An Excerpt of An Honors Thesis for the Department of International Relations at Tufts University

Alexa Reilly

Introduction: Indigenous Movements and Multinational Extraction Activity in the Ecuadorian Amazon

Background

This year, several blocks of land in the Ecuadorian Amazon are planned for auction to oil companies in a process which will lock in contracts that give foreign companies permission to extract from the land for the next 20 years. Multiple rounds of extraction licensing sales began in 2018 and several more companies, which have already received licenses, plan to begin activities in the coming year. These are the latest of several rounds of sales which encourage corporations to explore and extract from Ecuadorian land, particularly in the Amazon region. Foreign oil companies have a significant history of extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon, beginning with the entrance of the American company Texaco in 1967.

The extraction activities of a consortium of oil companies including Texaco and the Ecuadorian state oil company Petroecuador have had lasting effects on the region in which they worked, the northern Ecuadorian province of Sucumbíos. Due to poor clean-up techniques, oil production residues can still be found in the soil and waterways of the region, leading to an array of health and environmental problems. In addition, the entrance of oil workers from other regions of Ecuador caused shifts in social and cultural structures of the region’s indigenous communities.  Land transformations and the entrance of mestizo farmer-colonists have caused some indigenous communities to move from their historic territory into territories of other groups, leading to disputes, and at times, violence. On the other hand, foreign oil companies have also had a huge impact on the economy, with crude exports now representing Ecuador’s largest economic sector.

Research Goals and Rationale

The beginning of Ecuador’s oil age was preceded by a history of indigenous organizations that led protest movements on issues such as land rights, economic reform, and official recognition of ethnic identity. Current social movements in the Amazon region work towards a variety of demands, often including a call for a complete withdrawal of foreign extractive corporations in ancestral territories, or beyond that, a move to an Ecuadorian economy that is no longer dependent on extractive exports. In response, I ask: How have indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon staged resistance again oil extraction on their land and to what degree has each movement been met with success or failure? How is “success” defined by participants in these movements and what outcomes result from participating in these movements beyond clear-cut “success” or “failure”?  The first question has normative implications for how protesters of transnational oil corporations could increase the likelihood of their demands being met, while the other question offers insight into less-studied questions on other significant results of movement participation beyond simply success or failure. These insights may have broader implications for participants both within and outside of the movements examined.

Chapter I. Historical Background of Extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon and Ecuadorian Indigenous Social Movements

Extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon: The Beginning

On a small scale, exploration for various forms of mining[1] had occurred in Ecuador’s Amazon region throughout the 20^th century. Targets for this exploration included oil, gold, and other minerals. Oil was discovered on the Ecuadorian coast in the 1920s (Ministry of Hydrocarbons). In the same decade, surveying for oil began in the Amazon rainforest[2] in nearby countries like Peru (Petroleum Technology Transfer Council), though the search for petroleum faced greater challenges in the Amazon than in many other regions, due to the terrain’s lower accessibility. Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil had first surveyed for oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon in the 1930s, though the process was largely unsuccessful, besides discoveries at a few well sites (Sawyer 68, “Firms Abandon Oil Search”). Shell, along with other corporations, re-entered Ecuador in the 1960s (Shell) and oil activity intensified in 1964 when Texaco began to surveil the land and build camps in the northern province of Sucumbíos[3]. The company established its first well in 1967, after commercial quantities of oil were found near the Cofán[4] settlement of Dureno and modern-day Lago Agrio[5] (Corte Interamericana 14). In 1972, the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline–which ran from Lago Agrio to the coastal city of Esmeraldas–was completed, and oil production surged.

Extractive Industries 1980s

While oil extraction was accelerating in the northern Ecuadorian Amazon, other provinces in the Amazon region were also experiencing an increase in the extraction of gold and other minerals which had first started in the early 20^th century (Cleary 1990 1). Additionally, indigenous people in the Ecuadorian Amazon had been facing conflict with westerners for centuries before oil and mineral mining accelerated, whether through interactions with missionaries, loggers, or others (Finer et al 2009). Gold exports form a significant part of the Ecuadorian economy, though not nearly as large an amount as oil exports (Banco Central del Ecuador 2018), and there are several large-scale gold mines in the Amazon region. Unlike oil, gold is more evenly distributed throughout Ecuador’s three continental regions: the coast, sierra (or highlands), and Amazon, making its effects less regional in scope. Copper and other minerals are also mined in the area. While I will focus centrally on oil extraction in this paper, it is important to keep in mind that various overlaps exist between people and organizations protesting oil extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon and those protesting similar industries in the same region.

In the 1980s, oil corporations began moving into the central-south region of the Ecuadorian Amazon (the provinces of Pastaza, Morona-Santiago and Zamora-Chinchipe) (Sarayaku vs. Ecuador 17), while mining of other minerals remains prevalent in these provinces.  (“Nuestra selva no se vende”). These mining operations are located in the territories of several ethnic groups, including the Shuar, Waorani, Kichwa and Achuar.

National Oil Policy 1970s-2017

The early years of the intensification of oil extraction which started with Texaco saw a wave of new laws and organizations created to regulate the industry. In the 1971 Hydrocarbons Law, the Ecuadorian government declared that oil was national patrimony to Ecuador, belonging to the Ecuadorian state. In 1972 the earliest version of Ecuador’s national oil company, then called CEPE (Corporación Estatal Petroloera Ecuador or Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation) was created (Salazar 50). This coincided with Texaco beginning production in established reserves in 1972 (Sawyer 11). In the early 1970s, the Ecuadorian government sold land in the Amazon to seven foreign oil companies, creating a consortium in which CEPE was the biggest stakeholder. Under Ecuador’s military dictatorship of the mid 1970s, this share was given to Texaco and the national oil company dissolved. In 1989, Petroecuador, a successor to CEPE, was created and soon came to hold the largest consortium share (Salazar 71). Meanwhile, administrations of the 1980s and 1990s implemented neoliberal policies such as decreased export taxes on extracted resources (Sawyer 13). These decreased taxes served to encourage foreign interest in the country’s crude oil sector. Furthermore, they scaled down internal processing and refinement, making Ecuador more dependent on foreign trade partners for refined petroleum goods like gasoline (Sawyer 12).

In 1992, Texaco ceased its operations in Ecuador, but left a country full of international oil companies. In the 1980s and 1990s, companies from the United States, Italy, Spain, and other countries had begun activity in the central-south Amazonian provinces of Orellana and Pastaza. During this time period, there were more examples of organized meetings between representatives of corporations and of indigenous organizations than before. For instance, Sawyer describes meetings between the oil corporation ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Company), the Organization of Indigenous People of Pastaza (OPIP), and smaller organizations. Many view such meetings as false consultations meant to seek confirmation for the oil companies’ plans.

By the early 2000s, Ecuador was beginning to recover from a financial crisis and many felt resentment towards previous neoliberal[6] policies, some of which were viewed as an iteration of western imperialism. In the early 2000s, post-neoliberal rhetoric became common in administrations. In 2007, Rafael Correa won the presidency, running on an anti-imperialist, anti-establishment platform. For instance, in his inaugural address, Correa spoke of changing global structures of power: “They are the superiors, the owners of our countries, the owners of our democracies, while we, as heads of state, are only their primary servers” (Discurso de Posesión del Presidente Rafael Correa). In addition, Correa promised to support underprivileged populations, including indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian citizens. While he found support in several indigenous groups, Correa also denounced many indigenous protests, labeling them as too extreme (Cepek 2018).

In his first year of presidency, Correa announced the plan for the Yasuní-ITT initiative. The initiative asked for donations from the international community in return for a permanent suspension of oil activity in Yasuní National Park, one of the world’s most biodiverse regions and home to several indigenous nationalities, including uncontacted peoples[7]. The plan was presented to potential international donors largely in terms of its ecological impact, rather than in terms of other cultural or non-environmental concerns. In 2013, the plan ended due to insufficient pledged funds and Correa announced land auctions to Chinese oil companies, such as CNPC (Chinese National Petroleum Corporation). Correa was criticized by some for taking actions that may have encouraged Chinese oil exploration before announcing the initiative’s failure; for example, an “oil corridor” was created that allowed the Chinese company Sinopec to extend their operations nearly to the ITT region (Hill). Meanwhile, during Correa’s presidency, protesters, particularly in the central-south Amazonian provinces, experienced more repression than they had under previous administrations. Several movement participants were jailed or threatened. At the same time, Correa attempted to exercise more control over the Ecuadorian press (Punín Larrea).  

In 2008, a new constitution was signed into law. The constitution included a “rights of nature” clause which stated that nature is not property of the government, but rather an entity with rights. The constitution also included references to Ecuador as being “plurinational” and new mentions of Pachamama, a Quechua/Kichwa[8] conception of the natural universe or Mother Earth[9]. While previous constitutions had included words like “multicultural,” they did not recognize that Ecuador is made up of different nations of people. The 2008 changes represent success for many Ecuadorian indigenous movements, which often included calls for official, written recognition of their cultural differences. The constitution also contains potentially contradictory pieces relevant to resource extraction. For example, under the “Development” section, the constitution declared that the government reserved the right to expropriate natural resources whenever deemed justified, (Ecuador 2008). On the other hand, the constitution of 2008 states that “prior free and informed consultation about plans and schedules of research, exploitation, and commercialization of non-renewable resources found in their territories that can affect them environmentally or culturally” is necessary and that affected populations must “share in the benefits” of such activity (Constitution 2008 Art. 57-7). This largely mirrors the language in the 1998 Constitution (1995 Constitution Art. 84-5). The constitution also says that the territories of peoples living in voluntary isolation are untouchable and will be free from all extractive activity (Constitution 2008 Art. 57). The various articles requiring consultation of and respect for populations living on extractive land create tension with the article that states that the national government has total ownership of subsoil resources. This tension has led to conflict between the government, extractive companies, and citizens.

Effects of Oil Activity

The wave of extraction which began in 1967 left devastating effects on ecology, human health, and culture in the area. Throughout their time in Ecuador, members of the Texpet consortium failed to comply with basic safety regulations, often choosing to construct installations as quickly as possible, without following their own company health and safety policies. Upon their departure, Texaco simply covered oil wells and pools, without cleaning or draining them beforehand (Beristain 2005). 600 open oil pools were left behind (Corte Interamericana 15). Flares, common structures for burning off waste oil, had long been running, killing large numbers of insects and birds (Toxic Tour, Cepek 2018 106).  It is difficult to measure exactly how much oil has entered nearby ecosystems as a result of Texpet’s operations, though some estimate that up to 18 billion gallons of oil were leaked into the waterways, both during and after Texaco’s time in Ecuador (“Chevron Fined for Amazon Pollution” 2011). As early as the 1970s, Cofán and Siona people began to notice changes in the color of their water, different tastes in the fish and meat they ate, and the development of new stomach and skin illnesses. Initially, most Cofán people did not attribute these changes to oil directly, though some worried that the westerners had brought the illnesses and had caused bad spirits (cocoya) to harm their game animals (Cepek 2018). People of other ethnic groups, including Kichwa and mestizos, experienced similar problems. It has been shown that those living in the areas closest to Texpet extraction installations have significantly higher rates of cancer, miscarriage, and stomach and skin illnesses (Beristain et al. 2005). Further, road construction often involves deforestation and breaks up animal habitats. Species diversity has been found to decrease with proximity to roads constructed by and for Texaco (Vaca Almeida 2017). The urbanization which came as a result of extraction also threatened many species’ habitats (Corte Interamericana 17). Additionally, many cultural changes rapidly occurred as a response to foreign company entrance. For example, oil employees introduced a money-based economy which led to higher levels of individualism (Becker 2018). This, in turn, further accelerated environmental impacts by encouraging commercial hunting and fishing. Traditional gender relations changed to more closely reflect western structures, as men were offered oil jobs while women were not encouraged to work. Women also experienced sexual violence at the hands of western workers (Baristain et al 2005).   

Outside of Sucumbíos, the effects of oil corporations on health, biodiversity, and culture are not as well-documented, though similar negative impacts have been reported (Orta-Martínez and Finer). Additionally, violent conflicts have occurred both between indigenous peoples and non-indígenas and between different indigenous groups in the Central-South. This increased violence has been attributed in part to oil incursion. The introduction of new diseases, construction of intrusive roads, and dying wildlife have led some communities to move to new locations outside of their traditional homes, causing conflict. For instance, in 2003, Waorani[10] warriors killed at least 12 members of the related Taromenone[11] tribe, in response to tensions between the groups which had escalated as the Waorani moved away from their historic land and onto Taromenone land. After continuing conflict, Waoranis massacred or kidnapped nearly all the known remaining Taromenone people in 2013 (“Death in the Amazon”). In other cases, movement outside of traditional land fortified and caused the growth of existing communities located deeper in the forest, such as the pueblo of Sarayaku discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. An additional effect of extraction throughout the region is the increased risk of injuries or even death on the job for those who work for the companies (Interview 6). Further, due to the economic importance of oil extraction, petroleum corporations have often had significant political influence (Corte Interamericana 13).

Anti-Extraction Social Movements

In the 1970s and 1980s, new indigenous organizations were created and became a primary actor in movements representing indigenous peoples throughout Ecuador (Sawyer 42). Indigenous peoples in the central and southern parts of the Ecuadorian Amazon observed oil activity in the north of the region and created new organizations to defend their land in case the activity spread south. These organizations (i.e. OPIP) fought primarily to legally secure ownership of historic indigenous lands (Sawyer 45), while also involving themselves in other movements, such as those for recognition of plurinationality and the expulsion of extractive companies.  

In the 1980s and 1990s, demonstrations against oil company entrance surged and some indigenous demonstrations (i.e. Cofán and Waorani protests) were successful at keeping petroleum companies off parts of indigenous land. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, a Texaco well was closed in 1987 after an extended period of time in which Cofán protesters blocked roads leading to the well site. Earlier in the 20^th century, Royal Dutch Shell ceased operations in Waorani territory after years of receiving violent threats from Waorani people near their camp (Lu et al. 17). Protests in other areas (i.e. Sarayaku, Pastaza) were frequent and elicited responses from the government and extractive companies. Anti-extraction social movements joined these disruptive protests with publicity campaigns and legal action.

Petroleum and Protest Today

Today, oil companies continue to enter and extract from the Ecuadorian Amazon. Chinese national oil companies buy the vast majority of currently available land, though other countries’ companies (i.e. Spain) are represented throughout the region as well. Oil is crucial to the Ecuadorian economy. In 2014, Ecuador produced approximately 500,000 barrels of oil per day, much of it coming from the northern and central Amazon provinces of Napo, Sucumbíos, and Orellana (Banco Central del Ecuador). The concessionary auction system, which started under Correa after the aforementioned failed Yasuní-ITT initiative, continues to this day. Three separate rounds of auctions began in 2018 (Secretaría de hidrocarburos 2018), and there are currently[12] 13 petroleum land blocks proposed for auction to the international market (“Nuestr selva no se vende”). For a map of how the oil blocks are delineated as of 2018, see Figure 1. 

There are currently a variety of anti-extraction movements in the Amazon region, involving both indigenous and non-indigenous people. These movements work alongside regional (i.e. UDAPT), national (i.e. CONAIE) and international (i.e. Amazon Watch) organizations. Many movements demand the removal of extractive companies from indigenous territories, alongside demands for increased recognition for indigenous propriety over the land. Additionally, organizations like Confeniae (Confederation of the Indigenous Amazonian Ecuadorians) include messaging about demands for rights to freer protest, without fear of persecution for staging non-violent movements. These demands are a direct response to Correa-era arrests of protesters in the region. Participants today are reaching a larger international audience than in previous decades. Many organizations have a large social media presence and several English-language documentaries about oil extraction in the region and the movements in response were released since the early 2000s and continue to be produced (i.e. Crude 2009, A Future Without Oil 2010, and The Last Guardians 2018). Additionally, several groups, including both the Cofán protesting Texaco and the Kichwa countering CGC, have turned to legal means to demand reparations from the companies that previously occupied their lands.

Note on the History of Ecuadorian Indigenous Movements

Indigenous movements throughout Ecuador have a long history, dating back to conquistador Pedro de Alvarado’s entry into Ecuador in the 16^th century. As Becker notes, many current forms of protest in various Ecuadorian indigenous movements have their origins in the alliances between leftist groups and indigenous groups which began to take shape in Ecuador in the 1920s. Historically, the largest indigenous movements took place on huasipungos or haciendas[13] in the sierra region of the country. These movements largely focused on demanding land distribution reform, recognition of and education about indigenous history, language, and culture, and fairer working conditions for indigenous workers. Movement members often marched to big cities or government offices, organized strikes, and staged protests on their haciendas. Throughout the 20^th century, several new indigenous organizations were formed, including the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians and the Ecuarunari (the Kichwa Confederation of Ecuador).

In short, the movements which exist against oil extraction and other mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon stem from the concurrence of two historical courses, the long history of Ecuadorian indigenous movements and the relatively newer impositions brought on by mining. Because of the economic and ecological implications of resource extraction in this region, the current indigenous-led movements against extraction attract attention from across Ecuador and the world, potentially creating a novel interplay between the long-entrenched indigenous movement dynamics and tactics of the past and the need to meet modern pressures and use contemporary tools.

Chapter II. A Review of Scholarly Literature

Introduction

Ecuadorian indigenous movements have been unusually successful in terms of causing change in government and social structures within the country (Jameson 2011). In comparison to movements in other Latin America countries—including those with similar sized indigenous populations—Ecuadorian indigenous movements have been more successful in inciting constitutional changes and electing leaders of their movements to national offices. In at least a handful of cases these movements have removed extractive companies from indigenous land (Cepek 2018). There is a large body of research examining factors behind the emergence and growth of indigenous movements in Ecuador, and in Latin America more broadly; most of these works have been produced from the 1990s to the present (Van Cott 2010). Additionally, works on social movements in Nigeria and other countries with extensive presence of extractive industries inform this review (Omeje 2017). A subset of the work reviewed here evaluates factors behind the effectiveness of the movements in achieving their demands and attempts to describe the ultimate results of the movements, beyond success and failure. Here, I pay particular attention to authors who specifically examine Ecuadorian indigenous movements that respond to the presence of extractive corporations, particularly those in the Amazon.

Arguments developed to explain factors influencing the efficacy of Ecuadorian indigenous movements draw from a variety of disciplines, including political science, sociology, history, and anthropology. Scholars typically operate within and between the following schools of thought: 1. political conditions (Yashar 1998, Van Cott 2009) 2. mobilization strategies (Bob 2005), 3. identity definition (Sawyer 2004, Canessa 2007), 4. coalition formation (Becker 2008, Cepek 2014, Cepek 2018), and 5. framing and continuity of messages (Jameson 2011, Yashar 1998). These categories denote the primary factor each author analyzed in explaining either emergence or outcome of movements, but it is important to note that overlap between the categories is common, and that authors tend to acknowledge that all the aforementioned areas of analysis contribute to the structure and outcomes of social movements.

Definitions

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a term broadly used throughout sociological, economic, and political science work, particularly in Latin America. Neoliberalism can refer to both an economic theory and a general ideology. Generally, proponents of neoliberalism believe in the rationality of a free market economy, though the concept can be extended to individual freedoms in other areas like politics and social life (Ritzer 116). Economist Joseph Stiglitz’s describes it as, “a grab-bag of ideas based on the fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate resources efficiently, and serve the public interest well.” Sawyer defines neoliberalism as “a cluster of government policies that aim to privatize, liberalize, and deregulate the national economy as to encourage foreign investment and intensify export production” (Sawyer 7). While neoliberalism is deeply linked to globalization, it is not solely about foreign investment and also involves allowing market forces to shape the domestic economy. Scholars on Latin American indigenous movements, like Yashar and Becker, identify the general idea of neoliberalism as a common target for protests. Anti-neoliberal protests are also common in other regions of the world (Ritzer 115).  For the purposes of this paper, I use Sawyer’s definition which focuses on exports and foreign investment, as neoliberalism’s relationship with foreign investment is key in the extraction of Ecuadorian oil and in the objections that protestors have to it. Ecuador experienced a wave of neoliberal policies in the rapidly changing governments of the 1980s-1990s which sought to encourage investment from other countries, while recent governments have, at least in rhetoric, vocally rejected neoliberalism.

Schools of Thought

Political Conditions

The political conditions category encompasses works which focus on the national political structures and circumstances under which resistance movements have emerged. Yashar (1998) argues that incomplete political liberalization is needed for national and larger-scale subnational indigenous movements to form. In other words, marginalized indigenous populations must experience a partial increase in freedoms which allows them to strengthen their political power slightly, without actually attaining all the freedoms and services they want or need. Rather than making indigenous citizens more content with their situation, partial liberalization empowers them to demand more. While noting the importance of established social networks and other factors, Yashar posits that these factors will not provoke the rise of a movement unless freedoms of expression and association have increased nationally, without extending completely to indigenous groups. This idea of the importance of partial liberalization is repeated in Van Cott (2009), which examines cases in Ecuador and Bolivia. Comparative case studies like Van Cott’s are common in this school. Johnston argues that protests in democracies are more likely to occur when conditions have improved for a marginalized group and the group feels relative deprivation to other groups, but not complete deprivation. Inclán (2018) observes that Latin American indigenous movements of recent years have mirrored protest movements in western democracies, in the sense that they are a part of a normal political process and do not result in regime overthrow. Thus, Johnston’s theories of social movement emergence in democratic states are relevant here.

Mobilization Strategies

Scholars who study mobilization strategies examine how people are effectively recruited into and retained in a movement. This includes financing, rhetoric in recruitment messages, and forms of press and social media used to reach potential participants. In recent years, these scholars have increasingly used surveys of movement participants to analyze why they chose to be involved in a movement (Inclán). Bob (2005) argues that success of a social movement is more dependent on financial resources than any other factor, and that movements can most effectively be analyzed by looking at the marketing strategies that the movement adopts when seeking funding. He also posits the importance of technology use and of the consolidation of political power within social movement organizations. Scholars of coalition formation (i.e. Becker 2008) include resource mobilization in their work but do not analyze it as the main determinant of success. Meanwhile, scholars of mobilization strategies (Bob, Tilly) include coalition formation within their analysis, but focus more on the aspects that lead to an organization being able to use their resources to form coalitions, rather than on the effects of the coalitions once they are formed.

Identity

Though most researchers on indigenous social movements acknowledge the importance of identity definition to some degree, identity definition scholars argue that the essential factor influencing the emergence and success of indigenous social movements is the way in which identity is defined by members of the movement. Much of the scholarly work specifically focusing on anti-neoliberal Ecuadorian indigenous movements fall under this category, at least in part. Sawyer focuses on the social movements led by the Shuar and other Ecuadorian indigenous groups against the actions of foreign oil corporations in the late 1990s to early 2000s. She compares these movements to indigenous social movements in Ecuador’s past, focusing on the early 1990s, and states that Amazonian indigenous movements against extractivism have more to do with demanding racial equality and recognition of indigenous rights than they do with opposition to the health, environmental, and other types of direct effects of extraction. Sawyer identifies the drive for official national legal recognition of Ecuador as a “plurinational state”—one comprised of multiple nations, rather than one homogenous population—as a driving force behind the emergence of movements in roughly the decade leading up to her work. In Crude Chronicles, Sawyer notes that it was necessary for indigenous Ecuadorians to rethink their own identity in order to come together under the identifier of “indigenous” rather than “Cofán,” “Shuar,” “Kichwa,” or any other identifier. Sawyer also addresses how identity can be manipulated and weaponized by opponents of a social movement in order to delegitimize the movement, using the example of an oil company paying a family to separate from their community and form their own indigenous organization comprised of only themselves. Eisenstadt (2011), like Sawyer, discusses how indigenous identity is malleable and can be used as a tool in social movements. Eisenstadt’s work also looks at how communitarianism, a quality typically associated with Latin American indigenous groups, can be expressed in greater or lesser degrees depending on responses received by indigenous social movements.

Coalition Formation

Becker, too, addresses the role of identity redefinition and alignment on the formation and efficacy of indigenous movements. However, he, and other scholars of coalition formation, look primarily at how groups of separate identities form alliances to pursue common or related goals. Becker writes about the ways in which identity was maintained and altered in the relationships that indigenous Ecuadorians have formed with urban leftist organizations since the 1930s. He argues that the relationship was necessary for the incorporation of indigenous people into public activism and instrumental in defining the national collective indigenous identity. Becker argues that the relationship started out with leftists patronizing indigenous participants in their movement and essentially forcing members to identify themselves only along class lines, but that over time, indigenous people became more willing to identify themselves along multiple parameters, adding indigenous ethnicity to their public identity. Becker demonstrates that over time, indigenous people started controlling movements and urban blanco-mestizo people played more supportive roles in national movements. Becker argues that social movements have most likely been able to achieve their demands when people define themselves primarily by indigenous identity, while drawing on support from non-indigenous people who share their class identity. Kimerling (2007), like Becker, addresses patronizing coalitions, noting how alignment with foreign organizations can create unjust conditions in modern indigenous resistance operating through legal networks. Kimerling and Becker both demonstrate that coalitions with non-indigenous people can make movements more effective, but that this efficacy comes when indigenous people, rather than external groups, are in charge of the movement.

Cepek (2014) also emphasizes the importance of coalition formation. He argues that the Cofán have had unusual success in their movements against oil extraction, because they have an effective intermediary between their culture and the West, Randy Borman—a white man, born and raised in a Cofán town, fluent in English, Spanish, and A’ingay (the Cofán language). Cepek identifies cooperation with western NGOs as an important factor in movement development. This echoes Johnston’s idea that subnational movements are more successful when they situate themselves into transnational movements, such as the anti-neoliberal “global justice” movement. However, like Becker, Cepek recognizes the ruptures that emerge between Cofán collaborators and Western environmental organizations as well as the related divisions that emerge within Cofán communities in response to coalition formation. The dual nature of coalition building is seen globally (i.e. in Colombia, see Escobar and Restrepo 2010).

Abers and Von Bülow (2011) analyze specific variations in the role actors take on in coalitions. They give the name “brokers” to those actors who mediate between different stakeholders in a given situation. They find that certain broker roles, like translators, are easy to fill, while those filling representative roles of a group are more likely to be unsuccessful. Several authors also note the importance of coalitions between indigenous Amazonian groups and subalterns in other countries or of different ethnic backgrounds (Van Cott 2010, Bob 2005).

Continuity of Messages

Some view the various Ecuadorian indigenous-led social movements as different branches of a single indigenous movement, owing to consistent messages across several movements and organizations. While previously discussed scholars focused largely on why movements emerge, with some space dedicated to measuring their effectiveness, Jameson (2011) centrally seeks to understand why Ecuadorian movements, like Pachacutik, are more successful than indigenous movements in other Latin American countries. Jameson argues that the peculiar success of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement is due to the maintenance of a single, continuous message across time and across organizations. Like Sawyer, Jameson identifies the consistent message as the call for a plurinational state. This message, Jameson writes, provides a consistent direction for movements even in changing political conditions, and he predicts that if the message continues to take a central position in indigenous social movements, the movements are less likely to disappear or be co-opted in the future. Few other works focus specifically on the continuity of demand messaging. Some (Yashar 1998, Johnston 2011), however, note the importance of continuity in structures, arguing that movements created from pre-existing social structures are more effective than those which incorporate several disparate actors. Johnston (2011) argues for the importance of already existing social organizations in providing a common space for movements to begin and evolve, showing how social movements grow more quickly when they stem from well-established community structures, like churches. Yashar writes that pre-established trans-community actors are essential in Latin American indigenous movements.

Analysis

Together, these approaches offer insight into how indigenous movements emerge and expand, as well as potential outcomes of the movements. Political condition theories provide important information about how social movements emerge and their potential effects and can be generalized to look at various global situations. However, they do not directly address the unique agency of those creating and sustaining social movements. Further, because they generally rely on examination of a range of movements across countries, these theories are best suited for somewhat general questions of why a movement emerges and whether it will be mostly effective or ineffective, not for looking at the specific individual outcomes of a movement, or for looking at a specific geographic region within a country. Here, I use ideas of political liberalization to inform my research but do not focus on it exclusively.

In contrast with political conditions theorists, mobilization strategies scholars narrow the focus to look at specific qualities of the movements themselves but still tend not to focus on the agency of actors within the movements. Furthermore, social mobilization arguments do not adequately explain why some scholars argue that current Ecuadorian indigenous movements have not been met with as much success as they experienced in the 1990s (Van Cott). Having an understanding of mobilization strategies, in terms of financing and marketing to potential participants, is an important component of understanding Ecuadorian indigenous movements, but it cannot be viewed as the primary element. I do not focus on resource mobilization in this paper.

Each of the remaining schools of thought have a more situation-specific focus and are closely related, providing clear ties between the success of indigenous social movements and the unique culture and history of the region. As demonstrated above, coalition formation and identity definition scholars often overlap extensively because of the ways in which alliances change perception of identities and vice versa. Though they are both useful, the extent to which coalition formation and identity definition ideas have been applied specifically to Ecuadorian movements means another study within those schools may only be used if it also considers other factors that interplay with identity and coalition-forming. In fact, Van Cott remarks that most of the cases examined by identity and coalitions scholars are actually over-studied. She believes that by focusing so intensively on unusually successful movements like the Ecuadorian Pachacutik movement, our perception of the level of success of strategies used by indigenous social movements in Latin America becomes skewed.

Both of the aforementioned schools of thought can be used to illuminate the less often-emphasized area of framing continuity. This year (2018), several communities of indigenous people were confronted with the beginning of oil extraction on their land for the first time. It will be interesting to see whether or not extant organizations and previously declared messages will be incorporated into movements that arise in response to these new situations. Further, it is a critical time to examine if Jameson’s assertion that continuity of plurinationality demands is a determining factor in efficacy of Ecuadorian indigenous movements. Plurinationality was codified in the Ecuadorian constitution 10 years ago. With the success, on paper, of the ultimate goal of many indigenous movements, how will the message continue to be incorporated into movements, if at all? Is it accurate to label the movements for recognition of plurinationality as successful, and, if so, how will people connect their movements to movements which have already achieved their goal? Have pre-existing organizations that emerged in the movement towards this goal strengthened or weakened as a result? Answers to these questions will likely impact how indigenous Ecuadorians define themselves within their movements and the ways in which they connect with outside allies.

Summary, Conclusions, and Contributions

My research will apply findings from the reviewed schools to a specific geographic region and situation – subsurface resource extraction (especially oil extraction) in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Though there is a wealth of information on indigenous social movements in Ecuador, most of it focuses primarily on indigenous groups of the highlands, rather than on the Amazon. My focus on movements which respond to petroleum extraction further narrows my research area. However, there are various groups within the movements of eastern Ecuador, and I am still able to compare different groups throughout the region, just as seminal scholars like Sawyer and Becker did while using the entire country of Ecuador as the area of analysis. This scope of focus and deductive methodology allows me to examine a variety of examples while arriving at reasonably historically and culturally grounded conclusions.

I also directly examine efficacy and outcome of movements, much like Jameson. Published research which examines the effectiveness of indigenous movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon takes into account the most recent developments, such as the latest round of Amazon oil field auctions beginning in 2018. Many indigenous movements today respond directly to those sales. Nor do many scholarly works examine the effect of the 2008 constitution, which both recognizes Ecuador as a plurinational state and redefines “nature” as an entity with rights rather than a commodity of the government. These are just a few examples of changing contexts which underscore the importance of conducting new research in the field.

