Việt Nam has officially announced its candidacy for re-election to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for the 2026–2028 term. The move comes during widespread criticism of its human rights record during its current tenure on the council. The announcement has reignited debates about the legitimacy of the UNHRC and whether countries accused of violating human rights should be allowed to influence global human rights policies. Given Việt Nam’s history of human rights abuses, the United Nations and the Human Rights Council have failed in their global service by allowing the country to run for immediate re-election.

A Troubled History of Human Rights Violations

Việt Nam’s human rights issues are deeply intertwined with its political structure and history. Since gaining independence from French colonial rule in 1945, Việt Nam has been governed by the Communist Party of Việt Nam (CPV), which has maintained tight control over all aspects of society. While this centralized authority initially helped unify the nation, the Party leadership abuses this trust to violate human rights and oppress its people. As the Foundation for Economic Education puts it plainly, “a government that is giving you things can take them away.” 

Since its independence in 1945, Việt Nam has continuously altered their Constitution. Compared to the original Constitution in 1946, sections containing provisions on human rights have been pushed back, altered, or even removed in its later incarnations.¹ Of the reported crimes, the most common issues include police mistreatment of suspects, politics being distorted by the judicial system, and limited privacy rights.² Việt Nam now uses its socialist regime as justification for its abuses of human rights and political enemies. Pro-democracy activists are normally subjected to surveillance and harassment while police are sent to squash protests while censoring journalists. 

Việt Nam’s approach to human rights has been characterized by widespread restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Independent media outlets, labor unions, and civil society organizations are banned, leaving little room for citizens to challenge the government or advocate for change.³ Pro-democracy activists are frequently subjected to surveillance, harassment, and imprisonment under vaguely worded laws such as “propaganda against the state” or “threatening national security.”

One particularly alarming case that drew international press attention occurred in May 2022 when a prominent human rights defender, Truong Van Dung, was sentenced to six years in prison for giving interviews to foreign media outlets and possessing banned books. Following his arrest, he was held incommunicado for more than nine months and denied access to both legal counsel and family visitation.⁴ During his trial, he additionally claimed that two officers at the Hỏa Lò Prison had beaten him and left him with severe pain, for which he was also denied medical help.⁵ Such incidents highlight the government’s intolerance for dissent and its willingness to use the judiciary as a tool for political repression. The U.S. Department of State has also criticized Việt Nam’s electoral process, describing the May 2021 National Assembly elections as “neither free nor fair.”

These practices have drawn condemnation from human rights organizations worldwide. Human Rights Watch has repeatedly called out Việt Nam for its failure to uphold basic freedoms, while Amnesty International has documented numerous cases of arbitrary detention and torture. Despite these concerns, Việt Nam secured a seat on the UNHRC for the 2023–2025 term—a decision that sparked outrage among activists and observers who questioned the council’s commitment to its mission.

The UNHRC’s Membership Dilemma

Việt Nam’s bid for re-election raises broader questions about how membership in the UNHRC is determined. The current UNHRC is organized through regional bodies in which Việt Nam is one of thirteen countries representing the Asia-Pacific States region. 

Critics argue that the inclusion of nations with poor human rights records undermines the council’s credibility. China, Ethiopia, Cuba, and other authoritarian regimes have also secured seats on the council despite facing accusations of systemic abuses. This pattern has led many to question whether the UNHRC is capable of fulfilling its mandate to promote and protect human rights globally.

This makes sense when realizing how relatively simple the process for joining the council is: any United Nations member state can declare candidacy and secure a seat with an absolute majority vote from the General Assembly (97 votes).⁶ There are no formal vetting procedures to assess candidates’ human rights records or ensure they meet certain standards. Without oversight, countries accused of egregious violations can gain influence over international human rights policies.

The lack of a formal process of declaring candidacy for the council is far more than just symbolic; it is telling of how little the United Nations guarantees that members are vetted for the positions they apply for. For example, just within the Council, there are numerous members who have debated against the use of Human Rights Defenders.⁷ The UNHRC has proven that its member countries don’t need to care about human rights to join. Instead, they can have complete influence on global human rights by passing a simple majority vote. Very rarely do countries not get elected if they declare candidacy. The last Member Country to be denied a bid to the Council was Saudi Arabia, an anomaly which came as a result of election to that regional body being actually competitive for the first time in years. 

Suspension from the council is even rarer and requires a two-thirds majority vote from the General Assembly. To date, only two countries—Libya in 2011 and Russia in 2022—have been suspended due to extreme actions that violated UN principles. Even when member states undergo a Universal Periodic Review every 4.5 years to assess their progress on human rights issues, enforcement mechanisms remain weak.

Việt Nam’s Controversial Candidacy

Việt Nam’s announcement that it will seek re-election has sparked renewed criticism from activists, experts, and international observers. Even since Việt Nam committed to an “active, constructive, and responsible role” in their next term, its image as a defender of human rights is sullied by its past and present actions. Many argue that Việt Nam’s continued presence on the council tarnishes its legitimacy and diminishes public trust in its ability to advocate for human rights. 

Dr. Nguyen Dinh Thang, director of BPSOS (Boat People SOS), an international human rights organization focused on Southeast Asia, suggested that Việt Nam’s bid serves political purposes rather than a genuine commitment to improving human rights. According to Thang, Việt Nam aims to “prove to its people that it has a good reputation,” push back criticism from other countries and human rights defenders, and build closer economic ties with the West. This isn’t far from what Radio Free Asia also hypothesizes: that Việt Nam wants to spite human rights defenders who believe they should not have a seat. Regardless of true intention, Việt Nam’s primary goal is to legitimize their role in the council amidst the pushback and secure another term. 

Such tactics are not unique to Việt Nam; other countries have been accused of using their positions on the council for political gain rather than meaningful reform. Australia faced similar criticism during its 2018–2020 term when activists accused it of performative participation rather than substantive advocacy.⁸ Despite outright slander from media and pushback from citizens of the country itself, the UNHRC still allows these countries to submit claims for candidacy. Việt Nam is not the first, and certainly not the last, country to take advantage of the eerily few qualifications needed to join the council. This begs the question: why does the United Nations, an organization that prides itself on its credible international reputation, allow countries that disregard human rights to create international standards for human rights?

The Broader Implications

Việt Nam’s re-election bid underscores a critical challenge for the United Nations: balancing inclusivity with accountability and maintaining legitimacy. While diversity among member states, especially those who falter in their ability to uphold pristine standards for human rights, can foster dialogue and collaboration across different perspectives, it also risks undermining its credibility. And when the UNHRC has multiple countries that have severe offenses on their human rights, they need to draw a line to ensure effective decision-making for international human rights. 

