. Polls conducted for the Center for Economic Strategy, a Ukrainian think tank, indicate that fewer than half of refugees plan to return while the share certain they will not return has risen from 10% to 34%. 

At first glance, these trends appear to seriously jeopardize the future of the Ukrainian nation and its capacity to recover after the war. They further deplete Ukraine’s already diminished scholarly and political elite, along with its high-skilled and educated workforce—groups essential for rebuilding and developing a country torn by war and facing prolonged strategic strain for the foreseeable future. Yet the question remains: is the picture truly as bleak as it appears, or can some opportunities still be found amid the crisis?

Ukraine’s wartime exodus has indeed drained its youth and talent, but it may paradoxically lay the groundwork for a new reformist elite while strengthening an already vast diaspora actively involved in the fight for Ukraine. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, millions of Ukrainians eager to contribute to their country’s struggle have joined established diaspora communities, quickly integrating into networks and structures devoted to advancing the Ukrainian cause. Many of Ukraine’s brightest minds have also gained unparalleled opportunities to pursue world-class education and training abroad, helping to cultivate the country’s future elite. Historical precedents show that even in times of upheaval, departing citizens continue to aid their homelands from abroad and later return to lead renewal when the moment is right. If effectively engaged, Ukraine’s globally connected generation could become one of Ukraine’s greatest strategic assets, driving its post-war recovery, reform, and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

The Driving Force of Ukrainians Abroad

Ukraine has a solid and influential diaspora, with around twenty million Ukrainians and people of Ukrainian descent worldwide, largely concentrated in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Since February 2022, millions of newly displaced Ukrainians have joined this community, with many eager to support their country’s defense and contribute to its recovery. The Ukrainian diaspora has mobilized the country’s resources, skills, and connections on a scale unprecedented in the nation’s history in order to organize aid deliveries, lobby governments, counter Russian propaganda, and lay the groundwork for Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction. 

The powerful support from Ukrainians abroad has become a vital pillar of the country’s resilience. Ukrainian-led and allied organizations have delivered money, food, medication, clothing, and protective gear for soldiers, while others have focused on assisting displaced Ukrainians and rehabilitating wounded veterans. Equally vital has been the diaspora’s advocacy and lobbying in the international arena. Ukrainians abroad have been organizing mass demonstrations in EU capitals and the United States to demand increased military aid and press for accountability for Russian war crimes, hosting film screenings and public debates to counter Russian propaganda, and convening conferences dedicated to Ukraine’s recovery agenda. 

The scale, diversity, and determination of the Ukrainian diaspora make it an indispensable asset in the country’s struggle for survival and future recovery. Its members have reinforced Ukraine’s resilience on every front of the war. The networks, expertise, and global credibility they have built will remain a source of strength long after the fighting ends. When the hostilities end and Ukraine turns to reconstruction, these communities abroad—experienced in advocacy, resource mobilization, and cross-border collaboration—will be uniquely positioned to channel investment, transfer skills, and contribute to Ukraine’s post-war recovery.

The Pool of Ukraine’s Next Reformers

History offers examples of countries in turmoil where, once the right moment was seized, returning elites transformed the state. Georgia, Ukraine’s post-Soviet peer, saw such a shift after the 2003–2004 Rose Revolution. The new president, Mikheil Saakashvili—a Columbia Law graduate—drew a generation of Western-educated reformers back home. In just a few years, they implemented anti-corruption measures once thought impossible, from dismantling the corrupt traffic police to streamlining bureaucracy, making Georgia one of the easiest places in the world to do business. While the country still faces challenges, its transformation remains among the most striking in the post-Soviet space, serving as a reminder that even a small, well-prepared group of returnees can reshape a nation.

Just as Georgia’s transformation after the Rose Revolution was driven by a wave of Western-educated returnees, Ukraine today is positioned to harness a similar dynamic. With many of its most talented and promising people now educated at leading global universities, active in anti-war and development projects, and enriched by the experience of living, working, and embracing Western values, Ukraine has a strong chance of seeing a similar wave of transformative returnees after the end of the war. Even today, many of its young policymakers and social leaders hold prestigious Western education and training, positioning them to play a decisive role in shaping Ukraine’s post-war transformation. 

In the years ahead, Ukrainian returnees could form the backbone of a new reformist generation, leveraging global networks to attract investment, modernize institutions, and integrate the country more firmly into Euro-Atlantic structures. Their international credibility and familiarity with best governance practices will be vital in advancing judicial reform, digital transformation, and anti-corruption efforts—securing post-war recovery, accelerating EU integration, and building a more resilient, competitive, and democratic state. 

Turning Displacement into a Strategic Asset

While the wartime exodus has drained Ukraine’s population, it also holds untapped potential. Host countries have provided Ukrainian refugees with unprecedented opportunities to live, study, and work in stable, well-resourced environments. Programs such as the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive, the UK’s Homes for Ukraine, and the U.S. Uniting for Ukraine have offered legal status, housing, healthcare, education, and access to the labor market. These conditions enable displaced Ukrainians not only to survive but to build careers, gain advanced education, and develop global networks that can be reinvested in Ukraine’s future. 

The impact of this opportunity is already visible. Ukrainians abroad are applying their Western expertise, training, and resources to critical areas of national need. Diaspora economic and social entrepreneurs are contributing in fields where reconstruction must meet evolving global standards—particularly in the context of EU accession. Expertise from the Ukrainian community in the United Kingdom has helped design a roadmap to rebuild and decarbonize Ukraine’s steel sector in line with the EU Green Deal. Similarly, the Mykolaiv Water Hub has drawn on the Ukrainian diaspora in Germany to spearhead innovative water-related industries in southern Ukraine. Such initiatives demonstrate how skills gained abroad can directly accelerate reconstruction and modernization.

Beyond economic expertise, the large and engaged diaspora strengthens Ukraine’s political resilience. Communities abroad have proven adept at advocacy, coalition-building, and resource mobilization — organizing some of the largest pro-Ukraine rallies in European capitals and North America since the war began, securing meetings with top policymakers, and influencing sanctions and aid decisions. They have mobilized millions of euros in humanitarian and military support, and spearheaded global campaigns to counter Russian disinformation. These wartime achievements have built networks and reputations that will be invaluable in peacetime, facilitating investment, technology transfer, and integration with international markets and institutions.

Moreover, today’s generation of displaced Ukrainians is acquiring advanced skills and leadership experience that position them to play a decisive role in the country’s future. Education at leading universities, training in competitive industries, and work within democratic institutions abroad can provide the expertise to reform governance, modernize the economy, and strengthen the rule of law. Exposure to transparent decision-making, independent media, and effective public administration can help them embed these practices at home. Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution returnees brought comparable skills and ambitions, but Ukraine’s dispersed talent pool is larger, more globally embedded, and benefiting from a wider range of opportunities and resources provided by host countries. If effectively engaged and given clear avenues to participate in rebuilding, this cohort could become the backbone of a reformist elite—capable of transforming institutions, accelerating EU integration, and developing a resilient democracy in Ukraine.

Displacement is undeniably a loss—but it is also an investment. The challenge for Ukraine is to turn this moment of crisis into a strategic advantage, ensuring that the skills, networks, and vision gained abroad return home. If it succeeds, the country’s greatest wartime outflow could become the very force that rebuilds it stronger, more competitive, and more firmly rooted in the Euro-Atlantic community.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Ukrainian Flag, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

In a Kyiv bomb shelter, a wartime president addresses his people via a smartphone. In London, thousands march with foreign flags, chanting in solidarity with a land under siege. In Tehran’s studios, state TV anchors broadcast messages across the Middle East. These scenes show that modern conflicts are fought not only with missiles, but also with narratives that leap across borders. Digital stories and images have become a strategic frontline. From a communications perspective, war is now “about perception, telling a story about who is the victim and who is the aggressor.” Across the world, this “correspondence of conflict”—the public narrative back-and-forth of war—is shaping alliances, foreign policy, and diplomacy.

Three conflict zones illustrate this trend and each case demonstrates how digital communication and international perception can sway the course of wars and the world’s response.

Ukraine: Zelensky’s War of Words and Images

From day one of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine fought on the information front. President Zelensky posted a defiant video from central Kyiv declaring, “We are here”—proof that he and his cabinet had not fled and would resist. That brief clip set the tone for a new kind of wartime leadership, harnessing social media to rally the nation and win support abroad.

Zelensky understood that winning the narrative was as crucial as winning battles. He turned communication into a strategic weapon, delivering daily addresses to rally Ukrainians and making personal appeals to international audiences. One public diplomacy expert noted that Zelensky uses every platform — from speeches to X — to press Ukraine’s case. Under his guidance, Ukraine offered a model for how a nation under attack can shape its image via digital media.

Equally remarkable was how Ukrainian society joined the effort. Government social-media accounts adopted memes and other humor to keep Ukraine in global headlines and counter Russian propaganda. Ordinary Ukrainians became citizen reporters, sharing raw videos of bombed neighborhoods, civilian resilience, and frontline heroics. “Every Ukrainian became a voice of the embattled country . . . an eyewitness of brave resistance,” observed one analysis. Unpolished clips of everyday bravery had a major impact, their authenticity cutting through Kremlin propaganda. Amplified by influencers and a volunteer “PR Army” of communication professionals, these real-time stories helped truth prevail over disinformation.