Additionally, many studies reviewed here focus mainly on the relationship between government bodies and the indigenous movements. As new communities face the incursion of foreign corporations, it will become even more important to understand what effect, if any, Ecuadorian social movements have on the corporations on their land and on other non-government actors, rather than focusing solely on change through government channels. In my work, I hope to acknowledge the role that direct movement-to-company communication can play in addition to movement-to-government communication.

Chapter III. Methods to Explore the Impact of Message Continuity on Indigenous Movement Success in the Ecuadorian Amazon

Hypotheses and Case Selection

How have indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon staged resistance against oil extraction on their land and to what degree has each movement been met with success or failure? What factors affect the degree of success attained? How is success defined? More broadly, what outcomes come from movement participation? In response to the second question, I hypothesize that if demands of the movements examined are clearly connected to the central messages of past indigenous movements, effectiveness will increase. This is because connected, continuous messages encourage stronger coalitions between organizations, attract more participants to the movement, and help prevent the movement’s demands from being forgotten with the passage of time. Additionally, I hypothesize that movements which have more and stronger connections with international organizations will experience more success, due to resulting external pressure on government and companies and potential resource augmentation that can come with international publicity. In addition, I believe that many movements, whether partially or fully successful or not successful at all, will experience other outcomes including increased interactions between geographically or culturally separate populations and increased movement activity in other, non-extraction related social movements.

I use qualitative, comparative analysis of different historical cases to test my hypothesis and then evaluate current cases using the same factors to provide an overview of how my findings may apply to current events. Case #1 is the movement against oil extraction in Sucumbíos, largely focusing on Cofán led protests and actions in 1982-1994. Case #2 is the movement against oil extraction in Pastaza, focusing on the Sarayaku Kichwa movement against various oil companies in 1989-2007. Current cases I evaluate in Chapter V include current multi-nationality movements against national company Petroamazonas[14] and various foreign companies and the multi-nationality legal movement against Chevron.

Operationalization and Methods

The degree to which each movement can be labeled as “successful” will be addressed more thoroughly within chapter IV. I define success on the basis of each demand, rather than labeling entire movements successful or unsuccessful. High success would mean the demand was clearly met and resulted in tangible changes. Moderate or mixed success refers to mixed outcomes (i.e. an official document demanded reforms but was not enforced in reality, or one part of the demand was met and another was not.) Low success or failure means the demand was not met.

To analyze past movements in terms of framing, allies and identity, external factors, and movement outcomes, I used primary (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) and secondary sources (Sawyer 2004, the Global Nonviolent Action Database for the Kichwa movement, and Cepek 2018 for the Cofán movement.) To look at current cases, I use a 2018 documentary called The Last Guardians, analysis of conferences between different communities affected by oil extraction and indigenous organizations in March 2018 and January 2019, and an analysis of messages posted on Facebook by groups representing the current anti-extraction indigenous movements. These groups include “Comunicación Confenaie” and “Conaie Comunicación.”

In addition, I conducted interviews to analyze both current and historical cases. These included in-person and Skype interviews with people currently involved in protests—all of whom have been involved for several years—along with representatives of organizations which are involved in social movements against oil extraction. I interviewed a variety of contacts, not focusing solely on those involved in the two cases described above. Questions focused primarily on relationships within and between different groups within the movement and outside stakeholders like the government and oil officials, along with questions on media representation and movement outcomes. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and were transcribed and analyzed for common themes, particularly regarding statements made by the interviewee about successes and failures experienced during their involvement in anti-extraction movements and their initial goals for the movement.

In summary, I have selected cases which give me high levels of control and variation. My qualitative approach allows me to gain a deep understanding of the dynamics of the selected movements and to draw on this knowledge to evaluate current movements. By having a variety of information sources, I can corroborate results or reveal and analyze discrepancies between the results from different sources. I believe my interview component has helped me generate new information in response to the latest government actions and developments within the social movement.

Chapter IV. Findings: Movements of Today

Today, the frontier of oil extraction has moved south to the provinces of Pastaza, Morona-Santiago, and Zamora-Chinchipe. Gold and other mineral extraction continues in this region as well. As previously described[15], the people of Sarayaku and neighboring communities (such as the nearby Zápara communities) continue to fight against the entry of oil companies. In the North, extraction has greatly decreased, and today the people of Sucumbíos demand reparations and collaborate with activists from other provinces to support their anti-extraction calls.

External Environment: National Government

Today, the pressures and opportunities presented by the national government, international community, and media all differ as compared to the 1980s to early 2000s. The presidency of Rafael Correa from 2007 to 2017 was a critical period for indigenous activists and other participants in anti-extraction movements. During his presidency, activists reported an increase in arrests linked to protest participation (Interview 1, Interview 4, Interview 6, Interview 7). This extends beyond the Amazon’s anti-extraction movement. For example, 35 participants in protests in the sierra in August 2015 were arrested. These arrests were immediately denounced by indigenous leader and CONAIE co-founder Luis Macas, among others. Aggressive anti-protest tactics were used not only in indigenous anti-extraction movements, but in various protests throughout the country (“Correa pierde el control en Ecuador: represión y arrestas”).

Threats were also common under the Correa administration. Interviewee 5 said he had been threatened and said, “The Correa government started to follow me.” Similarly, attorneys legally representing people affected by oil extraction reported threats from both extractive companies and Ecuadorian police (Interview 2, Interview 8) under the Correa administration. These threats from police and military personnel had not, to my knowledge, been reported on a large scale before Correa came to power and, according to interviewees, subsided soon after he left office. Interviewee 7 said that one of his colleagues[16] had been killed by the Ecuadorian military after participating in protests against the extraction of minerals near his home[17]. The interviewee described the protestor as “the man who fought the most against mining.” One interviewee described police killing protestors from his town and arresting others. Organizations like Confeniae publicly addressed this Correa-era suppression, for example writing on their website that the organization is “against the military suppression of their movements.” (Confeniae website). In addition to use of physical force, Correa kept a tight grip on the Ecuadorian press, leading to Ecuador receiving a “not free” rating from Freedom House’s annual report every year from 2013-2017. Correa often referred to journalists as “assassins with ink” (“Freedom in the World: Ecuador”).

It is worth noting that indigenous protestors are not the only ones affected by increased suppression tactics. A police officer had also died in December 2016 after being shot in the head while controlling protests in the central-south region under the Correa administration (La Voz de Galicia). Other officers had been injured at the same event (“Correa informa de un policía muerto”). Officers were also injured in a 2009 protest in Morona-Santiago (Mena Erazo).

Further, the protest suppression at the hands of police and military personnel, combined with the control over press, may have made the companies themselves and their allies more comfortable using threat tactics of their own. Interviewee 4 said that the Correa administration “normalized” violence. Interviewee 8 reported a break-in which appeared to come from someone connected to Chevron’s legal team. He said that early in his job working with the legal team representing the affected peoples, someone broke into his office, moved around all the documents, but left everything there, including his computer and objects of monetary value. This indicates that whoever did it was more interested in getting information for the court case and possibly scaring the new lawyer, rather than robbing the office.

Beyond outright suppression, the rhetoric of Correa and his administration regarding protest impacted anti-extraction movements. A 2015 article writes that Correa has described the indigenous protests as looking to “destabilize” the Ecuadorian government (Prensa Libre). This is just one example of several instances where he used wording which described indigenous protestors as a threat. According to a 2015 article, Correa responded to a CONAIE-led mobilization by saying that the indigenous protestors had no motive for their protest (Constante), showing an attempt to delegitimize indigenous protest. Interviewee 6 talked about the rumors started about him around this time: everything from generally calling him “subversive” to accusing him of terrorism and of being part of a guerilla group. Throughout his time as president, Correa also issued several “calls for dialogue” (“Mena Erazo”) between the protestors and government officials. When indigenous activists did not meet these calls, it likely became easier for him to call them subversive and violent. On the other hand, Correa frequently stated he was supportive of indigenous organizations throughout the country. For example, he said that he felt deeply for his “dear companions” in CONAIE after one of its members died in a protest (Mena Erazo). In regard to Sucumbíos, Correa’s rhetoric was often strongly against Chevron and in favor of those legally fighting against the company. A 2015 article in The Nation states “Correa accused the oil giant…of ‘deliberately polluting’ the Amazon rain forest in eastern Ecuador, of ‘shamelessly lying’ to evade its legal responsibility to clean up.” Correa also stated that the affected people of Sucumbíos “have all our sympathy” (North).

One reason for the apparent discrepancy between Correa’s rhetoric about Chevron and lack of denouncements for other oil companies currently in Ecuador is the different experiences of extraction in the North and Central-South, described in chapters I and IV. People in Sucumbíos have already publicly experienced death and destruction on a large scale as a result of oil extraction and are now fighting predominantly a legal battle for reparations. Their struggle generally hasn’t presented a threat to future extraction, nor has it been polemical in the eyes of the Ecuadorian public. The incentives for Correa’s administration to stifle their actions and support mining in their area seem low. Also, the attention which the general Ecuadorian public paid to the north was higher throughout Correa’s terms than that paid to central-south provinces. Meanwhile, incentives to shut down protests of people in Pastaza or other central-southern provinces which had the potential to disrupt the future of an industry worth billions of dollars to the national economy were high. This may explain why Correa’s treatment of social movements differed between the two regions. Further, Chevron embodies the archetype of a rich, powerful, imperialist business from the West that benefits from the neoliberalism which Correa vocally rejects. Neoliberal tenets of deregulation and privatization generally benefit large multinational corporations like the oil supermajors[18] (Smith-Nonini) while the smaller, non-American companies entering Ecuador in the recent past are not as good a target for Correa’s anti-neoliberalism. Lastly, Correa’s vocal support for peoples of Sucumbíos generally focused, and continues to focus, on their legal battle. For example, in November 2018, Correa retweeted a link to an article titled, “The Chevron Case is fundamental for the world.” (@MashiRafael). Correa may consider law a more “acceptable” movement tool than public protest. However, this does not mean that the Correa administration was always supportive of the actions of protestors from this province. Though Correa didn’t explicitly speak against activists in Sucumbíos, his administration’s protest suppression tactics did affect the larger, Ecuadorian Amazon-wide movement in which the activists of Sucumbíos took part.

Movement participants’ views on Correa vary. There is a significant number of indigenous people in Sucumbíos who have been affected by crude extraction who supported Correa and continue to believe in Correísmo, or his general political philosophy. Sucumbíos was the only Amazonian province in which Lenín Moreno, who was at the time viewed as an extension of Correa, won the 2017 presidential election (“El mapa bicolor del Ecuador”). Guillermo Lasso, his opposition, won in all other Amazon provinces. This fact alone doesn’t mean that the people of Sucumbíos are inherently bigger supporters of Correa than other people from the Amazon region. However, it does stand out as an interesting occurrence when taken alongside the vocal, continued support for Correísmo from some indigenous people of Sucumbíos that can be seen across social media. A 2017 El Comercio article describes the general support for Lasso throughout the rest of the Amazon region as, “the indigenous movement’s very clear disaffection towards the government due to the implemented mining policy and the persecution of indigenous leaders” (“Lenín Moreno ganó en 15 capitales de provincia”). This disaffection appears not to have extended completely to Sucumbíos.

Meanwhile, some who work in fields related to anti-extraction movements feel Correa was not special in terms of his attitude towards protest and level of support for extraction. Though suppression had intensified under Correa, one interviewee was clear that he feels all presidents are inherently pro-extraction and may just use slightly different tactics to attain their goals. He said, “The governments can be right, left, anarchists, whatever. They have different political ideologies but all, all of them are extractivist.” (Interviewee 2). This sentiment was also reflected by people working on the case against Chevron in the documentary Crude, soon after Correa’s election. A conversation was shown in which an Ecuadorian member of the team stood clearly against an American colleague’s expectations that Correa would somehow be different from past presidents in his support for indigenous peoples and his opposition to extraction. Other people don’t necessarily see Correa as strictly against the indigenous Amazonian peoples’ expressions of opposition to extraction but do note that they feel he says a lot without doing anything. For example, some call him “El Habla-Yo-Yo;” in other words, someone who constantly says “I will do x, I will do y” but never does it (Toxic Tour). Others did not speak so much of the Correa administration’s protest suppression but did say he betrayed the Amazon by ending the Yasuní-ITT fund[19] . Interviewee 5 also believed that Correa and other government officials appropriated aspects of indigenous cultures—i.e. the use of the Kichwa Sumak Kawsay in the constitution—for political gain without actually doing anything for indigenous communities. He also said, “It’s like, let’s say we have a car and we tell Correa to drive the car. And more people come on to travel in the car and we’re left outside, and they drive on whatever roads they want to in our car” (Interview 5). Though several interviewees stated that they had thought that Correa would be different from past presidents–more supportive of indigenous communities and less in favor of expanded extraction than past presidents (i.e. Interview 5, Interview 7) –all who said this also expressed disappointment or frustration with his policies and actions.

The current president of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, was Correa’s former vice president and was expected to continue many of Correa’s policies throughout his presidency when he took power in 2017. However, in many ways, Moreno has not met this expectation. This is true in terms of anti-extraction protest control or suppression. When asked how indigenous demonstrations changed after Moreno took office, one interviewee simply said that Moreno has been “less bad, less problematic” (Interview 5). Another said that Moreno hadn’t really had any effect on anti-extraction movements yet, and that maybe over time they would start to see a clearer position towards the anti-extraction protests (Interview 1). Several interviewees felt that things are generally calmer under Moreno, though threats against movement participants do continue. For example, in January 2018 a leader in the Sarayaku community was attacked by an anonymous person who threw stones at her house and verbally threatened her. In April, the Zápara president received death threats (Amnesty). As stated above, one interviewee felt that all presidents are essentially the same: all are pro-extractive and Moreno, like Correa, is no exception (Interview 2). Overall, Moreno does appear to be just as extraction-friendly as past presidents and his administration continues to promote Ecuador’s oil resources (Secretaría de hidrocarburos). In response to lowered oil prices, his administration has advocated expansion of extraction. Further, Interviewee 8 described relationships between Moreno, the US government, and American companies like Chevron. He said, “We know Moreno met with Mike Pence and negotiated an exit from the Chevron case, an exit favorable to the company.” The Ecuadorian organization Center for Economic and Social Rights made the same claims, saying, “Vice President Mike Pence’s visit to Ecuador ‘seeks to align the country to U.S. influence [and] eliminate ‘irritating’ subjects like the Chevron case” (“Ecuador Rights Group Warns”). In this way, we see Moreno working against the indigenous movement’s demands and aiming for a favorable position with the United States and its corporations.

In terms of rhetoric, Moreno has tried to distance himself from his former ally, Correa. In January 2019, he publicly spoke of alleged corruption in oil sales under the Correa administration and said of an investigation into these corruption charges that, “The conclusions are so shameful and scandalous that I have decided to present a denunciation with the full reports…so that all these crimes that may have been committed can be investigated” (“Lenín Moreno pidió investigar los proyectos petroleros”). He made a public statement on April 2, 2019 denouncing “the quantity of unjustly incarcerated people” under Correa (@elcomercio). Like Correa, Moreno does frequently state his support for the indigenous people of the Amazon and throughout Ecuador. For instance, he tweeted on February 12, 2017 (soon before taking office), “Today in the Ecuadorian Amazon I reaffirm my commitment to the future of the indigenous pueblos and nationalities.” As Moreno’s presidency is still relatively young, time will tell how his policies affect social movements in the Amazon[20].

External Environment: Media Representation and Technology

Interviewees expressed mixed opinions on the way national and international newspapers and other news sources depict anti-extraction movements. One interviewee said he felt that the representation was fairly accurate. He said that news comes from local reporters familiar with the situations and local context, and that those stories then essentially get copied on the national and sometimes international levels (Interview 7). Reports are often created after journalists attend press briefings held by local leaders (Confeniae Facebook, Interview 5). These leaders are, in general, part of the anti-extraction movement. However, other interviewees expressed the concern that some media seemed to paint companies and governmental officials in a more favorable light than protestors and local leaders (Interview 2, Interview 8). Some noted that Chevron and other companies use their economic resources to buy publicity and space in press, which gives them an advantage over movement participants (Interview 2). One interviewee said that the type of publication mattered. He felt that foreign magazines or papers with an economic or business focus tended to describe protestors more negatively, or Chevron more positively, than other news sources (Interview 8). This can be seen in language used in articles from sources like Forbes, which typically do not use particularly negative language for the protestors themselves but do express disdain for courts that decide against Chevron, i.e. “Time to Hit Ecuador with Tariffs for its Bad Faith Towards Chevron” (Krauss). News releases from advocacy groups and some left-leaning newspapers tends to paint activists as strong people fighting for their lives, i.e. the National Resources Defense Council’s article, “A Village in Ecuador’s Amazon Fights for Life as Oil Wells Move In,” from April 2019.  No interviewee directly mentioned any impact that the Correa administration’s restrictions on press freedom may have had on the representation of the movement in Ecuadorian media sources.  

Further, a common theme in interviews was the feeling that press, especially foreign press, always focused on individual leaders or protest participants and sought to make heroes out of people. One of the interviewees who complained about this dynamic felt that he had been made into a hero in the legal battle against an oil company and expressed annoyance that journalists chose to focus on him rather than the large collective of indigenous protestors and their allies. He said, “The fight is the affected peoples’ and the documentaries ignore that.” He prefers to be viewed as a part of the large group of people who had been affected by extraction (Interview 2). One interviewee said, “It’s not about making people into figures like Rigoberta Menchú[21], it’s about a pueblo or a family” and that foreigners want to make stories “in a Hollywood way” (Interview 5). The same interviewee did feel like this trend towards individual-focused representation was less common within Ecuador, and that movement leaders like him often explicitly communicated to local NGOs and journalists that they do not want to be the subject of that sort of individualistic reporting (interview 5), which has led to some improvement. However, the interviewee feels that even with this communication, some western journalists continue to report on the actions of individuals, rather than collectives. This type of representation can be seen in the 2008 documentary Crude, perhaps one of the most well-known representations to western audiences of Ecuadorian social movements. The documentary focuses primarily on an American lawyer and an Ecuadorian lawyer and their actions, rather than on entire groups of people.

Another key external factor is the presence of social media and other modern technologies which are used within the movement. Many indigenous organizations (i.e. Confeniae, CONAIE) have Facebook accounts that post at least once each day, and Twitters that post even more frequently. Beyond posts from organized groups, many individuals involved in the movement also use Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp and other social media and messaging applications to share about their anti-extraction actions and views. These tools connect people and make it easier for the messages of movements to spread on the local and global levels, as has been seen in various social movements throughout the world[22]. The particulars of social media use will be discussed more in the Messaging and Framing section. Other technologies used widely within the anti-extraction movement include modern mapping tools, video editing, and cell phones.

The unique location of the new oil blocks further distinguishes the anti-extraction movement of today from the past. Many movement organizations today grapple with the fact that some oil blocks overlap with the territories of uncontacted peoples like the Taromenane. When asked about Confeniae’s position against the incursion of extractive corporations on this territory, interviewee 3 said, “That’s within our agenda, but it’s not a topic that we’ve been able to work on in any detail, because even we don’t know them…so it’s difficult to provide any answer for that demand.” Some Waorani people do have contact with these tribes, as uncontacted groups and the Waorani are closely related. Since uncontacted peoples have not been incorporated into anti-extraction movements, it is unclear how they will affect and be affected by the movement going forward. As of right now, they are often referred to when movement participants discuss cultural loss and damage, but activists are not sure how to turn this rhetoric into action.

Goals and Overall Methods and Actions

Today, the goal of those participating in anti-extraction movements mirrors demands of the past. Many state that they want all extractive corporations to be prohibited from entering indigenous territory. One interviewee made a further claim of hoping Ecuador can become a “post-extractive state” in which the economy no longer depends on extraction at all (Interviewee 5). Some people, especially those working in the north of the Amazon region, stated that they wanted reparations for damage already done and public recognition of the damage by companies involved (Interview 2). Several interviewees described themselves simply as “against mining” (i.e. Interview 4). Many also ask for informed consent and more equitable consultations (“Acción Ecológica and Ecuador: Indigenous Women Protest Lack of ‘Consultation,’”). Mirroring the consultations of the past touched on earlier, Interviewee 1 described a consultation in Mera, Pastaza in which the government only described the potential good that could come from extraction, without mentioning any risks. In this way, anti-extraction movements have remained fairly constant in their goals since the 1980s. Of note is that at Confeniae’s beginning-of-the-year meeting, community leaders, Confeniae directors, and other participants frequently mentioned oil extraction specifically when discussing their objectives for the year. However, in the written plans laid out for the year, in which central plans were listed next to actors involved with the topic and a time frame for addressing the goal, the words “oil” and “extraction” did not appear at all. Main plans included “training about the human rights of the Amazonian nationalities,” and, “elaborating and updating action plans for conservation and environmental protection.” (Confeniae 2019). These themes were then discussed verbally alongside conversations about extraction. Because of this, it appears that some people involved in anti-extraction movements see extraction as something that affects many of the goals that they work towards, though not necessarily as a central target in and of itself.  

It is important to note here that, though many people who live in communities which experience the effects of extraction support anti-extraction movements, not everyone in these communities does. Everyone who I interviewed made it clear that they were against extraction within indigenous territory. I asked four interviewees if they believed that the majority of people from the Ecuadorian Amazon agreed with this anti-extraction position. All said yes, at least in general. Interviewee 3 qualified his answer, by saying that he felt confident that the majority of people in the central-south region were in agreement but that he didn’t feel he could speak for the North. Of the North, he said, “They already live with this reality. So, they need to, often, negotiate with the businesses” (Interviewee 3). Starting around 2012, many people in the Cofán community of Dureno supported seismic exploration by oil companies on their land, as long as they would get a fair share of the profits of oil. Many thought that oil exploration in the area was inevitable. Since any nearby activity could end up drawing the crude oil out from directly under Dureno[23], it would be best if they had direct contact with the companies and could work out a way to profit from it (Cepek 2018 215-217). Therefore, activism for fair profits from extraction, and for safe and healthy extraction methods happens alongside movements against extraction in Dureno. In the past, this led to conflict, physical violence, and mistrust within the community. Cepek writes that initially, the conflict occurred mainly between generations, with younger people supporting oil extraction with fair terms and older people categorically rejecting extraction. However, over time, elders were convinced that if companies weren’t allowed to enter yet, the young people would simply allow it after older community members died, and therefore unfairly receive all profit that came from extraction (Cepek 214-215).  Other interviewees did point out that even in the Central-South, there are some people who support extraction within their territory, though Interviewee 6 felt sure that all those people had a deal with a company (i.e. a payment or a promise that a needed public service would be provided by the company). Interviewee 4 noted the different experiences of the North and Central-South much as Interviewee 3 had. However, in contrast with the image of Dureno outlined above, she felt that as a whole, the indigenous peoples of the North held the same view as those of the Central-South, and that their different experience actually fortified anti-extractivism. “We work with the nationalities of the Amazon region. So, in the North, they’ve worked against petroleum exploitation more than 40 years. They have lived in their own blood and seen the reality that they [extractive companies] have come to divide and to destroy.” It does seem that overall, anti-extractivism throughout the Ecuadorian Amazon region remains strong, though the goals of the movements take on different nuances depending on factors like location, generation, and personal experiences.

In general terms, the tactics used by the movements of today bear many similarities to previous movements. They rely on the use of various forms of media–including traditional news, social media, art installations, and documentaries–to create public campaigns about the situations they confront and about the movement. They also use marches and other large demonstrations, sometimes including disruptive tactics like burning tires to prevent road passage (“Llantas quemadas en vias de Ecuador”). For example, protestors last year (2018) camped outside the presidential palace in Quito in order to protest a law meant to allow local people to benefit from extraction in their land, which they felt did not address the concerns they had about threats posed by extractive companies. (“Indigenous Women Protest Lack of Consultation, Environmental Damage”). Further, people involved in the anti-extraction movement continue to fight legal battles. The most famous example is the ongoing litigation between Chevron and the affected peoples of Sucumbíos. This currently involves multiple cases being brought in several different countries, including Ecuador, the United States, Brazil, and Canada. Litigation is also being used by the Waorani of the Block 22 area in western Pastaza, and by others (“Waoranis presentan acción de protección para frenar licitación del bloque 22 en Pastaza”). More so than in the past, the anti-extraction movement involves building economic alternatives to extraction, particularly through community-based tourism and eco-tourism (Interview 1, Interview 5, Toxic Tour).

Messaging and Framing

Messages spread by movement participants today in many ways mirror those of past movements. Like the framing used in both Sucumbíos and Pastaza, people speak and write in terms of the death of ancient cultures and the extinction of Amazonian biodiversity. Like earlier protestors, leaders of communities and organizations today frequently talk in terms of territory and its historical meaning, beyond simply land (Confeniae meeting 2019). For example, in The Last Guardians, a Kichwa activist states, “We are here. This is our territory. This is our children’s territory.” In conferences between different movement participants, people also frequently discuss the themes of autonomy and self-determination (i.e. Confeniae 2019). The prevalence of these topics shows a connection to non-extraction related indigenous movements of the past which called for recognition of plurinationality and land reform–concepts clearly related to ideas of “territory”–and of the autonomy of indigenous groups. It is significant that these messages continue after plurinationality has been legally recognized in the Ecuadorian constitution.

Today, there appears to be even more appeals to the global importance of the region than before. In other words, not only should extraction be halted for the people and creatures who live in extractive zones, but also because this region of the Amazon provides oxygen for the world and because the continued reliance on fossil fuel will only put more people at risk of being negatively affected by climate change (Interview 4, Interview 5). Some even clearly assert the importance of their fight over similar struggles elsewhere. One interviewee stated that the battle against extraction differs between the Amazon and sierra and wrote that in contrast to the serranos (people of the sierra) who only need to protect their own small pieces of land, “we’re caring for it [the forest] for the world” (Interview 4). I did not see this sort of assertive, comparative statement while reviewing rhetoric of earlier movements. While this type of statement did not come up frequently throughout my research, its existence may be a sign of a necessity for participants to make their own movement stand out in a national and global sea of social movements.  

In public statements and in meetings within the movement, many appeal to what they describe as the dishonest and patronizing nature of the extractive companies. For example, in a meeting at Confeniae, a participant said, “They give us little candies” and “They lie to us” (Confeniae 2019). “Candies” refers to companies giving out or saying they will give out favors to those who cooperate with their plans. The use of this word emphasizes that these favors do not compensate for what many indigenous activists feel is lost when the companies work on their land.  While these quotes come from a meeting between local leaders, accusations of dishonesty and patronization are also repeated for the general public. For instance, Amazon Watch released a document called, “Chevron’s Ten Biggest Lies About Ecuador.”

One of the most striking differences between the movements of today and those of the 1980s-2000s is the decision to abstain from all direct communication with representatives of extractive corporations. As seen in Sawyer and Cepek’s accounts of, respectively, Pastaza and Sucumbíos movements against subsoil resource extraction in the 1990s to 2000s, nationality leaders and representatives of indigenous and ally organizations frequently met directly with representatives from oil corporations at that time. I asked 6 of 8 interviewees if they had had direct communication with any representative of an oil or extractive corporation, and only one said they had in the past, but had not directly interacted with oil representatives in years (Interview 2). This interviewee is a lawyer who had needed to directly talk to representatives of the corporation in the past. All other interviewees had said they do not directly communicate with extractive companies. Interviewee 3 said “The decision is to not have any type of dialogue with the businesses because generally the businesses search for a way to convince the leaders. The simple act of talking to them could lead to something happening.” Other interviewees echoed this sentiment or said simply that dialogue with the companies is “impossible.” (Interview 7).

Direct dialogues with government officials have been rocky, though it is not obsolete as is dialogue with oil officials. Interviewee 5 stated that there was no dialogue between the local government and Confeniae or organizations that partner with Confeniae from about 2007 to 2017, but that they are now in direct communication with governments on various levels. Representatives of the organization have communicated directly with President Moreno, as well as with local and provincial governments. The ten-year period in which the interviewee stated there was no dialogue were the same years Rafael Correa was in office. The interviewee said that it was when Correa left that communications “opened” at all levels of government. Interviewee 7 echoed this, saying, “this current government opened the national dialogue.” Interviewee 6 discussed trying to have dialogue with the government in the past (it was not specified when exactly these attempts were made), but that nothing ever came of it and ties, at some point, broke. Interviewee 8 echoed the idea that nothing ever comes out of direct conversations with Ecuadorian governments and describes this as being the result of the strong ties that exist between the government and extractive companies. He said that he just wanted the government to “not participate in this…not in favor of the company nor in favor of the affected.”

 Interviewee 5 stated that he had won in some ways in the past by working with local and national government and that he thought one potential strategy that could impact success in the future is working more directly with mid-level (i.e. provincial) governments. He said, “It is important to work on the level of, for example, Pastaza because these are the authorities that make public policies. At the international level there’s pressure from the UN, human rights bodies…but that’s not it [what is needed]. In this case, it’s not binding. If the state says, ‘I don’t want to pay attention,’ well then, no… but it was important for us to win on the international level.” No other interviewee specifically mentioned shifting towards increased communication with province-level governments, though this interviewee wanted to incorporate this type of dialogue into the movement.

A substantial change in messaging strategy is the current, extensive use of websites and social media. As briefly discussed earlier, many indigenous organizations (i.e. Confeniae, CONAIE) frequently post on platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Posts include photos taken at conferences, information about demonstrations, and campaigns surrounding critical dates (i.e. anniversaries of court decisions and International Women’s Day). Individual activists post and share posts about threats to their land or community and information about protests, alongside personal posts about their lives. This use of social media allows the movement participants to reach larger audiences and to disseminate information quickly to those who are involved in or following the movement. It also becomes easier for people outside the movement or on its outskirts to quickly contact players within the movements. A simple example is the ease with which I, in Boston, could email or Facebook message possible interviewees in Ecuador. The same would be true for other researchers, foreign or Ecuadorian journalists covering the movements, people living in extractive areas who don’t have close ties within the movements, or, essentially, anybody at all. This opens the possibility for western consumers of Ecuadorian resources, possible donors, or experts in organizing and other relevant skills to hear and be heard by Ecuadorian activists. Many organizations have directors of communication, and a large part of their job is managing social media accounts. Confeniae also has a program called “Lanceros Digitales” or “Digital Spear-Bearers,” which is made of people from multiple different communities who all communicate with press and post on the website to share the latest news from their own communities. The lanceros also collaborate with each other, for example creating and posting a video expressing their shared indigenous identity. Further, messaging apps change the way people communicate and allow for easier and quicker organization of demonstrations or coordination for meetings. For example, Interviewee 4 described organizing a conference for indigenous women and said that she simply uses WhatsApp to communicate with other leaders and directors involved.