The UNHRC was established in 2006 as a successor to the discredited UN Commission on Human Rights, which faced similar criticisms over its lack of membership criteria.⁹ However, nearly two decades later, it is clear that these structural flaws persist—most notably the absence of rigorous standards for candidacy and the inclusion of countries who consistently violate what the council stands for. Yet, despite the obvious complications that the UNHRC has in its very foundation, they have made little to no efforts to respond to the community’s requests for accountability. 

As debates continue over Việt Nam’s suitability for re-election, some experts call for broader reforms within the UNHRC itself. These could include stricter vetting processes for candidates, more frequent reviews of member states’ performance, and stronger enforcement mechanisms to hold violators accountable. Some argue for the dismantling of the council as a whole in hopes of overhauling the corruption and replacing it with a new system. Leading countries such as the United States have openly condemned the UNHRC dating back to 2020, and the new Trump Administration has withdrawn from the council completely. Should the UNHRC not respond to these calls to action, they run the risk of losing legitimacy and standing as a council in general. 

Proposed Measures for Rejoin

Given Việt Nam’s track record, many experts believe that its candidacy should be contingent upon concrete reforms aimed at addressing its human rights violations. The United Nations should acknowledge the shortcomings of the country and only allow Việt Nam to rejoin under certain circumstances. First, Việt Nam should release arbitrarily detained activists who have been imprisoned under vague charges such as “propaganda against the state.” This step forward would prove Việt Nam’s commitment to free press and acceptance of criticism. The government should also publicly denounce excessive force by law enforcement officials and take steps to address corruption within the judicial system, namely its frequent physical abuse of detainees. Additionally,  Việt Nam should formally commit to upholding international human rights standards during its term on the council and accept suspension if it fails to meet these obligations.¹⁰ These measures would signal a genuine commitment to reform while helping restore trust in Việt Nam’s government and its role within the UNHRC. 

While Việt Nam needs to be held accountable for their actions by the council, the UNHRC also must reform parts of their system, specifically in regards to candidacy, if they wish to retain legitimacy on a global stage. To target the issue of retaining legitimacy, the UNHRC should create a set list of qualifications for countries to run for the council. Some of these criteria should include that countries should not have any accusations of human rights violations on mainstream media networks. Additionally, the UNHRC needs to create stronger review systems. The Universal Periodic Review takes place every 4.5 years and uses only three documents to determine if a country is violating human rights. They should create a new review system that not only reviews countries more frequently, but also more closely. And although they review countries, there are few mechanisms to ensure that countries are following the UNHRC standards. These include authorizing commissions of inquiry and treaty-based bodies. However, there is little accountability if these countries are found to violate standards. The UNHRC should commit to enforcing their standards and upholding proper discipline if they are violated. 

Conclusion

Việt Nam’s candidacy for re-election poses significant ethical questions about how global institutions, such as the UNHRC, should operate. Should a country accused of systemic abuses be allowed to shape international human rights policies? And if so, what safeguards can be implemented to ensure accountability?

For now, Việt Nam faces mounting pressure from activists and international observers who demand tangible reforms before it can reclaim a seat on one of the world’s most influential human rights bodies. As these debates unfold, they will likely shape not only Việt Nam’s future but also broader discussions about how the United Nations as a whole can better uphold their principles on an international level.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: The Allee des Nations with the Flags of Member Countries at United Nations Office | Image sourced from Pexels | CC License, no changes made

Written by: Samantha Larkin

By one o’clock, a dozen students had already taken the most coveted seats in Yale Law School’s Levinson Hall. Soon to be joined by community members and faculty, the spectators engaged in quiet conversation, with some notable murmurs about coming assignments and skipped classes. Others spent the time hurriedly making up the work they were missing or getting ahead on work due later so they could spend the rest of this Wednesday afternoon carefully reflecting on the discussion they would hear.

That discussion was one of many in the new “Big Picture” series, hosted by the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy. October 2nd marked the first public talk in the series, focusing on the real-world applications of former UN Ambassador Samantha Power’s recently published memoir, The Education of an Idealist.

The memoir traces Ambassador Power’s life from her childhood in an Irish pub to her new life in Atlanta, Georgia; her athletic college days to her experience as a war-correspondent in Bosnia; and from her life as a professor and advocate for human rights to her appointment to the National Security Council by former President Barack Obama. Her role as the American Ambassador to the United Nations is expounded upon, as well as the struggles she faced in trying to protect human rights and promote freedom around the world. Ambassador Power is best known for her foreign policy regarding humanitarian crises, and the role America has to play when there is trouble abroad. One of the main questions her new memoir seeks to answer is how the United States should intervene in foreign nations when the lives or liberties of people are at stake.

Interviewing Ambassador Power about her book and her role in foreign policy were former National Security Adviser to Vice President Joe Biden and visiting lecturer, Jake Sullivan, as well as the 22nd Legal Adviser of the Department of State and Sterling Professor of International Law Harold Hongju Koh. After a brief introduction by Brady-Johnson Professor of Grand Strategy and History, Beverly Gage, Ambassador Power took up the microphone to greet the crowd of eager students and to read an excerpt from her memoir, setting the tone for the discussion. 

Throughout the panel, Power harkened back to her memoir, referencing the outbreak and persistence of certain issues like the Ukrainian Crisis and her mission to Cameroon to promote the safety of civilians living in fear of the Boko Haram. The memoir not only reflects the growth and education of an important American ambassador, but the influence she and her policies had on the world. 

With brief commentary on the current state of American foreign relations, Ambassador Power admitted that the power America once had to intervene in humanitarian crises may have been recently ignored. With the current presidency focusing on internal affairs, our former status to foreign countries— and certainly our allies— has been reduced. But, she recalls her own time at Yale, specifically in the History department, and hopes that new educational initiatives—such as the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy—are raising a new generation of humanitarians and policy makers.

You can buy Ambassador Samantha Power’s Pulitzer Prize-winning memoir The Education of an Idealistat the Campus Bookstore, Barnes and Noble online, or Amazon, as well as her well-known book on foreign policy “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. For more information about Ambassador Power, or to see upcoming dates for her book tour, you can visit www.samanthapower.com.

For the next “Big Picture” event, visit the Brady-Johnson Program in grand strategy website.

Written by: Henry Suckow Ziemer, Silliman College ’21

This piece was published as part of our YMUN Pegasus series.