This digital people’s war paid off diplomatically. By winning hearts and minds abroad, Ukraine won unprecedented international support. Public opinion abroad pressured many governments to impose tough sanctions on Russia and send weapons to Kyiv. NATO and EU leaders that once hesitated became more unified behind Ukraine, reflecting how Zelensky’s media diplomacy translated into tangible aid. Even diplomatic forums became venues for Ukraine’s narrative: at a 2024 peace summit in Switzerland, Zelensky’s team ensured global media heard his call for a “just peace.” In short, strategic storytelling reinforced Ukraine’s physical defense by aligning the world’s support with the nation’s struggle.

Israel–Gaza: A War of Narratives and Global Reactions

On October 7, 2023, Hamas militants attacked Israel. Graphic videos of the assault spread online within hours, sparking global outrage and sympathy for Israel. Israel quickly cast the attack as “Israel’s 9/11” and launched a military response. But as Israeli bombs pounded Gaza, a parallel war of narratives unfolded over who was the victim and who was the aggressor. Analysts noted that the conflict was about perception, with civilian suffering becoming the center of gravity for international support.

In Gaza, Hamas and ordinary Palestinians flooded social media with images of destroyed buildings and wounded civilians to sway global opinion. In past Gaza wars, support for Israel “faded as sympathies turned toward the Palestinians” amid high civilian casualties, and 2023 followed that pattern. Hamas’s media wing effectively used such footage to change international opinion. Outrage over the suffering sparked protests from Istanbul to London, with demonstrators waving Palestinian flags and demanding an end to the bombardment. 

Israel, meanwhile, pushed its own narrative: officials emphasized Hamas’s brutality and use of human shields, and the Israel Defense Forces circulated videos of precision strikes to show efforts to minimize civilian harm. Both sides churned out reams of supporting footage and armies of online supporters around the world eagerly shared content echoing their side’s view.

The information war peaked with the Gaza hospital explosion. Within minutes of the blast, Hamas blamed an Israeli airstrike for the carnage, while Israel insisted a misfired Palestinian rocket was to blame. Social media lit up with competing claims long before any evidence emerged. “False assertions flew on the internet,” demonstrating how each side weaponized unverified information (later evidence pointed to a failed militant rocket, but by then each narrative had hardened). This episode epitomized “Truth Decay”—the collapse of shared facts as partisans embraced whatever fit their narrative.

As these narratives battled, governments felt the pressure. The mounting civilian toll in Gaza and the global outcry forced Israel’s allies to grapple with public demands for ceasefires or restraint. Western leaders supportive of Israel faced protests at home, prompting some to soften their stance. In international forums, debates often mirrored the dueling narratives seen online. Even firm alliances strained under public opinion. The Israel–Gaza war showed that controlling the story is now integral to war. Military operations ran hand-in-hand with messaging. And as chants of “Stop bombing Gaza” or “Stand with Israel” echoed worldwide, it became clear that public sentiment can sway diplomatic calculations—sometimes pushing leaders toward de-escalation.

Iran: The Public Diplomacy of Resistance

Iran demonstrates how a narrative campaign can be waged outside of active battle to build influence. Tehran’s theocratic regime uses public diplomacy as a strategic tool to shape regional opinion. It leans on a “menu of narratives” that appeal to Arab and Muslim sensibilities—anti-imperialism, Islamic unity, and support for the Palestinian cause. By casting itself as the champion of the oppressed and the chief opponent of U.S. and Israeli aggression, Iran seeks to win hearts and minds across the Middle East.

Tehran propagates its message through state-controlled media and cultural outreach. International outlets like Press TV (English) and Al-Alam (Arabic) broadcast Iran’s perspective globally, countering Western narratives. By using media as a diplomatic tool, Iran aims to shape its image and build sympathy abroad. 

The regime also runs cultural and religious programs—from conferences to schools—to reinforce its “resistance” narrative. On social media, Iranian leaders speak directly to foreign publics: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei operates official X accounts in multiple languages to spread his message internationally. Meanwhile, Tehran’s cyber proxies wage covert influence campaigns: investigators found Iranian-run accounts masquerading as locals online to push anti-Saudi and anti-Israel propaganda.

This narrative offensive has helped Iran punch above its weight. By hammering themes of Muslim solidarity and Western perfidy, Iran has stirred sympathy among segments of the Arab public. U.S. analysts admit that while Washington focused on sanctions and military pressure, Iran was busy winning the war on the Arab street. The United States effectively “ceded the battleground of public diplomacy,” one report concluded, allowing Iran’s narrative to go unchallenged. Thus, when Iran backs proxy militias in places like Lebanon or Iraq, it often frames that support not as interference but as solidarity in a common struggle—an image that resonates with many. By mastering the narrative, Tehran has managed to expand its influence even under sanctions and isolation, wielding soft power where hard power cannot openly go.

The New Battlefield of Narratives

In a hyper-connected age, the narrative battlefield is nearly as crucial as the physical battlefield. Alliances form or fray based on the stories that dominate social media and television. Leaders must recognize that a viral tweet or image can sway international action faster than diplomatic cables. But this new reality also means misinformation can cause chaos like a missile strike. With every smartphone a potential broadcast, truth and propaganda often blur. The challenge is to counter falsehoods even as we harness communication for good. As one commentator noted, engaging with the media can “contribute to a successful peacemaking process” and should not be overlooked by policymakers.

The cases of Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran show that public communication is now a critical front. A compelling narrative can rally supporters or pressure governments more than any negotiation. Ultimately, who prevails in a war may hinge on whose story the world believes. The pen and the camera have become mighty weapons – and wielding them effectively could help shape a peaceful future.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Address by President of the Republic of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Part 2 : Russia’s Geopolitical Reckoning in the Middle East

Russia’s historical engagement in the Middle East is entrenched in religious, cultural, and geopolitical considerations. From its protracted wars against the Ottoman Empire to the Soviet Union’s extensive Cold War-era involvement in the Arab world, Russia  has consistently sought to shape the region’s security and economic landscape, seeking the warm water ports of the Mediterranean. In recent years, President Vladimir Putin has reinvigorated Russia’s presence in the Middle East, leveraging arms sales, energy cooperation, and military interventions to counterbalance Western influence. However, the war in Ukraine, the economic fallout from Western sanctions, and shifting regional dynamics have weakened its standing. This analysis examines Russia’s evolving role by assessing its trade and investments, arms exports, military deployment, and diplomatic activity in the Middle East.

Russia has positioned itself as a key player in the region, with a long-standing presence in Tartous, Syria. Its influence increased during the Nasser era and continued until after the Six-Day War in 1967, marking a significant period of Russian military involvement in the region. Over the past decade, Russia’s 2015 military intervention in Syria, which decisively bolstered the Assad regime against opposition forces during the civil war, was a defining moment, securing Moscow’s foothold in the Levant. Beyond Syria, Russia expanded its economic and strategic ties with Iran—primarily through arms sales and sanctions evasion—while fostering energy cooperation with Saudi Arabia and economic interdependence with Turkey through trade. Its ability to navigate relationships with opposing factions—such as Iran and Israel or Saudi Arabia and Qatar—exemplified its diplomatic flexibility that allowed Russia to maintain a balancing act that allowed it to exert influence while avoiding direct confrontation. One of Russia’s most significant regional engagements has been through OPEC+, the group of oil-producing countries, where its partnership with Saudi Arabia played a pivotal role in global energy markets. Energy cooperation allowed Russia to circumvent sanctions, while growing arms sales bolstered its defense industry. Meanwhile, the Wagner Group’s (state-funded, paramilitary organization) operations in North Africa extended Moscow’s influence through proxy engagements, reinforcing its military reach. In Lebanon, when the major powers appointed consuls to “protect” various sects, Russia’s consul took on the responsibility of protecting the Greek Orthodox community.

Yet, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia never sought outright hegemony in the Middle East; instead, it pursued pragmatic engagement aimed at counterbalancing U.S. dominance while safeguarding economic and military interests. This strategy proved effective until the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which triggered a cascade of destabilizing consequences that undermined Russia’s regional stature.

The war in Ukraine has drained Russia’s military and economic resources, diverting attention from its Middle Eastern ambitions. Western sanctions have curtailed- although not to the extent Europe had hoped- Russia’s ability to sustain arms exports, diminishing its economic leverage. Russia’s capacity to fulfill defense contracts with Egypt, Algeria, and Iran has been constrained, forcing these states to explore alternative suppliers, including China and Western nations, with this erosion of Russia’s reputation as a reliable arms supplier further weakening its strategic influence.

Historically, energy and defense contracts have served as the backbone of Russia’s engagement in the Middle East. While OPEC+ remains a crucial forum for Saudi-Russian cooperation, the balance of power within the alliance has shifted. Saudi Arabia, increasingly aligned with the U.S. on security matters, has assumed a more assertive role, diminishing Russia’s ability to shape global oil prices. Moreover, BRICS has re-emerged as a geopolitical force, with Russia leveraging its expansion to position the bloc as a counterweight to Western influence, shaping BRICS into a more anti-Western coalition, integrating authoritarian states and capitalizing on U.S. policy missteps. However, internal divergences within BRICS, especially between China, India, and Saudi Arabia, complicate its cohesion.