Additionally, activists use a variety of creative, visual means of communicating messages about their movement. For example, activists in Sucumbíos collaborated with Quito-based art collective Nina Shunku to create a mural denouncing the actions of Texaco. It now stands in the center of Lago Agrio. Video is a common way to communicate the damages done by extraction and the movements against it. These include short videos shared on social media and websites (such as the Lanceros video described above) and full-length documentaries in both English and Spanish like The Last Guardians (2018). There are also musical projects meant to display the culture of indigenous communities living in extraction areas. For instance, there are young Cofán people currently working on a recording project to share their music and their oral stories, in both A’inguay and Spanish. Mapping technology is also being used. Waorani activists currently fighting the incursion of new gold mining companies recently released a map on social media and websites. The map overlays historical Waorani knowledge of the territory (i.e. animal habitats, sites of historic battles, the locations of medicinal plants, etc.) with current government maps which show oil blocks and current cities (“Mapping Waorani Territory”). This creates a clear visual for outsiders to get an idea of the conflicting views of the territory and its value.

Alliances and Identity

Today, movements against extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon are more connected with each other and with movements and Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) outside the region than ever before. Local organizations like Confeniae bring together smaller, single ethnicity organizations and individuals, leading to high levels of interaction between different peoples. Movement participants also work frequently with non-indígenas who have a variety of different backgrounds and careers. Several ecologists and biologists, both from the region and from other regions and other countries, play roles on an individual level, helping build eco-tourism initiatives and otherwise working directly with community leaders to protect the plants and animals within their territories.

Eco-tourism is an important product of alliances on the local level. It is seen by many protest participants see as an alternate to oil extraction (Interview 1) and has involved the collaboration of people of different ethnicities and with different knowledge backgrounds. Interviewee 1 expressed hope for eco- and community based-tourism initiatives, saying that as a result of eco-tourism, “there are some crazy biological results, some crazy cultural revitalization.” Interviewee 5 also supported increased community-based tourism, saying that, “It allows us to raise awareness about the importance of the Amazon ecosystem and especially indigenous territories.” While community-based tourism is growing and some scholars have expressed hope that it can help economically empower disenfranchised peoples (Inostroza), it does not yet appear that tourism would bring immediate profits on the same scale as petroleum extraction. Financial data on profits and costs of tourism in the region are not well-studied. A study of ecotourism in part of the Peruvian Amazon found that eco-tourism, when combined with compatible activities like small-scale pig farming, was the second-most profitable use of land next to logging. If ecosystem services and social benefits were to be factored into the measure of profit, the researchers predicted that ecotourism would even exceed logging (Kirkby et al.). While these results are promising, Ecuadorian ecotourism may face a larger challenge due to the fact that crude exports are a much larger part of the Ecuadorian economy than timber exports are in Peru.

On an international level, according to interviewees 4 and 5, relationships with COICA are currently very strong. Interviewee 4 discussed her excitement to organize a meeting between indigenous women from all the Amazonian countries, to be held at the COICA headquarters in Quito. Relationships with western allies, including NGOs, also continue to shape anti-extraction movements. I found mixed experiences in terms of partnerships with western organizations. In 2013, an already strained relationship[24] between Cofán communities and Acción Ecológica ended when Dureno decided to allow BGP to conduct seismic exploration on their land (Cepek 2018 193-194). Cepek writes that though the reasons for the ties breaking may be complex, many Cofán people from the area interpret the relationship’s end as a result of such organizations, “only being interested in them as opponents of the petroleum industry” (194). In this example, we see how it is necessary for indigenous protest participants to adhere to the belief systems of their allies if they wish to continue their partnership. In contrast with the ruptures between western NGOs and indigenous organizations outlined in the literature, few interviewees claimed to have experienced any negative consequences of partnering with western allies. Interviewee 3, for example, said that the organizations with which he had worked on both a national and international level had all held the same firm position against extraction that he had; he did not report any conflicts with these organizations.

The only criticism of allies that came up during interviewees is when Interviewee 5 said that he did experience cases when foreign NGOs, like the foreign press discussed earlier, wanted to make “public figures” out of certain individuals, particularly women. Though I didn’t see any evidence of concrete ways that alliances with foreigners may change the actual identities of indigenous movement participants, we can see how the participants feel the need to present certain aspects of their identity in easy-to-understand ways for western audiences. For example, indigenous activists often dress in more traditional clothing when addressing non-indígenas, while they may wear jeans and other western clothing in daily life. Interviewee 5 said that in response to this directing of identity representation, particularly the individualistic representation, he “reminds them [the organizations] to be very careful with that.” He went on to say that because of the clear reminders and communication from indigenous movement participants, no NGO has been able to “break the organic parts” of local organizations. This implies that though there is a struggle between the ways indigenous activists and their western allies want to depict the anti-extraction movement, this interviewee feels foreign actors were not able to change any essential piece of the identities of indigenous organizations.

Further, Interviewee 5’s comment about choosing female leaders as “heroes” is interesting. It may point to how organizations from the western world want to focus on certain identities that will appeal more to progressive western audiences. My interviews did not focus specifically on gender representation in the movement, and it is difficult to say to what extent different genders are represented and how exactly roles differ based on gender. However, it is clear that women have a unique, identity-based, and significant position within the movement. Groups like Mujeres Amazónicas—”Amazonian Women”—are comprised of women and focus centrally on the role of women in indigenous protest. Women take on roles as leaders in many communities, nations, and organizations, for instance in the leadership of Sarayaku or as directors in Confeniae. In her account of the movement in the 1990s, Sawyer shows that in the past, discussions between oil companies, governments, and indigenous representatives were male-dominated. Though it is difficult to judge the degree to which this is true today, I have seen indigenous women participating in meetings led by Confeniae and UDAPT, contrasting Sawyer’s description in which she was typically the only women at a table (119). Combined with the leadership roles held by women and women-centered SMOs, it does seem that the women are legitimately important forces within the movement. Becker wrote, “recognizing the central role of women as not exceptional but rather characteristic of Indigenous movements is key to understanding the development of popular movements in Ecuador” (8). Maybe today, these women who have always been driving anti-extraction and other indigenous movements are simply taking a more center-stage, visible role than they were able to in the past.

But, as interviewee 5 pointed out, some allied organizations and media sources intentionally center the images of women to the point of unreasonably exalting women activists. The 2018 documentary “The Last Guardians” has a section which focuses specifically on the women involved in organizing marches and otherwise leading the movement, featuring statements such as, “Us women have stepped up and taken the lead” alongside references to children’s futures. Additionally, while interning with UDAPT, I was told my interviews for a video I created for the organization would be best if I focused on women, especially mothers. This shows the desire to represent the movement as being led by women, and particularly to appeal to the idea of a protective, nurturing woman standing up for her children’s future. Though the role of women is genuinely important in this movement, it is difficult to separate how much of the depiction of women is an accurate representation of a movement and how much is attempting to appeal to an audience with either feminist beliefs or a general desire to protect women and children. Interviewee 5 concluded that, “The role of women is important, but it can’t be exploited.”

One form of alliances that I saw more in the modern movement than in the past is celebrity allies. When looking at the anti-extraction movement of the past, I did not find examples of any celebrities known outside of Ecuador involved. Today, global celebrities who have spoken or shared content about indigenous anti-extraction movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon include Leonardo DiCaprio, Roger Waters of Pink Floyd, actors Brad Pitt and Danny Glover, Sting, and Trudie Styler. Their involvement has increased international awareness of anti-extractivism in Ecuador and has gained funds for water filters in polluted areas and other public service installations.

One difficulty throughout the process of attempting to evaluate the costs and benefits of alliances formed in this movement is the simple fact that people may want to protect or speak well of their allies. Even if relations aren’t perfect, people may want to continue the relationships with allies and may choose to focus on the positive aspects of their partners in interviews. Interviewee 8 also noted that foreign NGO allies (i.e. Amazon Watch and Greenpeace) have faced threats from people representing oil companies. For this reason, it may be difficult for some interviewees to discuss their relationships with allies in detail. With that said, the information I was able to get about allies shows that alliances with SMOs help indigenous organizations mobilize and spread their messages, though at times the allies may misrepresent certain aspects of the movement (i.e. exalting the role of women).

Outcomes and Further Analysis

The movement of today has, at this point, only met some of its goals, as stated by the participants—the goals being end of extraction, payment of reparations, and transparency from extractive companies and in government-led consultations. A few of these goals, i.e. Ecuador developing a “post-extractive economy” are unlikely to be met anytime soon due to the nation’s high dependence on crude export revenues.

There have been some successes, mostly partial successes. For example, a 2011 Ecuadorian court ruling, which was then upheld in 2018, said that Chevron owes affected communities $9.5billion in reparations. This case was won by the affected peoples after filing the case in Ecuador in 2003, and a previous legal battle in New York dating back to 1993. However, the Ecuadorian court has not been able to enforce this ruling, the ruling has been declared fraudulent in a New York court, and no money has been paid. Recently, an attempt to try the case in a Canadian court failed (New York Times). Throughout the years of complicated litigation, the affected peoples have won some cases, but have never received any reparations or public acknowledgement of wrongdoing from Texaco or Chevron. Interviewee 8 said, “Winning the trial gave us nothing” and, “We can’t clean the Amazon with the paper on which the sentence is written.” While the movement’s success in winning a court case against such a large company and in gaining public recognition is acknowledged as success by the participants, many agree that these successes alone are “nothing.” There is a sign that this may change in some way. In 2018, a group of Chevron shareholders wrote a letter to the Chevron CEO, criticizing him for Chevron’s handling of the case in Ecuador (“Chevron Shareholders Slam CEO”). This could represent a step towards success for the affected peoples if Chevron does in fact start to handle the case differently as a result.

Some progress has already been more concretely realized in the North. The Cofán of Dureno experienced success when the Ecuadorian government paid for the construction of houses in the central Dureno community. This development is called the Ciudad del Milenio and will have cost the government millions of dollars by the time it is complete, showing a large investment in repaying the people of Dureno for harm done by Petroecuador. Though activists expressed that they will not be satisfied until Chevron fully pays for Texaco’s part of the damage in this area, many are excited that their demands are being met by the government (Cepek 229-230).

In 2012, the Kichwa of Sarayaku succeeded in winning a court case which forced the Ecuadorian state to publicly acknowledge their unconstitutional promotion of Sarayaku land for oil exploitation (Environmental Justice Atlas). In 2013, exploitation was indefinitely delayed within Sarayaku, though an interviewee said, “for now, there’s no exploitation,” (Interview 3) emphasizing that this may not be the permanent result the activists of Sarayaku want. New blocks which overlap with Sarayaku are now up for auction for exploitation. However, when asked if they had experienced failure during their time in the movement, interviewees didn’t label partial successes like these as failures at all. When asked, Interviewee 4 simply said “I haven’t yet had any failures.” Both interviewees 2 and 8, speaking from their experience with the Chevron case, suggested that they thought the international justice system had failed those in the movement, but that within the movement itself, there wasn’t any failure. Generally, my interviews show that movement participants are often unwilling to label their movement as successful or unsuccessful. None of the interviewees have attained their ultimate goals, but all have experienced some form of victory.

Beyond success and failure in relation to people’s initial demands, several of the interviewees mentioned some version of “unity” or “cooperation” as a major success. Interview 2 said, “Really it’s not easy to, for 25 years, maintain the unity of six different indigenous pueblos and peasants and mestizos. That’s a success.” When asked about successes, Interviewee 7 spoke of his time as president of an indigenous organization, saying “I achieved the unification of all the federations.” He said that before his time in the presidency, organizations “began to divide,” so he saw the “reconstruction of unity” as a success.  Interviewee 4 responded, “Here we are, women united. We have demonstrated the unity of women of different nationalities.” While people from different ethnic groups had collaborated with each other throughout Ecuador’s history[25], it is naturally not always easy to remain united as a single movement when that movement is comprised of people with different backgrounds, cultures, and vastly different experiences of extraction. Adding to the potential for division is the fact that historically, conflicts between different groups existed in some areas–i.e. between some Kichwa and Waorani groups in Pastaza (Sawyer 125). Further, as seen throughout Becker’s Indians and Leftists, adopting the broad, collective identity of “indigenous” doesn’t necessarily come naturally to many people. Therefore, the ability to work together under general identities like “indigenous” or “anti-extractivist” is seen as an accomplishment by many activists.

Interviewees also saw the increased public recognition of their fight as a success. For example, interviewee 2 mentioned that he found it amazing that people around the world now know about the Ecuadorian case against Chevron. Since a large component of Ecuadorian indigenous movements over time has been the demand for a recognition of indigenous identities and the country’s plurinationality, it is significant that some interviewees identified that more people throughout Ecuador and the world now know about their people and about the diversity of nations within Ecuador.

Another outcome is participants gaining valuable skills through their work in the movement. Interviewee 5 spoke of the need to be educated at a high level to be taken seriously by the government and oil company representatives. On one hand, this represents the cultural change of a need to turn towards western schooling, possibly giving up time with family or time spent doing traditional jobs to gain an education: a change which may have negative consequences for family relations. On the other hand, gaining this education has the potential to open up opportunities outside of the movement, which could better the social or economic standing of participants.

It appears that in the current movement, as in the past movement, external forces have a large effect on movement outcomes. In particular, the Correa government presented new challenges and costs for movement participants. We also see, perhaps more clearly than in the past, the importance of allies in changing outcomes. The public recognition that interviewees identified as important has been fostered by alliances between different groups on the local level and with international organizations like Amazon Watch. Additionally, changed strategies regarding dialogue engagement may make a difference in outcomes. In comparison with the past, dialogue with companies has decreased and dialogue with governments has been recently renewed. It is difficult to quantify the effects these changes have had and will have on movement outcomes, but these are new, potentially significant developments.       

Appendix Chapter V: Images of Today’s Movement

Chapter VI. Conclusions: Past, Present, and Future

Comparing the Past and Present

In summary, there are many similarities between the anti-extraction movements of today and those of the past. General tactics, including marches and disruptive protests, inter-community conferences, publicity campaigns, and legal action remained similar over the period from 1980 through today. Messaging and framing also remained similar across the years, often emphasizing indigenous sovereignty and indigenous concepts of territory. Messages of environmental preservation have also consistently been present, though with varying force. Alliance-formation remains an important part of the movements and today connections with potential allies may be facilitated by modern technology and forms of communication. Throughout the years, the general economic dependence on oil and pro-extraction stance of the federal government have remained constant.

 There are several major differences between the anti-extraction movement today and that of the past, both in terms of external pressures and opportunities and in terms of choices made by participants in the movement. One important external difference is the national political environment. The national administration changed frequently during the 1980s to early 2000s but remained committed to expanding extraction and promoting neoliberal ideas. In contrast, from 2007 to today, even after Correa’s time in office, the anti-neoliberal rhetoric and other tenets of Correísmo have remained present. Suppression of protests spiked under Correa and has dwindled in the early years of Moreno’s administration. The degree of communication between the movement and governments has fluctuated over the years as the government itself has changed. A stark difference between the past and present is the general commitment to having no dialogue with extractive companies, seen in the Central-South, as opposed to the frequent communication or attempts at communication with these companies in the past. Also significant is the change in technology available to and used by movement participants.

In terms of alliance formation, alliances with individual actors appeared very early in the anti-extraction movement, but larger-scale alliances with organizations, both domestic and foreign, have grown in recent years. Today, many of the local SMOs involved in this movement (i.e. Confeniae and single-nationality indigenous organizations) are well established, while in the 1980s, most were new organizations. Based on interview data, it seems that many activists today feel comfortable openly communicating their needs to allied organizations most of the time, contrasting the miscommunications and conflicts between the local participants and larger organizations in the past reported by authors like Cepek.

In both past and present, successfully causing the removal of an extractive company from a given territory has been very rare. Partial successes–i.e. contracts won in Sarayaku in the 1990s and cases won by UDAPT in the 2000s which were not enforced–are more common than total successes in which the demands of movement participants are met in the long term. My research has identified that success has so far been driven by not just one, but rather a combination of the factors discussed here, principally external factors and alliances. When asked what influenced any successes that they had experienced, several interviewees (discussing both the past and present) pointed to collaboration between different ethnic groups and organizations. Such alliances have contributed to greater awareness of the anti-extraction movement and, particularly as larger organizations came to be involved, more funding and external pressure. Additionally, chapter IV demonstrated how external factors like company contract terms affect movement success, as seen in the Cofán’s success against Texaco. Because framing mechanisms have remained essentially consistent throughout the history of the movement and are related well to the framing other Ecuadorian indigenous movements, it is possible that this continuity has influenced success as well. Today and in the past, concepts used in messaging about a variety of the overarching goals of indigenous organizations is thoroughly incorporated into statements in opposition to extraction. Further research would be needed to fully understand how this continuity in framing has shaped movement outcomes.

Further, I found variations in the movement’s goals in the past and present. Some activists today want an end to extraction, while others want extractive practices to be improved in some way. Others, especially in the northern part of the region, want reparations for past damage by extractive companies. Predicting exactly where these movements will head in the future and how their goals will change was not the focus of my work. However, based on the continuity of framing and in the content of goals throughout the anti-extraction movement and in earlier Ecuadorian indigenous movements, and on conversations with young people involved in the anti-extraction movement, I believe that the goals of removing extraction from indigenous territories will remain consistently strong in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, as extraction does expand or continue, those who grow up beside extraction all their lives will likely modify the views and goals of their parents and grandparents. As seen in some Cofán communities in Sucumbíos, young people in general may become more comfortable with some level of extraction. Instead of fighting against extraction entirely, they may focus their efforts on demanding monetary benefits, more eco-friendly extraction methods, and other modifications to already-existing extraction or to extraction which may begin in the near future.

Outcomes for Participants

As previously stated, many of the costs and benefits associated with becoming involved with anti-extraction movements have remained fairly similar over the years. Interviews and social media sources point to the fact that increased connections with people outside of one’s ethnic group, and the associated feeling of unity, are common outcomes of movement participation. Additionally, movement participants may gain valuable skills in communication and the use of certain technologies, like social media. Movement participants may be driven to gain further education more so than non-participants. This higher education can provide benefits in finding job opportunities or in other areas of life, as well as drawbacks for some individuals who otherwise may not have pursued a western-style education. On the other hand, movement participants are also likely to experience more danger as a result of their participation. The level of danger changes based on political climate and, possibly, based on public awareness of the protestors’ situation, as seen in discrepancies between treatment of protests in the North versus the Central-South.

Significance

These results are a basic stepping stone to understanding the current factors affecting anti-extraction movement outcomes in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The outcomes of the movements are hugely important not only for participants but also for anyone living in extraction zones, due to the myriad of social, environmental, health, and other threats of extraction already discussed above. Also, all Ecuadorians may be affected by changes in extraction due to the dependence of the Ecuadorian economy on oil and the government’s use of oil funds for public services. Further, the outcomes of social movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon have impacts beyond the region. If extraction rate is in any way affected by the anti-extraction movements, this could impact how countries like the United States[26] get their oil.  This may become especially important as the Venezuelan economic and political crisis continues, impacting another major source of oil in the region. Further, with the growing connections between movements in different countries, as exemplified by organizations like COICA, the success or failure of anti-extraction movements in one country has the potential to impact these movements elsewhere, not only within the Amazon, but throughout the world. Understanding how these anti-extraction movements function under different regimes and other varying external circumstances can help shed light on movements in other nearby countries which are experiencing change in political climate, or will be in the future, such as Brazil.

Limitations

My conclusions are limited by the scope of the research I was able to complete and by constraints on the methods I had at my disposal. For example, interview analysis involved only eight 20- to 45-minute interviews, and I was only able to spend a brief time (about ten days) in contact with interviewees and in their cities and communities. Further, due to travel limitations, I interviewed six people involved in movements in the central-south region and only two from the North, meaning the current views of people from Sucumbíos and other northern provinces are less well-covered here than those of the people of the Central-South. Additionally, access to primary sources–including newspaper articles and other media–from Ecuador prior to the 2000s is limited. In order to deal with these constraints, I used various sources (a combination of interviews, news reports, published ethnographies and secondary sources, social media, etc.) in order to corroborate the patterns I observed. However, it is important to keep in mind that any results discussed here should be further investigated in the future using more rigorous and thorough methods. A further constraint is my inability to access sources in any indigenous languages, or any language apart from English and Spanish. Furthermore, I did not have information about funding and other resource mobilization for groups within this movement.

Future Research

In the future, I would be interested in learning more about how people’s views of their own identity may change in response to outside pressures like alliances and representation in the media. My interview questions and overall methods did not provide a good basis to answer this question but researching it further would allow insight into how identities may shift when people become involved in anti-extraction movements. Additionally, how does media portrayal affect the success or failure of a movement? Though I talked to people about how they felt about media representation, the question of the effects on success levels was not clearly addressed by my research. I would expect that negative portrayals of activists (i.e. presentation as “terrorists” and “guerillas”) would make it harder for participants to gain public support and therefore harder to get the government’s help, funds, and other benefits that would increase success. This prediction was not explicitly verified in my research and could be investigated further in the future. Also, in regard to media, is it possible for uncontacted peoples have agency in influencing their own representation in media? As many indigenous organizations become more and more skilled in social media and public relations, is there a way for them to use this knowledge to protect the interests of people with whom they have no direct contact and who are not developing these skills themselves?

I would like to learn more about the historic and current gender representation of the Ecuadorian anti-extraction movement in the Amazon. At a conference I attended in March 2018, in which leaders from various nationalities each gave a speech about their fight against extraction, all main speakers were men. Similarly, most of the presidents of indigenous organizations that I have researched are men. These anecdotal incidents do not say a lot without a deeper understanding of the gender roles in the various cultures represented in this movement. Contrasting the gender composition which I saw, indigenous women are often the central focus of international media coverage (i.e. recent International Women’s Day campaigns, footage from The Last Guardians). Further, Interviewee 4 stated that she had never experienced sexism from her fellow activists. Interviewing more female activists in order to study the discrepancies between what media shows, what women in the movement feel, and what I (from my foreign perspective) see in terms of gender composition in the movement would be interesting and valuable.

Further, future research should address not just the success and failure of the faction of the movement that seeks a complete end to oil extraction, but also the faction which accepts some extraction but demands more transparency from extractive corporations and fairer sharing of profits. As noted earlier, many in Sucumbíos have shifted their attention to these goals rather than outright anti-extractivism. Further, even those who want extractive companies to leave altogether still demand more transparency from companies that are already on their land and from the Ecuadorian government. Though those I interviewed all wanted oil and mining companies to leave indigenous land altogether, all also noted and expressed annoyance or disdain at some degree of deception or lack of information from the companies. In response, it would be valuable to investigate further how movements can change the information which comes from extractive companies and how companies that are in the region may or may not change their behavior in response to social movements. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a related, interesting field of study. What effects might CSR efforts of companies extracting in the Ecuadorian Amazon have on the ultimate outcomes of extraction? In the case of the Ecuadorian Amazon, can negative effects of extraction truly be prevented through CSR and to what degree?

Lastly, taking into account the importance of national government which I identified, how will the apparent decrease in suppression under the Moreno administration impact the scope and success of these movements in the future? Will his administration’s policies lead to more protests as seen in studies examining partial liberalization in the past? Would this potential greater participation change the outcomes of the movements? Overall, there is much left to study in the field of indigenous anti-extraction, both inside and outside of the Ecuadorian Amazon. Studying these movements more will help us better understand how people can effectively advocate for themselves in the face of the immense economic and political power of multinational corporations and what happens when they choose to take on this advocacy role.

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Endnotes

[1] Note that the term “mining” includes oil and gas extraction as well as excavating for other subsurface resources.

[2] “Amazon” is used in this paper to refer to the broad-leafed tropical rainforest which covers approximately 1.7 billon acres of land surrounding the Amazon river and its tributaries. This rainforest spans nine South American countries.

[3] Note: Sucumbíos was not yet established as a province at the time Texaco entered. It was declared a province in 1989 (Provincia de Sucumbíos).

[4] The Cofán are an ethnic group with a population of about 2000, spread throughout the Amazon region of Northern Ecuador and Colombia.

[5] This city is officially known as Nueva Loja, but is more commonly referred to as Lago Agrio, meaning “Sour Lake,” named after Sour Lake, Texas, the birthplace of Texaco.

[6] See Literature Review: Definitions for more information on neoliberalism

[7] “Uncontacted peoples” refers to indigenous groups, such as the Taegeri and Taromenone, who have voluntarily decided to isolate themselves from the outside world. Due to historical relationships and territorial proximity, these peoples have contact with some Waorani groups but not with other indigenous and non-indigenous groups of people. For more information, see Cabodevilla et al. 2005

[8] Quehua generally refers to a cultural group and language in Peru, Bolivia, and Chile while Kichwa refers to a related culture in Ecuador or the related cultural group and language in Ecuador and Colombia

[9] More information about Pachamama can be found in Zaffaroni 2011 (https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=la+pachamama&btnG=)

[10] The Waorani (also spelled Hauorani) are an indigenous group of the Ecuadorian Amazon whose traditional territory stretches from modern-day Puyo to the eastern border with Peru, covering large parts of Pastaza and Orellana provinces. https://www.amazonfrontlines.org/chronicles/mapping-waorani/

[11] An uncontacted population

[12] As of February 2019

[13] Estates in which peasants (usually indigenous people) worked for a landowner

[14] An Ecuadorian state-owned oil company

[15] Chapter IV

[16] “compañero”

[17] No details on his death were provided

[18] The supermajors are BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and Eni

[19] See historical chapter

[20] Note added October 2019: This paper was written before the Moreno administration’s economic measures and subsequent indigenous-led protests in October 2019. These events are vital to understanding Moren’s relationship with indigenous movements.

[21] Indigenous Guatemalan activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner

[22] See Manuel Castells’ “Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age” for more information.

[23] Oil extraction from one area can often pull up oil from surrounding areas as well. If the company were to extract from an area outside the boundaries of Dureno, but nearby, they would likely be profiting off of Dureno’s oil.

[24] See chapter IV

[25] See Becker “Indians and Leftists” for more information

[26] The United States imports more Ecuadorian crude oil than does any other country

Written by Ben Gardner-Gill

“The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.” — Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting^[1]

Introduction

February 2, 1993 – As Václav Havel crossed the Charles Bridge in Prague to attend his inauguration as President of the Czech Republic at the Prague Castle, he embodied the democratic ideals for which he and his compatriots had tirelessly fought. The Charles Bridge is one of the landmarks of Prague and has seen the ups and downs of the city’s history, from glorious independence to treacherous oppression. Democracy was not new to Prague; the city had served as the capital of a democratic Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1939. After so many years under Nazi and Soviet influence, the memory of democracy, among other motivations, propelled Havel and millions of others to make demands of the communist regime in 1989. From the beginning of the revolution, Havel pushed for a popular democracy, and like the founders of interwar Czechoslovakia, he saw democracy as an aspirational goal. The memories of both democracy and communism remain powerful political tools in the Czech Republic to this day, but are not necessarily used in the positive, motivational way that Havel did. Rather, historical memory has been used across the political spectrum for a wide variety of goals. In this paper, I will examine how historical memory was used in Czechoslovak politics from 1990 to 1992, and how those usages established the framework for populist rhetoric surrounding historical memory, particularly that of the communist era and its abuses of power and societal cohesion. Despite their policy disagreements, parties from across the political spectrum used history and historical memory to build a collective framework, with quintessentially populist rhetoric pitting “the people” against “the elite,” that survives and flourishes to this day.

Methodology

Populism

I define populism as a political ideology in the purest sense, in that it is used by politicians to get elected. To define its scope I will use a version of Cas Mudde’s 2004 definition of populism: “A thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”^[2] I will make only two edits to Mudde’s definition: to remove the adjectives of “pure” and “corrupt” before “people” and “elite,” respectively. While the purity of the people and the corruption of the elite are two prominent themes within populist rhetoric, they do not fully encompass the range of themes that populists employ.

Mudde’s definition has been among the most cited in the field, and much of our contemporary (academic) understanding of populism is influenced by his work and this article in particular. Mudde also brings to the scholarly conversation two important points regarding what counts as populist. First, Mudde concludes “Most mainstream parties mainly use populist rhetoric, but some also call for populist amendments to the liberal democratic system (most notably through the introduction of plebiscitary instruments).” Rhetorical tools do not comprise a full strategy in and of themselves; populism is not a binary, with politicians either being fully populist or not, as many parties and politicians can engage in populist rhetoric. Second, Mudde says, “While charismatic leadership and direct communication between the leader and ‘the people’ are common among populists, these features facilitate rather than define populism.” In other words, populism is not dependent on the method of communication, but on the content of communication. We may think of the typical populist as being brash, outspoken, and male, but a populist can be quiet, technocratic, or female, and any other trait one could ascribe to any politician. In other words, it’s what they’re saying, not how they’re saying it.

Historical Memory

Historical memory is a process wherein people “construct and identify with particular narratives about historical periods or events,” according to Katherine Hite of Vassar College.^[3] This paper addresses both historical memory and history, though for use in political rhetoric, the two are practically inseparable, so the distinction is commented upon only when salient.

This paper addresses historical memory in the context of one country, Czechoslovakia, and one use, its role in populist rhetoric. This specificity and interaction have been ignored in the field of memory studies partially because they do not fit within the field’s theoretical debates. This paper will not adjudicate between Western European narratives based on “trauma” and Eastern European narratives based on “mourning,” as described by Uilleam Blacker and Alexander Etkind, because both sorts of memories co-exist.^[4] Nor will this paper attempt to classify different sorts of memory in politics, as Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik do in “Twenty Years after Communism” and Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker do in “Communism’s Shadow.”^[5] The focus of this paper is what binds memory rhetorics together, in the sense that they contribute to populist rhetoric, rather than what splits them apart. Nor will this paper attempt to put memory in transnational context as with many recent works, including those of Timothy Snyder and Philipp Ther.^[6] Instead, this paper only looks at Czechoslovakia.

The work that has been done on the intersection of memory politics and populist rhetoric in Czechoslovakia is limited. James Krapfl’s “Revolution with a Human Face” is a must-read for its depth and care taken to highlight the voice of the common man between the years of 1989 and 1992, the turbulent period that is also covered in this paper.^[7] In his 2015 article “Anti-Communism of the Future,” Petr Roubal explores the intellectual rise and fall of the Civic Democratic Alliance (Občanská demokratická aliance, ODA), and while his deft touch makes the article an important addition to the field of Czechoslovak intellectual history, his focus is on the party’s conservatism, not its populist rhetoric or use of history.^[8] Finally, in his 2010 book The Unfinished Revolution,James Mark shows that politicians like to ‘write’ themselves into the history of the revolution as a means of elevating their stature in front of voters.^[9] While this may be characteristic of populist leaders, it does not define populist rhetoric. This paper thus seeks to fill a gap in the literature on populism and historical memory by examining the two concepts together in a specific place, at a specific time, in a way that has not been done so before.

Sources

To examine political rhetoric, this paper investigates documents published by parties and politicians whose audience was the voting public. These documents range from comprehensive party platforms to issue-specific pamphlets to personal manifestos of politicians. Some of the latter type of document likely were aimed at a more limited audience, but were nonetheless publicly distributed. Public documents, unlike internal party communications, display populist rhetoric in the context which is most important for defining “populist:” when politicians were seeking votes.

This paper will focus its analysis on several parties active in the early 1990s, namely the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ), the Christian Democratic Party (Křesťanskodemokratická strana, KDS), the right-conservative-Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa, SPR-RSČ), the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), and the big tent liberal Civic Forum (Občanské fórum, OF).