“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” 

This was the sentiment that struck me as I listened to the opening remarks during a special event at the Friday session of the UN High Level Political Forum (HLPF). The focus of the workshop-syle meeting was Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Relative to many of the other goals, the presenters said, SDG 16 had received significantly less attention and funding. Yet despite this apparent lack of interest, achieving peace and justice and crafting strong institutions is essential to the achievement of practically every other development goal. State fragility in particular is a major impediment to obtaining any form of meaningful progress with respect to the SDGs. A combination of factors, from exploitative regimes, inequalities, and armed conflict, contribute to state fragility. According to the Fragile States Index, the majority of the worlds’ countries exhibit symptoms of state fragility to a worrying extent. 

When it comes to peace and stability, the security community may represent an unlikely ally. Too often it seems that a mutually reinforcing wall exists between the theorists and practitioners of international security, and those looking to advance the cause of sustainable development. The former see international institutions as cumbersome and largely ineffective, lacking concrete mechanisms for following through with their grand pronouncements. The latter can often see national militaries as part of the problem, not the solution. Both criticisms are not unfounded, and strike at the heart of very real issues with both the international development and security architectures. However, the isolation between professionals in both disciplines has led to what speakers at the HLPF termed “siloed” discourse, each expert remaining confined to their specific area of focus and not venturing beyond. Siloes are detrimental to progress on the SDGs, which are by their nature cross-cutting and interdisciplinary. Yet there is a burgeoning consensus that the two disciplines enjoy a symbiotic, rather than adversarial relationship. The 2011 World Development Report centered around issues of conflict and security. This report noted that, “no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single United Nations Millennium Development Goal”. Furthermore, Kathrine Sikkink in her book Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century notes that one of the most significant methods for improving human rights compliance is reducing the incidence of armed conflict.

While Sikkink emphasizes the need to restrain foreign interventionist instincts as one method for decreasing violence, it will take a more comprehensive strategy to meaningfully resolve current wars, and prevent the outbreak of new ones. Measures such as reevaluating UN Peacekeeping Operations, increasing funding for transitional justice initiatives in post-conflict states, and supporting professional, accountable security forces in fragile states all represent useful tools to this end. A fundamental first step however, is elevating SDG 16 to begin with. This is an area which the United Nations is uniquely suited. As a high-profile international institution, it can help bridge the gap between security, human rights, and development silos and encourage sharing of best practices and crafting new strategies to safeguard peace. 

This task is daunting, the realm of armed conflict remains one of the most pernicious issues in international politics today. While some promise has come from recent studies which suggest that interstate wars are on the decline, this has been counterbalanced with an uptick in civil wars and insurgencies. While the solution to the ongoing challenge of fragile, failed and fragmented states is not apparent, what is clear is that finding one will require a new way of thinking which can incorporate perspectives from a number of theoretical and practical disciplines. The United Nations has the ability to jump–start such a conversation and raise SDG 16 to the position it deserves, it has a responsibility to do so. 

“[Nuclear weapons is] the firm guarantee by which our descendants can enjoy the most dignified and happiest life in the world” – Kim Jong Un^[1]

North Korea has always been at the spotlight of the international stage with its rogue regime threatening the safety and security of millions of lives through nuclear weapons procurement. Although the United Nations have pushed sanction efforts to slow down and dissuade the North Koreans from developing these weapons, their efforts by large have failed. The United Nations’ efforts to stop North Korea from obtaining  nuclear weapons exemplifies  global governance — an international organization with transnational actors who cooperate to collectively solve an issue that affects the security of the world. This is the general mission of the United Nations. However, the practice of global governance demonstrated by the UN relies on the member nations to be accountable for their agreements and follow through official resolutions. By sequentially analyzing critical failures of the United Nations through the frames of key strategic eras, this paper will attempt to explain how miscalculations, inefficiencies, lack of accountability, ineffectiveness of sanctions, and emergence of state primacy accounted for the failure of global governance in North Korea from procuring nuclear weapons.

Historical Background of United Nations in North Korea

In the summer of 1950, the United Nations first intervened in the Korean peninsula conflict after North Korean forces, backed by Chinese and Soviet Union support, invaded South Korea. After a unanimous vote from the Security Council of 9-0 on intervening, 21 members of the United Nations committed their troops and supplies to support South Korean military operations (https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict). Following strict UN guidance on troop intervention, President Truman justified the necessity of contributing troops into the peninsula as a combined United Nations military effort.  This allowed for him to declare the conflict not as war, but as a United Nations led “police action” under directions of the Security Council allowing him to circumvent Congressional approval.^[2]

Upon establishment of the United Nations, Article One of the UN charter outlined the maintenance of international peace and security agreed upon by the Security Council. During this period, the Security Council condemned Soviet endeavors to spread communism to other parts of their neighboring countries. During the Korean conflict, China was yet to be admitted into the United Nations and the Soviet Union vacated their seat in the Security Council. The absence of these two nations allowed the UN to enter  the Korean peninsula. Without the Soviet Union to veto any actions taken by the Security Council and the United Nation’s substantial interest in the Korean peninsula, the Security Council found it easy to gain support to intervene in the conflict. The United Nations Security Council resolution which outlined the intervention in Korea asked for member states to self-determine their contributions to the conflict whether it was with troops, supplies, or both. Additionally, the Security Council asked the United States to take the strategic lead in the conflict by establishing a unified command for the conflict as it had the preponderance of strategic interest in the region.^[3] This was the United Nation’s first intervention in North Korea—perhaps the first and last successful intervention in the Korean peninsula.

Critical Failures of the United Nations throughout Key Strategic Eras

The Miscalculations:
Height of Soviet Influence, Post- Korean War Rebuilding (1950-1960)

During the first decade of existence upon the Armistice Agreement from the Korean War, North Korea enjoyed robust relationships with its communist “big brothers,” but the United Nations miscalculated how these partnerships would be critical in allowing North Korea to procure weapons. During this time, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed a joint research agreement that allowed North Korean scientists to study abroad to gain the technological information necessary to develop their own weapons program. In addition, the Soviet Union provided the Soviet IRT-200 nuclear research reactor and various other facilities that would put North Korea on a launch path towards rapid weapons development. Though the international community was aware of these developments, the 600 nuclear weapons that the United States positioned in South Korea sent a message that the international community was aware of the North’s activities and was ready to take action if the Soviet Union dared to take action against South Korea in North Korean interest. Despite the North’s endeavors to start a weapons program, the earliest years of North Korea were primarily focused on to rebuild from the Korean War and for Kim Il Sung to build his regime’s image built around propaganda. Due to the overlapping timeframe of the Cold War and North Korea’s direct alliance to the Soviet Union, perhaps they were perceived as homogenous threats to the United Nations rather than a separate issue.  Furthermore, international intelligence agencies during this time doubted that the warn-torn North Koreans would ever be able to develop nuclear weapons capabilities robust enough to damage any other country beyond its immediate neighbors—a fatal miscalculation.^[4]