Widespread international condemnation of Russia’s Ukraine invasion has led to a breakdown in diplomatic relations with the West. The sanctions that have been imposed in response have also forced Russia to deepen economic ties with Iran, which has supplied drones and military aid for the Ukrainian war effort. However, this partnership is constrained by Iran’s own economic fragility. This dependence on Iranian drones and munitions marks a stark reversal of traditional roles—Russia, once a dominant arms supplier, now finds itself reliant on Iran for military supplies. Meanwhile, the UAE and Turkey have facilitated Russian financial transactions to circumvent sanctions, yet the long-term viability of these arrangements remains uncertain, as Gulf states remain cautious about fully aligning with an internationally isolated Russia.

Despite the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, Russia has maintained a military presence in Syria, leveraging its bases in Tartus and Hmeimim to project power in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was achieved through agreements with Syria’s new government, which, facing economic hardship and regional isolation, sought security guarantees, economic aid, and leverage in negotiations for sanctions relief. By allowing Russia to retain its military infrastructure while distancing itself from Iran, the new leadership aimed to balance foreign influence and prevent overreliance on any single power. Russia has further entrenched itself within Syria’s defense establishment by overseeing military restructuring, integrating Russian-trained officers, and counteracting Turkish influence. However, with the redeployment of Russian forces to Ukraine, its ability to conduct large-scale military operations in the Middle East has waned.

Simultaneously, Israel has become increasingly assertive in Syria, invading it and conducting frequent airstrikes on Iranian and Russian-linked targets. Russia, once a critical mediator between Israel and Iran, now finds itself increasingly sidelined. Its efforts to balance support for Palestine while maintaining cooperative ties with Israel—partially to deter Israeli arms supplies to Ukraine—have further complicated its regional standing. As Iran expands its footprint in Syria, Russia’s influence continues to weaken.

While Russia’s relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain intact, they have become increasingly transactional. Gulf states, once skeptical of U.S. commitments, are now deepening their defense ties with it, diminishing their reliance on Russia. Even Turkey, a crucial intermediary for Russia, has strategically balanced its engagements with both the West and Russia, avoiding full alignment with the Kremlin. 

Russia’s mercenary presence, primarily through the Wagner Group, has been destabilized following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin. This has revealed Russia’s weakening control over its forces in Libya and Sudan, leading the UAE and Gulf states to recalibrate their engagements with Russia. Taking advantage of North African dissatisfaction with Western policies, Russia has sought to expand its influence, particularly through arms sales and energy deals. Algeria, a key partner, has deepened military cooperation with Russia, including arms sales and joint defense exercises, while balancing these ties with its broader foreign policy goals. Although neutral in global conflicts, Algeria seeks to maintain economic relations with the EU and a strategic partnership with the U.S. for counterterrorism and regional stability. Meanwhile, in Libya, Russia supports General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) through military aid and political backing to secure oil and strategic ports, contrasting the U.S.’s diplomatic approach in supporting the Government of National Unity. Although Russia has made inroads with these nations, its efforts are constrained by regional rivalries and competition from other powers. Russia’s drained resources have weakened its position in the Maghreb, leaving space for other global players like China. 

Russia’s trajectory in the Middle East over the past decade reflects an initial phase of strategic expansion followed by a period of decline precipitated by the war in Ukraine and regional conflicts. While Russia successfully entrenched itself through military interventions, energy partnerships, and arms sales, the geopolitical and economic ramifications of its invasion of Ukraine have severely constrained its regional influence. Sanctions, declining military capabilities, and shifting alliances have left Russia increasingly marginalized. Although it retains a presence in Syria and maintains economic partnerships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, its role in the region is increasingly defined by limitations rather than ambitions. We are likely to witness a determined  Russian effort to reclaim some of the influence it has lost over time, refusing to accept a diminished role in the region. This drive to reassert itself will likely contribute to the ongoing instability, as Russia’s actions in seeking to regain its influence may exacerbate existing tensions and complexities in the region.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Planes Releasing Russian Flag Colours Over the Red Square in Moscow, Russia,” Image source from Pexels | CC License, no changes made

Introduction

In the second season of his hit TV show Servant of the People, President Vasyl Holoborodko—played by current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky—finds himself in the process of securing a crucial loan agreement for Ukraine from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As the deal nears completion, he is presented with a series of unofficial “additional clauses” that drastically alter the agreement’s terms. To receive the funding, Ukraine must begin large-scale shale gas extraction—devastating the country’s environment—curtail agricultural and wheat production, and designate the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone as a nuclear waste disposal site. The officials state that these conditions are non-negotiable, implying that Zelensky would profit significantly if they were to be accomplished. In a shock to the IMF representatives and the Ukrainian public who are unaware of the extraordinary demands, Holobrodko rejects the deal. 

Nine years later, Zelensky—having transformed from a fictional president into Ukraine’s actual leader—finds himself in a remarkably similar situation. This time, the foreign power is U.S. President Donald Trump, who, styling himself as a master dealmaker, has demanded Ukraine repay military and financial aid fivefold, primarily through the exploitation of its vast mineral resources, including lithium, titanium, and rare earth elements. This arrangement would effectively transfer significant control over these critical assets to U.S. interests. When Zelensky rejects the proposal, citing concerns over national sovereignty and the disproportionate repayment terms, Trump responds by publicly mischaracterizing Zelensky as a dictator and suggesting that Ukraine’s leadership is ungrateful for the support received.

The confrontation between the two leaders reveals a stark contrast in how two former entertainers-turned-presidents engage with political reality. For Zelensky, the war has forced a transition from media personality to wartime leader, where abstract political theater gives way to concrete matters of national survival. Trump, however, continues to treat the conflict as another episode in an ongoing reality show¹—a narrative to be rewritten, a deal to be negotiated, an image to be managed. Their clash illustrates how the boundaries between media spectacle and geopolitical reality have become increasingly blurred, even as actual lives hang in the balance.

The Media-Construction of Zelensky and Trump

In the current geopolitical environment, it is difficult to position Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky as parallel contemporaries, yet both of them emerged through a similar political roadmap. Both Zelensky and Trump emerged from the world of show business and entertainment. The former crafted his public career through the first ever successful virtual political campaign, and one of the greatest of all time. This campaign intertwined a character shaped to perfectly fit the desired populist narrative with a candidate who promised change and a post-ideological, youthful freedom from the establishment that preceded him. In his campaign, Zelensky explicitly described his campaign strategy as a sort of “reality show.” The latter crafted an executive persona of efficiency and proficient deal-making on The Apprentice, even as his business ventures failed and his personal life was filled with strife and scandal. For both leaders, their media representations didn’t simply reflect their political ambitions; they preceded and shaped the very reality they would later inhabit, exemplifying what French thinker Jean Baudrillard called the “precession of simulacra,” where representations cease to reflect reality and instead create their own self-sustaining truth.² Their campaigns took advantage of what another French philosopher, Guy Debord, termed the “society of the spectacle,” – where the commodification of reality has allowed social relations to be mediated through images.³ However, the spectacle is not merely media imagery, but a totalizing social condition where lived experience is increasingly mediated by representations. In this society, meaning and reality itself can be shaped and bent to serve the narratives of the ruling elite. As a result, the two leaders operated in what Baudrillard calls the hyperreal world–a society in which the distinction between reality and simulation collapses. 

For Trump, his entrepreneur dealmaker persona manifested in promises to “drain the swamp” of Washington corruption and use “common sense” politics. For Zelensky, the vision of an honest and resourceful school teacher materialized into a platform of anti-corruption and youthful efficiency, focused on extensive online media communication. The Ukrainian president’s 2019 campaign emphasized unity over ideology, avoiding divisive issues in favor of a broad, populist appeal. Beyond campaign similarities, Zelensky’s initial approach to Putin was also not so far removed from Trump’s deal-making strategy—“unlike Poroshenko, Zelensky said that he would even be willing to sit down with Putin to bring a halt to the killing.”⁴ Moreover, for both Trump and Zelensky Debord’s spectacle was not only a campaign tool, but a governing strategy. Trump’s first term revolved around media sensationalism in which policy took a backseat, while Zelensky prioritized optics and a direct, media-savvy approach, throughout his early tenure. 

Even today, on a domestic level, Zelensky’s approach to reform has resemblances of modern Trumpism. Shortly after coming to power in 2019 Zelensky faced a problem, he could not make his right-hand man during the campaign, Andriy Bohdan, an official within the Ukrainian political scene. Due to the Ukrainian law on “lustration”, civil servants who worked under Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych for more than a year and did not resign of their own accord between 25 February 2010 and 22 February 2014 are not allowed to take public office. As a result, through a combination of a law from the Poroshenko administration and by renaming the President’s Administration to The Office of The President, the institutional body gained a sort-of semi-autonomy from democratic checks and balances. Over time, Andrii Yermak replaced Bohdan, and during the full-scale invasion he accumulated unprecedented power, with certain lawmakers calling him the “de facto head of state” and many allies expressing concern. Although established in war-time circumstances that arguably can be taken into consideration, Yermak’s operation as a Zelensky loyalist outside the scope of normally granted powers closely mirrors Trump’s approach to governance in his second-term, with personal loyalty and specific individuals superseding the systems established checks and balances.