This paper will be analyzing the OF and ODS as separate parties, despite the fact that since the ODS is a successor party to the OF, the two parties could be considered one contiguous political party. The OF and ODS shared some members, but former OF members who founded the ODS took the ODS in a decidedly more right-wing direction than its predecessor. On occasion, the ODS recalled and refuted the OF’s rhetoric of a year or two prior, and where relevant this paper notes the dates of these interactions. The two parties also had other salient differences beyond ideology. The OF was the party of the Velvet Revolution that set up a big tent across the political spectrum to include all anti-communists, whereas the ODS defined itself on a distinct portion of the political spectrum and looked to present a policy program that was much less centered around anti-communism. Because of the differences in ideology and goals, these two parties represent fundamentally different perspectives in Czechoslovak politics, and can thus be compared in opposition to each other when analyzing political rhetoric.

Historical Background

The Czech and Slovak peoples were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for years. They had varying degrees of autonomy largely based on the whims of Vienna or Budapest, but nonetheless maintained their culture. Thanks in part to these strong traditions as well as some clever politicking, the victorious Entente of the First World War supported the establishment of a democratic Czechoslovakia, founded on October 28, 1918.^[10] The new democracy faced hurdles when establishing a functional, multiethnic democracy, but also had significant advantages in industrial production that allowed it to rebound from the war. While not a perfect state by any reckoning, Czechoslovakia and its internal faults cannot be blamed for its downfall.

After the National Socialists took power in Germany, Adolf Hitler began to pursue Lebensraum for the German people. First on his checklist of territories was the Sudetenland, a thin strip of land in the north and west of then-Czechoslovakia. The majority of the Sudetenland’s residents had ethnic German roots, but the lands had been under Czech control for hundreds of years and many of the Germans had integrated with their Czech neighbors. However, the Western allies feared German aggression and, throwing Czech claims out the window, attempted to appease Hitler by granting him the Sudetenland at the Munich Conference of 1938. Hitler did not stop there, and during the subsequent World War subjugated Czechs under a “Protectorate” with a Nazi Reichsprotektor in charge. For the Czech people, their time under Nazism was a harsh withdrawal from the system of European democracies which they had so treasured in the interwar years.

After the war, hope for a democratic Czechoslovakia returned, but so did a desire to take revenge for the country’s suffering. President Eduard Beneš pursued retributive justice against ethnic Germans in the country through a series of decrees, which remain on the books to this day. However, domestic politics were unstable and the democratic parties proved too weak to maintain their foothold. The Communist Party staged a coup in February 1948, known in Marxist historiography as Victorious February (Vítězný únor). They quickly consolidated their control of state apparatuses, initiating forty-one years of one-party rule.

The communist state was all-encompassing but not all-powerful, as demonstrated by the 1968-1969 period of reform and protests known as the Prague Spring. Responding to public dissatisfaction with the prior twenty years of communist rule, the Central Committee of the KSČ under First Secretary Alexander Dubček adopted a reformist “Action Programme.” The effort was quickly met with backlash from the Soviet Union, which organized a coalition of Warsaw Pact troops to invade Czechoslovakia and extinguish the small light of hope that the Prague Spring had provided the people. The next iteration of the regime, referred to as “normalization,” lasted from late 1969 to late 1989, and was marked by authoritarian, conservative rule under close Soviet supervision.^[11] Fed up with their oppression, a growing movement of underground anti-communist activists began building support, and as the communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact states around them fell, these activists took the opportunity to revolt.

This democratic revolution, among the last to occur in the former Warsaw Pact countries, was quick, prompting historian Timothy Garton Ash to quip in its midst, “In Poland it took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks; perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!”^[12] The revolution was also bloodless, earning it the nickname of the Velvet Revolution. The Czech group which was the dominant ‘party of the revolution,’ the Civic Forum, became a fully-fledged political party and the odds-on favorite to dominate the 1990 Czechoslovak federal elections. They set the tone for Czechoslovak democracy from the outset, but that became complicated over time with ideological and rhetorical disagreements among numerous factions.

Setting Democratic Norms

The Civic Forum focused on the foundation of interwar Czechoslovakia to provide historical context and inspiration for the task of democratization at hand. The 1918 revolution was depicted as a broad-based popular movement, with references to a “rabid crowd” that established “our common house.”^[13] This rhetoric helped reinforce the OF’s message of historical justice, that the post-communist movement was merely a restoration of the status quo, rather than the establishment of something new. Politicians were also keen to drawn on the parallels between the two periods, and continued to do so for some time. Two years after the fall of communism, Václav Klaus, leader of the ODS, wrote, “This task stood before our families or grandparents in Czechoslovakia after the First World War, this task facing us after the collapse of the communist regime.”^[14] Klaus and others placed the contemporary democratization of Czechoslovakia in the grand arc of history, making themselves historical actors of great importance whose decisions would immediately be written into the history books. When this rhetoric was combined with the reminder of the popular nature of the first revolution, a clear message emerged, encouraging the public to get involved in their democracy, and to strike a new path forward. However, this did not mean the communists were entirely removed from the political discourse.

As the Communist Party began to pick up the pieces of their oppressive regime and try to contend in the 1990 elections, they simultaneously tried to make a range of historical arguments to legitimize their continued presence in a democratic system and to delegitimize the previous communist regime. Among the most prominent of these was the argument that the past state was deeply flawed: “The state of development of the society we have achieved in the past cannot be considered as genuine socialism. The name of the republic as socialist was unwarranted and voluntaristic.”^[15] The KSČ argued that genuine socialism is compatible with democracy, whereas the disingenuous socialism of the past regime was naturally autocratic and incompatible with democracy. This was a legitimate rhetorical strategy, as the Czechoslovak people had been relatively welcoming of the liberalizing, yet still communist, reforms of the Prague Spring. The leader of those reforms, Alexander Dubček, said only a few months prior to the publication of this platform, “The idea of socialism with a human face became the idea of the people, the memory of the nation… Its inheritance is in you.”^[16] The Communists of 1990 were trying to build upon this memory of the Prague Spring, the memory that communism could be promising and invoke passion for change, uplifting the people rather than crushing them. Perhaps this memory of the Prague Spring weakened under the harsh “normalization” regime that followed it, but the Communist Party, like so many others, believed memories could endure through oppression. However, most parties had a radically different interpretation of history, and historical memory, than the communists did.

There was general consensus amongst non-communist parties established prior to the 1990 elections, and carried from there on, that the KSČ was inherently undemocratic, regardless of the successor party’s declared commitment to reform. A Civic Forum pamphlet in December 1989 declared that “democracy can only be promoted and improved by democrats,” reflecting a cautiousness about allowing undemocratic actors into the newly established system.^[17] This cautiousness was widely shared when considering the KSČ’s role in the political system, with a profound sense of distrust driving the rhetoric of other parties. The OF’s Jaroslav Chloupek wrote, “KSČ is likely to be willing again to promise anything in its election program that could bring success to it in the upcoming elections even when it is clear that these promises will not be able to be fulfilled because its unlimited government for the last forty years has left us a sad legacy.”^[18] Similarly making no distinction between the past and present Communists, the Christian Democrats invited the public to “vote against totalitarianism.”^[19] This rhetoric does not distinguish between the contemporary KSČ, which wanted the voters to believe it had reformed from communist times, and the KSČ which was the ruling party for over forty years. By doing so, the non-communist parties sought to tie the present and past communists in the voters’ minds, and hoped that the voters’ bad memories of the past would motivate them to oppose the KSČ in the election. The OF proclaimed “We must not allow these forces to gain [an advantage] in the forthcoming elections, because that would mean the end of our still weak, yet being born, democracy.”^[20] The natural counter, of course, was to vote for a non-communist party. To advocate for themselves as non-communist parties, the KDS campaigned on the martyrdom of its political forefathers who opposed communism during the 1970s, and the OF campaigned on the platform that its leaders were the ones who had overthrown communism in the Velvet Revolution.

However, even these mainstream parties were still dogged by the fact that some of their leaders had held, even briefly at local levels, some affiliation with the Communist Party. In a strike against both the communist regime and their contemporary foes, Miroslav Sladek’s SPR-RSČ proclaimed to voters that “Republicans are not burdened with past and cooperation with the KSČ, they are the only guarantee of freedom and democracy, and they can defend your interests.”^[21] Despite other illiberal statements, the SPR-RSČ was still fundamentally a democratic party. Whether or not the mainstream parties would include them among their number is a separate issue, but the SPR-RSČ pushed themselves forward as a truly democratic, committed anti-communist party.^[22] Other parties recognized the poor political optics of having members with a communist past involved in a democratic future. The process of preventing said members from taking public office, known as lustration, came up in the debate about the democratic future of Czechoslovakia.^[23] In a statement typical of the era, Jan Chudomel of the Civic Movement (Občanské hnutí) argued that both legal and political routes needed to be traversed in order to deal with the issue of lustration: “It is necessary to condemn all individuals to whom we can blame. However, we think it is an illusion to think that we can deal with the past by law or by some administrative decision.”^[24] The law, after all, had been monopolized by the communist regime. Under the democratic state, the basic laws were promulgated within a few months. However, it takes time for the legal institutions of any new regime to take root in the minds of the public and of politicians, and Czechoslovakia was no different. There were also invocations of the last, failed effort to establish Czechoslovak democracy after the Second World War, such as an OF pamphlet written by Miloš Zeman: “The Communist Party, after three years, took absolute power and did not intend to deal with any of the other domestic political forces. It follows that [the party] also bears full responsibility for what’s been going on for another forty years in the country.”^[25] Zeman is making three points here. First, he implies the law was no barrier to the last communist rise and would be no barrier to another. Second, he makes a point against a political rival. Third, and most importantly, Zeman highlights the monopolization of power by the Communist Party on the political level, subduing dissent and opposition. When viewed in conjunction with the concerns surrounding lustration and individual connections of party members to the past regime, as the OH and SPR-RSČ emphasized, one may ask how these characteristics came to be the defining traits when politicians were denouncing the anti-democratic nature of the prior regime. The answer lies in the same place: the intensely elite nature of the communist regime, in which a small group of individuals wielded the entirety of the party’s power.

Anti-Elitism

Non-communist parties seized upon the prior regime’s elite character as a central point of criticism, and won political points by invoking the memories of the bygone communist structures and the harm they did to the public’s trust of the state and political engagement. Under the communist regime, political power was highly centralized, and the same cadre of people controlled every party and state function. As Miloš Zeman wrote, the regime’s elites did not allow much dissent, especially not during the post-Prague Spring normalization or by any other organized political parties. According to this interpretation of history, the elites were shut off from the rest of society, only debating amongst themselves to make political decisions and only communicating to the outside world when it was politically expedient. Orthodox communists may have disagreed with this interpretation and argued along traditional ideological lines that strong central control was needed in an economically unstable, ethnically fractured state which ideologically required significant central planning. They may have also disagreed with the characterization of the central leaders as elites, and rather cast those leaders as public servants, in the same way that a democrat might.

However, the dominant view amongst non-communist parties was that these Communist political leaders were elites disconnected from their subjects and exercised their power in ways detrimental to Czech society. From the very beginning, the Civic Forum argued that communism was an ideology that inherently promoted elite structures: “The Communists’ objective, as shown by Marx’s teachings, is the violent takeover of power and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has always been in fact a dictatorship of a narrow ruling Communist Party, a dictatorship directed against all, including the proletariat.”^[26] Marxism-Leninism was grounded in the idea of a vanguard to lead the revolution, but the Civic Forum ultimately overstated the proletarian nature of Marx’s own teachings. Regardless, Czechs and Slovaks recalling their experience under communism would not distinguish between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, and so the OF had no need to do so, either. The notion of “dictatorship of the proletariat” is relevant because it invokes another negative memory: the Soviet Union’s dictatorship and its dominance over Czechoslovak politics. Another operative concept is a dictatorship “directed against” the proletariat. This “elite” antagonism towards “the people” is a crucial component of populist rhetoric, because it serves the larger populist message that “the people” are not properly represented or listened to. In this manner, the OF cast the communist elites against the people living under the regime, and thus established, in one small way, the “elite” versus “people” paradigm of populist rhetoric.

Some of the OF’s members echoed the overall party line, but others added their own perspectives that strayed from the party’s typical stance. Miloš Zeman took slight turns in his own rhetoric that are suggestive of the populist rhetoric he would later employ as President of the Czech Republic. As he wrote in 1990 for an OF pamphlet, “The system of uncontrolled power without feedback leads to the general degeneration of political culture, to the extinction of political personalities of interest.”^[27] Zeman adopted the OF line to the extent that he characterized the past regime as one of “uncontrolled power” that was a “degeneration” of a political culture, meaning interwar Czechoslovak democracy. However, Zeman’s choice of words suggests that the personalities of interest, meaning political figures with ties to both the public and the government, were, in fact, beneficial. As such, Zeman argued the self-sequestration of elites under the communist regime was fundamentally harmful to the people at-large. Since the previous regime’s power had gone unchecked, the subsequent system of government necessitated checking power by creating a “feedback” relationship between the politicians and their constituents in such a way that leaders were bound to serve the people rather than themselves. For the Civic Forum, the only option capable of meeting this criterion was a representative democracy. Thus, Zeman simultaneously advanced the OF’s chief rhetorical goal of promoting a democracy in light of an undemocratic past while also constructing a framework to support “political personalities of interest.” As one of those personalities, Zeman later could and would take advantage of this framework. Regardless of Zeman’s own future ambitions, though, his characterization of the communist regime as lacking “tangled bonds” was resonant for other parties in the early 1990s.

Other politicians critical of the communist regime’s elitism focused their attacks on the lack of engagement with the populace. This lack of “tangled bonds” was a common theme in the context of contemporary political struggles. When discussing the rough first few years of democratic growth in Czechoslovakia, Václav Klaus was particularly keen to link the lagging areas of contemporary development to the harms inflicted by the past regime. In the context of a discussion on political decision-making and the struggle of politicians to balance party and public, he characterized the communist leaders and “intellectuals” as possessing a “‘central’ reasoning” and as “a group of people who have acquired the feeling of total decision-making freedom.”^[28] In other words, politicians felt as though they were always right, and did not feel bound in their decision-making capacity by the people they claimed to represent. Klaus’s frequently stated dislike of communist central planning manifested itself in a more generalized anti-elite sentiment in the post-communist period. “Intellectuals” in this context is an anti-elite term because of the implication that intellectuals are removed from the people and popular concerns. Klaus further frames this anti-elite sentiment both in the historical and social context, advocating for a “government for the citizen” and for the restoration of the “most precious social values.”^[29] This directly contrasts the model of communist leadership, thus setting Klaus up as a consummate anti-communist democrat. Nevertheless, not every party took the opportunity to portray itself as the sole perfect solution to the democratic ills of the country.

The Christian Democratic Party took a less individual, but still bombastic, approach to the issue. The KDS had a small, devoted base of conservative Christians, and constantly sought to expand its potential electorate without deviating too far from its Christian principles. The party railed against the communist regime, and in its 1992 electoral program referred to the regime’s political and economic system as “absurd” because it was completely self-contained and did not engage in any dialogue with subsidiary components of the system.^[30] Their main point of contention similarly targeted the lack of “tangled bonds” which Zeman had referred to two years prior. The lack of bonds between leaders and subjects created a small, elite-centered incentive system, which in turn had deleterious effects on democratization because there were too few people sufficiently equipped to hold the high offices of the country. The KDS thus urged voters to exercise caution when considering the development of a new political elite in post-communist Czechoslovakia. Implicitly, this was a point in favor of the KDS, which consistently portrayed itself as a sensible, honorable party with a long history of opposing communism and many ties to the people.^[31] The KDS’s strategy stood in contrast to Klaus and his political vehicle of the ODS, who were more outspoken about their own fitness for a ‘democratic rebuilder’ role. In spite of these differences, both parties spoke the same language regarding the deficiencies of the past.

A range of parties acknowledged that the main task in building a post-communist democratic society was repairing the “tangled bonds” first established between voters and their representatives during the interwar First Republic, but these parties also expressed concerns about potential weaknesses in the rebuilding process. The KDS engaged in a theoretical exposition on the subject, arguing that the institutionalization of “self-governing structures” was ultimately the right path, with a “natural involvement of the individual” in the system serving to “effectively [prevent] the emergence of monopolized structures of power.”^[32] The KDS was advocating for a balance between the individual and the structures of power. The rhetoric utilized to describe those structures of power, such as “monopolized,” however, could easily be deployed in more anti-elite rhetoric as well; the elite monopolization of power necessarily means that “the people” do not have that power, which plays into the hands of politicians using populist rhetoric.

Although this may not have been the intention of the program, it certainly left the door open for such applications. So, while parties agreed that the main task of building a democracy was to build confidence, or bonds, between the voters and the representative, they had to confront another rhetorical challenge: what would happen if one of the sides of the “tangled bonds,” either voter or politician, did not trust the other? The answer was that politicians would take advantage of the voters.

In early 1990, the Civic Forum posited that the threat to democratization in Czechoslovakia would come from politicians failing to properly engage with voters, prompting parties across the political spectrum to attempt to engage voters with rhetoric that drew on the memory of communist elitism and its relation to the present danger of contemporary politics. In December 1989, the OF laid out an aspirational goal for what voters should look for in a leader, including the “trust” and “confidence” required to rebuild bonds between voters and leaders, but with provisions for a voter’s “admiration… anger, and annoyance.”^[33] Ultimately, though, the OF promulgated a cautious message, saying that while the public and honest politicians (including themselves in this category) were working to build a democracy, “We can be threatened both from the outside and from the inside.”^[34] To some extent, this is not a surprise. Emerging from decades of authoritarian leader-driven politics, including Nazism and communism, the Czechoslovak people were naturally skeptical of individuals who claimed political leadership after the fall of communism. Voters in 1990 tangibly felt the weight of their country’s long and complicated history: some harmful leaders had come from outside and imposed themselves, such as Rudolf Heydrich, the Nazi Reichsprotektor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, while others had come from within to betray their people, such as Klement Gottwald, who led the 1948 coup that signaled the beginning of forty years of communist domination. Yet neither case is cut and dry as “outside” or “inside” political players, as Heydrich had domestic collaborators, and Gottwald received significant aid from the Soviet Union. With these grim memories at the forefront of the Czechoslovak voter’s mind, the OF set out an optimistic path, winding through the dark forests of Czech history to a brighter, democratic future. However, this prompts another question: presuming that voters’ memories would lead them to be on the lookout for unscrupulous politicians, why were politicians able to threaten the voters? Wouldn’t the voters be able to pre-empt and monitor such politicians? The answer, according to parties in the first few years of democratization at least, was no: voters did not have the capacity to keep their politicians in check because the communist regime had harmed them and their Czechoslovak society.

Addressing a Broken Society

Parties from across the political spectrum argued that the communist system had broken Czechoslovak society to such an extent that the people could not properly hold their politicians accountable and prevent them from acquiring too much power. The OF argued that the destruction of the Czechoslovak citizen began with the core conceit of the communist regime. In the context of a pamphlet urging laborers to protest on International Workers’ Day, May 1, the party charged that the Communists had abandoned their working-class roots and cared little for the common man, forcing injured workers to the “periphery” of the workforce without compensation.^[35] The publishers of this pamphlet wanted to motivate workers to continue their anti-elite fight on International Labor Day, and the best way to do so was through utilizing the past, rather than the present. In a pamphlet written for the OF around the same time, Miloš Zeman cautioned that the present process would be a slow one because the injustices of the past are hard to overcome: “For forty years, we have been trained to behave normally [according to communist rules], and it is not to be expected that adopting new rules of behavior will take place and painlessly.”^[36] Together, the two OF arguments say that communism fundamentally changed the way society functioned and the relationships of individuals. Ondřej Matejka of the Prague-based Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes remarked that “the danger for democracy and freedom in our country is more in the habitus we have inherited from the communist regime.”^[37] In other words, the common people were so neglected under communism, and so unable to change their disenfranchised status until the Velvet Revolution, that they had retained much of their inherent disposition, or habitus, from the communist era. This theme, that these peripheral laborers, people “trained” to behave normally, would be unable to maintain and defend democratic government from power-hungry politicians, was central to the rhetoric that the Civic Forum set out in early 1990.

The Christian Democrats echoed the Civic Forum’s rhetoric in their own campaigning, though with more provocative wording befitting their electoral base. The main problem as the KDS put it was an “atomized society after 40 years of communist totality.”^[38] The KDS viewed its role as bonding those atoms together, a process they initiated through the incorporation of historical rhetoric: “We are obliged to decipher a deeper understanding of how oppression, lies, and fear associated with the communist totality have destroyed everything human.”^[39] This dramatic rhetoric was intended to attract the attention of voters, and perhaps to provoke them to consider the injustices of the communist regime. To invoke the voter’s humanity is a strategy to invoke their sense of self-worth, thereby potentially making the voter perceive the party more positively. The KDS hoped that the voters would conclude that drastic change was necessary to handle a drastic situation, and thus would vote for the KDS to accomplish that change. However, the KDS’s approach that distinguished leaders and voters as two separate entities was not a popular approach amongst other parties.

The ODS agreed that the national habitus needed repair, but framed their vision for the rebuilding process in inclusive terms that portrayed the ODS as a party of the common man, which in turn established a template for future populist appeals. Like the KDS, their argument had a historical basis, saying, “Yes, we have to deal with our past,” but the immediate political and legal applications of dealing with the past, such as lustration and releasing prisoners wrongfully convicted under the communist legal system, were of less importance overall.^[40] Rather, as Václav Klaus argued on behalf of his party, “The most complex is the eradication of Bolshevism in us, the eradication of the habits and the comfort of communism, collectivism and irresponsibility, a process that is far more difficult than several… processes and laws.”^[41] According to Klaus, dealing with the past would only work by engaging society and individuals, and it could not be handled at just the political level. This view informed his politics and led to his use of rhetoric that shifted the emphasis away from political leaders and toward the collective task of the people. Klaus very much saw himself as a part of this collective task, using “we” as the operative subject dealing with “our past” and the “Bolshevism in us.” Klaus’s message reaffirmed that the ODS was a part of the people and shared their experiences and concerns. Thus, even though they said dealing with the past cannot solely be a political process, Klaus and the ODS turned it into one. This was a critical part of the political strategy of the party, which recognized that the average voter was not going to have their voice automatically injected into the national conversation, and so in response the ODS framed itself as the means for the people to have their “own chance.”^[42] This positioned Klaus to be the person to carry the voter’s “chance” to the national stage, and for the ODS to be able to stand up and, per their own rhetoric, claim to be speaking truthfully on behalf of the people. This stands in contrast to the KDS’s more provocative rhetoric about both history and the role of leaders, but at the roots  of their rhetoric, the KDS and OF are still similar.

The ODS and KDS both agreed upon the systemic problem at hand set out by the OF in 1990: the people’s spirits have been broken down and that was dangerous not only for them but for the system as a whole. The OF had developed that rhetoric while it was still the big tent, relatively apolitical party of the revolution, but quickly had to come up with a corresponding electoral strategy as it transitioned to being a political party contesting an election. Miloš Zeman described the basis of this new strategy in March 1990: “We therefore appeal to the self-esteem of each of us, not to the humiliation that has long been cultivated in us.”^[43] This was a fairly simple strategy: appeal to peoples’ idealized selves, and tell them that the OF values these idealized selves. This is a different type of messaging from the KDS’s separation of leaders and voters and the ODS’s call to collective action; the OF was distinguished from the latter because the ODS framed the process in negative terms, e.g. the “eradication” of Bolshevism, whereas the OF framed it in positive ones, e.g. an “appeal to the self-esteem.” All three parties, though, recognized the need for some sort of popular action. Regardless of the nature of the balance they sought to strike between voter and representative, they agreed a balance needed to exist. But even as their lofty political goals aligned, the question remained how those goals would be achieved and how politicians would take advantage of the fractured society. The answer begins with the “appeal to self-esteem.”

The non-communist political establishment predicted a nationalist incursion into the nascent democratic system because voters’ desires for a sense of purpose and worth could be fulfilled by nationalism. These non-communist parties had established early on that the individual spirit had been bruised and battered under a communist regime that shunted the people off to the side in favor of an elite political system. The KDS came to the conclusion that such a battered individual would be in no position to resist an attractive candidate who would convince the voter to renounce “their individual veil in favor of some personality or in the spirit of skillfully manipulated group interests (local, social, professional, religious, national, etc.)… [There is] only a single functional way: one movement and one leader. Thus, to the corporative, authoritative state of the Franco-Spanish or Mussolini Italy. The process… inevitably leads to the end of democracy.”^[44] This call back to two fascist regimes served as a clear reminder; the KDS wanted its voters to understand that the newborn democratic system could slide back to the authoritarian depths from which it came. The logic was that any reasonable voter would hear this appeal and turn up their nose at any politician seeking to “manipulate” group interests. But this logic is not complete, and not fully fleshed out considering the circumstances of the day. As expressed by the ODS, “people are looking for a group to associate them on the basis of shared characteristics – language, customs, traditions, historical experience – and this is a good reason for the rise of nationalism.”^[45] This draws yet another contrast with the KDS, as the ODS portrayed the nationalist decision as understandable given the context of forty years of communist rule, whereas the KDS fundamentally believed the people were good liberal, individualistic citizens who has just been harmed, and once recovered, they would reject nationalism. The Communist Party ultimately bet on a nationalist approach similar to that which the ODS had described.

The Communist Party’s support for nationalism provoked other parties to both denounce the Communists and then position themselves as distinctly opposed to the now-tinged nationalist rhetoric. The KSČ attempted to adopt a wide range of strategies in the few years immediately following the fall of the prior regime. One strategy which won the favor of party leadership was the national unity strategy, described as follows: “We are committed to bringing together patriotism, a feeling of national pride, common interest, and a concern for the better future of the country. We are in favor of developing the national identity.”^[46] At first glance, this seems to be in opposition to traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which de-emphasizes the role of nations in favor of emphasizing class struggle as the primary driver of society’s ills. In practice, though, there was some leniency during the communist regime for expressions of national goodwill, so the KSČ’s position was not historically baseless. The national strategy was their replacement for communism’s role as a governing ideology in people’s lives; for those voters who felt that communism gave them a sense of unity, the KSČ hoped they would feel the same about national unity in a democratic system.

Referring to the mainstream parties’ predictions of voter behavior, the KDS was proved wrong. Not all voters rejected the KSČ’s nationalist message, whereas the ODS’s position was somewhat validated. Writing in 1992, Václav Klaus struck an assured tone: “people have always tried to get followers by playing on the strings of their national sentiment… Sometimes the left-wing politicians use it, almost at regular intervals, at a time when they feel that national demagogy can get more sympathy than social demagogy.”^[47] Klaus criticized not only the communists, but also the left wing, more broadly speaking, as being unprincipled and prone to destructive nationalist thought. He was confident that this “national demagogy” was nothing more than a tactic to be deployed at will. More piercing than just his basic dismissal of nationalist leaders, however, was Klaus’s explanation for why precisely, in his democratic worldview, the communists could not employ nationalist rhetoric:

Different socialist thinkers are trying to redefine socialism and give it a whole new, uncompromising sense, but it seems they will not succeed. They had to make sense of the people to erase the experiences of several decades, they would have to find a new Marx, someone who would… once again convince romantic dreamers among the intellectuals that it is possible for the state to organize our lives better than how we are able to organize ourselves.^[48]

Here, Klaus linked the re-establishment of socialism with the erasure of memory. By neglecting to clearly define socialism, Klaus could apply this rhetoric to a wide variety of left-wing parties, ascribing to them a great sin: disrespecting the memory of the Czech people. He also incorporated anti-elite rhetoric by saying that only “romantic dreamers among the intellectuals” would buy the new iterations of socialist thinking and thus ignore the “experiences of several decades,” which were presumably those of “ourselves,” meaning the common man, including Klaus himself. As such, Klaus wielded historical memory as a tool to forward a populist outlook on the present and future of Czech politics. The core of his rejection of the post-Velvet Revolution KSČ lay in his own memory and his belief that many voters felt the same way he did. Not only the political mainstream attacked the KSČ’s newfound nationalism, however, as the far-right Republican Party also took issue with the communist rhetoric of national unity.

The SPR-RSČ attacked the KSČ along similar lines as the ODS, focusing on the history of communist rule and the insincerity of the sudden rhetorical shift. The SPR-RSČ naturally wanted to promote a republican view of government and hung its hat on comparing communism to republicanism. It characterized communism as a fraudulent ideology, going so far as to ask of communist voters, “Are they people who do not want to admit their life misconceptions, or real supporters of fraudulent ideology?”^[49] At face value, one might say that the SPR-RSČ believed there was no ‘understandable’ nationalism in the same way that Klaus might posit. In fact, the SPR-RSČ engaged in nationalist rhetoric at many points, so their issue with the KSČ was twofold. First, the SPR-RSČ disdained the lack of respect that KSČ supporters had for their own memories. This is because the SPR-RSČ wanted to communicate to its potential voters that their memories would be respected and elevated in the political discourse. Second, the “fraudulent ideology” of the KSČ was similar to how Klaus derogatorily discussed an attempt to “redefine socialism.” The SPR-RSČ and ODS alike painted the KSČ as swindlers, liars, and opportunists, characteristics which they hoped would send voters into their arms and away from the communists. The SPR-RSČ, ODS, OF, and KDS all firmly opposed the KSČ and its political strategy in the new democratic Czechoslovakia, focusing their criticisms on the KSČ’s lack of respect for the people’s memories and belief that the KSČ policy of national unity was not constructive for rebuilding a strong Czechoslovak democracy. Because the non-communist parties were unified against explicitly nationalist rhetoric, they each had to present their own distinct rhetorical alternative that would simultaneously reach out to the people through an “appeal to self-esteem” and re-establish the “tangled bonds” that would limit the government and thus new elite formation.

Solutions within a Democracy

The non-communist parties sought to promote themselves as honorable and relatable, and emphasized their solidarity with their voter base rather than a broader national unity with all Czechs or Slovaks. Prior to the 1992 elections, Václav Klaus opined that, despite his less-than-stellar confidence in the success of the country’s future democratization, he still trusted that some political actors would be more successful than others: “it will not be ambitious, nationalist slogans of the desperate politicians (ohánějící politikové) who say the last word, but the thoughtful and pragmatic thinkers.”^[50] Klaus contrasted “desperate politicians,” a way to disparage elites, with “pragmatic thinkers,” a category in which he implicitly put himself. He thus situated himself as a man of the people ready to fight against the worst tendencies of those politicians. Klaus’s more general sentiment of “thoughtful and pragmatic thinkers” proves to be informative when analyzing other parties’ rhetoric; through their campaign materials, they each answer what it means to be “thoughtful and pragmatic.”