The Inefficiencies:
Weapons Development during Heightened Global Surveillance & Post-Cold War (1970-2010)

By the 1970s, North Korea developed a significant amount of domestic infrastructure and research on nuclear technology. Once the United Nations perceived North Korea’s nuclear technology significant enough to recognize, North Korea signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1977. Despite the agreement, the 80’s marked the most expansive growth of indigenous North Korean research when it started high explosive weapons tests designed for bombs, various triggering mechanisms, a fuel rod fabrication complex, and a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. Concerned by its neighbor’s sudden aggressive growth in nuclear weapons technology, the Soviet Union made North Korea sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to be a non-nuclear weapon state in 1985 in exchange for Soviet light water reactors which were to be used solely for energy. For the United Nations, North Korea’s signing of the NPT was considered a rhetorical win, but North Korea was ultimately a false-ratifier of the treaty. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many impoverished Soviet Nuclear scientists sought refuge in North Korea, bringing along with them substantial amount of classified technological information into the hermit kingdom.^[5] Although international intelligence agencies had been aware of this movement, not much action was considered to prevent the migration.

In 1991, the US pulled out its nuclear weapons from South Korea followed by the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Through the Declaration, both North and South Korea promised “not to manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons, as well as ban nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.”  It further mandated usage of bilateral inspections to ensure compliance of these standards. However, the North Koreans violated the agreement within a few years upon ratifying, and none of the conditions of the original Declaration were held to account. The lack of accountability was one of the biggest failures of the agreement, especially on the part of the United Nations.^[6]

The failure of the United Nations to properly share intelligence and take actions contributed to the failure of stopping the North Koreans from developing and acquiring weapons technology. Due to the US’s vested strategic interest in the region, the United Nations relied on the US to keep North Korea a nuclear weapons free state. Had the United Nations structured a joint platform that involved non-US stakeholder countries to prevent North Korea’s weapons program, the United Nations may have had a chance to block North Korea at its earliest stages.

The Lack of Accountability: The Modern Years (2010-2018)

These past eight years have marked the most successful and aggressive missile tests by the North Koreans and revealed the catastrophic failure of United Nation against their weapons development. The successful launching of the missiles proved that the aggressive United Nations sanctions and Security Council resolutions did little to stop North Korea’s weapons development.

In 2011, Kim Jong Un officially takes over for his late father and is declared the official Supreme Leader of North Korea. During the last eight years, North Korea’s weapons development expanded faster than ever and despite increased sanctions and condemning of North Korean activities by the United Nations, the North Koreans proceeded with their weapons development largely unaffected by any global repercussions. In March 2012, North Korea announced its launch of a satellite to celebrate the centennial birthdate of Kim Il Sung. Soon after in April of that year, the United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea’s satellite launch because it had parallel applications to ballistic missiles development which was in direct violation of United Nations resolutions 1718 and 1874. Despite threats of international sanctions, North Korea continued its satellite developments and successfully launched Unha-3 in late December of 2012. In January of 2013, the Security Council passed resolution 2087 which froze North Korean assets and placed heavy sanctions on their trade. Unaffected by these sanctions, North Korea announced its plans to restart its heavy water reactor at Yongbyon in April of the same year. In March of 2014, North Korea test fired thirty short-range rockets and two medium-range Rodang missiles. Although the United Nation’s Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea for its launches, North Korea announced the next day that it will carry out a new form of nuclear weapons test. In November of 2014, North Korea threatened a fourth nuclear test after the United Nations Human Rights Committee referred North Korea to be tried in the International Criminal Court for human rights abuses. In March of 2016, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270 that condemned nuclear test and launch of early 2016, expanding existing sanctions on North Korea. The United Nations continued to condemn North Korea actions from then on, but North Korea did not stop.^[7]

The last [decade showed the culmination of the failure of the United Nations in North Korea. By 2010, the North Koreans had enough research and development needed for a full weapons development. Essentially, no amount of global governance in the last eight years would could have curbed either the capabilities or willingness for North Korea to continue with their weapons development. In the eyes of the US, North Korea is a rogue state that has no accountability for its actions as it is largely self-sustained through illegal black markets, reliant on domestic production, receives critical support from China, and most importantly, does not care about the well-being of its of people.(https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/threat-rogue-states)  For North Korea, the Constructivist model of naming-and-shaming has no effect on them because their reputation does not matter in how they conduct trade or preserve security relations with other countries. Kim Jong Un knows that despite China’s involvement in the Security Council,Beijing’s alliance prevents the failure of their regime,

Failure of United Nations Sanctions

The analysis of why sanctions did not work in North Korea merits a unique assessment of its own independent of its timeline. Despite heavy international sanctions posed by the United Nations, North Koreans have developed sophisticated ways to get around them through illicit means. With North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the United Nations placed technology-based sanctions prohibiting the trade of any type of goods that could be used to build missiles. Although initial sanctions slowed the procurement of some materials, the North Koreans were quick to adapt and overcome. They became increasingly sophisticated in evading sanctions— the 2017 United Nations report stated that their tactics have become “increasing in scale, scope, and sophistication.”^[8] With the advancement of the domestic research, North Korea found other means to develop weapons through reverse engineering of old Soviet equipment or importation of old weapons systems from the 70s. Although the technology sanctions placed in the early 2000s resulted in uneven missile tests in North Korea, they were largely ineffective in halting their weapons development.^[9]

Since Kim Jong Un took over the regime, North Korea’s missiles tests frequented more than ever with increased success rates. In 2016, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to “severely toughen its penalties against the isolated country.”^[10] Despite efforts to implement the most “comprehensive, robust, and unyielding” sanctions on North Korea, much of the success of the sanctions relied on China to follow through with the agreements. However, academics later critiqued the ineffectiveness of the United Nations’ sanctions on North Korea. Critics claimed that due to the importance of nuclear weapons for North Korea, no amount of economic sanctions will stop their procurement of the weapon. In fact, some believed that “sanctions may help Kim control the flow of money to individuals that increasingly are seen as rivals to the state’s authoritarian controls.”^[11]