Spectacle Meets Reality

While these similarities exist, Russia’s full-scale invasion and its implications is a critical divergence between the political journey’s of Zelensky and Trump that defines their current geopolitical conflict. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Zelensky—and the country as a whole—has been forced to reckon with a continuous existential threat that has shattered his ability to deny the notion of national categorization as an outdated universal. The confrontation with war stripped away Zelensky’s anti-establishment simulacra, thrusting him into the irreducible stakes of war. Zelensky’s leadership was forced to confront a reality his character President Holoborodko never anticipated—mass graves, bombed cities, war crimes. While Zelensky hasn’t abandoned the mechanisms of spectacle society– indeed, his masterful use of media and global diplomatic performance suggests an intensification of spectacle –the Russian invasion created a rupture in how this spectacle functions. For Ukrainians experiencing the war firsthand, the brutal materiality of the conflict cannot be reduced to mere representation or mediated experience as Debord describes in Society of the Spectacle. The existential stakes of invasion, resistance, and survival pierce through the totalizing nature of spectacle society.

This has forced Zelensky’s leadership into a unique position: while still operating within the realm of global media spectacle for diplomatic purposes, he must simultaneously address the undeniable material conditions of a nation at war. The luxury of treating all reality as mediated representation, a key feature of spectacle society, collapses in the face of immediate physical threat. This creates a hybrid form of leadership where spectacular elements remain but are grounded by concrete wartime imperatives that demand clear moral and tactical distinctions between aggressor and defender. However, this rupture in the spectacle is primarily contained within the sphere of the war itself. Beyond Ukraine’s borders, the conflict is still largely experienced through the mediating lens of spectacle that Debord identified, even as the material reality of the war strains against pure representation.

Trump, on the other hand, has continuously been able to maintain the simulacra of his persona and political identity, extending the hyperreality by being reelected for a new political term. As Slavoj Žižek describes it, Trump embodies a paradoxical form of postmodernism—while presenting himself as a defender of traditional values against postmodern permissiveness, his public performance exemplifies what Žižek calls “universalized irony and cynicism.” This self-relativizing stance allows Trump to maintain multiple contradictory positions simultaneously, maintaining his hyperreality by never fully committing to any single truth claim. His words always implicitly include a ‘don’t take it too seriously’ approach that undermines the very statements he’s making. This strategic self-relativization serves as both sword and shield: it allows Trump to make inflammatory statements while simultaneously maintaining plausible deniability, effectively immunizing himself against traditional forms of accountability by constantly destabilizing the very notion of sincere political discourse.

This strategy exemplifies post-truth politics, a condition in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion, personal belief, and spectacle. In the post-truth era, political reality is not evaluated by its factual accuracy but by how effectively it resonates within the media ecosystem. This reality reflects Debord’s analysis of the spectacle as a closed loop of self-referential representation—where images and narratives no longer reflect material reality but instead refer only to other images and narratives, sustaining a world of pure appearance. Trump’s political persona is not dependent on governance, diplomacy, or tangible results; it thrives within a recursive media ecosystem in which his authority is continually reaffirmed by its own representations. His approach to the war in Ukraine mirrors what Baudrillard analyzed during the Gulf War—a war measured not through its real on-the-ground devastation, but “by its speculative unfolding in an abstract, electronic and informational space.”⁵ This attitude from the U.S. President plays directly into the hands of the Kremlin. Their greatest geopolitical enemy only months ago is now actively supporting and regurgitating their own post-truth myths, contributing to the destabilization of Ukraine’s legitimacy as an independent state.

Zelensky’s Challenge

As Baudrillard’s historical insights suggest, Ukraine risks the war becoming nothing more than a media representation on the geopolitical stage, where its real danger and existential importance is manipulated by the narrative around it rather than its material consequences. Trump thrives in this constructed reality, where truth can be bent to his will. However, Zelensky, as both a media figure and a wartime leader, introduces a disruptive force—the materiality of war—that resists full absorption into Trump’s spectacle. On February 19th President Zelensky stated that Trump “lives in a disinformation space.” This simple acknowledgment of Trump’s disinformation dependency provoked an insecure response, momentarily exposing the fragility of Trump’s hyperreal ego. Zelensky’s challenge was a breaking of the reaffirmation of Trump’s own representations, an unwanted disruption in the media ecosystem that he so adamantly desires to control. This is why Trump’s response — calling Zelensky a dictator, and even stating that Ukraine should have come to the negotiations table long ago since they are the ones who started the war–was so volatile. The blatantly false rhetoric clearly demonstrates that to Trump this battle is not just a foreign policy disagreement, but an intrusion of reality into a self-controlled managed world of image. By saying out loud what everyone knows but does not say, Zelensky momentarily destabilized the spectacle, breaking Trump down from a self-created pedestal in which everyone is nothing more than merely his Apprentice.

The Battle Over Global Perception

In Zelensky’s TV show, after rejecting the foreign power’s demands, the Ukrainian public erupts in outrage forcing his character, Holoborodko, to quickly resign. In reality however, the Ukrainian people are far more united than authoritarian leaders of post-truth could ever understand. One of Trump’s greatest skills is his ability to shield himself from a reckoning with the real—best exemplified by his lack of consequences for numerous unlawful actions, both within and beyond the presidency. January 6th stands as the Polaris in this constellation of impunity. However, while Trump can shape perceptions at home, he cannot so easily manipulate the views of the global public, and most importantly, the Ukrainian people. Earlier this week, Trump claimed that Zelensky had a “4% approval rating” as a part of a fiery speech. While throwing unsubstantiated numbers like 4% support is a continuation of his commitment to the simulation of reality, it has thus far only increased the support for Zelensky domestically. Although Ukrainians may not be incredibly sound in domestic political organization, the country’s citizens nonetheless are prolific in rallying against a perceived external aggressor. 

Trump, while a master within the United States, has a foundational inability to understand populations that are not contained with his media bubble and do not fit his construct of reality. His pursuit of forcing a deal between Russia and Ukraine is an unprecedented test for his ability to export the hyperreality he has created beyond the bounds of the passive American consumer, to the geopolitical arena which has thus far interpreted the war as far more existential both for Ukraine and Europe as a whole. For Zelensky, the current reality is also a test — a challenge of how well he can utilize his media experience in a battle with another post-ideological figure.To an extent, the former-comedian is confronting his own past political identity taking to the absolute extreme of performative populism, while simultaneously facing an existential threat from the Russian military.

Conclusion: Hyperreality vs Reality

Zelensky’s confrontation with Trump is not only a political dispute but a collision of two different relationships with reality—one grounded in the material consequences of war, the other sustained by spectacle-driven hyperreality. The question is whether Trump’s hyperreality can maintain itself against something as materially significant as Ukraine’s battle against Russian aggression, and if its perception as an abstract narrative can be exported beyond his domestic support base. Unlike most passive consumers of American political spectacle, Ukraine’s allies—Poland, the Baltics, the UK—are confronting a tangible security threat that cannot be reduced to a media construct. This shift in geopolitical relations has opened a second front for Zelensky; he is not only battling a Russian invasion but also resisting the symbolic war of hyperreality waged by one of his country’s most powerful allies.

While post-truth politics has long been a weapon of the Kremlin, Trump’s attempt to impose this hyperreal logic onto the U.S. approach to Ukraine represents an unprecedented shift—not in the use of disinformation itself, but in its application by an American leader in the context of a war where the U.S. has historically positioned itself as the guarantor of reality against Russian manipulation. If Trump succeeds in exporting his spectacle-driven diplomacy onto the conflict, it would signal a transformation in how global power operates—not through material force alone, but through the control of perception itself. But if Ukraine’s struggle resists mediation, it may reaffirm that some events—despite the spectacle’s attempts—cannot be fully reduced to image and performance. In this sense, the war in Ukraine is not just a geopolitical struggle but a battle over whether material reality can push back against the forces of simulation.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Ukraine Drills, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

1. Olga Onuch and Henry E. Hale, The Zelensky Effect (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023),143. ↩︎
2. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 18. ↩︎
3. Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Ken Knabb (Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2014), 2. ↩︎
4. Onuch and Hale, The Zelensky Effect, 153. ↩︎
5. Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. Paul Patton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995),56. ↩︎

The continent of Europe is seeing the rise of a new global war, not one characterized by trenches or tanks, but with gray zone conflict. With the start of Russia’s summer offensive in Ukraine, Moscow also increased its hybrid attacks in Europe. These attacks occur in the ‘gray zone,’ meaning that they fall just below the threshold of war. Hybrid attacks include weaponized migration, sabotage, cyber attacks, assassination attempts, and more, all of which Russia continues to direct at Europe and the United States. Hybrid attacks gained prominence in European security after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, where Russia used “little green men”—Russian operatives masquerading as independent defense groups. Many observers assumed the operatives were in fact Russian troops, but their lack of insignia, their operational security, and the Kremlin’s silence on the matter gave Moscow a degree of deniability that it successfully exploited. Similar hybrid attacks have happened throughout history, with increasing notice during the Cold War, as assassinations and sabotage were carried out by both the Soviet Union and Western countries in an effort to undermine one another. Using hybrid attacks and waging war within the gray-zone allow the perpetrating country cover to carry out these attacks, while also making the threat ambiguous in order to avoid further escalation. Hybrid warfare proves especially potent against democratic countries, which are often rigid in their policy structures, making it hard for the whole bureaucracy to respond quickly outside of a crisis. 

Although Western nations have caught on to these Russian hybrid tactics, responding to them has become no less challenging. While NATO Secretary Generals Mark Rutte and Jens Stoltenberg condemned the attacks publicly, Russia continues to further escalate its sabotage campaign. With these attacks dramatically increasing in recent months, the West can no longer afford to sit back as Russian sabotage looks to undermine democracies in the West and weaken consensus in the EU and NATO.