The Civic Forum portrayed itself as a practical party that sought to unite the people under a shared mission to build a better society. They prefaced some of their more negative rhetoric by reminding voters that they were the ones who had “stood at the head” of the revolution.^[51] This was a way to remind voters of their leadership credentials and hopefully make the party’s pessimistic program more palatable. The program did not pull punches, saying “the current state of our house is therefore bleak,” but also responded to this harsh truth directly: “the electoral program of the Civic Forum is primarily a rescue program for the house.”^[52] Such rhetoric framed the task of democratization as a mutual struggle to be shared by the party and its voters. The OF wanted to emphasize that they, too, lived through communism, and shared the same experiences as the voting public. One experience they highlighted was that of the common laborer under communism: “Millions of people have worked honestly, but their work has often been falsified in absurd jokes, ruining our birthplace.”^[53] With this proclamation, the OF sought to capture voters on two counts: the “falsification” of experience, and the invocation of the shared past, as in “our birthplace.” Regarding the falsification of experience, the party recognized that its voters deserved to be acknowledged for their work in a way that they weren’t previously, and by bringing light to this injustice, the OF implied their own ability to correct it. Regarding the shared past, such rhetoric created a strong sense of belonging and togetherness, in addition to the OF’s unique position as being the party of the revolution. Despite all of the historical motivation and popular rhetoric, the OF understood its “rescue program” might not be popular amongst voters, and so pre-empted a backlash: “We are aware that the willingness of the victims is not very popular in the electoral program and that the formulation of this goal can be abused in the electoral struggle by those who have caused our shameful lag behind the advanced world.”^[54] This is indicative of a key political point, as the OF characterized its political opponents as opportunists who hindered the country’s democratization. In this sense, the OF appealed to the desire of the Czechoslovak people to move away from communism and back into the community of democratic states. It is simultaneously a popular and anti-elite argument, but in such a way that built off of the OF’s rhetorical strength as the party of the revolution. The OF was thus both thoughtful and pragmatic with this approach, which incorporated an understanding of challenges facing the party on both policy and political fronts, but also was pragmatic for the sake of its own political gains. As the OF predicted, though, other parties would be quick to decry its outlook.

Despite being a successor party of the Civic Forum, the ODS was quick to criticize the OF’s rhetoric as being elitist and insufficiently conscious both of history and of contemporary popular sentiment. Writing in 1992, Václav Klaus remarked that political parties had a duty to fight on behalf of their voters, but some parties were less suited to do so than others: “Elite clubs… can not fulfill this task. They can not get people “down” for such a program.”^[55] Klaus attributed this to a chief weakness: “The lack of respect for historical experience, continuity and tradition.”^[56] This was a direct repudiation of the Civic Forum’s effort to build support by energizing voters to vote for a program. In the abstract realm, away from policy, Klaus was also setting up an important anti-elite rhetorical construct by describing the former OF politicians as belonging to “elite clubs.” This harkens back to the concern about the “uncontrolled power without tangled bonds,” in other words the elite club of the communist regime. So, when Klaus slammed “the lack of respect for historical experience,” he was attempting to refocus the historical debate away from the OF’s leadership role in the Velvet Revolution, and toward the character of its leadership. Embedded in this was the implication that the ODS was not an elite club, because to be an elite club would be disrespectful of “historical experience, continuity and tradition,” and for Klaus, that disrespect was a most foul crime. He wanted voters to believe the same thing about the ODS that the OF wanted its voters to believe: that our party is comprised of people just like you, who understand your historical experience and who will fight for you. This thoughtful and pragmatic end goal was shared by parties outside of the political mainstream, namely the SPR-RSČ, even if the means to reach that end were different.

The SPR-RSČ used flamboyant rhetoric to emphasize its comprehension of contemporary dynamics between the elite and the people. Underlying most SPR-RSČ rhetoric was a recognition of the importance of the past, and the “honor” of the people to speak openly of their memories.^[57] Accompanying this, however, were drastic statements about the harm done to the people under the communist regime, and how it had not ended when the regime left. A few months after the Velvet Revolution, the SPR-RSČ insisted that “The public is perfectly emotionally and intellectually manipulated. All the means of this psychotechnical manipulation are concentrated in the hands of a narrow group of internationals.”^[58] The word “internationals” in this context is code for the elite who worked against the people from abroad. This evokes the communist era, when Moscow pulled strings in Prague. Encompassed within this argument are domestic collaborators as well, implied to be the SPR-RSČ’s political opponents. The SPR-RSČ warned voters that the other parties may not be as tame as they seem, and not genuinely concerned with, or ingrained in, the public consciousness. The SPR-RSČ’s positive message, to accompany this doom and gloom, took on a revolutionary, almost philosophical tone: “The only real danger to the government is free and brave citizens, morally autonomous, powerful and independent people… Our people have forgotten that freedom must not be left before life, for living without it is mere shame.”^[59] The SPR-RSČ engaged in the “appeal to the self-esteem” that Miloš Zeman set out as the task of all political parties at the time, in advance of the 1990 elections. The SPR-RSČ characterized the people as powerful, and reminded them that their power must be put to good use, lest freedom “be left before life” as it was under the communist regime. “Our people” evoked the sense of camaraderie that other parties also desired, and suggested that the SPR-RSČ also recognized the value of aligning their personage, and thereby their goals, with voters. In this sense, the SPR-RSČ was not much different from the ODS or OF: all portrayed themselves as parties of the people, standing with their voters rather than being aloof leaders. After all, nobody wanted to be accused of being an elite.

Conclusion

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of an oppressive communist regime, Czechoslovak parties and politicians sought to win support by using history and historical memory to construct populist rhetoric. This rhetoric appealed to voters’ dissatisfactions with the communist regime’s elitism and destruction of Czechoslovak society. The post-communist parties responded accordingly, on the former issue deploying anti-elite rhetoric, and on the latter issue advocating for the reconstruction of “the people” as a unit. These two rhetorical tools, “the people” and “the elite,” define populist rhetoric, then and now.

On the basis of painful historical memories, the non-communist parties rejected attempts of the Communist Party both to stake a place in the democratic system, and to introduce explicitly nationalist rhetoric into political debates. The non-communists debated fiercely about what non-nationalist path should be taken, but all converged on the same principle of “thoughtful and pragmatic” popular representation. This was deployed in a variety of fashions, with the Civic Forum proclaiming a big tent to face the practical problems of the era, the Christian Democrats seeking to lead the people based on a shared set of values, the Civic Democrats pushing a policy agenda forward from a place amongst the people, and the Republicans riling up their voters with fervent rhetoric in order to stand out.

Partisan ideological differentiation in the Czech Republic has become richer over the years, and so has the overt presence of populists in Czech politics. These populists include the current President, Miloš Zeman, the very same who was a loyal member of the Civic Forum, and Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš, a political outsider. While some analyses seek to explain their success, and the success of other populists in the region, as a new phenomenon, this paper has sought to show that their success is merely building on a long rhetorical tradition. The focus of their messages change, perhaps corruption one year and immigration the next, but the framework that undergirds their appeal has a long history. In order to best understand the present, we must understand the past, and in order to best advocate for the future we want, regardless of ideology or tactics, we ought to educate ourselves on what successful rhetoric looks like.

Bibliography

“1. Máj 1990. Jak Dál?.” 6 April 1990. Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

Benda, Václav. Public letter. 1992. Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

Bernhard, Michael and Jan Kubik, editors. Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Blacker, Uilleam and Alexander Etkind. “Introduction.” In Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe, edited by Uilleam Blacker, Alexander Etkind, and Julie Fedor, 9. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Chloupek, Jaroslav. “Člověk a Komunismus, Ideologie a Skutečnost.” Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.

Chudomel, Jan. Interview. 20 May 1992. Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives.

Civic Forum pamphlet. Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.

“Co by nás mohlo demoralizovat.” 15 December 1989. Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

David, Roman. Lustration and Transitional Justice: Personnel Systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.

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Garton Ash, Timothy. “The Revolution of the Magic Lantern.” The New York Review of Books. January 18, 1990. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/01/18/the-revolution-of-the-magic-lantern/.

Heimann, Mary. Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed. Yale University Press, 2009.

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Hoffman, Ivan. “Report of the Soft Revolution.” Czech subject collection, Box 8, Folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives.

Klaus, Václav. Proč jsem optimista? 1992. Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives.

Klaus, Václav. Interview. První Zprava. Czech subject collection, Box 9, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 68.

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Mudde, Cas. “The populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39 (2004): 541-563.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Joshua A. Tucker, editors. Communism’s Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes. Princeton University Press, 2017.

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Roubal, Petr. “Anti-Communism of the Future: Czech Post-Dissident Neoconservatives in Post-Communist Transformation.” In Thinking through Transition, edited by Michal Kopeček and Piotr Wciślik, 171-200. New York: Central European University Press, 2015.

Šenkyřík, Ladislav. “Od totality k demokracii.” 4 May 1990. Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.

Snyder, Timothy. Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. London: Basic Books, 2010.

Ther, Philipp. Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten. “Ethnische Säuberungen” im modernen Europa. Göttingen: Vanderhoek and Ruprecht, 2011.

Volby 1990. Czech subject collection, Box 15, folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 9.

“Žďárský Program.” 1992. Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 14.

Zeman, Miloš. “Přijmout Odpovědnost za Vlastní Budoucnost.” 2 March 1990. Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 1.

Endnotes

^[1] Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 3.

^[2] Cas Mudde, “The populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39 (2004), 541-563.

^[3] Katherine Hite, “Historical Memory,” International Encyclopedia of Political Science, edited by Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412959636.n251.

^[4] Uilleam Blacker and Alexander Etkind, “Introduction,” in Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe, eds. Uilleam Blacker, Alexander Etkind, and Julie Fedor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 9.

^[5] Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, editors, Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration (Oxford UP, 2014). Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker, editors, Communism’s Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes (Princeton UP, 2017).

^[6] Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (London: Basic Books, 2010). Philipp Ther, Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten. “Ethnische Säuberungen” im modernen Europa (Göttingen: Vanderhoek and Ruprecht, 2011).

^[7] James Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2013).

^[8] Petr Roubal, “Anti-Communism of the Future: Czech Post-Dissident Neoconservatives in Post-Communist Transformation,” in Thinking through Transition, eds. Michal Kopeček and Piotr Wciślik (New York: Central European University Press, 2015), 171-200.

^[9] James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2010).

^[10] Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed (Yale University Press, 2009).

^[11] Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed (Yale University Press, 2009).

^[12] Timothy Garton Ash, “The Revolution of the Magic Lantern,” The New York Review of Books, January 18, 1990, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/01/18/the-revolution-of-the-magic-lantern/.

^[13] Ladislav Šenkyřík, “Od totality k demokracii,” 4 May 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California. Page 2. Note on archival citations: I follow the requirement of the Hoover Archives to identify the item, collection, and box, and when possible add other information in the format of this footnote. Translations are by the author with the assistance of online machine translation, and by professional translators. Miloš Zeman, “Přijmout Odpovědnost za Vlastní Budoucnost,” 2 March 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 1.

^[14] Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 5.

^[15] “Průvodce: Volebním Programem KSČ,” Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 4, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 1.

^[16] Ivan Hoffman, “Report of the Soft Revolution,” Czech subject collection, Box 8, Folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives. The speech in question was delivered in Bratislava on November 23, 1989. Page 41.

^[17] Civic Forum pamphlet, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.

^[18] Jaroslav Chloupek, “Člověk a Komunismus, Ideologie a Skutečnost,” Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.

^[19] Václav Benda, public letter, 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

^[20] Jaroslav Chloupek, “Člověk a Komunismus, Ideologie a Skutečnost,” Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.

^[21] Volby 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 15, folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 9.

^[22] Smer, the ruling party in Slovakia, was founded on a similar principle: no former communists allowed.

^[23] Roman David, Lustration and Transitional Justice: Personnel Systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

^[24] Jan Chudomel, Interview, 20 May 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives.

^[25] Miloš Zeman, “Přijmout Odpovědnost za Vlastní Budoucnost,” 2 March 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 1.

^[26] Jaroslav Chloupek, “Člověk a Komunismus, Ideologie a Skutečnost,” Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 1.

^[27] Miloš Zeman, “Přijmout Odpovědnost za Vlastní Budoucnost,” 2 March 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 1.

^[28] Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 7.

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] “Žďárský Program,” 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 14.

^[31] Ibid., page 4.

^[32] Ibid., page 10.

^[33] “Co by nás mohlo demoralizovat,” 15 December 1989, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. The article is on page 3 of a longer pamphlet.

^[34] Ibid. The statement also seems incredibly prescient three decades down the road, as in the search for good leaders threats can come from anywhere. This can be interpreted to mean both future populists coming from positions within politics, like Miloš Zeman, and from outside of politics entirely, like Andrej Babiš.

^[35] “1. Máj 1990. Jak Dál?,” 6 April 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.

^[36] Miloš Zeman, “Přijmout Odpovědnost za Vlastní Budoucnost,” 2 March 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 3.

^[37] Ondřej Matejka, interview with author, July 24, 2018, Prague.

^[38] Václav Benda, public letter, 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

^[39] Ibid., page 11.

^[40] Václav Klaus, Interview, První Zprava, Czech subject collection, Box 9, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 68.

^[41] Ibid.

^[42] Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 14.

^[43] Miloš Zeman, “Přijmout Odpovědnost za Vlastní Budoucnost,” 2 March 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 6.

^[44] “Žďárský Program,” 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 12.

^[45] Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 23.

^[46] “Průvodce: Volebním Programem KSČ,” Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 4, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.

^[47] Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 30.

^[48] Ibid., page 11.

^[49] “Dnešek: pravicový opoziční list,” July 1991, Czech subject collection, Box 8, Folder 4, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 14.

^[50] Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 14.

^[51] Miloš Zeman, “Přijmout Odpovědnost za Vlastní Budoucnost,” 2 March 1990, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 3.

^[52] Ibid., page 2.

^[53] Ibid., page 1.

^[54] Ibid., page 3.

^[55] Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 32.

^[56] Ibid.

^[57] “Dnešek: pravicový opoziční list,” July 1991, Czech subject collection, Box 8, Folder 4, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 14.

^[58] Ibid., page 6.

^[59] Ibid.

Written by Maegan Liew Chew Min

Introduction

In The Republic, Plato likened auxiliaries to watch-dogs, and warned of them turning into wolves that turn upon the sheep they are meant to guard. Indeed, military intervention in politics has been a long-standing concern among philosophers, political scientists and state leaders alike^[1]. The intervention of the military in politics, most notably in the form of a coup^[2], is regarded as a threat to be guarded against. However, there exists a largely neglected phenomenon within the literature: the democratic coup d’etat^[3], which seeks to facilitate civilian rule.

This neglect illuminates a wider paradigm in the study of Civil-Military Relations (CMR): the traditional coup model, with its extensive empirical occurrence, has become paradigmatic of how military intervention has been analysed in the field. This suggests an implicit assumption that military coups necessarily culminate in military rule under military government/dictatorship (Varol 2012).

By studying the research question of ‘Why does the military stay in power after coups?’, this paper seeks to overcome the skewed nature of the field by rejecting the conflation of military coups with military rule. In identifying the factors that are instrumental in delineating a ‘democratic coup’ that is followed by democratic elections from a ‘military coup’ that is followed by military rule, the focus of the study is re-oriented from the study of coups to the identification of the causal factors explaining why the military stays in power after coups, in the form of military rule. This paper posits that a strong civil society, or the absence thereof, has significant implications for post-coup developments and the establishment of military rule.

This paper begins by providing an overview of existing literature on the causes of military intervention in politics. My hypothesis is then introduced to address the gap in existing literature. The paper takes an actor-based approach in analysing alternative explanations. By showing that these alternative factors remain constant across traditional and democratic coups, I argue that the presence or absence of a strong civil society has a causal effect on the establishment of military rule after coups.

Literature Review

The study of CMR can be generally split into two paths: the sociologically-oriented study of the military^[4], and the institutionally-oriented examination of post-colonial CMR focusing on coup occurrence in developing states^[5] (Feaver, 1999). While CMR is a broad subject that involves a spectrum of relationships between the military and civilian society at various levels, the field has generally focused on the control of the military by civilian authorities^[6] (Feaver, 1999).

Coups have been the traditional focus of CMR^[7] as they explicitly embody the fundamental problem of the military using its coercive power to displace civilian leaders (Feaver, 1999; Kanchanasuwon, 1989)^[8]. Yet, despite (or perhaps due to) the field’s focus on military coups, there has been a dearth in literature analysing post-coup developments (Marinov&Goemans, 2013). This has translated into a lack of distinction in the literature with regards to the types of military coups and variation in coup outcomes. In particular, the democratic coup has been a neglected phenomenon (Varol, 2012). This paper seeks to add to existing literature by distinguishing traditional coups from democratic coups, in explaining the post-coup development of the military’s continued hold on power. 

There exists vast literature examining the explanatory factors of military intervention in politics. These factors can be differentiated according to whether they are external or internal to a country. They may pertain to structural factors, such as the internal/external threat environment (Desch, 1999), or agential factors, such as the role of international actors and great powers in asserting pressure (Masaki, 2016). Internal agential variables are further differentiated according to the civilian/military distinction^[9] (Huntington 1957, 1968; Finer, 1962; Welch, 1976). In theorising military intervention, however, there has been a lack of reference to the agential role of the people. Schiff (2009) points out that the current CMR literature focuses on political institutions as the main ‘civil’ component of analysis, failing to consider the role of the citizenry^[10]. This paper seeks to contribute to existing literature through the study of the role of the civil society in discouraging military rule.

Civil Society: Theory & Hypothesis

Civil society can generally be defined as sustained, organised social activity, in support of the public good, undertaken by groups formed outside the state, the market, and the family (Tasnim, 2012; Parnini, 2006). Civil society covers a diverse range of activities, from the provision of public goods to advocacy for social reform, which ultimately works towards ensuring political equality, political liberty and popular sovereignty (Huq, 2005).

The drawing of a positive link between civil society and democracy has been a long-standing one (Tasnim, 2012). Huq (2005) operationalised the relationship between civil society and democracy in Fig 1 below.

In particular, civil society is widely deemed to promote democracy by broadening participation among the citizenry (Huq, 2005; Tasnim, 2012). This is not only through the civil society’s provision of channels for the representation of the people – it plays an important role in building confidence and conferring legitimacy to democratic governance. Firstly, civil society acts to monitor and restrain the power of the state, increasing the accountability of the state to the people (Tasnim, 2012). In addition, civil society has been linked to the generation of social capital^[12]. Social capital theory associates dense networks of associations to the generation of trust and cooperation among citizens, sustaining high levels of civic engagement (Newton, 2001). Civil society, with its democracy-building characteristics, may thus influence the occurrence of military rule in two ways.^[13]

First, civil society alters post-coup developments and outcomes.^[14] A strong civil society that cultivates democratic culture and social capital will translate into broad political and civic engagement of citizens that serves to decrease the military’s success in retaining power after coups.^[15]

Second, a strong civil society can exert a socialisation effect on the military, influencing its post-coup policy.^[16] By socialising the military into reflecting its democratic and civic values, a strong civil society influences the military to facilitate post-coup elections and voluntarily subordinate itself to civilian rule.

My Hypothesis is thus as follows: The absence of a strong civil society is likely to lead to the establishment of military rule following a coup.

Methodology

The argument I present is developed in the empirical context of Bangladesh, using a within case comparison design^[17]. Bangladesh presents an interesting case study and an ideal setting for the study of both military intervention in politics and the role of civil society.

Firstly, the Bangladesh political trajectory has been marked by coups and military intervention in politics. Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan following the Liberation War which had not only been a struggle for independence, but also a struggle for democracy (Khondker, 1986). Yet, Bangladesh would find itself following in the footsteps of Pakistan’s military regime with the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, shortly after its hard-fought independence. Amongst numerous coup attempts made against civilian and military regimes alike, the successful coups of 1975 and 1982 led to the rise of the military regimes under General Ziaur Rahmen (1978-1981) and General Ershad (1978-1981) that would define the first few decades of Bangladeshi independence.

It was not until widespread opposition brought down Ershad’s military regime in 1990 that democracy in Bangladesh was restored. However, the competing legacies of democratic inclinations and the legacy of Pakistani military regime would again find themselves in conflict when in 2007, the military-backed caretaker government (CTG)^[18] interrupted Bangladesh’s democracy^[19]. This covert takeover by the military has been likened to a military coup (Lorch, 2017). Yet, in this 2007 military takeover, the military asserted its commitment to restoring democracy and, unlike the 1975 and 1982 coups, delivered on its promises of returning power back to the civilians in the democratic elections in December 2008 (Ahmed, 2010)^[20].

Secondly, Bangladesh’s vibrant and strong civil society is widely-recognised^[21]. At the same time, Bangladesh presents an interesting case of a strong civil society existing in a weak state (Lorch, 2017)^[22]. The Bangladesh case captures the nuances of democratic coups and of a strong, vibrant but non-vigilant civil society (Lorch, 2017; Tasnim, 2012)^[23], presenting a good case for the study of civil society’s role in guarding against military rule.

In addition, Bangladesh, being a post-colonial, developing state, faces similar challenges as the rest of the Third world. The study of Bangladesh’s transition from a military regime to a democratic one today may contribute to existing literature as well as inform policies in addressing military coups that continue to plague parts of the post-colonial world.

In view of Bangladesh’s unique political trajectory, this paper adopts a within-case comparison of the 1975 and 1982 military coups that led to establishment of military regimes, as opposed to the 2007 military-backed CTG that was more akin to a democratic coup characterised by post-coup elections and the voluntary transfer of power to civilians.

Measure of Dependent Variable: Military Rule

The presence/absence of military rule is contingent on whether the civilians or the military are in power. The absence of military rule after coups is operationalised as the presence of free and fair democratic elections that transfers power to civilian leaders within 5 years^[24].

In Bangladesh, military rule was observed to follow the 1975 and 1982 coups^[25], while military rule was absent in the 2007 coup^[26].

Measurement of Explanatory Variable: Civil Society

In view of the lack of civil society index data dating back to the 1970s, the measurement of the explanatory variable will be operationalised in three ways for construct validation purposes. 

• Literacy Rate

The correlation between literacy rate and political mobilisation/participation has been well-established (Ganguly, 1996). An increase in literacy rate will thus likely be correlated to a stronger civil society.

As literacy rate in Bangladesh has been increasing steadily^[27] (Fig 3), it can be inferred that the civil society in 2007 was stronger than the civil society during the 1975 and 1982 coups.

• Hartal Occurrence

Hartals are an interesting phenomenon of political strikes in Bangladesh^[29]. Strikes occurrence reflect civic/political engagement, revealing the strength of the civil society. A rise in occurrence of hartals will reflect a corresponding increase in the strength of civil society.

The occurrence of hartals in 1990s-2000s was higher than in the 1970s-1980s^[30], as a negative correlation was found to exist between hartal occurrence and the time-periods under military dictatorship (Azmon&Salmon, 2004)(Fig 4).

• Voter Turnout Rates

Voter turnout rates not only reflects civic/political participation but is also correlated with the strength of social capital (Putnam, 2000). An increase in voter turnout will thus likely reflect a corresponding increase in the strength of civil society.

From Fig 5, there has been a rise in trend of voter turnout rates from the 1970s-80s to the 1990s-2008^[32]. This reflects an increase in civic/political participation as well as social capital, indicating the presence of a stronger civil society during the period of the 2007 coup as opposed to the 1975 and 1982 coups.

Alternative Explanations

As noted in the literature review, there is a rich body of scholarship that points to a number of factors that may explain military intervention in politics. This paper takes an actor-based approach and examines alternative explanations involving the role of the civilian government, the military and the international community.

AE1: The absence of legitimacy of civilian government is likely to lead to the establishment of military rule following a coup.^[34] 

The absence of civilian legitimacy is operationalised by:

• Lack of resistance or Support from the citizenry for military coup

The lack of resistance, or even support, from the people for military intervention indicates weak civilian authority and popularity. In both the coups of 1975 and 1982, no demonstrable resistance or opposition was observed (Khondker, 1986). In the 2007 coup, the military had received substantial support from the civil society, including approval from NGOs and the media (Lorch, 2017).

• Corruption Rankings

While mismanagement of civilian governments can be in various forms, the level of corruption in government often has direct implication for its legitimacy. In view of its consistent ranking amongst the world’s most corrupt countries since 1990s^[35] as well as past records of widespread corruption under the Mujib and Sattar civilian governments (Rahman, 1983; Blair, 2013), it can be inferred that civilian governments in Bangladesh have largely been deemed corrupt and lacking in legitimacy.

AE2: The military’s self-perception of its custodianship responsibility is likely to lead to the establishment of military rule following a coup.^[36] 

The presence of the military’s self-perceived custodianship responsibility is operationalised by:

• Occurrence of military coup amidst a state crisis

A state crisis may include political instability, widespread disillusionment or abuse of state power. A military coup executed in such a backdrop may be reflective of the military’s attempt to fulfil its manifest destiny. The coups of 1975, 1982 and 2007 had invariably been executed in the context of state crisis^[37].

• Promise of political reforms and democratic elections

Attempts of military to justify coup by promising to improve and remedy the country’s political scene could be reflective of the military’s self-perception as saviours of the country. All three coups were followed with criticism of the previous government as well as promises of political reform and elections (Khondker, 1986; Blair, 2010).

AE3: High dependence on international actors for disbursement of financial resources is less likely to lead to the establishment of military rule following a coup.

Dependence on outside actors for resources, in particular Western aid, can make the military vulnerable to external pressure. Outsiders’ demands for elections can be potentially decisive in determining post-coup developments when external actors exercise substantial control over the country’s financial resources (Marinov&Goemans, 2013).

• Aid Dependence

Dependence on international donors has been a traditional form of external dependence of a country. In Bangladesh, aid dependence (as % of GDP) has been on a downward trend (Fig 5). At its peak in the 1970s-1980s, military rule had persisted^[38]. With a decreased dependence on aid in 2007, it is thus unlikely that external pressure would affect the occurrence of military rule following the 2007 coup. 

• UN Peacekeeping Compensation

The participation of Bangladesh Armed Forces in UN Peacekeeping Missions since the 1990s has emerged as another noteworthy form of external financial dependence.

According to Bangladesh’s internal documents, gross compensation from 2001–2010 amounted to US$1.28b (Cunliffe, 2017). This translates into slightly less than 0.2% of Bangladesh’s total GDP of $761.245b during the same period (World Bank, 2018). It appears that contribution to UN Peacekeeping Mission had not substantially increased Bangladesh’s dependence on external actors for financial resources^[40]. Since Bangladesh’s dependence on external finance disbursement is low, the impact of pressure from international actors on the military’s establishment of military rule should be limited.

Findings

The results from the operationalisation of my hypothesis and AE1-3 are summarised in the table below. 

This demonstrates that the presence of a strong civil society is both sufficient and necessary for the absence of military rule^[41].

The Growth of Civil Society

What explains the ability of the civil society to influence the military to pursue the democratic coup policy? This can be attributed to the growth of the Bangladesh civil society in both its vertical (increase in number of educated/professional citizens) and horizontal (increase in broad participation) strength^[42].

The 1971 Liberation War and its aftermath had necessitated and marked the birth of the work of NGOs. The beginning of Bangladesh’s civil society was motivated by the need for non-state actors to perform functions normally ascribed to the state^[43] (Lorch, 2016). However, it would take nearly 2 decades before the impact of Bangladesh’s civil society can be felt in the political sphere, when the people’s demonstrations brought down its last military regime under General Ershad^[44].

It is notable that this 1990 movement had been largely driven by student groups and professional associations within the civil society. Huq (2005) notes the abstention of organised labourers in the tertiary sector (agriculture, trade and industry) of the civil society from the 1990 mass upsurge. This phenomenon is supported by the association between education and literacy with political/civic mobilisation (Gunguly, 1996). As literacy rates increased from the 1970s to 1990s, civil society had gained in vertical strength, and was able to drive the downfall of Ershad’s military regime.

By the 2000s, civil society has strengthened in terms of broad citizen participation as well.  This growth can be charted by the voter turnout rates (Fig7)^[45]. This may be attributed to the role of the civil society in increasing the confidence of the citizenry in democracy through its building of social capital and monitoring of the state to increase accountability to the people. The caretaker government concept made possible by the civil society was one such example^[46].

In view of the high voter turnouts (above 70%) in the decade preceding the 2007 military takeover, on top of the country’s past experience of mass demonstrations against Ershad’s military regime^[47], it is likely that the military’s policy of facilitating post-coup elections had took into consideration the civil society’s values and position − which was ultimately reflected in the 2008 voter turnout, the highest in the country’s history.

The absence of military rule after a coup only occurred in 2007, following the growth of civil society in vertical strength by the 1990s and horizontal strength by the 2000s. Along with the causal mechanism illustrated in Fig 2, we can conclude that the absence of military rule occurred after and as a consequence of the growth of Bangladesh’s civil society.

Conclusion

To overcome the conflation of military coups with military rule and address the lack of research into post-coup developments, this paper has sought to explain the occurrence of military rule after coups through a within-case analysis of Bangladesh. In addition, this paper looked at an often-neglected actor in CMR − the citizenry. I argue that the strength of a civil society can influence the military’s coup policy through the process of socialisation as well as by acting as an obstacle to the establishment of military rule.

More analysis into the role of the different actors of civil society^[49] may be helpful to clarify the causal mechanism between civil society and military rule. The study of agential factors can also be better informed by considering the changes in structural factors/conditions^[50].

Through its findings, this paper hopes to highlight that the civil society, or “society of ‘men without arms’” (Huq,2005,p.89), can play an important role in shaping the CMR dynamics, and is an area worthy of greater attention by political scientists and practitioners alike.

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Endnotes

^[1] There exists a common belief, especially in the democratic world, that it is ‘natural’ for the military to obey civilian power (Finer, 1962; Feaver, 1999).

^[2] In this paper, a coup d’etat is defined as the seizure of effective executive authority through the threat or use of force (Marinov&Goemans, 2013).

^[3] Also known as a guardian coup, the democratic coup is characterised by efforts to facilitate free and fair elections, ultimately bringing about the transfer of power to democratically elected civilian leaders (Varol, 2012). The democratic coup, being an exception rather than the norm of coup models, has largely been neglected by existing literature (Varol, 2012).

^[4] Such as Janowitz’s (1960) The Professional Soldier

^[5] Such as Huntington’s (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies

^[6] This has its roots in the civil-military problematique, whereby “the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity” (Feaver, 1999, p214). This also explains the preoccupation of the CMR field with the ‘coup’ phenomenon.

^[7] It needs to be noted that the study of CMR is not limited to the area of coup occurrence as an indicator of military intervention in politics. In fact, scholars have argued that the coup/no coup dichotomy ignores the nuances of CMR. CMR can also be studied by examining military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance, delegation and monitoring (Feaver, 1999).

^[8] In particular, the study of CMR in the post-colonial world has been dominated by the phenomenon of coups (Feaver, 1999; Kanchanasuwon, 1989).

^[9] Huntington’s two classic works (1957, 1968) delineate this debate; in his earlier work, he emphasises the military’s professionalism and subsequently turns his attention to the degree of political institutionalisation by civilians in society. Likewise, Finer (1962) ties in the civilian/military factors through his disposition/opportunity framework, in which disposition to intervene encompasses factors like the military’s manifest destiny and corporate interests while opportunity to intervene may exist under weak civilian leadership. For example, Welch (1976) highlights the role of legitimacy and efficiency of civilian governments in deterring coups.

^[10] Schiff (2009) attempts to fill this gap through the concordance theory which emphasises the achievement of concordance via a cooperative relationship among the three partners: the military, political elites and citizenry, which will work to decrease the likelihood of a military intervention. However, Schiff’s argument fails to account for democratic coups in which the military stands in direct opposition to political elites.

^[11] Retrieved from Huq (2005), p.90

^[12] Social capital, found in civic communities and associational culture, refers to the features of social organisations facilitating coordinated action and has been found to be linked to the success of democracy (Tasnim, 2012; Putnam, 2000).