In addition to failed sanctions, the most recent missile tests debris showed that many of the parts originated from Ukraine or Russia alluding to the fact that North Korea’s resource for procuring weapons are vast and wide.  These parts were most likely procured through Chinese middlemen who North Koreans commonly use. In order to evade international sanctions, North Korean business managers would pull double duties as diplomats who embed themselves in major commercial hubs of China to get easy access to these Chinese middlemen. Many of the goods that are exchanged have dual uses in both military and civilian domains, making them easier to sell in the public circle. Sanctions were supposed to slow down and curb North Koreans from aggressively expanding their weapons technology. However, these sanctions had the opposite effect in some cases, and caused more Chinese middlemen to join the risky, yet lucrative business as they would charge higher fees in exchange for the risks of doing business with North Koreans. Despite upticks in prices, the North Koreans were happy to match the increased price of doing business. ^[12]

Lastly, the failure of United Nations sanctions in North Korea reveals another reality of global governance— realism. Countries like China and Russia, who have the most amount of regional influence on North Korea, have the political and economic means to enforce sanctions against North Korea if they wanted to. However, their own state interests of wanting a buffer zone between a US-backed South Korea and a former Soviet-backed North Korea is more attractive to them. Furthermore, North Korea is only a “rogue state” in the context of the Western-dominated global order. North Korea will be considered subordinate state and a rational actor to their former communist brothers of China and Russia. Essentially China and Russia are not as worried about North Korea procuring nuclear weapons as much as the West and Western-backed states because of the strategic alliance they share. This proves that in realism, ‘naming and shaming’ has little no effect when the survival of the state is most important.

Emergence of State Primacy: The Modern Years (2010-2018) continued

North Korea example demonstrates a troubling reality: global governance does not work anymore. The failure of the United Nations in North Korea is a great example of the re-emergence in the primacy of the state, especially for major power countries such like China. Global governance has and always will be state-centric in efforts to further individual interests in the global stage. In the example of North Korea, the United Nations failed to keep its most strategic member state accountable for their actions— China. For China, despite its role as a member of the United Nations Security Council, North Korea’s existence will always be of paramount priority and will prevent the failure of the state at extended costs. Furthermore, although the United Nations produces resolutions that require its member states to “comply”, the actual accountability of these resolutions are merely guided by international norms, trade relations, and global reputations. Therefore, the United Nations cannot truly hold China accountable for not following through with its resolutions. As an economic giant and with its preponderance of military presence throughout the world, China has afforded itself the ability to shield itself from the backlash of the international community. Furthermore, countries like China and Russia care little about their international norms allowing for them to operate freely in the setting of international governance where their actions require little accountability.^[13]

The current United States administration is catching on to this trend of reemergence of state primacy: “In the Trump worldview, bilateral deal-making among great powers is preferred; regional and multilateral organizations that might constrain the United States are suspect.”^[14] The resignation of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, is a example of this trend manifesting in the global arena because it sends a political message to the international community that the US does not want to be constrained by international norms stemming from liberalism. Traditionally, as the upholder of global norms, the US’s abilities to be effective in global governance were greatly constrained by its reputation and image. However, with President Trump potentially redefining the US’s role in the United Nations with a state-centric push of “America-first”, the US might eventually enjoy similar freedoms that China currently has in international relations. In short, the United Nations is losing legitimacy amongst great powers like the US.^[15]

Ultimately, China and the US hold veto power in the Security Council, promote state-centric interests in global governance, and are not held strictly accountable for their actions, no amount of resolutions and condemning will solve international conflicts. With the reemergence of state primacy challenging the current order of global governance, the North Korea issue reveals a grim reality: we lost our ability to properly subdue international issues through global governance because we did not adapt to the growing complexities of our times. Perhaps the institutions of global governance created to solve 20th century issues are no longer fit to solve the problems of today.^[16]

Conclusion

The United Nations failed to halt nuclear weapons proliferation in North Korea because of strategic failures of key member states as well as underestimating North Korea’s abilities to overcome international sanctions. Despite it being a global conflict, the United Nations and its member states largely relied on the US to handle the North Korean problem because of its strategic interest in the matter. However, with its hands tied to other international conflicts at the time, the US’s ability to actively intervene on the North Korean issue was severely limited. Furthermore, despite being a key Security Council member who agreed on many of the resolutions to punish North Korea, China played a substantial role in allowing the weapons program to thrive. Ineffective sanctions placed by the United Nations did little to stop North Korea’s proliferation efforts and inadvertently incentivized black marketers to frequent businesses with North Korean merchants. Most importantly, the United Nations’ failure to hold its member states accountable to the resolutions and failure to keep North Korea accountable for its agreements led to the greatest failure of global governance. With the reemergence of state primacy amongst member states, the ability for the representatives effectively practice global governance has become nearly impossible. An organization that cannot directly hold states accountable for their actions and can merely affect change through slow processes of international norms is not effective enough to combat complex global conflicts of the 21st century such as the problem of North Korea.

Bibliography

Berdal, Mats. “The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable.” Survival 45, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 7–30.

Francis, John Hudson, David. “Why Did Sanctions Fail Against North Korea?” Foreign Policy, n.d. Accessed November 8, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/09/why-did-sanctions-fail-against-north-korea/.

Goldin, Ian. Divided Nations. Why Global Governance Is Failing, and What We Can Do about It. Oxford University Press, n.d.

Goodrich, Leland M. “The United Nations and the Korean War: A Case Study.” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 25, no. 2 (1953): 90–104.

hermesauto. “‘Treasured Sword’: What Kim Jong Un Said about North Korea’s Nukes.” Text. The Straits Times. Last modified April 21, 2018. Accessed November 15, 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/treasured-sword-what-kim-jong-un-said-about-north-koreas-nukes.

Lynch, Colum. “U.N. Report Details How North Korea Evades Sanctions.” Foreign Policy, n.d. Accessed November 8, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/20/un-report-details-how-north-korea-evades-sanctions/.

Park, John S. “To Curb North Korea’s Nuclear Program, Follow the Money.” The Conversation. Last modified September 20, 2016. Accessed November 8, 2018. http://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program-follow-the-money-65462.

Salisbury, Daniel. “Why U.N. Sanctions against North Korea’s Missile Program Failed.” Last modified September 8, 2017. Accessed November 7, 2018. https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/why-u-n-sanctions-against-north-koreas-missile-program-failed/.

Sengupta, Somini, and Choe Sang-Hun. “U.N. Toughens Sanctions on North Korea in Response to Its Nuclear Program.” The New York Times, January 19, 2018, sec. World. Accessed November 8, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions.html.