While Russia’s motivations for sabotage in Europe are not immediately clear, some have suggested Russia conducts its hybrid operations in order to weaken the alliance’s support for Ukraine. This is highlighted by Russia’s clear focus on the defense sphere, with the targeting of defense storage centers and supply lines, as well as the assassination attempt on Arman Papperger, the CEO of German defense company Rheinmetall. However, hybrid warfare in Europe started long before the invasion of Ukraine. Both the USSR and the United States engaged in hybrid attacks during the Cold War, using political, economic, and clandestine means to weaken and undermine one another. Especially common on the part of the Soviets was the use of political assassinations. In recent years, it appears Moscow has re-embraced political killings as a tool of statecraft. For example, in 2019 Moscow ordered a hit on an ethnic Chechen in Berlin, and the U.S. and Germany foiled a Russian plot to kill the CEO of Rheinmetall, a German defense firm. 

However, the hybrid threat facing Europe goes beyond assassinations to tactics like cutting undersea wires in the Baltic Sea and committing arson at defense factories across Europe. These operations allow Moscow to eliminate political enemies, while also minimizing cost and maximizing damage. In response, Western officials have tightened security around defense infrastructure. These costs are borne by each country individually, instead of being diffused across the alliance, stretching Europe’s resources in defending against and responding to these attacks. An example of this is Russia jamming signals in Europe. Security experts debate if this is a deliberate hybrid attack by Russia, or in Russia’s eyes, an unintended and happy consequence of their warfare in Ukraine, but nevertheless, the consequences to Northeastern Europe prove costly, with over 350 flights canceled a day, and severe economic losses forecasted. With the costs acute for individual nations, Russia can build up its military capabilities, while forcing western states to draw on their resources, giving Russia a greater advantage in a long confrontation with NATO. 

In response to hybrid attacks from Russia, NATO continues to rely on a strategy of ambiguity. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the alliance anticipated more hybrid warfare and published a strategy for combating it. The strategy underlines strengthening intelligence sharing and NATO’s ability to “deter and defend” against these attacks, but not much beyond this. After the recent Washington Summit, the alliance re-emphasized that a hybrid attack could invoke NATO’s collective defense, but NATO still largely leaves it up to each ally to decide its response to hybrid attacks. The alliance faces other challenges as well. For example, defending against a covert attack on Russia proves difficult with the multiplicity of domains and the vast amounts of infrastructure Europe must defend. Additionally, the allies have often lacked political will to respond to these attacks. Some Transatlantic leaders fear publicly attributing these attacks to Russia will further escalate the situation and prefer to maintain ambiguity as part of an escalation management strategy. With a lack of large NATO or EU response to Russian hybrid operations, it is implied that NATO is either not strong enough to respond or attribute these attacks to Russia, or that the alliance is fractured and political consensus can not be reached, both of which further embolden Russia to continue these attacks.

Nonetheless, there are steps the West can take to respond more directly to these attacks and re-establish deterrence vis-a-vis Russia. For example, the United Kingdom recently revoked the accreditation of several Russian diplomats believed to be spies operating out of the Russian embassy in London under diplomatic cover. In 2018, an array of Western countries took part in a larger expulsion after the poisoning of a former Russian spy on English soil. Another way to limit the access of Russian agents is to limit their diplomatic freedom of movement. Poland pioneered this method in May by limiting Russian diplomatic agents’ accreditation to the territory they work in, thereby reducing the area in which Russian agents working under diplomatic cover could theoretically attack. The implementation of this strategy requires coordination through the European Union—although eight member states signed on to limit diplomatic movement, the EU will need to build greater political consensus to achieve a meaningful result. 

Limiting diplomatic movement and accreditation can help reduce the opportunities available to saboteurs to carry out offensives, but NATO information campaigns also help combat hybrid attacks. An information campaign centered around NATO’s hybrid warfare strategy shows Russia that the alliance takes note of these attacks, and will respond, potentially strengthening deterrence without escalating the situation. In the case of hybrid attacks, information campaigns prove useful to help shore up political will to respond. NATO’s information campaign after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine was particularly successful. This U.S. campaign of publicizing intelligence lessened the political cost of sanctioning Russian gas for German leaders, whose country heavily relied on imported Russian gas. 

Successful information campaigns like this one are only made possible through proactive alliance intelligence sharing. The alliance can serve as a facilitator of bilateral partnerships for intelligence gathering. Ukraine (although not a NATO member) and the United States proved the strength of this strategy. The CIA has been training and equipping Ukrainian agents since 2016 in a move beneficial for both countries. This gives the United States access to operatives fluent in Russian, and familiar with Russian culture with easy access into Russian espionage circles to collect intelligence while allowing Ukraine to perpetuate a shadow war in response to the Russian invasion. Similar partnerships could take place across the alliance with countries well equipped to train and equip operatives, with other countries whose citizens have strong linguistic and cultural ties to Russia, such as the Baltic states. These partnerships could help bring action to NATO’s statement of “defending and deterring against hybrid attacks” with states working together to collect intelligence and prevent any attacks. 

Although Russia seeks to remain below the threshold of war, its increased aggression in Europe jeopardizes the security for countries in NATO and the EU. As with any relatively new security concept, NATO and the EU’s security strategy must adapt to adequately provide safety to its member states. Through more restrictive treatment of diplomats and the spies who hide among them, increased information campaigns, and intelligence gathering partnerships, the West can take concrete steps to thwart Russia’s hybrid war. Combating Russia’s shadow war requires NATO and the EU to revise their hybrid warfare strategy to build a safer Europe.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: 1st Council at new HQ, taken on May 9 2018 | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

The Ukrainian steppe. There is no end to its breadth. It is an endless plain covered with thick feather grass, a rich tapestry of colorful fields. Welcome to the southern part of Ukraine. Farmers here usually begin their work in early March. Last year, however, was a challenge for them. The Russian invasion of the country has brought chaos to the Ukrainian agriculture industry, with mines and unexploded ordinance littering farmers’ fields. Regional council deputy Serhiy Khlan says that 50,000 hectares of land in the Kherson region have been cleared of mines, but another 450,000 remain dangerous. That’s an area the size of Slovakia. 

Hundreds of brave men are cultivating land for sowing. Agriculture remains a key sector in Ukraine’s economy, which has already suffered greatly because of the closure of the Black Sea ports and the devastation of industrial cities in the East. Ukrainian farmers have been killed by enemy mines in the fields. Ukrainian farmers save crops from fires after devastating Russian shelling, while ports have been targeted by missiles. Despite the mayhem, the Western border and the railway, which the Ukrainian economy strongly relies on, happened to be blocked by farmers from the neighboring state of Poland. 

In mid-2023, relations between Ukraine and Poland began to deteriorate. Poland became a refuge for Ukrainians fleeing the war in the first days of Russia’s invasion, while a conflict of interest began to grow. Due to the evident presence of Russian involvement, the situation only worsened. But let’s take it in order. 

Ukrainian Farmers Navigate Market Challenges 

Before the full-scale invasion, little attention was paid to the origin and destination of grain, and how critical it was for global food security. For years, Ukraine has been a major supplier of grain to Europe, significantly contributing to the state budget and earning the title of Europe’s breadbasket. The reliance on Ukrainian grain is particularly notable in regions like Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. According to the World Food Programme, countries such as Lebanon, Djibouti, Pakistan, Somalia, Mauritania, and Eritrea fulfill over half of their wheat requirements from Ukraine. 

Ukrainian grain is a crucial resource in alleviating hunger in developing nations. In 2022, Russia’s blockade of over 20 million tonnes of grain in Ukraine, threatening widespread hunger and greater problems in Ukraine’s economy. 

With an abundance of unsold grain from previous years and an upcoming harvest, Ukrainian farmers flooded the domestic market, while the global prices skyrocketed. Despite

challenges, the Black Sea grain deal, initiated in July 2022, enabled the export of 33 million tons by July. However, Russian inspections caused a 66% decrease in May. Despite gains such as stabilizing grain prices at $800 per tonne from a high of $1,360, Russia terminated the deal a year later. 

To increase the capacity for trade at Ukraine’s land border, the European Commission launched “Solidarity Corridors” in 2022. War is expensive – Ukraine needs to fight for its existence while maintaining functionality from within. 

Thus, all duties and quotas on Ukrainian goods were canceled. Ukrainian entrepreneurs and farmers resumed trading their goods. Ukraine exported nearly 33 million tonnes of grain and food to 45 countries, with Poland serving as a key transit corridor. However, Poland’s infrastructure couldn’t efficiently handle the influx, leading to delays. In July 2022, over 16,000 wagons, including many with grain, were stuck at the Polish-Ukrainian border due to customs issues. Poland envisioned itself as a hub for Ukrainian agricultural trade, but primarily for transit to other regions. Yet, some Ukrainian grain remained in Poland, allegedly saturating the local market. The Grain and Feed Chamber, a Polish professional organization, called for urgent government action in April 2023, emphasizing infrastructural and administrative improvements. Additionally, Polish farmers withheld grain, encouraged by promises of higher prices by Deputy Prime Minister Henryk Kowalczyk, despite global grain market prices stabilizing. 