^[13] Fig 2 summarises how a strong civil society may lead to post-coup elections, thereby guarding against the occurrence of military rule.

^[14] Marinov and Goemans (2013) demonstrate that post-coup dynamics can affect the military’s ability to intervene in politics. In particular, shared democratic norms and ideals among people in established democracies will lead to popular pressures for elections. Even in cases where the military seized power on account of civilian government mismanagement, the military will ultimately face “mounting pressures to return to the barracks once their job is done” (Marinov&Goemans, 2013, p.803).

^[15] This is also likely to be factored into the military’s calculus in deciding their post-coup policy, thereby orientating the military towards relinquishing power to civilian leaders through facilitating democratic elections.

^[16] This is related to the concept of subjective control put forward by Janowitz (1960) in which the interconnectedness of the military with society results in the military reflecting the core values of society, as embodied by the civic virtue of the citizen-soldier ideal (Schiff, 2009).

^[17] The within-case comparison of Bangladesh across time is an ideal model for the comparative case-study method which overcomes the many variables small-N conundrum for the testing of my hypothesis, as it enables for most other variables to be controlled for.

^[18] CTGs have been a practice relatively unique to Bangladesh. The concept of a caretaker government, composed fully of non-political personages and set up with the sole purpose of holding a national election, was an innovative idea made possible by the relentless efforts of the civil society (Huq, 2005). In the 2007 CTG, however, the role of the military as the mastermind behind the installation of the 2007 military-backed CTG installation distinguishes it from other CTGs in previous years (Blair, 2013). This has been interpreted as the military’s intervention into politics not dissimilar to a guardian coup (Marinov&Goemans, 2013).

^[19] On 11 January 2007, the military had forced President Iajuddin Ahmed to postpone elections and declare a state of emergency (Lorch, 2017). He also announced his resignation from the position of chief adviser to the caretaker government (Blair, 2010). The military would proceed to successfully unseat the incumbent executive, installing a new military-backed CTG the very next day (Lorch, 2017).

^[20] Having assumed power in the backdrop of widespread political violence, the military-backed CTG committed itself to introducing political reforms to ‘cleanse’ the political scene before returning to the barracks in December 2008.  

^[21] In 2006, a Nobel Peace Prize was notably awarded to Professor Yunus and the Grameen Bank, signifying the rising world recognition for the achievements of the Bangladeshi civil society (Tasnim, 2012).

^[22] For example, the country has consistently been ranked as one of the world’s most corrupt countries (Tasnim, 2012).

^[23] The literature has featured several studies regarding the paradox of the Bangladesh civil society’s inability to strengthen democracy in the country despite its vibrant nature. In particular, its non-vigilant nature has seemingly challenged the widely-assumed democracy-building function of civil society (Tasnim, 2012). The role that the strong but unvigilant Bangladesh civil society can play in a weak state has thus remained a gap in existing literature. This paper posits that the Bangladeshi case fits perfectly into the nuances of a democratic coup, which while at the one hand indicates poor democratic governance and on the other a strong democratic culture that the military subordinates itself to after usurping power. As is widely criticised, Bangladesh’s unvigilant and politicised civil society has diminished its surveillance role in keeping the democratic state in check, contributing to political disorder as part of the country’s confrontational politics and bitter rivalry between the two main political parties: the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. This motivated the 2007 military CTG to take over in a covert coup. At the same time, the strong, vibrant civil society worked to guard against the establishment of military rule, shaping the military policy into a democratic coup.

^[24] This 5-year criteria was adopted from Marinov and Goemans (2013). In this paper, elections staged by the military or which involve the participation of ‘civilianised’ military coup-plotters are not considered as free and fair elections. The outcome of elections must lead to the transfer of power to civilian leaders.

^[25] Following the 1975 and 1982 coups, performative elections were conducted to enable the military and coup leaders to come to power. As power was not transferred to civilians, the tenures of General Zia Rahman (1977-1981) and General Ershad (1983-1990) as the President of Bangladesh are considered as military regimes in this paper.

It is also notable that on top of the participation of military leaders-turned politicians in these elections, the ‘free and fair’ nature of elections was also questionable. For example, Zia’s 1977 referendum, which saw him secure an impressive 98.89% of the popular vote, featured problematic wording of the referendum question: “Do you have confidence in President Major General Ziaur Rahman and in his policies and programs enunciated by him?”. The referendum question was worded such that voters were neither aware of nor given a choice of an alternative to the proposed military regime (Khan, p.559). The 1986 and 1988 elections held during the Ershad regime had been essentially uncontested as the major opposition parties (the Awami League and BNP) had boycotted the elections (Blair, 2013).

^[26] In contrast, the 2007 military-backed CTG ushered in democratic elections within 2 years of its covert takeover in December 2008. The 2008 elections had largely been considered as free and fair, and brought the presently-incumbent party, the Awami League, to power. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s Free and Fair Elections component scored Bangladesh’s 2007 elections at 7, which was in line with world median and above the threshold score of 6 (below which is classified as an autocracy).

^[27] As data on pre-1980s literacy rate is not available, extrapolation is necessary. In 2007, literacy rate among adult population stands at 46.7%, a substantial increase from 29.2% in 1981.

^[28] UNESCO Institute of Statistics. (2018). Bangladesh. Retrieved from http://uis.unesco.org/country/BD 

^[29] This observable phenomenon was chosen in view of Bangladesh’s unique political culture of confrontational politics. The use of political strikes, known as hartals, is a particularly interesting political performance in Bangladesh. Hartals have traditionally symbolised protest against misrule and had also played a significant role in the demise of the country’s last military regime in 1990 (Ahsan&Iqbal, 2016). Today, the main grievance behind hartals has been political, such as concerns about election fairness (Ahsan&Iqbal, 2016). Participation in hartals thus signifies political and civic participation.

^[30] Azman&Salmon (2004, p.327) observed that the “military dictatorship period witnessed a lower level of strike activity than the subsequent democratic one”.

^[31] Retrieved from Azam, J., & Salmon, C. (2004). Strikes and political activism of trade unions: Theory and application to bangladesh. Public Choice, 119(3/4), 311-334.

From their results, it can be understood that the occurrence of strikes is negatively correlated with the military dictatorship. They found that this is not statistically significant – this can thus be interpreted as an anomaly. Since strikes during the military dictatorships of 1970s-80 is lower than under the subsequent democratic governments, the civil society is likely to be stronger during the 2000s.

^[32] The voter turnout rates in 1970s-80s hovered at 50-60% before shooting up to 75% by mid-1990s, with the voter turnout in 2008 hitting a historic high of 85.26%. The 2014 dip in voter turnout is an interesting phenomenon but is outside the scope of this paper. It is however likely to be associated with the BNP’s boycott of the 2014 elections, rather than a reflection of civil society strength. The 2018 elections voter turnout data is not yet available.

^[33] International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2018). Bangladesh, Voter Turnout. Retrieved from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/521/59/ctr

^[34] The strength and legitimacy of the civilian government has been found to be important in military intervention in politics (Welch, 1976). In his disposition/opportunity framework, Finer (1962) categorises weak civilian leadership as providing the opportunity for the military to interfere with civilian politics. The lack of civilian legitimacy discredits the civilian government, weakening the authority and popularity of the incumbent civilian leaders. This provides the stage for military intervention and also enhances the support for the military.

^[35] From 2001-2005, Bangladesh was ranked by Transparency International as the world’s most corrupt country for five successive years (Tasnim, 2012). Data on Transparency International Corruption Index began in the 1990s. The corruption levels in the 1970s-80s have to be extrapolated. In 1996, the first year when Bangladesh was included in the Transparency International corruption index, it was ranked the 4^th most corrupt country. In 2018, Bangladesh was ranked 149 out of 180 countries in terms of perceived level of public sector corruption (Transparency International, 2019).

^[36] The distinctive corporate identity of the military as the ‘guardians’ of the nation has been a fundamental factor motivating military interventions in countries. Finer (1962) terms this ‘the Manifest Destiny of Soldiers’ as saviours of their countries. He attributes the military’s consciousness of its unique mission and self-sacrificial corporate virtues as providing the basis for its self-perceived duty to save the nation by intervening in politics, shaping the disposition of the military to intervene (Finer, 1962).

^[37] The 1975 coup had occurred in the midst of an increasingly authoritarian and corrupt civilian government and declining standards of living in the country as a result of the 1973 oil crisis and 1974 famine (Lewis, 2011). The 1982 coup had been launched in an atmosphere of disillusionment amongst the public and loss of faith in a corrupt government embroiled in party factionalism (Rahman, 1983). The 2007 coup occurred amidst political chaos and violence in the lead up to elections (Blair, 2010).

^[38]This appears to challenge AE3. However, a limitation of my analysis is the lack of consideration of the Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics. Marinov&Goemans (2013) argue that greater dependence on Western aid flows can increase the likelihood of post-coup elections, but only in the post-Cold War era. However, as only the 2007 coup happened in the post-Cold War era, it would be hard to ascertain the impact and extent of international donor pressure in post-Cold War. My analysis will thus be based on objective aid amount.

^[39] Istiak, K. M. (2012). foreign aid to bangladesh: Some iconoclastic issues. The Journal of Developing Areas, 46(1), 331-343. doi:10.1353/jda.2012.0005 Retrieved from https://muse-jhu-edu.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/article/470006

^[40] Although this paper is unable to prove that Bangladeshi participation in Peacekeeping Missions had not granted external actors leverage to exert pressure on the military , this paper contends that Bangladesh contribution to UN Peacekeeping Mission had not substantially increased the country’s dependence on international actors for financial resources, and that pressure from international actors will thus be limited. Then, AE3 is disproved by the Bangladeshi experience as high aid dependence had not prevented military rule in the 1970s-80s, while post-coup elections were held despite low external financial dependence in 2007.

^[41] AE1-3 have been constant factors in all 3 coups, while the presence of a strong civil society is the only varying factor. Since the constant factors cannot explain the divergent post-coup developments, this paper argues that the presence/absence of a strong civil society is a causal factor in explaining the occurrence of military rule after coups. As there is an absence of military rule only when a strong civil society is present, a causal relationship can be drawn between the presence of a strong civil society and the absence of military rule. A strong civil society is thus both necessary and sufficient for an absence of military rule. 

^[42] This growth can be attributed to the increase in literacy rate and can be charted to Fig3 which maps the growth in literacy rate in Bangladesh.

^[43] Bangladesh’s civil society has been internationally recognized for its contributions and efforts in poverty alleviation and social development, as epitomised by Grameen Bank’s famous micro-credit system (Tasnim, 2012). Other NGOs like the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee have also been pivotal in initiating welfare and education programmes throughout the country.

^[44] The civil society’s opposition to General Ershad and demands for his resignation had been taken into account by the military in their refusal to back Ershad in imposing martial law (Blair, 2013).  

^[45] While the 1970s-80s voter turnout had hovered at 50-60%, by the mid-1990s, voter turnout soared to above 70%. Significantly, voter turnout rate shot up to a historic high of 85% in 2008, reflecting broad civic participation. This suggests a high level of political/civic engagement of the citizenry at the time of the 2007 military coup. This represents a growth in horizontal strength of civil society.

^[46] Elections held in 1991, 1996 and 2001 had been considered highly competitive free and fair elections (Huq, 2005). This can be attributed to the holding of elections under caretaker non-political governments. The concept of a caretaker government (CTG) set up with the sole purpose of overseeing national elections was largely the achievement of civil society efforts in Bangladesh (Huq, 2005). In turn, the CTG arrangement driven by the civil society boosted both accountability as well as civic/political participation of the citizens, as reflected by the growth in voter turnout rate from 1996 onwards.

^[47] The factoring in of the civil society’s strength and position into the military’s policy had been observed in 1990 when Ershad’s appeal to the military to implement martial law against the people’s demonstration was rebuffed (Blair, 2013).

^[48] Graph of voter turnout rate across years, based on data from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2018).

^[49] For example, the media or NGOs as opposed to the citizenry

^[50] Such as the Cold War/post-Cold War environment

Written by Mbella Beseka

BRI critics have denounced China’s efforts to invest and build diplomatic relations with African countries as veiled attempts to recolonize a continent still recovering from previous attempts by European powers. Given that many of these African countries are relatively young and in favor of rapid development, governments tend to welcome financial assistance. Due to their experience with European intervention^[2] African governments are starting to turn to Chinese investment due to the country’s reputation of following a policy of non-intervention. Despite the billions of dollars in aid these countries received from Western countries and institutions, the burden of reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus—a set of broadly free market economic ideas, supported by prominent economists and international organisations, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and the US—was seen as destructive to their economies.^[3] This has tinged these countries’ perceptions of international institutions such as the IMF and makes China a more attractive alternative which offers an equal or greater amount of aid with less strings attached. While Africans applaud the increased role that China has taken in the development of other nations, especially as China is still considered a developing country, others worry that this is merely a way to spread Chinese influence at the expense of the future autonomy aid recipients—particularly those in Africa. Racism and discrimination often permeate the conversation about China’s increasing engagement with Africans. This concern is given additional weight when placed in context with incidences that have recently occurred across the continent.

Kenya provides a good example since it receives a large amount of public and private assistance from China. In October 2018, Kenyan workers complained of race-based discrimination from a Chinese supervisor after a cellphone video circulated the month earlier showing the supervisor exhibiting derogatory behavior towards Kenyan employees.^[4] The employees also complained of being subjected to “monkey insults” which they associated with the country’s history of slavery and European colonization. The impact words such as these have on the workers signifies the ever-present legacy of colonialism. The historical trauma of subjugation affects how former colonized countries have received Chinese and other foreign presences. In situations such as what occurred in Kenya between African laborers and Chinese managers, there is a widespread fear that Chinese presence is, instead of forward into the future, moving countries backward.^[5] Some are concerned that Chinese-owned business enterprises operated in African countries have changed the professional landscape. Some workers have complained about having to call their Chinese bosses “masters” and claim they are experiencing “neocolonialism, racism, and blatant discrimination.”^[6] An additional prevalent concern is the language barrier between Africans and Chinese bosses. For example, when Chinese businesses send supervisors into Kenya, the workers struggle to learn Chinese in fear of their supervisors regarding them as incompetent and fire them. The Chinese supervisors, on the other hand, are able to work with little expectation of learning English^[7].

At the same time, Chinese engagement can also present a reliable asset for African countries to achieve national development aspirations. On 6 December 2018, the Senegalese government announced it was able to complete the decades-long construction of a museum commemorating the art of past black civilizations.^[8] Many recognize China’s role in the completion of the project: after decades of inaction, China’s $34M investment was able to spur the project into fruition.^[9] Besides being a cultural boon, this museum’s construction also comes at a prime moment in domestic politics. The Senegalese presidential elections are approaching in 2019, so the construction of the museum will also improve incumbent President Sall’s prospects for re-election. Although the museum is centered around Négritude and the decolonization of indigenous African art, the presence of Chinese artifacts from the Guizhou province at the opening ceremony^[10] and Chinese signage in the museum’s concrete back room is a reminder that it was built largely in part due to a Chinese financial donation.^[11]

CASE HISTORY

The Sino-Cameroonian relationship began in the 1970s, when Cameroonian independence was still nascent. The desire to form a bond with China was born out of the country’s struggled to escape French control. During its colonial administration of Cameroon, France constructed facilities for the export of cash crops and the import of industrial products into the mainland^[12]. As a result, after independence, Cameroon was not capable of separating itself from French economically or politically. To achieve his goal of making the country more autonomous, the first president of the independent republic, Ahmadou Ahidjo, established relations with major powers at the time including the United States, Russia, and China. In 1971, Cameroon diplomatically recognized the People’s Republic of China, a foreign policy tactic aimed at neutralizing French influence in Cameroon^[13]. This decision would foster a diplomatic and economic relationship which would carry through to Paul Biya’s present-day regime

POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP

During a meeting between Presidents Paul Biya and Xi Jinping in March 2018, the leaders placed a large emphasis on expanding trade zones and collaboration in key areas such as business cooperation, infrastructure, and human resources development^[14]. Meetings such as this are representative of the amical relationship the two countries enjoy with one another. Paul Biya and Cameroonian political leaders have been received in China several times over the past years as well as the other way around. By analyzing the political nature of the Sino-Cameroonian relationship, it will help to discern the level of influence the countries exert on each other and in which ways the political link is asymmetrical. In order to measure this, only interactions on the public (between the governments) domain will be counted. This will include loans from the Chinese government, diplomatic relations, and foreign policy.

There are several positive aspects of the Chinese government’s relationship with Cameroon. Benefits of Chinese aid include humanitarian aid and the enhancement of security near conflict zones. In November 2018, China reportedly granted the Cameroonian government emergency equipment and materials to assist those fleeing the conflict in the northwest and southwest regions^[15]. This is in addition to the 1.7B central African francs (CFA), or about 20M Yuan, that China had already committed two months earlier to the support of emergency humanitarian assistance in regions being affected by separatist violence in the northwest and southwest regions of the country^[16]. The Chinese government also approved a donation worth CFA 3B in foodstuffs to help with refugees from Boko Haram violence and the separatist movement in the South. Instead of being given to the Cameroonian government, the large grant was given to Abdoulaye Baldé, the head of the World Food Program^[17]. The above instances are exemplary of a larger history of China giving aid to Cameroon without an expectation of being paid back as in the case of loans. Examples of humanitarian aid are somewhat recent given that they are reactions to the crises in the northern region with Boko Haram with the Ambazonia separatist movement which both displace native populations. The other major benefit of Chinese aid comes in the form of security force reinforcement. The two conflicts mentioned require a strong police and military force in order to mitigate them. Unfortunately, these conflicts are happening concurrently, meaning that a focus onto one diverts attention to the other due to limited resources. China has helped Cameroon to resolve this concern. In July 2018, Cameroon signed a convention with China to receive CFA 4.5M and spend on purchasing military equipment^[18]. A Cameroonian foreign service officer stated this donation was meant to reinforce state capacities in peacekeeping and security operations in the region^[19]. Although humanitarian aid and security reinforcement benefit the Cameroonian government immensely, there are no examples of the benefits moving in the other direction. The above are all one-sided exchanges where it is very clear which party will be receiving aid and which party will be distributing it. It is clear that Cameroon stands on the receiving end of both public donations and Chinese governmental assistance. This would indicate that there is an unequal benefit relationship between the two on the public domain.

Aside from the benefits and imbalance, there are also several dangers that the Cameroonian government is already starting to face in its engagement with China. Many BRI critics discuss the sovereign debt that African governments take on when accepting loans from the Chinese government or banks. The lack of conditions placed upon their financial assistance is more likely to increase national indebtedness while decreasing debt sustainability capacity^[20]. In some cases, countries are already finding it difficult to repay their debts to China, and some fear that these countries’ sovereignty will be at risk. For example, Sri Lanka recently ceded their rights to Hambantota port for ninety-nine years to China because it could not repay its debt^[21].

In Cameroon, the government is taking on large debts for public expenditures. A new dam being built this year in Warak, a region in Northern Cameroon, will be financed in part through a loan to the Cameroonian government from the International and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in the amount of CFA 182B, which is approximately $315M^[22]. Public debt in Cameroon is managed and monitored by the Autonomous Sinking Fund, otherwise known as the Caisse Autonomed Amortissement (CAA)^[23]. The country, however, is still failing to meet its debt obligations to China. President Biya has traveled to China several times since November 2017 to plead for Beijing to be more flexible in its debt financing structure^[24]. This puts Cameroon in a precarious position. Since the Cameroonian government does not release specific data on its debt or other economic measures, an interesting question would be whether or not Cameroon will ever be able to meet its obligation. If it is not capable of returning on its debts, that opens the possibility of China asking the Cameroonian government for compensation through other means, as in the case of Sri Lanka.

Another important factor is China’s influence on Cameroonian foreign policy. China is well-known for its “One-China” policy which denies the existence of a separate Taiwanese state. In several instances, despite China’s claim of adhering to non-interference and respect for national sovereignty, it tends to denounce countries that host Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, or that seek diplomatic relations with Taiwan^[25]. After the 14^th Dalai Lama attempted to visit Botswana, a Chinese official stated that “The 14^th Dalai Lama is a political exile who has long engaged in separatist, anti-Chinese activities under the cover of religion”^[26]. Cameroon’s foreign policy is almost identical to the positions that China takes on issues. For example, President Biya stated in June 2018 that “Cameroon firmly supports the “One China” policy…They share large common interests and a common position in international affairs” and will cooperate with China in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations^[27]. Over the years, most likely as a result of the increased interaction with China, Cameroon and other African nations have grown closer to the world power. This does limit the discretion of leaders to embrace ideals or entities that may go oppose Chinese interests without directly going against their own.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP

In the first eleven months of 2018, China spent $91.37B in overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI), with the highest recipient sectors of investment across the globe being energy and technology with an estimated $25B each^[28]. In general, Cameroon has accepted more FDI over the years. The FDI percentage of GDP has increased to be over 20% in 2017 versus only less than 5% in 1995^[29]. This is indicative of a larger trend in Cameroon economic policy which focuses on orienting the economy towards more open trade and increasing market access for Cameroonian exports^[30]. Agriculture and forestry are the main contributors to GDP, and oil also provides a considerable amount to the domestic economy. Externally, petroleum products make up the country’s largest exports^[31]. Investors tend to look towards energy, oil and gas, the transportation sector, and sports facilities, such as stadiums and infrastructure for the Africa Cup of Nations 2019 tournament^[32]. International partners include France, with whom Cameroon has several special trade agreements including a 15% tax and deductions for technical assistance^[33]. Although it does not share this privilege with the Western power, China is reportedly Cameroon’s largest trading partner^[34]. Cameroon receives 67% of annual FDI from China^[35], making it a major recipient of Chinese aid in the continent.

France is still the biggest source of foreign investment in the region, with French companies owning majority shares of national firms^[36]. In recent years, however, China is seen as Cameroon’s major fund provider through public and private means: whether it be money from the government, or from banks such as the Export-Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of China^[37]. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) has recently published figures on Chinese investments and contracts in Cameroon since 2005. They found that total Chinese investment between 2005 and 2018 amounted to $12.25B with the majority of investment going towards the transportation ($5.57B) and energy ($3.39B) sectors^[38]. Their data showed that there was negligible investment directed towards agriculture, chemicals, finance, health, or tourism industries. The AEI found that three major contracts procured in the past decade by Chinese firms in Cameroon: a $500M contract by Sinomach in the transportation industry in March 2010, Sinopec’s $540M contract in May 2011 in the energy industry, and the largest being Sinosteel’s $660M contract in December 2012 in the Metals sector^[39]. The most recent investment was in the energy fields in the amount of $520M throughout the course of 2017. The AEI’s data shows that money from China flows mainly towards transportation infrastructure and the already notable petroleum industry. Very little of these funds goes towards the agriculture sector, also a prominent industry in Cameroon’s domestic economy. This should not come as a surprise, as the original mission of the 1B1R Initiative is to form a connective trading route that would function as a modern-day Silk Road. It follows that Chinese engagement would prioritize the improvement of infrastructure such as ports and roads as well as the investment into important commodities such as oil over domestic concerns such as agriculture or tourism.

Cameroon has also seen a growth of previously absent industries as a result of investment. In 2017, a Chinese businessman made plans to build an auto plant in the industrial zone near the Chinese-built deep-sea port in the southern-Cameroonian city of Kribi – it would be the first car plant in Central Africa^[40]. Information technology has arguably received the most generous benefits of influx of Chinese investment. Due to Chinese intervention, modern technological devices such as cellphones or innovations such as broadband Internet connection are becoming more prevalent across the country. In the past decade, the Internet penetration rate has increased from less than 3% in 2007 to 23.2% in 2017^[41]. Some see this translates into a greater impact on people’s daily lives than even the billions of dollars spent on infrastructure development^[42]. Private sector investors from China and abroad have historically been deterred from investment due to administrative obstacles such as red tape and systemic corruption^[43]. Despite this, the rising rate of Chinese investment over the years would suggest that this effect is limited.

Another important aspect of the economic relationship between the Cameroon and China is trade. Both countries import and export goods from the other, but experts note a difference in both the nature and quality of goods. Chinese exports to Cameroon tend to be cheaper, modern products which result in higher accessibility for Cameroonian consumers to goods such as cellphones. Before 2010, well-worn analogue phones were the only option for most Cameroonians who could not afford the emerging smartphones. In the past eight years, Chinese mobile phone manufacturers such as Tecno Mobile, Huawei, LG, ZTE, and OnePlus have flooded the Cameroonian market with affordable smartphones, allowing thousands of people to access the Internet for the first time^[44]. Many critics are saying that the massive arrival of Chinese products at such low prices is destabilizing already delicate African industries^[45]. This flood of cheap goods from China tends to undercut local businesses who are not able to competitively price their products against less-expensive Chinese imports^[46]. These businesses are often forced to close and/or eliminate jobs due to competition^[47]. As a result, local African manufacturing bases have been slowly eroding away while making more room for larger Chinese corporations to sell to a larger share of the market. Although this has occurred in other parts of Africa, Cameroon has not yet shown evidence of following this path. In fact, there is an unofficial requirement for international firms and projects to provide ‘local content’ in the form of local jobs going to Cameroonians^[48]. Although this is not yet enshrined in the law, it is a barrier against a rise in unemployment and some protection for Cameroonian laborers. This protection, however, does not extend to local businesses.

Cameroon exports to China is concentrated around raw material goods. According to Chinese customs, Cameroon was its fourth largest timber exporter between January and August 2018, valuing transactions at around $47.3M^[49]. According to the United Nations ComTrade database, Cameroonian exports in 2017 totaled $788M. $460M came from mineral fuels, oils, and products of their distillation as well as $303M coming directly from wood products^[50]. In summary, Chinese exports help to introduce previously unavailable technology which is helping to modernize many areas of Cameroon, particularly rural agriculturists. Cameroonian exports help to fuel China’s ability to be an industrial giant with natural resources such as metals gained from mining, oil, and wood.

Infrastructure development is one of the largest sectors of development in Cameroon. Chinese funds have gone into a variety of projects which range from transportation, energy, and even recreational construction. Examples include the Kribi Seaport Loan which was worth $363M^[51], the Memve’le Dam which injects 201 megawatts of additional energy into Cameroon’s energy with total costs of $673M^[52], and a malaria research center in Yaoundé at a cost of $400K^[53]. Many of these projects are built upon a partnership between Cameroonian governmental ministries and Chinese companies. Chinese contributions to Cameroonian infrastructure are not limited to the construction of new buildings, but also to the improvement of public health and sanitation. In November 2013, an agreement was signed for the Cameroonian government to take a loan of CFA 84.72B to finance projects which would provide potable water to Bafoussam, Bamenda, Kribi, and Sangmelima – the four largest coastal cities besides Douala in the country^[54]. The objective was to increase the rate of access to clean water from 29% to 75% by 2020. Social impact initiatives such as this are also common in other areas of the country where Chinese banks offer generous loans for Cameroon to fund socially beneficial projects that combat disease, ensure security, or encourage development. The ongoing hydro-electric Bini dam project in Warak features the construction of energy evacuation lines and rural electrification lines as well as the reconstruction of access roads to the site^[55]. Cameroonian officials are positive the new dam will prevent energy deficits in northern Cameroon^[56].

The port in Kribi offers a model of the manner in which Chinese infrastructure investment currently occurs in Cameroon. Kribi is a coastal city which also housed one of the country’s major trade ports. Before construction, the port was congested to the point that ships would have to wait more than a week before docking^[57]. The lack of efficiency led to negative effects on trade and spurred the Cameroonian government to act. Despite intense French competition for the project, the Export-Import Bank of China managed to convince the government that it would help it realize its dream for “free” without the strings of the former colonial power^[58]. In this instance, China was beginning to edge out other international competitors. At the end of the construction, the port will be able to easily handle more than 100M tons of merchandise^[59], a remarkable increase in trading capability for the coastal city. In this instance, Chinese aid not only won out over other Western competitors, but also proved essential in creating sustainable economic opportunities for Kribi which will likely spur development in the region.

Cameroon is suffering from widespread poverty, decline in the education and public health systems, corruption in the political administration^[60]. There are innumerable examples which prove Chinese aid is necessary for continued growth and stability in the country. Nevertheless, Cameroon is dangerously dependent on this aid. Chinese aid presents several future risks in the form of increasing sovereign debt and foreign policy influence, but also more immediate threats. In instances where Chinese companies have violated laws in domestic mines, not only has the Cameroonian government not responded to complaints, but the national army has reportedly protected Chinese firms’ interests while intimidating the surrounding communities^[61].

PERCEPTION

The actual risks outlined above vary from the current discourse surrounding Chinese engagement with African countries. Some fear a new wave of “colonialism-by-consent” of African nations in exchange for necessary aid. After analyzing newspaper publications^[62] whose circulation was based in and outside Cameroon, public speeches, and other sources which would reflect opinion, it becomes apparent that there is a clear divide between those who are excited versus those who are pessimistic to Chinese investment in the country. While actual Cameroonian residents (it is important to stress those who actually live in the country) tend to be optimistic about recent financial assistance, non-residents dread future claims on Cameroonian sovereignty and negative consequences. An explanation for this would be that residents who are confronted by the daily struggles of poverty in Cameroon welcome Chinese investment untainted by Western interventionism whereas non-residents, particularly those from the West, are more likely to fear the loss of hegemonic economic and political control in the country.

When surveyed by a public opinion survey in 2014, Cameroonian residents generally had positive sentiments towards Chinese activity in Cameroon. 48% of respondents believed that China is the best model for national development^[63]. Out of 36 countries surveyed including Nigeria who receives more aid, Cameroon scored the highest in this metric. In terms of the extent of influence, 68% of Cameroonians believe the former colonial power, France, has the most influence in their country, whereas only 15% pointed to China. This would suggest that Cameroonians would first look at France as a greater threat to national sovereignty before looking at China. Interestingly, 81% of Cameroonians do believe that China’s economic influence has “some” or “a lot” of influence in their country.  80% of Cameroonian respondents stated that Chinese economic and political engagement had a “somewhat or very positive” influence, whereas only 10% of Cameroonians stated they believed the Chinese economic and political influence was “somewhat or very negative influence”. Also relevant is the fact that 73% of Cameroonians believe China’s economic development assistance is doing a somewhat or very good job whereas 14% believe they’re doing a somewhat or very bad job.

There are several factors which would explain the widespread approval, all surrounding the positive economic benefits from development that the residents enjoy being attributed to Chinese contributions to Cameroon. Chinese-funded projects are seen to better the population’s quality of life and contribute to the reduction of poverty^[64]. The Chinese are helping to build up Cameroon’s burgeoning digital economy sector which had been relatively weak compared to other African countries due to lack of network infrastructure and the high cost of devices^[65]. In the past years, broadband penetration has risen exponentially and locals are even using their new smartphones to combat illegal logging fueled by corruption^[66]. IT and other technological development has positive effects on the daily lives of Cameroonians in that it improves communication and the introduction of new job markets. In the words of a university graduate who was excited by the construction of the Kribi sea port, “This is the future^[67].”

One interesting point is that the positive perception of Chinese investment extends to the Ambazonia separatist movement. The crisis started with a strike action by English-speaking lawyers and teachers against the imposition of French has unleashed an internal armed conflict against the Biya regime^[68]. Bareta News, the largest online publication in the territory claimed by Ambazonia, even referred to Chinese grants to the Bini dam project as evidence that “God is still saying something”^[69]. There are even references to the Chinese being “renowned for their know-how and their intelligence” when discussing how Paul Biya failed to persuade the Chinese government to help him meet his domestic commitments^[70]. Even the Ambazonian separatist movement values Chinese engagement with the country for the necessary economic resources it brings.