“Analysis | How ‘isolated’ North Korea Managed to Build an ICBM That Could Reach Alaska.” Washington Post. Accessed November 8, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/07/how-isolated-north-korea-managed-to-build-an-icbm-that-could-reach-alaska/.

“Atomic Energy Research Institute | Facilities | NTI.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed November 8, 2018. https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/776/.

“Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association.” Accessed November 8, 2018. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.

“Crisis in Global Governance.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 25, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/event/crisis-global-governance-0.

“Factbox: History of Failure: Efforts to Negotiate on North Korean…” Reuters, March 6, 2018. Accessed November 7, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-talks-factbox-idUSKCN1GI2PQ.

“North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: A Brief History.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 8, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations.

“President Trump and the Future of Global Governance.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 25, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/blog/president-trump-and-future-global-governance.

“The United Nations in Korea.” Accessed November 6, 2018. https://www.trumanlibrary.org/dbq/unitednations.php.

“Understanding the China-North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed November 8, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.

“Understanding UN Sanctions on North Korea.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed November 7, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/north-korea-sanctions.

“United Nations Forces in the Korean War | The Anzac Portal.” Accessed November 6, 2018. https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/history/conflicts/korean-war/korean-war/armed-forces-korean-war/united-nations-forces-korean-war.

Endnotes

^[1] ‘Treasured Sword’: What Kim Jong Un Said about North Korea’s Nukes,” Text, The Straits Times, last modified April 21, 2018, accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/treasured-sword-what-kim-jong-un-said-about-north-koreas-nukes.

^[2] “The United Nations in Korea,” accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/dbq/unitednations.php.

^[3] Leland M. Goodrich, “The United Nations and the Korean War: A Case Study,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 25, no. 2 (1953): 90–104.

^[4] “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association,” accessed November 8, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.

^[5] “Analysis | How ‘isolated’ North Korea Managed to Build an ICBM That Could Reach Alaska,” Washington Post, accessed November 8, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/07/how-isolated-north-korea-managed-to-build-an-icbm-that-could-reach-alaska/.

^[6] “North Korean Nuclear Negotiations: A Brief History,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed November 8, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations.

^[7] “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy | Arms Control Association.”

^[8] Daniel Salisbury, “Why U.N. Sanctions against North Korea’s Missile Program Failed,” last modified September 8, 2017, accessed November 7, 2018, https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/why-u-n-sanctions-against-north-koreas-missile-program-failed/.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Somini Sengupta and Choe Sang-Hun, “U.N. Toughens Sanctions on North Korea in Response to Its Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, January 19, 2018, sec. World, accessed November 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions.html.

^[11] John Hudson Francis David, “Why Did Sanctions Fail Against North Korea?,” Foreign Policy, n.d., accessed November 8, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/09/why-did-sanctions-fail-against-north-korea/.

^[12] John S. Park, “To Curb North Korea’s Nuclear Program, Follow the Money,” The Conversation, last modified September 20, 2016, accessed November 8, 2018, http://theconversation.com/to-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program-follow-the-money-65462.

^[13] Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 12, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097.

^[14] “President Trump and the Future of Global Governance,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed November 25, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/president-trump-and-future-global-governance.

^[15] “Crisis in Global Governance,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed November 25, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/event/crisis-global-governance-0.

^[16] Ian Goldin, Divided Nations. Why Global Governance Is Failing, and What We Can Do about It (Oxford University Press, n.d.).

Written by Tyler Jager

As the Cold War came to a close in the 1990s, global attitudes towards conflict changed. The majority of conflicts during the Cold War were “regional”, involved both intrastate and interstate actors, and were located in the so-called “Third World” (referring to nations not aligned with the United States nor the Soviet Union). These qualities made conflict susceptible to proxy warfare for the two contending blocs on the world stage, and as such, most conflicts were viewed as intractable and even inevitable, since both superpowers had a vested interest in a conflict’s result. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the international order left behind created an environment seemingly fit for conflict resolution at a level previously unthinkable. Civil wars, whether they were in Latin America or Southeast Asia, were no longer zero-sum-games for global power; they were viewed as collective problems that had to be addressed with collective action (Lund 2003). In 1992, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, introduced “An Agenda for Peace”, a response to a Security Council request noting an “unprecedented post-Cold War opportunity”. More broadly, this report became the de facto doctrine of the United Nations after 1991: expanding on the idea of peacekeeping to include “preventive diplomacy” and “post-conflict peacebuilding”. Up to this point, UN intervention into conflict zones was limited, due to frequent vetoes of more expansive action by the Security Council. The mandate of a peacekeeping mission during the Cold War was the bare minimum: to monitor compliance with a peace agreement. The new “Agenda for Peace” encouraged a vast expansion of this exercise to recognize and prevent future conflict, to rebuild norms and state institutions post-conflict, and to address the “deepest causes” of conflict (which Boutros-Ghali recognized as “economic despair, social injustice and political oppression”).   

Suddenly, everything from protecting safe zones to rebuilding a sovereign state’s police force to employing its people could qualify as conflict prevention. The definition expanded to include multiple actors, such as states, international bodies, or NGOs. Today, the phenomenon we call “liberal intervention” can be defined as a multilateral outside intervention (under which the UN qualifies) into an intra-state conflict to provide security (Lund). This paper will evaluate the effectiveness of post-Cold War liberal intervention, and analyze why some interventions succeed and others fail, through two prominent case studies. This paper will not examine whether such interventions are legally valid or desirable in principle. Nor will this paper analyze the level of political openness or democracy as a criterion for successful intervention; an intervention is considered successful if and only if it prevents political violence.

The first case study to examine is that of Angola. Broadly simplified, the Angolan Civil War began in 1975, immediately after Angola’s successful war for independence from Portugal. Faced with a power vacuum, the two major liberation movements, the Marxist-Leninist group MPLA and the conservative group UNITA, aligned with the Soviet and US blocs respectively, turned on one another. The conflict divided Angola along ethnic and tribal lines, with the Mbundu people as the UNITA base of support, and the Ovimbundu as the MPLA base of support. The Angolan Civil War quickly became an archetypal Cold War battleground; UNITA insurgents received covert American aid and arms, in addition to ground support from South Africa, while the ruling MPLA received the same from the Soviets, in addition to ground troops from Cuba. By 1991, however, international aspects of the conflict had faded. Cuba, South Africa, and Angola signed a multilateral ceasefire in 1990, and the leaders of MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Accords in 1991. The Bicesse Accords provided a framework for a Angola’s transition to multiparty democracy, with winner-take-all elections designed to cement the peace.