The imposters of the story 

As protests by farmers began in early 2023, the main concern was the drop in prices of agricultural products, especially grain. Witnessing grain prices in Poland tumble by 20-40%, their frustrations reached a boiling point. However, the first imposter of the story is the global market, which many Polish farmers either overlook or struggle to comprehend. 

The European Commission hasn’t received strong evidence backing the idea that cheap Ukrainian grain caused prices to fall. Yet, what we do know is that the decline in prices in Poland is directly linked to the lower prices in the global market. Furthermore, even with increased grain imports from Ukraine in 2022, the Polish grain trade balance remained positive, with exports being several times higher than imports. 

Despite this, the protests pushed Brussels to temporarily ban Ukrainian grain imports to Poland and other EU countries. Despite the European Commission suggesting that the ban should be lifted, Poland has declined to alter its position. 

The second imposter of the story–Russian influence and Russian grain. Polish-language telegram channels, allegedly run by Russians, are spreading hatred towards Ukraine and its government, which is particularly dangerous given the large number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland. Propagandists have attempted to influence society by claiming that Ukrainian grain is poisoned and harmful to the Polish economy. 

In 2023, protests against the import of Ukrainian grain became a political tool before the Polish parliamentary elections, with support from the right-wing radical party Confederation. Its leader, Grzegorz Braun, is known for his radical actions and ties to Russia, including funding from the Kremlin and organizing protests. 

Despite Poland’s formal recognition of the absence of banned Ukrainian goods in Poland, protests on the border with Ukraine continue. The queues at the border number about 6,000 cars for exit and 2,000 for entry. Meanwhile, trade between Poland and Belarus continues. There are no protests surrounding Belarusian imports. Though by this line of reasoning, there should be. In 2022-2023, Poland imported $2.6 billion and $55 million worth of goods from Russia and Belarus, respectively, while exports from Ukraine amounted to $1.3 billion. Imports of rapeseed meal from Belarus increased after the ban on its imports from Ukraine. So, here’s the question: Why’s everyone pointing fingers at Ukrainian grain for messing up the Polish market, while Russian and Belarusian goods get a free pass? 

So, can we talk, finally? 

The lack of understanding and communication proved to be a catastrophic issue in Ukrainian-Polish relations. The lessons from the last few months are clear: we need to talk. Despite being producers of the same niche, Ukraine and Poland can collaborate to ensure that both countries have their revenues. 

Agricultural producers should learn about market possibilities, and discuss compromises suggested by the European Commission. Dariusz Szymczycha from the Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce notes that Polish exports surged to $950 million in 2023, surpassing Turkey, Germany, and Italy. From January to November 2023, Poland’s total exports to Ukraine soared to $10.163 billion, marking a 17% increase compared to the previous year. Conversely, Ukraine’s exports to Poland declined by 27%, reaching $4.053 billion during the same period. 

Secondly, policymakers from both Ukraine and Poland should work together to ensure that changes are made and that there is no covert influence from Russia. The Polish government should invest in infrastructure to support surplus storage and exports. Unfortunately, it has overlooked this problem for the past two years, contrasting with Romania’s proactive approach, which has resulted in a shift of cross-border traffic from Poland to Romania. Furthermore, they should prioritize strategic decision-making over hastily reacting to unsubstantiated claims about Ukrainian grain and agricultural products. All of this leads to an even bigger challenge: revising the Common Agricultural Policy–especially as Ukraine moves towards EU integration. Another pressing issue for the EU is to decide on sanctions against Russian agricultural goods, which have long been overlooked as a major contributor to global market depression. Russia’s ongoing violation of international law further complicates the situation.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Ukrainian Moravia; photograph by the Kasova Hora | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

This essay won an Honorable Mention in the 2023 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “What is a current issue in international relations or world affairs that does not receive enough attention in global media?”

I didn’t want to go.”

These were the words of 14-year-old Anya, a Ukrainian girl who was staying in a home for tuberculosis patients when Russian troops swept through Mariupol.¹ The troops took Anya from the home and placed her with a Russian foster family, forbidding her to contact her mother in Ukraine. Anya is one of over six thousand Ukrainian children that are known to have been taken by Russian troops and relocated to “filtration” camps or Russian orphanages.² The kidnappings are part of a larger propaganda campaign to portray Russia as a “charitable savior.”³ In reality, they represent a campaign of ethnic cleansing which intends to strip Ukrainian children of their national identity.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, millions of Ukrainians have been displaced within the country and many more have become refugees in Western Europe. Up to this point, global media has prioritized reporting on developments in the war — as of April 23th, 2023, there were at least 354,000 total casualties as a result of the fighting.⁴ This essay, however, calls attention to a seriously underreported dimension of this conflict. Russia seeks to eradicate Ukrainian statehood, and kidnapping Ukrainian children has become one tactic to undermine national solidarity and reassert the supremacy of Russian identity.

Once in Russia, kidnapped Ukrainian children become fodder for Russian state-run media. The transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children is publicized “with patriotic fanfare.” The New York Times reported that “officials offer teddy bears to new arrivals, who are portrayed as abandoned children being rescued from war.”⁵ The Ukrainian children up for adoption are often orphans; in some cases, Russian troops killed or imprisoned the children’s parents before taking the children to the “filtration camps” where they are subject to harassment and abuse. From these camps, Ukrainian children are matched with Russian families in disparate parts of the Russian Federation. Raised in Russian households, these children quickly lose their Ukrainian language and identity to eventually assimilate into Russian culture.

The deportations of Ukrainian children are not unprecedented in Russian history. Historian Timothy Snyder identified the kidnapping of Ukrainian children as one method of “Russian eugenics,” drawing parallels between what is happening today and ethnic cleaning policies during the Soviet Union. From 1930 to 1952, Joseph Stalin forcibly transferred the populations of various groups to undermine their national identities. The Crimean Tatars suffered one of the highest mortality rates during their deportation in 1944. Nearly 8,000 Crimean Tatars died during the deportation itself, and thousands more perished in exile elsewhere in the Soviet Union.⁶ Today, the deportation of Ukrainian children follows the same logic as Soviet ethnic cleansing: Ukrainians are simply “proto-Russians, unaware of their true identity, who can be remade with force.”⁷ The Yale Conflict Observatory writes that the “primary purpose of the camps appears to be political re-education” in Russian language, history, and society.⁸ Eventually, Snyder concludes that these children will grow up to marry ethnic Russians, raise Russian children, and ultimately give up their allegiance to Ukraine.⁹

On March 17th, 2023, the U.N. Commision on Ukraine found that Russia had repeatedly violated international law, including the forced transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children within and outside of Ukraine.¹⁰ Their decisions were based on reports published by the Yale Conflict Observatory, which suggested that the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child provided the necessary legal guidelines to prosecute Russia.¹¹ While there is little that can be done to enforce the U.N. findings, there are several non-profit organizations that are working with Ukrainian families to locate and reconnect with their children who had been taken. Save Ukraine is one such organization that helps Ukrainian families locate and reconnect with their children. With their help, the mother of 16-year-old Anastasia was able to find her daughter after she was taken by Russian troops during a vacation to Crimea. Today, they live in a shelter in Kyiv operated by Save Ukraine.¹²

Meanwhile, there is a noticeable lack of coverage on this issue in international media. One potential explanation for the lack of attention is that photographs of damaged infrastructure or Russian troops constitute easily digestible content for foreign audiences. Cities in shambles quickly communicate the implications of the war while preserving the psychological distance between the media consumer and the actual conflict. The kidnapping and deportation of Ukrainian children, however, is both a psychologically troubling and historically complex issue. It requires a deeper knowledge of Soviet history and the tactics of war. But more importantly, the prospect of losing one’s children hits close to home. Therefore, it makes sense that the media has focused on simpler, more digestible topics.

Currently, the most harmful action that society and the media can take is censoring this issue. It is our commitment, as ethical beings, to confront the reality of what occurs during times of war and show compassion for the families who have not yet reconnected with their children. When we think about war, we tend to imagine soldiers, death, firearms, bombings, and devastation. This is because this is what we are least familiar with, and something most of us have not had to witness directly. I implore that you closely trace this issue, and stop ignorance once and for all.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Ukrainian children fleeing Russian aggression in Przemyśl, Poland | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons

1. Bubola, Emma. “Using Adoptions, Russia Turns Ukrainian Children Into Spoils of War,” The New York Times, last modified October 22, 2022, accessed April 30, 2023.
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2. “Russia’s Systematic Program for the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children,” The Conflict Observatory, last modified February 14, 2023, accessed May 1, 2023.
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3. Bubola. “Using Adoptions,” The New York Times.
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4. Faulconbridge, Guy. “Ukraine war, already with up to 354,000 casualties, likely to last past 2023 – U.S. documents,” Reuters, last modified April 12, 2023, accessed May 1, 2023.
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5. Bubola, “Using Adoptions,” The New York Times.
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6. Rywkin, Michael. Moscow’s Lost Empire (Armonk, NY: M.E Sharp, 1994), 67.
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7. Snyder, Timothy. “Russia’s Eugenic War,” Substack, last modified January 8, 2023, accessed May 1, 2023.
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8. “Russia’s Systematic,” The Conflict Observatory.
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9. Snyder, “Russia’s Eugenic,” Substack.
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10. “War crimes, indiscriminate attacks on infrastructure, systematic and widespread torture show disregard for civilians, says UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine,” United Nations, last modified March 16, 2023, accessed May 1, 2023.
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11. “Russia’s Systematic,” The Conflict Observatory.
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12. Julian E. Barnes, “The Group That Searches for Missing Ukrainian Children,” The New York Times, last modified April 25, 2023, accessed May 1, 2023.
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Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Western sanctions have failed to act as an effective deterrent against Russian aggression. Today, as Vladimir Putin’s troops continue to make significant advances in Ukraine, the West’s revived efforts are underscored by new measures implemented by the US and other allies against Russian oligarchs and banks, and the EU’s agreement on sanctions targeting parliamentarians. [1] Aside from triggering financial mayhem in Russia, the sanctions could result in something greater: an acceleration towards a bipolar global financial system based on both the dollar and the renminbi.