On the other hand, non-Cameroonian residents tend to hold negative perceptions of Chinese engagement with the country. Publications based outside Cameroon and Africa tend to accuse Beijing of creating a new system of neocolonialism in which businesses who extract minerals in exchange for infrastructure and project financing act as intermediaries for the Chinese government^[71]. Even in European government bodies, the EU Parliament President Antonio Tajani stated in March 2017 that Africa risks becoming a Chinese colony which only gives China natural resources—stability is not in their best interest^[72]. Dissidence in Cameroonian residents is present, but very limited to isolated incidents. One of these arises from Cameroonian fishermen who are seeing a decrease in supply of fish due to ecologically dangerous Chinese fishing practices in the waters^[73]. There are also some concerns over Cameroon’s rising debt crisis. Paul Biya has gone to Beijing several times in the past year to negotiate the restructuring of Cameroon’s debt to China, which was valued at little more than CFA3,000B at the time of the last visit in August 2018^[74]. From the Ambazonia movement, there is concern that by constantly giving Paul Biya’s regime grants and loans, it is indirectly financing the Biya’s campaign against English-speaking Southern Cameroonians^[75].

Possible explanations for the divide between the domestic and international opinions concerning Chinese engagement include proximity to experiences. Cameroonians will focus on the material benefits they receive rather than worry about the larger societal danger of Chinese political influence or losing national sovereignty since they must deal with the daily struggles of poverty. One of these struggles is “brain drain”, or the increase in emigration of high-skilled laborers in the country. Over 46% of Cameroonian-born physicians were found in the censuses of nine receiving countries as well as 19% of Cameroonian-born nurses^[76]. Instead of moving towards the future, Cameroonians are seeing human capital, a key instrument in doing so, fleeing the country in search of better opportunity. This logically makes Cameroonian residents more receptive of outside aid in the form of non-interventionist Chinese aid. For non-Cameroonian residents, long-term issues such as looming sovereign debt, power differentials between the two countries, and even respect for human rights in the work space are more pressing. Those living in the United States and European countries who write on the topic tend to act as observers to the situation. Another explanation is also the loss of Western hegemony in the country. France has long enjoyed diplomatic, political, and economic privileges in the country. It would make sense that a less obvious reason for Western governments’ fear of growing Chinese influence in Cameroon and other African countries  is that Western governments seek to preserve their own.

CONCLUSION

After analyzing the reality of the relationship between China and Cameroon, as well as the perception of that reality, it is impossible to draw absolute judgements on the actors. There are multiple motivations for each country’s actions on whether or not to donate or accept the aid. Due to poverty and growing corruption, it is difficult to see a situation where Cameroon can survive without the support of Chinese aid. On the other hand, this unequal relationship poses risks to Cameroonian future sovereignty and autonomy. This complex reality is understood by different actors along the same lines: those in Cameroon would rather choose the much-needed economic benefits that comes with Chinese support. Those residing outside, especially in Western countries, focus on the imbalance which they perceive as neocolonialism. It would be interesting to see if the same division along geographic lines is seen throughout the continent, or if this is specific to the case of Cameroon. Important questions to ask when looking ahead are whether China’s level of engagement with Cameroon and the continent are sustainable. Perhaps growing Chinese debt and a delayed Western response signal a turning point in the struggle for influence in Cameroon and other African countries.

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“« L’Afrique risque de devenir une colonie chinoise » selon le président du Parlement européen.” JeuneAfrique.com (blog), March 29, 2017. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/422521/politique/lafrique-se-trouve-situation-dramatique-selon-president-parlement-europeen/.

“Les limites du « miracle » chinois.” JeuneAfrique.com (blog), November 24, 2008. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/206695/societe/les-limites-du-miracle-chinois/.

“Mapping Chinese Development Assistance in Africa: An Analysis of the Experiences of Cameroon.” AFRODAD, 2011.

Nchanji, Nfor Hanson. “Fishing In Cameroon: A Chronicle of Administrative Corruption And Chinese Expertise.” Cameroon News Agency, September 7, 2017. http://cameroonnewsagency.com/fishing-cameroon-chronicle-administrative-corruption-chinese-expertise/.

“Nigerian Business Community Leaving as the Southern Cameroons Crisis Deepens.” BaretaNews, July 8, 2018. https://www.bareta.news/nigerian-business-community-leaving-as-the-southern-cameroons-crisis-deepens/.

Pettinger, Tejvan. “Washington Consensus – Definition and Criticism – Economics Help.” Economics  Help. https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7387/economics/washington-consensus-definition-and-criticism/.

Pilling, David. “Que cherche la Chine en investissant autant en Afrique ?” JeuneAfrique.com, July 13, 2017. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/453084/economie/cherche-chine-investissant-autant-afrique/.

“Ports camerounais : de l’enfer de Douala à l’espoir de Kribi.” JeuneAfrique.com, July 22, 2015. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/248871/economie/ports-camerounais-de-lenfer-de-douala-a-lespoir-de-kribi/.

“Senegal Unveils Museum of Black Civilisations,” December 6, 2018, sec. Africa. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46467098.

Sixtus, Mbom. “For a Chinese Company Building Central Africa’s First Auto Plant It’s Been a Bumpy Road.” Quartz Africa. Accessed December 13, 2018. https://qz.com/africa/1113621/for-a-chinese-company-building-central-africas-first-auto-plant-its-been-a-bumpy-road/.

Thomas-Johnson, Amandla. “Museum of Black Civilisations Aims to ‘Decolonise Knowledge.’” Accessed December 13, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/museum-black-civilisations-aims-decolonise-knowledge-181204221519936.html.

Wafula, Paul. “Behind the SGR Walls.” The Standard. Accessed December 13, 2018. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001287119/exclusive-behind-the-sgr-walls.

“WTO | Trade Policy Review – Cameroon 2001.” Accessed December 13, 2018. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp170_e.htm.

李虹睿. “China-Senegal Ties behind New Heritage Museum – Chinadaily.com.cn.” Accessed December 13, 2018. //www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/10/WS5c0e1dcba310eff303290208.html.

Endnotes

^[1] Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda, “What Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?” The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer.

^[2] David Pilling, “Que cherche la Chine en investissant autant en Afrique ?” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/453084/economie/cherche-chine-investissant-autant-afrique/

^[3] Tejvan Pettinger, “Washington Consensus – Definition and Criticism – Economics Help.” Economics  Help. https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7387/economics/washington-consensus-definition-and-criticism/.

^[4] Joseph Goldstein, “Kenyans Say Chinese Investment Brings Racism and Discrimination.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/world/africa/kenya-china-racism.html.

^[5] Goldstein, “Kenyans Say Chinese Investment Brings Racism and Discrimination.”

^[6] Paul Wafula, “Behind the SGR Walls.” The Standard. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001287119/exclusive-behind-the-sgr-walls.

^[7] Wafula, “Behind the SGR Walls.”

^[8] “Senegal Unveils Museum of Black Civilisations,” BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46467098.

^[9] “Senegal Unveils Museum of Black Civilisations.”

^[10] 李虹睿. “China-Senegal Ties behind New Heritage Museum – Chinadaily.com.cn.” //www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/10/WS5c0e1dcba310eff303290208.html.

^[11] Amanda Thomas-Johnson, “Museum of Black Civilisations Aims to ‘Decolonise Knowledge.’”  Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/museum-black-civilisations-aims-decolonise-knowledge-181204221519936.html.

^[12] Martin R. Atangana, “French Capitalism and Nationalism in Cameroon.” African Studies Review 40, no. 1 (1997): 83–111.

^[13] Julius Amin, “Cameroon’s Foreign Policy Towards the United States.” Outre-Mers. Revue D’histoire 86, no. 322 (1999): 211–36.

^[14] “China, Cameroon Agree to Further Advance Relationship – Xinhua | English.news.cn.” http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/22/c_137058022_2.htm.

^[15] “China Grants CFA1.8bn to Support Populations in Southwest and Northwest Regions.” Business in Cameroon. https://www.businessincameroon.com/cooperation/2611-8613-china-grants-cfa1-8bn-to-support-populations-in-southwest-and-northwest-regions.

^[16] “Cameroon: China Grants CFA1.7bn to Help Address Crisis in North-West and South-West Regions.” Business in Cameroon. https://www.businessincameroon.com/cooperation/0309-8303-cameroon-china-grants-cfa1-7bn-to-help-address-crisis-in-north-west-and-south-west-regions.

^[17] “Cameroon: China Donates CFA3bn for Refugee Care.” Business in Cameroon. https://www.businessincameroon.com/cooperation/2509-8386-cameroon-china-donates-cfa3bn-for-refugee-care.

^[18] “China, Cameroon Sign Military Assistance Agreement | defenceWeb.” http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52447:china-cameroon-signs-military-assistance-agreement&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&Itemid=111.

^[19] “China Donates Nearly $8 Million to Cameroon’s Security Forces.” China donates nearly $8 million to Cameroon’s security forces. https://www.trtworld.com/mea/china-donates-nearly-8-million-to-cameroon-s-security-forces-19016.

^[20] Mapping Chinese Development in Africa, AFRODAD, 2011.

^[21] Kay Coles James, “Chinese Model Presents Many Pitfalls for African States.” The Heritage Foundation. /international-economies/commentary/chinese-model-presents-many-pitfalls-african-states.

^[22] “China Loans Cameroon 182 Billion CFA, Promises to Recruit 1000 Cameroonians.” BaretaNews. https://www.bareta.news/dam-warak-chinese-company-recruit-1000-cameroonians/.

^[23] Mapping Chinese Development in Africa, 2011.

^[24] “Cameroon Seeks Debt Restructuring with China.” Business in Cameroon. https://www.businessincameroon.com/cooperation/3008-8296-cameroon-seeks-debt-restructuring-with-china.

^[25] James, “Chinese Model Presents Many Pitfalls for African States.”

^[26] “Botswana : pressions de la Chine qui s’oppose à une visite du dalaï lama.” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/457623/politique/botswana-pressions-de-chine-soppose-a-visite-dalai-lama/.

^[27] “Entretiens Entre Le Président Xi Jinping Et Le Président Camerounais Paul Biya.” https://www.focac.org/fra/ttxx_2/t1570883.htm.

^[28] “Chinese Investment Dataset – China Global Investment Tracker.” AEI. http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.

^[29] World Investment Report, 2018

^[30] “WTO | Trade Policy Review – Cameroon 2001.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp170_e.htm.

^[31] “WTO | Trade Policy Review – Cameroon 2001.”

^[32] “Cameroon.” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2017/af/269713.htm.

^[33] “Foreign Investment – Cameroon – Tax, Import, Export.” Nations Encyclopedia. https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Cameroon-FOREIGN-INVESTMENT.html.

^[34] Godlove Bainkong, “Cameroon: Remarkable Chinese Presence in Cameroon.” Cameroon Tribune (Yaoundé). https://allafrica.com/stories/201803210530.html.

^[35] Bainkong, “Cameroon: Remarkable Chinese Presence in Cameroon.”

^[36] “Foreign Investment – Cameroon – Tax, Import, Export.”

^[37] “Cameroon Seeks Debt Restructuring with China”.

^[38] “Chinese Investment Dataset – China Global Investment Tracker.”

^[39] “Chinese Investment Dataset – China Global Investment Tracker.”

^[40] Mbom Sixtus, “For a Chinese Company Building Central Africa’s First Auto Plant It’s Been a Bumpy Road.” Quartz Africa. https://qz.com/africa/1113621/for-a-chinese-company-building-central-africas-first-auto-plant-its-been-a-bumpy-road/.

^[41] “Cameroon: Internet Penetration 2017 | Statistic.” Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/640127/cameroon-internet-penetration/.

^[42] Amindeh Blaise Atabong, “How China Is Restructuring Cameroon’s Burgeoning Digital Economy Sector.” Cameroon News Agency. http://cameroonnewsagency.com/how-china-is-restructuring-cameroons-burgeoning-digital-economy-sector/.

^[43] “Cameroon.” U.S. Department of State.

^[44] Atabong, “How China Is Restructuring Cameroon’s Burgeoning Digital Economy Sector.”

^[45] “Les limites du « miracle » chinois.” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/206695/societe/les-limites-du-miracle-chinois/.

^[46] Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, “The Impact of Chinese Engagement on African Countries.” In Chinese Engagement in Africa, 49.

^[47] Haunauer & Morris, 49.

^[48] Cameroon.” U.S. Department of State.

^[49] “Cameroon Shipped 135,491 m3 of Timber to China Earning Over CFA27bn between January and August 2018.” Business in Cameroon. https://www.businessincameroon.com/wood/0111-8527-cameroon-shipped-135-491-m3-of-timber-to-china-earning-over-cfa27bn-between-january-and-august-2018.

^[50] “Download Trade Data | UN Comtrade: International Trade Statistics.” https://comtrade.un.org/data/.

^[51] “AidData | Construction of Seaport via Loan. http://archive.is/tSNuB.

^[52] “AidData | Memve’ele Dam.” http://archive.is/GHsHh.

^[53] “AidData | Malaria Research Center.” http://archive.is/uVsvi.

^[54] “China Exim Bank prête plus de 310 millions d’euros au Cameroun.” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/14885/economie/china-exim-bank-pr-te-plus-de-310-millions-d-euros-au-cameroun/.

^[55] “China Loans Cameroon 182 Billion CFA, Promises to Recruit 1000 Cameroonians.”

^[56] “CFAF 85 Billion to Construct Warak Bini Dam.” Business in Cameroon. //www.businessincameroon.com/?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3561:cfaf-85-billion-to-construct-warak-bini-dam&Itemid=465&tmpl=component&print=1.

^[57] “Ports camerounais : de l’enfer de Douala à l’espoir de Kribi.” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/248871/economie/ports-camerounais-de-lenfer-de-douala-a-lespoir-de-kribi/.

^[58] “Chinese-Built Port Evokes Dreams of El Dorado in Cameroon,” Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-08-29/china-stakes-its-claim-on-west-africa.

^[59] “Cameroun : China Exim Bank va financer l’extension du port de Kribi.” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/297005/economie/cameroun-china-eximbank-va-financer-lextension-du-port-de-kribi/.

^[60] “WTO | Trade Policy Review – Cameroon 2001.”

^[61] “Cameroun : tensions entre Camerounais et Chinois sur l’exploitation industrielle de l’or.” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/553750/politique/cameroun-tensions-entre-camerounais-et-chinois-sur-lexploitation-industrielle-de-lor/.

^[62] It is important to stress that information may be censured by the government, and that dissidence against the Cameroonian government’s relationship with China. This effect is assumed to be negligible for this paper..

^[63] “AD122: China’s Growing Presence in Africa Wins Largely Positive Popular Reviews | Afrobarometer.” http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad122-chinas-growing-presence-africa-wins-largely-positive-popular-reviews.

^[64] “Entretiens Entre Le Président Xi Jinping Et Le Président Camerounais Paul Biya.”

^[65]  Amindeh Blaise Atabong, “How China is restructuring Cameroon’s burgeoning digital economy sector.” Journal du Cameroun. https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/china-restructuring-cameroons-burgeoning-digital-economy-sector/.

^[66] Atabong, “How China Is Restructuring Cameroon’s Burgeoning Digital Economy Sector.”

^[67] “Chinese-Built Port Evokes Dreams of El Dorado in Cameroon.”

^[68] “Nigerian Business Community Leaving as the Southern Cameroons Crisis Deepens.” BaretaNews. https://www.bareta.news/nigerian-business-community-leaving-as-the-southern-cameroons-crisis-deepens/.

^[69] “China Loans Cameroon 182 Billion CFA, Promises to Recruit 1000 Cameroonians.”

^[70] “La Republique Du Cameroun Citizens Rising from Political Slumber.” BaretaNews. https://www.bareta.news/la-republique-citizens-rising-slumber/.

^[71] Pilling, “Que cherche la Chine en investissant autant en Afrique ?”

^[72] “« L’Afrique risque de devenir une colonie chinoise » selon le président du Parlement européen.” JeuneAfrique.com. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/422521/politique/lafrique-se-trouve-situation-dramatique-selon-president-parlement-europeen/.

^[73] Nchanji, Nfor Hanson. “Fishing In Cameroon: A Chronicle of Administrative Corruption And Chinese Expertise.” Cameroon News Agency, September 7, 2017. http://cameroonnewsagency.com/fishing-cameroon-chronicle-administrative-corruption-chinese-expertise/.

^[74] “Cameroon Seeks Debt Restructuring with China.”

^[75] “Colonial President Paul Biya To Desperately Visit China Amidst Conflict In The Cameroons.” BaretaNews. https://www.bareta.news/colonial-president-paul-biya-desperately-visit-china-amidst-conflict-cameroons/.

^[76] Michael A. Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson. “New Data on African Health Professionals Abroad.” Human Resources for Health 6, no. 1 (January 10, 2008): 1.

A Comparative Analysis between Current US-China Relations and US-Soviet Competition during the Cold War

“It is in the spirit, the spirit of ’76, that I ask you to rise and join me in a toast to Chairman Mao, to Premier Zhou, to the people of our two countries, and to the hope of our children that peace and harmony can be the legacy of our generation to theirs.” – President Richard Nixon, Feb 25, 1972

Written by Jenn Hu, from Stanford University

Abstract

With US-China tensions increasing dramatically in past years, many have speculated a new Cold War is emerging between the two countries, with headlines reading, “US & China relations: Cold War II”, increasing in prevalence. Political leaders on both sides of the Pacific have been eager to project the past onto the present, repeating calls for containment and an increased defense spending.

This paper thus aims to address two principal questions. First, what are the key similarities and differences between Cold War and current Sino-American Relations? Second, furthering the last question: is the Cold War an analogous historical event that can help us understand and formulate policies to shape US-China relations today? In addressing these questions, this paper will analyze the militaristic, economic, and ideological fronts of both relationships to determine whether the lens of the Cold War is meaningful in viewing US-China relations today.

Ultimately, this paper recognizes the many similarities apparent between Cold War tensions and current Sino-American relations that allow analysts to easily make hasty comparisons between the past and the present. There are, however, many fundamental differences that make these comparisons inappropriate at best, or even dangerous. Nonetheless, this paper concludes that there is value in seeking to gain a greater understanding of the core of great power rivalries through the lens of the Cold War; we should learn from the mistakes of the Cold War, rather than seek to emulate it, when formulating policy that will shape the Sino-American relationship of tomorrow.

I. Introduction: Friends to Cut-Throat Rivals?

In the spring of 1972, Nixon gave a toast  marking what would become an unforgettable turning point in US-China relations for the remaining quarter of the 20^th Century. He saluted, “to Chairman Mao, to Premier Zhou, to the people of our two countries, and to the hope of our children that peace and harmony can be the legacy of our generation to theirs”.^[1] However, the 21^st century rise of China has led to an increase in tensions between the two countries,  once again illustrating the fleeting and transient nature of international relations. With the onset of a trade war, armed conflict in the South China Sea, and a burgeoning Sino-American soft power rivalry, a new era of Sino-American competition has shoved the legacy of 1972 into the shadows.

As the tensions between the two powers increase, many have speculated that a new Cold War is emerging. It is easy to assume such a comparison is an appropriate one; after all, China has replaced the U.S.S.R. as the biggest communist country in the world, following the Fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991. The White House seems overly eager to apply the past to the present, with Washington continuously employing Cold War rhetoric when addressing the “China Question” – how to respond to China’s rise. The Trump administration has accused China of projecting its power in Asia and beyond, beckoning the United States to take action against China’s seemingly vindictive ambitions. Trump asserts, “China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific…calling for sustained US leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.”^[2] This is not unlike Kennan’s call to action in 1947 in “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, where he proclaimed that the increasing signs of Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe “would itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.”^[3]

China, on one hand, has responded in kind, though not as blatantly, with extravagant shows of its military prowess among other assertions, while on the other hand, has denounced Washington for its “Cold War mentality”, urging the US to abandon such “outdated notions.”^[4] Academic works attempting to explain the nature of US-China relations today also draw inevitable references to the Cold War, as it was the only other example of bipolar competition within recent history.^[5] However, despite these constant flashbacks to the Cold War, historically-focused comparisons of Sino-American relations today to the American-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War remain uncommon.

This paper thus aims to address two principal questions. First, what are the key similarities and differences between the two relationships? Second, given those similarities and differences, is the Cold War a relevant historical event to help us accurately understand and formulate policies to shape current US-China relations? Addressing these questions is not only necessary in gaining an objective and nuanced understanding of US-China relations beyond the Cold War, it is also crucial in formulating an appropriate and cohesive foreign policy to deal with the rise of US-China hostilities today. This paper aims to analyze the military, economic, geopolitical, and ideological fronts of both rivalries, and to explore the challenges inherent in using the lens of the Cold War to view US-China relations today. However, there is value in looking towards the Cold War to gain a greater understanding of the root of superpower competition. This paper recommends that others learn from the mistakes of the Cold War, rather than to model current strategies after Cold War strategy in formulating the Sino-American policies of tomorrow.

II. Characteristics of the Cold War: A Brief Look at History

It is important to establish the characteristics defining US-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Prior to 1945, the US and the Soviet Union were allies in World War II.^[6] However, without a common enemy, the alliance began to break down shortly after the war ended. Tensions began to rise as the US and the Soviet Union planned for Europe’s reconstruction and rehabilitation after the devastating conflict, eventually leading to the division of Europe into two diametrically opposing blocs, which espoused mutually exclusive ideologies and rival economic and political systems.^[7]

As superpower relations deteriorated further, the Cold War started to be defined as a zero-sum competition between the US and the Soviet Union, taking place within territorial, military, economic and political domains.^[8] This competition manifested in many forms, including a nuclear arms race, intense competition for influence in the developing world, and the implementation of the American Containment policy, among other effects.^[9]

Lastly, it is also important to highlight the paramount drivers behind this period of acute tensions between the USSR and the US: mutual distrust, suspicion, and misunderstanding.^[10] US-Soviet cooperation originally broke down due to mutual misinterpretation of intentions by the two parties – the Soviet Union’s attempt to create for itself a buffer zone was perceived by the US as an attempt to establish hegemony in Europe, while the Marshall Plan was viewed by the USSR as a form of American imperialism.^[11] This underlying distrust governed US-Soviet relations for the remaining half of the century until the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

III. Economic Relations: Mutually Exclusive Blocs or Economic Interdependence?

In the late 1940s,  US-Soviet distrust emerged as a result of ideological and political concerns, with both parties suspicious of each other’s attempts to spread their political models in the European continent and abroad. However, when one refers to “China’s rise” today, more often than not, they are referring to China’s growing economic strength. This is not at all surprising. In 1980, China had 10 percent of America’s GDP as measured by purchasing power parity.^[12] By 2016, China’s numbers have surpassed those of the US, standing at 115 percent of America’s GDP.^[13] Today, China’s reserves are 28 times larger than America’s.^[14] This rapid flight up the global economic ladder, with the accompanying relative decline of the US economy especially following 2008, or the perception as such, has fueled American fears of losing its place as the world’s most economically powerful country.^[15] Given this current state of affairs, it is only natural for a large part of the US-China competition to take place in the economic domain.

The global economy also served as a major battleground for the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Following the conclusion of World War II, Europe saw the rise of two economic systems; one founded on capitalism and free markets, and the other founded on communism and central planning. The implementation of the Marshall Plan by the US and the subsequent formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid by the Soviet Union concretized this economic division, splitting Europe up into two mutually exclusive economic blocs.^[16]

Today, the Sino-American economic relationship seems to be following a similar trajectory, marked by China’s launching of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); a project to recreate the old Silk Road which spanned across Asia and the Middle East.^[17] More importantly, as part of the BRI, China’s plans to directly contribute to the infrastructural development of the countries that will span the trade route, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, by providing investment and Chinese expertise.^[18] This is further heightened by China’s formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank that aims to support the building of infrastructure in Asia in 2013.^[19] Should it come to fruition, the BRI and the AIIB could break the monopoly that the current US-dominated Bretton Woods system^[20] has over aiding countries in their economic and infrastructural development.^[21]

The US has hitherto opposed the AIIB and the BRI by dissuading its European and Asian allies from joining, perceiving it as an attempt by China to start a new economic order outside the US dominated global economic and financial system.^[22] This, in turn, has only served to vindicate existing views within China about US economic containment.^[23] As a result, in this self-constructed zero-sum game, the Chinese dragon believes that has no choice but to sharpen her claws while the American eagle lurks behind her, ramping up efforts to establish a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with its neighboring Asian countries.^[24] These competing initiatives and responses today are similar to the game of ping pong that took place during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, with each side trying to respond to the other with increasingly intense efforts to gain economic superiority on the world stage.^[25] Through this, we are beginning to see the inklings of two clear trade blocs spearheaded by the US and China respectively, not unlike the ones that arose during the Cold War.

Despite these similarities, a key difference between the economic relationships of the two rivalries lies within the extent to which the two states are economically interdependent. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its close allies had remarkably little economic intercourse with the West.^[26] However, the same cannot be said for China, which is not only deeply integrated into the world economy, but also actively engages with American businesses and multinational corporations; bilateral trade between the US and China in goods and services alone amounts to close to 700 billion dollars.^[27] The risk of escalating economic competition between the US and China is further diluted by the strong economic ties the two nations have both to each other, and to the rest of the world. American attempts to dissuade their European allies from joining the AIIB were mostly futile, revealing that these European countries saw no real benefit in playing to this artificially constructed zero-sum competition between China and the US.^[28] Such sentiments, as a result of a high-level of interdependence, therefore greatly decrease the chances of mutually exclusive blocs forming within the economic sphere.

Owing to this high level of economic interdependence, treating trade relations as a zero-sum game can be destructive to both parties. The recent trade war between the US and China is evidence of this. This series of tit-for-tat tariffs started when the US imposed tariffs on all imports of steel and aluminum to pressure China to change its trade practices prompted Beijing to retaliate accordingly. Most recently, Washington has imposed tariffs on another $16 billion USD worth of Chinese goods, and Beijing has responded with tariffs on $16 billion USD worth of American goods.^[29] President Trump’s tweet, in 140 characters, sums up the zero-sum mentality that underlies the origins of this trade war: “Our markets are surging, theirs are collapsing. We will soon be taking Billions in Tariffs & making products at home.”^[30] However, reality is far from this. American tariffs are, in part, achieving their purpose by complicating China’s efforts to fix its economy^[31], though they have done little to reduce America’s trade deficit.^[32] Tariffs from both sides are also pressuring profits and driving production costs for American companies, inflicting the most harm onto American firms operating in China.^[33] This dichotomous approach towards bilateral trade and investment has therefore so far only resulted in losers, and it seems that any victory gained would be a pyrrhic one. 

In all, it is clear that US-Soviet and US-China relations are disparate on the economic front. Despite a few similarities at first glance, it is unlikely that economic competition between the US and China will lead to two mutually exclusive economic blocs–a characteristic that defined economic relations during the Cold War. The US and China therefore cannot, and should not, treat the economic competition as a zero-sum game, as it will not only hurt US and China, but it will also hurt the world economy, as both countries are central to global trade and investment. Instead, they should work towards cooperating with each other on a more extensive and meaningful level, as it has been proven in the past that economic collaboration and compromise is possible, and can benefit both parties.

IV. Nuclear and Military Competition: A Different Game Altogether

Though economic competition and trade conflicts can be debilitative to the global economy, they are nowhere catastrophic as a nuclear war. The nuclear annihilation that arose as a result of the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union defined the Cold War.^[34] This race arguably began with the dropping of the two American atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed shortly by first Soviet nuclear bomb test in 1949.^[35] Though progress was made to curb the arms race to avoid mass destruction, such as the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty, such progress proved to be minimal and futile.^[36] These treaties bore key limitations, allowing arms buildup to continue regardless.^[37]

The current nuclear arms race between US and China bears many similarities to the arms race of the Cold War, with Cary Huang, a senior editor for the South China Morning Post, explicitly stating, “The resurrection of a Cold War-style nuclear arms race is obvious”.^[38] In its just released Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump Administration called for the strengthening of its nuclear deterrence to counter the “growing threat” of China.^[39] Xi Jinping also recently unveiled his ambitious program to build a “world-class” military by 2050, and his calls for expanding the country’s nuclear arsenal are becoming louder.^[40]

These signs of Cold War behavior do not only exist within the rhetorical space of these political leaders. In January 2018, the US Missile Defense Agency tested a Standard Missile-3 Block IIA variant interceptor.^[41] Days later, China test fired a Dong Neng-3 Interceptor, announcing to the world that China’s indigenous ballistic missile capabilities are advancing at “breakneck speed”.^[42]In Beijing, there remains a concern that the US is attempting to contain China with a network of ballistic missile defense systems around Asia, while the White House is preoccupied with the fear of a China eager to dilute American hegemony in the region.^[43] This is reminiscent of the Cold War, where the American development of Intercontinental Continental Ballistic Missile was frantically met with the Soviet development of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) to show military supremacy on the world stage.^[44] It would thus be reasonable to make the assumption that the US and China are returning to the old ways of the Cold War that brought about widespread fear so many decades ago.

However, the similarities end at the microscopic level. The place that the arms race takes in the broader Sino-American relationship is different in nature as compared to that of the US and the Soviet Union. China’s biggest strength is not its nuclear arsenal, but its sheer economic weight—a fact of which Beijing is very well aware. China’s attitude towards the use of military force, according to Dr. Henry Kissinger, is founded on the philosophy that underpins the board game, Go: warfare is almost always the option of last resort.^[45] According to another expert, Dr. David Lai, such a frame of thought differs fundamentally from the Western philosophical paradigm of warfare. He notes, “In Western tradition, there is a heavy emphasis on the use of force; the art of war is largely limited to the battlefields; and the way to fight is force on force.”^[46] On the other hand, Sun Tzu, the Chinese grand master of military strategy, emphasizes strategy, and focuses on diplomacy to force an enemy into submission.

This divergence in attitudes is evident today, as the US accounts for 35% of global military expenditures, more than the next seven highest-spending countries combined.^[47] On the other hand, though China has been increasing its military budget, it primarily uses its economic power to tip the balance in its favor in areas where military force would traditionally feature prominently. China’s changing strategy in relation to the Taiwan Question illustrates this clearly. Learning from the lessons of the three Taiwan Straits Crises of 1955, 1958, and 1995-1996, China has moved away from military strategies, instead using economic incentives to strong-arm countries into abandoning diplomatic ties with Taiwan. El Salvador most recently broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan in August 2018, the third country to do so in 2018 alone, signing a document establishing relations with China, agreeing to abide by the one-China principle with “no pre-conditions.”^[48] Unsurprisingly, in explaining the reason behind this decision, the El Salvadoran President Salvador Sanchez did not fail to mention China’s economic strength, stating that El Salvador would see “great benefits” and “extraordinary opportunities” in the new relationship with Beijing, as “China is the second-biggest economy in the world with permanent growth and its achievements in different fields position it among the most successful countries.”^[49]

Current Sino-American relations are  game of Go, not a game of chess. As such, one would expect a hot war to be the more unlikely outcome of the intensifying rivalry, given that China sees the use of military force as an option of last resort. However, this might not be the case. The difference in expectations and attitudes might instead give rise to misunderstandings that can have catastrophic consequences. Consider this: The US continues to heighten its military presence in Asia. This, to the US, might be seen as the most natural and obvious means to balance China’s growing dominance in the region and abroad. What the US takes to be a natural development of its role in the international community can be seen by Beijing as an attempt to encircle China. In response, China might briefly consider economic or diplomatic options. However, they would most likely respond to America’s growing military involvement with its own form of military force. As military force is seen as option of last resort to China, they might take the arms race to be a matter of life or death, as compared to the US, which might see the arms race as just another domain in the Sino-American competition. To China, the possibility of surviving a nuclear attack, and by extension, earning victory in a nuclear conflict, would look promising as compared to a return to the “Century of Humiliation” at best, and the elimination of the PRC altogether at worst. The threat of a war, conventional or otherwise, could therefore very quickly erupt into nuclear catastrophe.