A UN peacekeeping mission, United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II, was deployed to monitor the ceasefire, and later the election. This mandate was fairly limited (understandably so, as this was before Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace”); the only direct authority of UNAVEM II was election monitoring. UNAVEM II could not enforce demobilization (which was voluntary), monitor the new defense force, and could only monitor other Angolan monitors of the ceasefire. The mission consisted of solely 1100 personnel and a $200 million operating budget – tiny for a UN peacekeeping mission. The 1992 elections were disastrous, neither free nor fair, and provoked further conflict (Paris 2010). The leaders of MPLA and UNITA ran against one another, and the losing candidate (the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi – originally a U.S. ally) contested the results, rallied his forces, and resumed the insurgency. This period of fighting from 1992 to 1994 was the worst yet in the history of independent Angola; 120,000 were killed over eighteen months, nearly half the amount of casualties in the previous sixteen years (Alker 2001). UNITA embarked on a shockingly successful campaign, striking deep into the heart of MPLA (and ethnically Ovimbundu-dominated) territory. The humanitarian crisis that ensued was one of the worst of the decade. As a result, the United States abandoned UNITA; with the USSR’s collapse the Cold War aspect of the Angolan Civil War was over.

When UNITA’s luck ran out late in 1994, its leaders agreed to another ceasefire with the MPLA government: the Lusaka Protocol. The existence of both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol makes for a useful comparison in analysis of conflict resolution strategies while keeping the variable of the conflict itself constant. The Lusaka Protocol differed from the Bicesse Accords in three major ways. First, it stipulated a power-sharing, coalition government, the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), much unlike the winner-take-all elections that took place after Bicesse. Second, it gave the accompanying UN peacekeeping mission, UNAVEM III, a far more comprehensive mandate with far broader resources. Unlike UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III assumed direct responsibility of enforcing the ceasefire, the creation of a joint national defense force, and the demobilization of UNITA. UNAVEM III had 7,000 staff, 6,000 of which were armed peacekeepers, and by the end of its deployment, cost nearly $900 million, more than quadruple the budget of UNAVEM II. Third, the Lusaka Protocol had flexible timetables (Rienner 1998). Military demobilization, reorganization, and the creation of GURN – all these processes were concluded months behind schedule. Despite this differences, Lusaka was not successful either. By 1999, the Angolan military was once again fighting with UNITA militants, and hostilities did not end until the death of Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, in 2002.

While there are many theories as to why the Bicesse Accords failed, the failure of the Lusaka Protocol casts doubt on nearly all of them. Lusaka should have succeeded if judged by scholarly conflict resolution criteria (Kornprobst 2002); and yet, despite six times the manpower, four times the budget, flexible timetables, and a power-sharing government, the outcome of Lusaka was the same as the outcome of Bicesse. Those theories that do explain the failure of both accords are structural. Some scholars, such as Stephen John Stedman, argue that the conflict in Angola was unsolvable so long as Angolan natural resources – namely oil and diamonds – remained in the hands that they did. The diamond industry gave UNITA nearly bottomless coffers to draw from, and the oil industry remained largely in the hands of MPLA. Neither party was economically dependent on the other, and as such there was no incentive for cooperation. If one party has a monopoly on a valuable, exportable commodity such as diamonds, why would it ever come to the negotiating table? Another point is that Angola, like many postcolonial African states, had no unifying national identity or institutions: Angolans identified themselves as UNITA or Mbundu first, and Angolans second (Sambanis 2000). The lack of a belief in an indivisible public good meant that leaders like Jonas Savimbi would not hesitate to enrich themselves with military action, if they had the power to do so and saw no credible international action to thwart them (Stedman 1995).

The second case study, El Salvador and its twelve-year civil war, is generally considered a success intervention-wise. The horrific Salvadoran Civil War lasted twelve years with 60,000 casualties, and it is a haunting memory in El Salvador and the Americas at large. The conflict began in full force on March 24, 1980, when the Archbishop Óscar Romero, a so-called “voice for the voiceless” and a Mandela-like figure in El Salvador, was assassinated by a lone gunman while conducting mass. Just one month earlier, Romero had written a plea to President Jimmy Carter to prioritize peace in El Salvador, and crucially, to end American military aid to the junta government. Tragically, it was Romero’s assassination, not his letter, that proved more representative of the immediate future of his nation.  The two chief belligerents of the civil war were FMLN, an umbrella Communist guerrilla group, and the right-wing military dictatorship in San Salvador. The war is perhaps most remembered for its infamous “death squads”; militias such as ORDEN, a group famous for torturing civilians and severing ears. Outside the law, allied with the junta government, and with the goal of terrorizing the rural population, from which FMLN drew its main support, the death squads were El Salvador’s national trauma. The underlying causes of the conflict were social and economic divisions in Salvadoran society: unbelievable levels of economic inequality between a tiny landowning elite and a large rural class of agricultural laborers. Similar to Angola, El Salvador was a commodity state, with coffee as the overwhelmingly dominant export. Given the example of Angola as a failed intervention, it would follow that El Salvador, a state with an equally intractable civil war, and with a similar economic and social structure, would be a recipe for another failed intervention on the part of the United Nations. And yet, the conclusion to the Salvadoran Civil War in 1992 is widely considered to be one of the most successful transitions from war to peace in the post-Cold War era, and it holds place to this day.

Why did the final peace agreement and accompanying peacekeeping mission (the Chapultepec Accords and ONUSAL, respectively) in El Salvador succeed where two agreements and four peacekeeping missions in Angola failed? It is nearly certain that the peace in El Salvador would have fallen apart if not for the efforts of the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (Hampson 1996). ONUSAL was the only monitor of compliance in the various political and security reforms that constituted the hundreds of pages in the Chapultepec Accords, and under the leadership of special UN representative Alvaro de Soto, it acted in a way unprecedented for a UN peacekeeping force. ONUSAL bullied and cajoled government ministries and boards; it publicly embarrassed both parties if they did not accept UN recommendations; it took on roles that were nonexistent under its original mandate (Wilkerson 2008). Within a matter of months in 1992, ONUSAL became the chief organizer of El Salvador’s elections, voter registration, land reform, resettlement of former combatants, and creation of a national civilian police force. ONUSAL accomplished the vast majority of these tasks successfully, and with a peak manpower of only 4,948 blue helmets (Dobbins 2005) and a total cost of $107 million (Brown 1999).