Although broader financial contagion arising from the Russia-Ukraine conflict cannot be ruled out, Western financial institutions are much less dependent on Russia than a decade ago. [2] The financial decoupling phenomenon between Russia and the West is hardly new, and aggressive sanctions aimed at further isolating the nation’s economy and financial systems will only quicken the decoupling process.

A less discussed impact of these sanctions is how they could increase Russia’s dependence on China. Although Chinese officials have no clear stance on Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, China sees Russia as a key piece to building a new Beijing-led world order. [3] Still, being Russia’s “strategic cushion” for military, political and economic support does not imply that China would deliberately violate Western sanctions for Russia, but it will likely allow Russian financial institutions greater access to Chinese markets and institutions. [4] Less than a week before Russia’s military campaign began, it announced a contract worth upwards of $20 billion to sell coal to China. Restrictions on imports of Russian wheat have been relaxed and a new 3-year gas deal with Gazprom, a Russian state-owned energy corporation, has been settled. All of these follow the Russia-China “friendship without limits” strategic partnership to support each other over endeavors in Ukraine and Taiwan with a promise to collaborate more against the West. [5] 

China’s moves fall in line with its long-term ambition of achieving de-dollarization. Critics may argue that the open and liquid nature of US markets will ensure the dollar remains the world’s major reserve currency. However, the Chinese are looking beyond merely strengthening the use of the renminbi on a global scale. Instead, they see finance as a critical element in the new greater power competition with the US. Foreign capital, trade, and the Belt and Road Initiative are mere examples of how Beijing has been diversifying its foreign exchange reserves to reduce its dependence on the dollar. [6]

Aside from increasing the rate of decoupling, the financial reckoning imposed on Russia and the resulting economic fallout (lower demand, higher inflation) will damage US financial hegemony on two major fronts. First, restrictions on the flow of capital to deliberately push Russia into a recession may result in intensified efforts to make the country more self-sufficient in the production of goods. [7] The same applies to China – Beijing has been trying to strengthen trust and increase transparency in its own financial ecosystem, not only to attract foreign investment but to also encourage investments in which vast amounts of Chinese savings would be channeled into the domestic capital market. [8] Second, sanctions against Moscow could push the US and other allies into succumbing to pricing pressures favoring Chinese goods. [9]

Global trade and the financial markets are today’s new geopolitical battlegrounds. Although Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine has left Russia politically isolated and economically hobbled, it presents an opportunity for China to advance a new Beijing-led world order. As the only competitor capable of matching the US on economic, diplomatic, military, and technological planes, China could potentially play a disruptive role on the world stage. [10] Changing distributions of power across the globe will likely damage US interests and ultimately, American hegemony. 

References

[1] Foy, Henry. & Fleming, Sam. “West’s first wave of Russia sanctions over Ukraine ‘just the beginning’” Financial Times. February 22, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/40b149bd-cbaa-418c-90df-00fa861e22f4. Accessed March 4, 2022.

[2] The Economist. “Western banks are much less exposed to Russia than a decade ago”. March 1, 2022. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/03/01/western-banks-are-much-less-exposed-to-russia-than-a-decade-ago. Accessed March 4, 2022.

[3] Foroohar, Rana. “China, Russia and the race to a post-dollar world” Financial Times. February 27, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/e5735375-75df-4859-bbf0-ae22e4fe2ff6. Accessed March 10, 2022.

[4] Zakaria, Fareed. “Opinion: Why is the Bide administration uniting our adversaries?” The Washington Post. February 17, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/17/biden-allowing-china-russia-alliance/. Accessed March 3, 2022.

[5] Munroe, Tony., Osborn, Andrew., & Pamuk, Humeyra. “China, Russia partner up against West at Olympics summit”. February 4, 2022. 

[6] Tan, Weizhen. “China is building up its ‘shadow reserves’ to counter its reliance on the US dollar” CNBC. November 17, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/18/china-diversifying-fx-reserves-assets-to-counter-us-dollar-exposure.html. Accessed March 5, 2022.

[7] Lynch, David. J. “Russia’s Ukraine invasion could be a global economic ‘game changer’” The Washington Post. March 5, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/05/global-economy-russia-ukraine/. Accessed March 5, 2022.

[8] Foroohar, Rana. “China, Russia and the race to a post-dollar world” Financial Times. February 27, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/e5735375-75df-4859-bbf0-ae22e4fe2ff6. Accessed March 3, 2022.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Congressional Research Service. “Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense – Issues for Congress. March 1, 2022. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf. Accessed March 6, 2022.

Near the Ukrainian border and in Crimea – a peninsula forcibly annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014 – the buildup of Russian military forces is a point of growing concern for US and European officials. Faced with a potential Russian invasion as soon as early 2022, the Biden Administration has developed a package of harsh economic sanctions and is prepared to apply diplomatic pressure in reaction to Russia’s aggressive actions in the region. Russia’s military buildup near the Ukrainian border has reminded US and European officials that Russia can also pose sophisticated challenges, even though China is the most significant strategic threat to the US moving forward. Beyond the immediate threat Russia poses to the sovereignty of Ukraine, there are much broader global consequences, making it critical that the US has a strong long-term strategy. The perceived firmness of the US’s response to Russia’s increasing military presence – one that the US Department of Justice states is larger than the 2014 invasion – will inform other authoritarian governments of the US’s hard limits as the world enters a new era of great power competition. The U.S’s current course of action in Ukraine has the opportunity to affect the actions of its most important strategic priority – China, and specifically the Chinese’s campaign for dominance in Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Taiwan has reported that China has flown great numbers of military planes into its air space recently. These actions, paired with increasingly aggressive rhetoric from China’s authoritarian government, concern US and European officials that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could materialize shortly, which would likely result in an all-out war between the US and China. During both the Trump and Biden administrations, the US has intensified its support of Taiwan and pledged to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons. Because of the US’s outspoken backing of Taiwan and China’s attempts to intimidate Taiwan, the peace and stability of the entire region have been compromised. With this potential threat looming, the US must take decisive action in Ukraine with the goal of deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in mind to avoid the unfavorable situation of fighting a two-front war – in Ukraine and Taiwan.

Written by Henry Suckow-Ziemer

Less than a week after Indian PM Narendra Modi promised a “jaw-breaking” response to a terror attack that killed 40 paramilitary police, tensions between India and Pakistan rapidly escalated. While events continue to rapidly unfold, they have underscored a fundamental dynamic of modern conflict, namely, its persistence. While the marked decline in interstate, and particularly major power wars since 1945 has led many to pronounce that the world has grown less violent in recent years. This claim has drawn adherents from corners as diverse as economics, anthropology and international law. Their findings seek to offer some hope in a news cycle which is often dominated by images of escalating global chaos and humanitarian disaster. These authors remind us that, in spite of what may appear on our news feeds, on the whole the world is a safer place, for states especially and perhaps for individuals as well, than it used to be. Unfortunately, to extrapolate out from these arguments and claim war is in an irreversible decline would be to neglect crucial lessons contemporary conflicts can teach us about the nature of political violence today.

Take the example of India and Pakistan over Kashmir. While historically a flashpoint, violence in that state had declined dramatically leading up to the February 14 bombing by Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammad. While India has historically had a policy of tit-for-tat reciprocal strikes in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, the rhetoric surrounding this particular attack seemed to indicate a desire to assume a more proactive stance. This trend, which may have been motivated by Modi’s own electoral concerns, resulted in India pursuing a much more forceful policy, launching airstrikes against supposed terrorist training camps in Pakistan. At this moment, a turning point could be identified, as Pakistan claimed the strikes were abortive and hit no actual targets, a claim which could be used to de-escalate the brewing conflict. India and Pakistan could pursue limited aims, Modi content with a more muscular show of force and Pakistan able to save face and potentially garner international support for its show of restraint in the face of aggression. The recent downing of an Indian jet has torpedoed this possibility for a rapprochement, raising fears of military escalation between two nuclear powers. As the situation continues to evolve, it is likely that this narrative with change drastically, but events to date have revealed two key themes of modern conflict; increasing hybridization and potential for escalation.

Gray zones? Hybrid war? Unpeace?

The first aspect of war in the modern age, growing hybridization, requires some initial clarification on terminology. Debate continues to rage over how to properly categorize the wars of the modern age. This has given rise to terms such as “hybrid war” which gained popularity following the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine. Other classifications include Gray Zone conflicts, battles that occupy the space between war and peace, as well as the more straightforward “unpeace” used by Lucas Kello to describe the deterioration of the international order facilitated by the internet revolution and cyberwar. Just as there exists debate over which term best describes modern conflict, so too do individuals challenge whether new terminology is even necessary in the first place. Traditional descriptions of hybrid war for instance, highlight the use of non-military tactics, economic, diplomatic and cyber, to prosecute a conflict. This has been the case for wars throughout history, as states have frequently employed non-military tools such as embargos, sanctions and propaganda campaigns in wars dating back hundreds of years. Similarly, with Gray Zone conflict, the notion that the dichotomy between war and peace has only recently eroded seems erroneous. By any definition it would be difficult to not view U.S.-Soviet proxy conflicts throughout the Cold War as Gray Zone battles, or even colonial struggles during the 19th century as extensions of this concept. In response to these critiques, proponents of Gray/hybrid/unpeace definitions have argued that recent developments have magnified the effect of these tactics. True, their theories may not represent anything new under the sun, but modern technologies, especially in the digital realm have opened doors previously inaccessible, allowing rogue actors to orchestrate mischief on a far greater scale than before.

This argument is more compelling, but it does not quite strike the heart of how conflict has been transformed by the modern age. Fundamentally, hybridization means the blurring of lines between state and non-state actors. On the one hand, it entails state militaries employing tools and tactics previously reserved for terrorist or criminal groups. On the other, it means insurgencies developing increasingly sophisticated infrastructure to wage more conventional battles. To illustrate this, consider two of the most prominent modern conflicts, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Russia’s occupation of Crimea, and subsequent intervention in the eastern Oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk proved the catalyst for much of current theorizing about hybrid war. Of particular import in this case was the sophisticated media and cyber campaign surrounding the Russian advance. Both within Ukraine and abroad, falsified news articles, cyberattacks on government infrastructure and electoral interference served to generate confusion over what precisely was happening on the ground. Who were the “little green men” that had suddenly appeared to support the separatists? Was the new Ukrainian government a coalition of west-looking reformers or an ultra-nationalist sect of warmongering fascists? Did the inhabitants Crimea or the majority-Russian eastern regions legitimately want to leave Ukrainian control? These questions amplified the fog of war and gave Russia greater freedom of movement at least initially. Combined with the force structure in the east of mixed local separatist and unmarked Russian troops, Russia gained a distinct tactical advantage. While recently scholars such as Lawrence Freedman have critiqued the strategic logic of Russia’s intervention, the hybrid strategy had distinct military benefits. In essence, Russia gained the ability to largely control the level of violence in Ukraine. When local separatists began to lose ground against the Ukrainian military, Russia could step up its material support to turn the tide, otherwise switching back to low-level insurgency to maintain a “frozen” conflict for little cost. Ukraine has resoundingly demonstrated that interstate conflict and territorial conquest remain very much alive today.

The history of the Islamic State presents what seems to be almost a flipped narrative from the previous case. An offshoot of Al Qaeda initially, this terrorist organization successfully capitalized on favorable environmental factors, including chaos in Syria and Iraqi discontent with the Maliki government, to rapidly expand its capabilities, reaching a pinnacle with its capture of Mosul in 2014. While this group has faced dramatic reversals as of late and today maintains but a sliver of its former holdings, it would be improper to forget how rapidly and successfully the Islamic State seized territory. In the process, it demonstrated another element of conflict hybridization, for not only are states increasingly utilizing tools previously thought the purview of insurgents, but non-state actors have been demonstrating a growing propensity for adapting conventional tactics. The Islamic State at different moments fought like an insurgency, a standing army and a terrorist cell, in many cases blending all these together for maximum effect. Furthermore, even as it has suffered the severe degradation of its conventional fighting force and resources, with the underlying political situation in the region still turbulent, IS has taken increasingly to going underground. This underscores yet another unique aspect of the hybridization of modern conflict, that groups can adjust their propensity for conventional or unconventional, state or non-state tactics according to the exigencies of the moment. Just because the Islamic State styled itself as an empire in the making does not mean that the loss of its territory will necessarily lead to its downfall.

This model of organization is not new, yet non-state combatants which can pursue hybrid strategies have consistently proven their efficacy even against better equipped adversaries. This was the case in 2006 with Israel’s war in Lebanon where the use of more conventional formations and technologies such as night-vision goggles and anti-tank missiles by Hezbollah fighter caught the Israeli Defense Forces by surprise. With hybridization among terrorist organizations appearing to be increasingly the norm, one must wonder where the next hybrid threat may come. At the moment, the danger of a mismanaged U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, a country whose military is flush with American hardware, appears particularly foreboding.

Running up the escalation ladder

The second aspect of modern conflict, by virtue of its hybrid nature, is the threat of rapid and unpredictable escalation. While this is common to all conflicts where violent emotions are unleashed and tensions run high, the unique character of hybrid conflict means it has greater potential for miscalculations to trigger a dangerous spiral. The case of India and Pakistan today is a particularly visceral example. While long standing tensions persisted in Kashmir, violence in the region was at a ten-year low when the Jaish-e-Muhammad attack transpired. In roughly two weeks, this bombing resulted in a standoff between two nuclear-capable states. Understanding how this came to be reveals the fraught dynamics at play in a hybrid conflict. Hybrid wars are fundamentally limited wars, yet the wide array of tools employed by combatants risks overextension on an unexpected front.

Take for instance Pakistan’s tacit toleration of terrorist groups such as JEM. So long as these organizations remained directed against India, they provided a valuable tool to maintain pressure against that country without Pakistan having to take the incredibly risky gamble of directly intervening. In this way Pakistan too could selectively escalate and de-escalate purely by jailing and releasing a handful of leading figures. While the degree of cooperation between the Pakistani armed forces and JEM and equivalents is hotly debated, at the bare minimum, it is probable that ISI, the Pakistani intelligence organization is privy to more knowledge of their operations than it lets on. Nevertheless, the danger of utilizing any non-state actor as a proxy for national forces remains that these groups can behave in very unpredictable ways at times. The launch of a major suicide bombing against India at a time when Modi, facing parliamentary elections, confronted criticism over being “soft” on Pakistan, likely would not have been the Pakistani government’s ideal outcome. That it did happen proved the catalyst for a situation which, while not out of either party’s control yet, was likely more than either bargained for to begin with.

In a vastly different context, Russian cyber operations hold a similar threat of escalation. In response to a CIA report which found evidence of Russian tampering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Barack Obama designated voting machines as “critical infrastructure” interference with which would be considered an attack on the United States. While no subsequent attack has been reported, this represents one pathway through which a Russian hybrid campaign could inadvertently lead to escalation. If, in the course of a Russian propaganda effort, say with the aim of distancing Ukraine from its western backers, a hacker were to compromise an aspect of the U.S. voting system, it is unclear what the extent of the American response would, or could, be.

If hybrid conflict is to be seen as a blurring of state and non-state capabilities, it follows that this blurring opens the door to new methods for waging war. Although this grants a military advantage in that it allows hybrid combatants to surprise their opponents by targeting weaknesses they may not have even been aware of, it also increases the risk of crossing an unseen tripwire. This element of modern conflict deserves greater analysis as, if wars are to become increasingly hybridized, a lack of understanding as to what this means risks more and more instances of actors going to the brink over an unforeseen pressure point. Absent a more thorough study, it is reasonable to expect new flare-ups not only in Kashmir, but in Israel, the South China Sea, Latin America and more.

The human dimension

The previous discussion has treated conflict largely at the macroscopic level. However it is vital to realize that wars are deeply personal and individual tragedies no matter how small. To the family fleeing violence in their hometown, the innocent individuals struck dead by an improperly called airstrike and the forcibly conscripted child soldier, the terms used to describe a conflict matter little. Scholars would do well to remind themselves of this when approaching the subject of modern conflict. This is not to say that the nature of a conflict is unimportant, far from it, if hybrid wars appear to be growing in frequency, and if they offer a pathway for actors to fight battles more effectively, then these kinds of wars must be better understood so as to reduce the exposure of innocents to harm.

They myriad forms hybrid wars and gray zone conflicts can assume not only creates macro-level threats of escalation, but also imperils innocents’ livelihoods in new ways. These threats are as diverse as Russian natural gas freezes leaving families without heat in the dead of winter to well-documented episodes of ethnic cleansing by IS to extortion, impressment and violence perpetrated by state-like criminal syndicates in Latin America. Furthermore, just as these types of conflicts blur the line between the state and non-state in terms of tactics employed, so too is the distinction between fighter and civilian similarly cast in grayscale. If one’s objective is to create political chaos in another country for instance, surely terrorising that nation’s citizens can be seen a legitimate military aim. Similarly an often overlooked element of modern hybrid operations is the use of cyber and conventional tools to wreak havoc on a state’s economy, often in order to supplement more kinetic tactics. The damage to citizens’ livelihoods created by this, while not always as dramatic as that produced by hard military attacks, can be profound and widespread. This is to say nothing of the innate risk posed by state-sponsored terrorist groups or disavowed military units who, lacking more direct oversight, can inflict severe human rights violations in the course of their campaigns. Finally, it appears unlikely that these threats will diminish and indeed, as the tools for waging hybrid war increase, so too with the ways in which they may impact the civilians in the middle.

At the front lines, were bullets, propaganda and economics meet, special attention must continue to be paid to those caught in the crosshairs. This is particularly true for more hybrid conflicts as the non-state dimension also frequently entails the discarding of some of the normative frameworks meant to impose restrictions on the horrors of war.