Contrast this with UNAVEM III, which included over 7,000 personnel and cost over $900 million—and failed. The success of ONUSAL may be as simple as higher quality and tenacity in its negotiating team, which was willing to be aggressive if necessary. It also differed in a key priority that was missing from the Angola case: human rights. Both sides of the conflict agreed early that monitoring human rights abuses, documenting past abuses, and providing justice to victims were the first step to sustainable peace (Montgomery 1995). The Chapultepec Accords stipulated the creation of a Truth Commission for El Salvador to “investigate serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth.” The staff of the Truth Commission traveled the country, collected over 2,000 testimonies, and documented human rights abuses meticulously. ONUSAL and the Commission used these findings to facilitate restorative justice between victims and perpetrators, and to make recommendations for purges in the military and new police force. Conversely, the Lusaka Protocol and Bicesse Accords of Angola did not monitor human rights whatsoever; their mandates were solely concerned with elections, power-sharing in government, and the military. In fact, the UN special representative to Angola covered up human rights violations; in a statement to Human Rights Watch in 1995, a UN official stated that “the situation is too sensitive for serious human rights monitoring. Making public what we know could undermine the peace process and put us back to war” (Vines 1999). Whereas UNAVEM was lacking in monitoring human rights abuses and justice for said abuses, ONUSAL was proficient in both. Finally, the smaller force in El Salvador may have helped ONUSAL avoid the bureaucratic delays that have accompanied most large UN interventions, as well as the usual backlash from local citizens against the blue helmets.

Of course, ONUSAL cannot act as the sole claimant of El Salvador’s success. It was the political climate of El Salvador that allowed for the Chapultepec Accords in the first place. Salvadorans overwhelmingly supported the peace process and ONUSAL regardless of their politics. A 1987 poll showed 83 percent of the national population supporting an end to the war through negotiated settlement (Call 2002). Citizens of El Salvador were extremely conscious about judicial independence and human rights, and by 1995, public figures were no longer afraid of coming to one another’s defense if blackmailed or silenced (Montgomery). Additionally, the military situation on the ground had convinced both parties that outright victory was impossible. In 1989, FMLN surrounded San Salvador for the first time, and appeared close to victory, although they were eventually pushed back due to a lack of civilian support within the capital. This near loss left the military government shaken, and as for FMLN, it was perceived the group would never reach the level of popular uprising it had hoped for (Wilkerson). This is a key and perhaps obvious difference between the beginnings of the peace processes in Angola and El Salvador: both parties in El Salvador genuinely wanted peace, even if that meant a outcome other than outright victory. The ceasefire enacted after Chapultepec was not broken once. By contrast, the parties of the Angolan Civil War had nothing to gain from peace; they already had monopolies over their respective industries. Therefore, they entered agreements to gain short-term advantages but with the understanding that eventually, they would scuttle them (Stedman 2002).

There were other structural factors at play in El Salvador that may have allowed for a successful transition. Unlike Angola, neither belligerent possessed a monopoly over the commodity good in El Salvador. While coffee processing areas and ports for exportation were largely controlled by the government, FMLN had broad control over coffee plantations in rural areas; thus, the nature of the industry ensured economic dependency between the parties. Secondly, El Salvador had a previous tradition – a rocky tradition, but tradition nonetheless – of parliamentary democracy and democratic institutions, and had a long history as an independent nation. Angola had no time between independence and civil war to foster a national or democratic tradition. 

Yet the contrast of Angola and El Salvador still implies several conclusions about how and why interventions succeed or fail. It appears that the success of an intervention depends on multiple factors, none of which are sufficient on their own to ensure peace, and that the failure of an intervention can be due to just one factor. There are several conditions that are necessary, but not sufficient, for peace to occur.

First, both parties must have a genuine desire for peace. This may seem an obvious conclusion, but it provides the corollary that to attempt intervention into a civil war between two parties who have no real interest in peace will always be futile, regardless of the resources committed to said intervention by the UN or any other body.

Second, the intervention force in question must be efficient and its leaders must be first-rate and assertive. Quite counterintuitively, the experiences of the UN in Angola and El Salvador suggest that peacekeeping missions with fewer personnel will be more successful, as this incentivizes logistical efficiency and minimizes waste.

Third, there must be some form of economic interdependence between the belligerents at hand. For example, MPLA and UNITA had their own foreign patrons and then their own resources from which to draw, and therefore could only lose economic power by relinquishing control, not gain it.

Fourth, human rights monitoring must be a part of the mandate of the peacekeeping force at hand, and coming to terms with past abuses and administering justice must always remain a part of the transition post-conflict.

Fifth, security-sector reform measures must take place. These were best implemented in El Salvador and partially so in the Lusaka Protocol: a demilitarization of the police force, integration of former combatants into said police force, and a dissolution of armed organizations that exist outside the law. The latter measure ensures that former combatants fight on the same side, and a clear line between the military in the sphere of external defense and the police in the sphere of internal defense prevents abuses.

With these conditions met, a third party intervention into an internal conflict can bring peace and stability. Of course, it’s entirely possible that all five are met and the intervention is still a failure. However, policymakers should not take such a result as evidence for the ineffectiveness of third party intervention. It is possible that intervention may have been the best option available, that the situation at hand was unsolvable, and that the absence of intervention would have been even worse. Put simply, it’s hard to end a war. In a study of 124 civil war cases since 1945, 43% were determined to have ended peacefully of their own volition. UN interventions only require a success rate above 43% to be considered more helpful than not.

Bibliography

Dobbins, J. et al. (2005). The UN’s Role in Peacebuilding: from the Congo to Iraq. RAND-Initiated Research.

Hampson, F. (1996). Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed Or Fail. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.

Kornprobst, M. (2002). Explaining Success and Failure of War to Peace Transitions: Revisiting the Angolan and Mozambican Experience. The Journal of Conflict Studies,22(2). Retrieved December 13, 2017.

Lund, M. (2003). What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of PostConflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

Maio, J. D. (2006). Managing Civil Wars: An Evaluation of Conflict-prevention Strategies in Africa. World Affairs,168(3), 131-144. doi:10.3200/wafs.168.3.131-144

Montgomery, T. (1995). Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and ONUSAL. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,37(4), 139-172.

Paris, R. (2010, April). Saving Liberal Peacebuilding. Review of International Studies, 36(2), 337-365.

Sambanis, N., & Doyle, M. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Quantitative Analysis. American Political Science Review,94(4), 779-801.

Wilkerson, M. (2008). Security and Democracy in El Salvador: An Undeniable Connection. Stanford Journal of International Relations,10(1), 32-41.

Vines, A. (1999). The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process. Human Rights Watch.