This might seem to be a ludicrous scenario. However, it is not entirely far-fetched. Some Chinese military officers still quote Mao’s audacious claim that even after losing 300 million citizens in a nuclear exchange, China would still survive.^[50] Hence, there are indications that MAD (mutually assured destruction) is not a given in this case, raising the possibility of a nuclear conflict between the two nations as a result of this discrepancy in expectations and underlying assumptions. Graham Allison, in his Destined for War, therefore advises US and Chinese political leaders to engage in “candid conversations”, to help leaders on both sides internalize the unnatural truth that war (conventional or otherwise) is no longer an acceptable option for nuclear powers.^[51] They should also build a set of mutually shared assumptions, to ensure that both sides are on the same page, playing with the same rules, on the same game board.

Another possibility to build stronger Sino-American relations on this front is to look at another fundamental difference between the nuclear arms race of today and the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race dominated the spotlight on the stage that was the Soviet-American relationship; the Soviet Union was America’s largest nuclear threat, and vice versa. However, today, it is harder for one to say the same for China and the US. In the recent years, notably since 2003 when it withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the DPRK has consistently positioned itself as America’s most immediate nuclear threat. At the height of tensions between the US and the DPRK in 2017, when both parties were exchanging increasingly aggressive nuclear threats, the American Ambassador to China asserted that “North Korea is the biggest threat to humankind right now and China and the US can stop it”^[52], showing that China and the US have many more opportunities to collaborate to curb the threat of other growing nuclear powers than those which meet the eye. This statement also indicates China is not consistently America’s biggest military threat, giving Washington more political leeway to collaborate with China in this domain. The rise of other nuclear powers adds complexity to the global nuclear landscape which should not be ignored. Political leaders on both sides of the pacific should not perpetuate the Sino-American nuclear arms race, falling back on the pure zero-sum bipolar competition that dominated the Cold War. They should instead hinge upon chances for cooperation to bring about a more peaceful world.

V. Ideological and Geopolitical Rivalry: Rising Nationalism and other Considerations 

It is undeniable that superpower nuclear race and economic rivalry were key aspects of the Cold War. However, to many, the Cold War remains a primarily ideological competition: a struggle between “good” and “evil”. Communism and liberal capitalism were potent ideological foes not only because they offered fundamentally opposing views about how society should be ordered, but also because both American and Soviet leaders respectively thought democracy and communism were exportable political models that could expedite development and human progress.^[53]

At first glance, one might assume that the Sino-American rivalry would embody that ideological conflict, since American democracy and free markets clash with China’s designation as a communist country. However, these ideological differences do not affect that relationship in the profound it affected the US-Soviet relationship. China has embraced a market-based economy and does not seek to spread and assert the superiority of the communist system in the way that the Soviet Union did. Lee Kuan Yew aptly sums up this observation, stating, “Unlike US-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the US and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market.”^[54]

Nonetheless, a different kind of ideological conflict might emerge between the US and China–one driven by nationalism.^[55] In the last decade, Chinese leaders have come to rely much more heavily on nationalism to maintain public support for the regime, seeing that communist ideology has decreased in relevance after China opened itself to the global economy.^[56] Not only has nationalism become a stronger force in China in recent years, its content has also changed in important ways; China has since positioned itself as a victim of aggression by the world’s other powers, seeking to overturn its “Century of Humiliation” and reassert its historically dominant position in Asia.^[57] American nationalism is also at an all-time high, with the election of Donald Trump and the popularity of his campaign slogan, “America First”, as a manifestation of America’s growing insecurities about its relative decline in domestic and international realms.^[58]

As a result of this phenomenon, China is increasingly eager to gain geopolitical influence and soft power, while the US has become increasingly adamant in maintaining its hegemonic position. This fundamental clash of interests has primarily manifested itself in developing sub-regions such as Latin America and the African continent. Over the past 15 years, China has become the most significant new economic actor in these sub-regions, with China most recently pledging $60 billion USD of financing aid to African countries, with “no political conditions attached.”^[59] However, critics remain skeptical, seeing China’s increasing economic involvement with these countries as a means of promoting the Chinese experience in governance and development abroad. These attempts to export the “China model”, which has also been termed “authoritarian capitalism”, have been perceived by Washington to be part of an effort by China to threaten the influence of American “liberal-democracy” in these developing areas, “challenging and supplanting US hegemony”.^[60]

Thus, at first glance, this conflict and competition between political models would seem similar to that of the Cold War; where both the US and the Soviet Union competed for ideological and political influence in the Third World. However, such a comparison is complicated by two key factors. Firstly, the level of involvement that both countries have in these regions is not as overtly intense as that of the US and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the US and the USSR did not only finance political parties and militias that were aligned to their respective ideological and political models, they also provided military aid and training for opposition groups to launch guerilla wars to supplant existing regimes.^[61] However, in the present moment, the US and China are mostly involved in these countries through economic aid, and though the US has employed military force to overturn regimes in the 21^st Century, this has yet to be done in direct response to China’s growing presence in these areas.

Secondly, this comparison is further complicated by the fact that though the US sees China’s growing political and ideological influence as a threat to American soft power and geopolitical influence, they nevertheless acknowledge the fact that China has yet to cross any red lines that warrant an extensive response on America’s part. America’s perspective of this has been articulated by a Brookings Institute Report that states, “For now, China’s rise has not unduly harmed core US national security interests in the Western Hemisphere, but it has challenged US influence and warrants continued attention”.^[62] This is unlike the Cold War, where the US and the Soviet Union saw the spread of the other ideology as an existential security threat, and it is for this reason that the US and the USSR embroiled themselves in the Korean and Vietnam War, among other proxy wars^[63].^[64]

These complications render it difficult to make a compelling case that the two rivalries are comparable, despite the fact the current trajectory of US-China relations in the ideological realm seems to tend towards a Cold War-like competition in the developing world. However, this discrepancy is more to do with the fact that this aspect of competition is still in its premature stages than with fundamental differences between the US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War and the US-China rivalry of today. Though there are indications that an increasingly conspicuous Chinese presence is bringing social disruptions that will inevitably spill over into the political realm, the overall political effect of China’s heavy investment in Latin America and Africa remains to be seen, as compared to the significant political upheavals that took place during the Cold War as a result of the superpower rivalry. Discussions must also take place to decide when and if an intensified American presence would be an appropriate response to Chinese involvement in African and Latin American contexts. Nonetheless, with the passing of time and the discovery of further evidence–especially regarding the impact of China’s actions in the developing world–a more thorough examination of the case can be made in the future. As such, this paper recommends academia and media to refrain from comparing the Cold War and US-China competition on this front for the time being, encouraging politicians to acknowledge the current trajectory of the US-China rivalry in order to prevent conflict and unnecessary entanglement in the developing world as a result of this emerging ideological competition.

VI. Broader Insights and Recommendations

Overall, in analyzing US-China relations today, it is evident that there are interesting similarities between the US-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War and the US-China rivalry of today in militaristic, economic, and ideological domains. Nevertheless, these similarities exist mostly on the surface. Graham Allison summarized this aptly,

“The temptation to find a fascinating precedent, conclude that the rise of China is “just like that,” and move directly to apply a prescription is itself a trap. As my late colleague Ernest May never tires of saying, the differences matter at least as much as the similarities.”^[65]

In this case, the fundamental differences between the two rivalries render any sort of superficial comparison unproductive, or even dangerous. It is unwise to examine the US-China relationship in silo; one must also take the broader nature of geopolitics today into account. In the 21^st Century, geopolitical power is no longer concentrated in the hands of two great powers as it was during the Cold War, when the US and the USSR were the dominating powers of the world. Today, strong regional powers, such as, Japan, India, or states in the European Union, when united together, have the geopolitical clout and potential to shift the balance of power against either of the two powers.^[66] The state of the world today is thus not solely dependent on the US or China; other state actors have to be taken into account as well. In such a multipolar world, it is therefore near impossible for America or China to sufficiently combine allies and neighbors against each other, limiting the possibilities for containment and a purely Cold War style bipolar competition between the two countries.       

Despite these various differences, there is an important similarity to glean from the two rivalries. Looking back on the analysis of the three domains, it becomes clear there are common factors fueling friction and hostilities on all fronts of the US-China rivalry: mutual suspicion, distrust, and misunderstanding. On the military front, “almost anything China does to improve its military capabilities will be seen in Beijing as defensive in nature, but in Tokyo, Hanoi and Washington, it will appear offensive in nature,”^[67] while American efforts to increase its military presence in Asia will be seen in Beijing as an effort to encircle and contain China. On the economic front, similar insecurities and suspicions towards China’s increasing economic influence has prompted the United States to declare a trade war on China in early 2018, which has only served to fuel further antagonism between the two countries. The same can be said with regards to China’s efforts to expand its influence in the developing world and America’s efforts to maintain a dominant position in the global sphere. 

This is not unlike the US-Soviet relationship, where American perceptions of Soviet aggression, and Soviet fears of American encirclement led to a series of strategic miscalculations that served only to perpetuate distrust and non-cooperation between the two superpowers.^[68] A lack of mutual understanding therefore seems to be the underlying and fundamental driver of hostilities in both relationships, and understanding how this fuels the US-Soviet rivalry can be the key to understanding US-China relations today beyond superficial comparisons.

As such, the policies of the Cold War should not, and must not, be seen as a model for formulating current foreign policy. Instead, politicians and policy makers must learn from the past mistakes of the Cold War, and endeavor to develop clear lines of communication, build on mutual understanding on all three fronts, and establish people-to-people exchanges. This is particularly the case given that America and China are still heavily interconnected, especially economically. Treating such a relationship as a zero-sum game has only proven to inflict harm on both countries, as  the negative impacts of the ongoing trade war have illustrated on both sides; such a mentality would only produce losers and pyrrhic victories. We should therefore work towards fostering a US-China relationship built on cooperation while this relationship still exists, rather than allowing it to follow the footsteps of the US-Soviet relationship after 1945, towards a point of no return.

VII. Conclusion

This paper concludes that it is mostly unproductive to employ the lens of the Cold War to view US-China relations in the manner that the press and politicians are doing so today. The binary mode of thought that pervaded the Cold War is strongly deterministic and oversimplifies complexity, “setting up almost a framework for promoting false choices within this narrative” (Kausikan).^[69]

However, it is important to note that the Cold War is not entirely irrelevant in understanding US-China relations. Beyond surface-level comparisons, we can more easily understand and project the future of US-China relations by looking at the way mutual misunderstandings and insecurities similarly fueled hostilities between the US and the Soviet Union, learning lessons from the past to bring about a better future. Further investigations should also be carried out to articulate how specific mistakes made during the Cold War can be avoided, and how policies for cooperation during the Cold War can be implemented in a way that takes into account the differences in geopolitics today. Ultimately, this paper encourages the US and China to avoid looking to the past to borrow solutions for the present and the future, and instead, endeavor towards developing a new long-term model of great power relations that can benefit US, China, and the world.

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Endnotes

^[1] President (1969-1974 : Nixon), Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President (Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1971), 374.

^[2] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington: President of the U.S, 2017. 46.

^[3] George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-78.

^[4] “China Condemns US ‘Cold War Mentality’ on National Security.”, BBC News, December 19, 2017.

^[5] For example, Jude Woodward’s The US vs. China: Asia’s New Cold War?,  The Tragedy of Great Power Politics by John Mearsheimer, and The Contest of the Century by Geoff Dyer. 

^[6] John L. Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 1.

^[7] Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 7.

^[8] James R. Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO), xiii.

^[9]Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide, xiii.

^[10] Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 4.

^[11] Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 5.

^[12] Andrea Willige, “The World’s Top Economy: The US vs China in Five Charts,” World Economic Forum, accessed September 14, 2018, http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/.  

^[13] Willege, “The World’s Top Economy”.

^[14] Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 7.

^[15] John Woodward, The US vs. China: The New Cold War? (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 5.

^[16] Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide, xxiv.

^[17] Yu Cheng, Lilei Song, and Lihe Huang. The Belt & Road Initiative in the Global Arena: Chinese and European Perspectives (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 3.

^[18] Cheng, Song, and Huang, The Belt & Road Initiative in the Global Arena, 3.

^[19] David Dollar. “The AIIB and the ‘One Belt, One Road’,” Brookings, September 07, 2017, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-aiib-and-the-one-belt-one-road/.

^[20] Consists of international financial and economic institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

^[21] Dollar, “The AIIB and the ‘One Belt, One Road’.”

^[22] Ibid.

^[23] Fu Ying, “How Chinese and Americans Are Misreading Each Other — And Why It Matters,” The Huffington Post, September 09, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fu-ying/chinese-americans-misread_b_8105040.html.

^[24] Alexander Denmark, “A New Era of Intensified U.S.-China Competition,” Wilson Center, January 16, 2018, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/new-era-intensified-us-china-competition.

^[25] Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide, 135.

^[26] John J. Mearsheimer,  “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 393.

^[27] Allison,  Destined for War, 7.

^[28] Andrew Higgins and David E. Sanger. “3 European Powers Say They Will Join China-Led Bank,” The New York Times, March 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/18/business/france-germany-and-italy-join-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank.html.

^[29] Business Insider, “Trump Reportedly Wants to Push Forward with Tariffs on $200 Billion Worth of Chinese Goods despite New Trade Talks,” Business Insider Singapore, September 14, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.sg/trump-china-trade-war-tariffs-goods-200-billion-talks-2018-9/.

^[30] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “The Wall Street Journal has it wrong, we are under no pressure to make a deal with China, they are under pressure to make a deal with us. Our markets are surging, theirs are collapsing. We will soon be taking in Billions in Tariffs & making products at home. If we meet, we meet?,” Twitter, September 13, 2018, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1040242677877551104.

^[31] Weizhen Tan, “US-China Trade War’s Impact on China’s Economy,” July 18, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/us-china-trade-wars-impact-on-chinas-economy.html.

^[32]David Dollar, “As the Trade War Worsens, the Trade Deficit Increases,” Brookings Institute, August 16, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/as-the-trade-war-worsens-the-trade-deficit-increases/.

^[33]“U.S. Firms in China Feeling ‘clear and Far Reaching’ Trade War…,” Reuters, September 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-survey/u-s-firms-in-china-feeling-clear-and-far-reaching-trade-war-pinch-survey-idUSKCN1LT049.

^[34] Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide, xiv.

^[35] Ibid.

^[36]Michael Krepon, “Has Arms Control Worked?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6, no. 4 (1 May 1989): 27–28 .

^[37] Krepon, “Has Arms Control Worked?”, 27-28.

^[38] Cary Huang, “Why China Will Go Full Steam Ahead in Nuclear Arms Race,” South China Morning Post. February 13, 2018, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2133033/why-china-will-go-full-steam-ahead-nuclear-arms-race.

^[39] Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Defense, 2010.

^[40] Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Speech, Beijing, October 18, 2017, Xinhua, www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.html.

^[41]Ankit Panda, “China and the United States Worry About Each Other Missile Defense Intentions. So Why Not Talk?” The Diplomat, March 4, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/china-and-the-united-states-worry-about-each-other-missile-defense-intentions-so-why-not-talk/.

^[42] Panda, “China and the United States Worry About Each Other Missile Defense Intentions.”

^[43] Ibid.

^[44] Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide, 142.

^[45] Henry Kissinger and Penguin, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 20.

^[46] David Lai, “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi:” (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, May 1, 2004), https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA423419, 5.

^[47] STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE., SIPRI YEARBOOK 2018 : Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. ([S.l.]: OXFORD UNIV PRESS, 2018).

^[48] Goh Sui Noi, “Taiwan Loses Third Diplomatic Ally This Year after El Salvador Breaks Ties,”, News, The Straits Times, August 21, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-set-to-lose-its-third-diplomatic-ally-this-year-source.

^[49] Goh, “Taiwan Loses Third Diplomatic Ally This Year”.

^[50]Philip Taubman and Special To the New York Times, “Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used on G.I.’s,” The New York Times, February 22, 1988, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/22/world/gromyko-says-mao-wanted-soviet-a-bomb-used-on-gi-s.html.

^[51] Allison,  Destined for War, 209.

^[52]Holly Ellyatt Cutmore Eunice Yoon, Geoff, “North Korea the ‘biggest Threat to Humankind’ Right Now, Top US Diplomat Says,” December 6, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/06/north-korea-the-biggest-threat-to-the-humankind-right-now-top-us-diplomat-says.html.

^[53] Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm,” 393.

^[54] Lee Kuan Yew, “Speech by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew at the US-ASEAN Business Council’s 25th Anniversary Gala Dinner in Washington DC, 27 October 2009,” Government Website, Embassy of the Republic of Singapore, accessed September 18, 2018, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/washington/newsroom/press_statements/2009/200910/press_200910.html.

^[55] John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 516.

^[56] Mark Beeson, “Can the US and China Coexist in Asia?” Current History, (September 2016): 203.

^[57] Beeson, “Can the US and China Coexist in Asia?”, 203.

^[58] Gerald F. Seib, “Trump Plunges Ahead With America-First, Nationalist Approach,” The Wall Street Journal, April 03, 2018, http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-plunges-ahead-with-america-first-nationalist-approach-1522793064.

^[59] Anna Fifield, “China Pledges $60 Billion in Aid and Loans to Africa, No ‘Political Conditions Attached’ – The Washington Post,” Washington Post, September 3, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-pledges-60-billion-in-aid-and-loans-to-africa-no-strings-attached/2018/09/03/a446af2a-af88-11e8-a810-4d6b627c3d5d_story.html?utm_term=.a04c4afa9842.

^[60] Ted Piccone, “The Geopolitics of China’s Rise in Latin America,” Brookings. February 22, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america/. 

^[61] Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide, 424.

^[62] Piccone, “The Geopolitics of China’s Rise in Latin America.”

^[63] Truman famously remarked, “Korea is a small country, thousands of miles away, but what is happening there is important to every American.. An act of aggression such as this creates a very real danger to the security of all free nations.”

^[64] Arnold, Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide, xxvi.

^[65] Graham Allison, Destined for War, pg. 218.

^[66] Bilahari Kausikan, “How Not to Think about Geopolitics in East Asia,” The Straits Times, June 01, 2018, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/how-not-to-think-about-geopolitics-in-east-asia.

^[67] John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The National Interest, June 05, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=8.

^[68] Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 4.

^[69] Kausikan, “How Not to Think about Geopolitics in East Asia.”

Written by Karen “Ken” Krmoyan

Abstract

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been waging war on the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh since the 1990s. The long-lasting, frozen conflict has resulted in ethnic strife and fundamental hatred on the individual level in the citizens of both Caucasian countries. What shapes this sentiment on a more individual level has received limited attention. This study argues that having democratic values and ideals translates into having a less hostile attitude towards the other nation amongst citizens of Armenia and Azerbaijan — and more so in Armenia than in Azerbaijan.  By using the chi-squared test of independence and ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit regressions for both the Armenian and Azerbaijani datasets, this study provides evidence in favor of the suggested mechanism. The findings have both optimistic and pessimistic implications with regard to the potential of reduced individual-level hostility in the future. Future research should improve limitations of data operationalization in an attempt to further test the conclusions of this study.

Introduction: What Can “Break the Ice”?

A Story of Two Caucasian Peoples

Upon becoming Secretary-General of the Communist Party in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev transformed the Soviet Union. With the launching of a new economic program known as perestroika (restructuring) and a policy called glasnost (openness), the new leader of the USSR set the stage — intentionally or otherwise — for the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 1988.[1] What Gorbachev did by allowing a more open stance on public discourse and loosening the state grasp of the media was, essentially, the unearthing of the decades-long nationalistic feelings in the Caucasus successfully silenced by his predecessors, most notably Stalin. The result was a nationalist movement that kick-started in the Armenian capital Yerevan in 1987 and led to a bloodshed, ongoing as of May 2018.

Tracing the roots of the conflict, one must go back to the formation of the Soviet Union. After the Caucasian republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan were Sovietized in 1921, the ‘Treaty of Brotherhood and Friendship’ was signed between the Soviet Union and the newly created Republic of Turkey.[2] The treaty agreed that the Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh (then, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) was to be placed under the control of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), Turkey’s newly formed sister-country. (Ironically, representatives from neither the Armenian SSR nor the Azerbaijani SSR were involved.) However, the Armenian SSR was not able to counteract Moscow, especially with the beginning of Stalin’s reign who made sure “to divide the Caucasian peoples to prevent unified resistance”[3]. Thus, it was after Mr. Gorbachev’s policies that ultimately gave birth to a war frozen in nature. The conflict is termed “frozen” since, as Gahramanova puts it, “neither the central state nor the international community recognized the secession and there is no agreed political settlement”.[4] On the one hand, Armenians fight for their right of self-determination and territorial integrity, pushing the international community to recognize the region as an independent state or part of the Republic of Armenia.[5] On the other hand, Azerbaijan pushes for territorial integrity from its own perspective, arguing that the Armenians are “latecomers” and that Armenia occupied and is still in illegitimate control of Azerbaijani land after the ceasefire in 1994.[6]

The fact that the countries are involved in a seemingly unsolvable situation is mirrored on the individual, micro-level as well. From the commencement of the conflict in 1994, it was “deep anguish and simmering discontent” that gave birth to the “riots and street demonstrations” in the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh capitals.[7] Similar, often even more violent manifestations of ethnic pride and nationalism from the Azerbaijani sides also took place, most notably in a town 32 kilometers away from capital Baku called Sumgait. It is estimated that in February 1988 “some 30 ethnic Armenians had been killed in a pogrom”[8] and there was an unofficial report by a Soviet journalist that “an Armenian girl was burnt alive; her charred torso was later dragged and mutilated on the street.”[9]

The demonstrations of nationalistic sentiment and hatred on the individual level are, however, often taken for granted. Literature on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is focused on the nature of the conflict and is oftentimes approached as a case study for “frozen” conflicts (like, conflicts in Crimea, India and Pakistan, the Koreas, and South Ossetia) from the perspective of warfare and diplomacy. Yet, in a conflict of such accentuated ethnic strife, exploring what constitutes the sentiment towards the other nation on an individual level is equally crucial.

Democratic Attitudes: Explaining Patterns in Ethnic Strife

Democratic values are among those that can influence one’s attitudes towards another nation. There have been some recent studies on democratic attitudes, one of the most notable being that of Ariely and Davidov which tried to establish a cross-national comparative method of estimating democratic attitudes.[10] Other scholars, Sullivan et al. explore democratic attitudes and tolerance towards certain population groups, like communists and atheists.[11] One aspect that has received relatively less attention is how democracy and having democratic attitudes affects one’s view of a specific ethnic group. That is the matter of this study that argues that, in the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, having democratic values makes an individual more accepting of the other nationality. As part of a secondary goal, this study argues that the established framework of democratic-ethnic attitudes holds in the case of Armenia more strongly than in Azerbaijan.

Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework and previous research on democratic attitudes, ethnicity-related attitudes, and where the two meet. Section 3 operationalizes the main independent and dependent variables and shows some trends in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2011-13. Section 4 runs the rigorous statistical analysis based on the χ² test of independence and ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit regressions for both the Armenian and Azerbaijani datasets. Section 5 concludes.

Where Democratic and Ethnic Attitudes Meet

Democracy and Democratic Values

One of the most exhaustive and compelling definitions of democracy is advanced by Dahl who suggest that in a democracy, there is “continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.”[12] In his other work, Dahl explicates the rights of citizens under democracy that include rights for effective participation and equality in voting, among others.[13] Hence, citizens living in a democratic state tend to be exposed to the idea of equality of opportunity and familiar with their freedoms, especially with the advent of television and other modern technologies. These attributes of democracy crystallize into a “democratic culture” which assumes that individuals living in a democratic social organization have a say in “making the control under which they live.”[14]

The creation of democratic culture largely makes citizens favor democracy since they prefer to be able to exercise their rights and freedoms in lieu of being oppressed in an autocratic regime. As a result, citizens that are in favor of democratic ideals develop a culture of dialogue, bringing “an orientation toward constructive communication, the dispelling of stereotypes, honesty in relaying ideas, and the intention to listen to and understand the other”.[15]^,[16] Other democracy scholars, Schmitter and Karl, put the concept of “competition” in a central place with regard to democratic practice, whereby decisions are taken “after listening to the alternatives and weighing their respective merits and demerits.”[17]

“National Sentiment”: Attitudes towards the Nation in Conflict

It is also imperative to break down the concept of the so-called “national sentiment” with regard to Armenians or Azerbaijanis by the other nation. Attitudes towards another nation can defined as a stance — “simply a person’s general feeling of favorableness or unfavorableness”[18] — on individuals of certain cultural, national, religious, and/or other identities other than one’s own. The term “national sentiment” is put in quotation marks due to its ambitious generalization trying to ascribe a set sentiment to all members of a nation. However, considering the Caucasian conflict, attitudes towards a nation with which one’s country is involved in active conflict are, indeed, “more national.” As shown later, a large percentage of the population in a country, unsurprisingly, holds a similar — often hostile — opinion on the rival country.

There has been growing research on attitudes on immigrants, especially in the context of the European Union and the United States. For instance, Becchetti et al. investigate the effect of household income on attitudes towards immigration in Germany from 1992 to 2004.[19] Mayda explores economic and noneconomic determinants on stance on immigration in the United States up to 2006.[20] However, there is very limited empirically-rigorous literature on what constitutes the stances on a particular nation — let alone a nation in conflict. A Belgian study investigates national attitudes towards foreigners in Flemings and Wallonia, with particular regional findings[21]; while a Canadian research project investigated the attitudes of Canadians towards Native Indians.[22] The latter example can be representative of a study on “national sentiment” on a rival nation in that there used to be conflict between white immigrants and Native Indians; however, it is still not indicative of sentiments during an active, ongoing conflict that has been taking place for more than twenty years.

Democratic Values and National Sentiment

Surprisingly, the merits of democratic culture and attitudes are shown to be under- studied. It is true that the effect of democracy as a regime has been under the attention of many researchers. One study explores the multiple scenarios with regard to the effect of democracy on economic growth and inequality.[23] However, the effect of democratic attitudes and ideals seem to have passed the researchers’ attention. One of the few investigations pursuing that goal is carried out by Hooghe et al. where the researchers scrutinize the effect of democratic attitudes on trust in European democracies.[24]

But especially in the context of regional conflicts, democratic attitudes can tell part of the story regarding the individuals’ “feelings” towards the other nationality.  Tolerance, fairness, and compromise are among the most important values of the democratic tradition.[25] These values are what produce a culture of “listening” and tolerance with little (if any) consideration of the other individual’s background. This is, of course, an ideal theory which cannot hold completely in practice due to people’s inherent biases and historical-cultural reasons. Nevertheless, with the spread of democratic ideals in the two countries, an individual with democratic values will be as or more likely to sit down at the same table with the representative of the other nationality, ceteris paribus, especially given the heightening conflict and its implications on both nations. This means that the tolerance characterized by the democratic ideals enables individuals to establish relationships with a representative of the other nationality. By consequence, individuals will have less hostile attitudes towards the other nation.

A skeptic might argue that Armenia and Azerbaijan are not the most emblematic democracies in the world. However, this study is concerned with neither the regime of the countries nor the regime’s by-products. Instead, it is exploring democratic attitudes on the individual level to get a picture of individual perspectives on ethnic strife. After all, today one can live in a partially democratic or un-democratic state but very well have democratic values due to wider access to travel, television, education, and social media.

Operationalization & Visualization: “How Much Do They Hate Each Other, Anyway?”

This study uses the dataset of surveys run by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) as part of the “Caucasus Barometer” initiative. Being a face-to-face, paper-and- pencil interview, the survey is about socio-economic issues and political attitudes and was conducted on a representative random sample, with the individual as the unit of analysis. The survey involves both Armenia and Azerbaijan and the data include demographic information and indicators related to democratic values and ethnicity-related attitudes.

The time period of 2011-2013 is chosen as the focus of this study because of the absence of Azerbaijani data beyond the year of 2013. This factor is taken into account in the analysis of the data and extrapolation towards more recent years is maximally avoided. It is hypothesized, however, that the conclusions hold for beyond 2013 because, given the Armenian dataset after 2013, democratic attitudes do not change significantly and the attitudes towards the other nationality deteriorated. This is explained by the increased tensions of the so-called “Four-Day War” that broke out in April 2016 when the cease-fire was broken yet again.[26]

Democratic Attitudes: Operationalization

The challenge of quantifying a concept so broad as ‘democratic attitude’ cannot be emphasized enough. Bearing this in mind, this paper develops two models of measuring attitudes towards democracy with the data available in the CRRC dataset: (1) the self- evaluative indicator model, (2) and the criterion-based indicator model.

Self-Evaluative Indicator Model

The first method that this study develops is the self-evaluative indicator model. This indicator comprises the following question: “Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion [on democracy]?” The question has the following options:

• Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
  • In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferred.
  • For someone like me it doesn’t matter.

The model (referred later as “Attitudes-SEI”) codes the first option as 1, and the other two as 0, making it a binary variable.1 This is done with the logic that if there is any doubt on the preference of democracy, the response should be coded as a disapproval (= 0). A method similar to the self-evaluative indicator model is used by Ariely and Davidov [2011] in their investigation.

Criterion-Based Indicator Model

The second method (referred later as “Attitudes-CBI”) that the study develops to measure democratic attitudes is the criterion-based indicator model. The model is an index including three re-coded variables from the CRRC survey. For the purposes of creating an indicator of three variables, the variables have been recoded in the following ways to become binary:

1. Free Speech: “People have the right to openly say what they think”
   1. Not recoded
   1. Possible answers: approve (= 1), disapprove (= 0)
2. Protests: “People should participate in protest actions”
   1. Recoded, used to be an ordinal variable from 1 (“strongly agree”) to 4 (“strongly disagree”)
   1. Possible answers (after recoding): approve (= 1) includes values 1 and 2, disap- prove (= 0) includes values 3 and 4.
3. Voting: “It is important for a good citizen to vote in elections”
   1. Recoded, used to be an ordinal variable from 1 (“not important at all”) to 10 (“extremely important”).
   1. Possible answers (after recoding): approve (= 1) includes values greater than 8, disapprove (= 0) includes values less than or equal to 8.

The index is calculated by computing the arithmetic mean of the three variables,[27] giving the possibility of the following answers: 0, 0.(3), 0.(6), 1.[28] According to the criterion-based model, individuals that have a higher index have a stronger approval of democracy and democratic attitudes. The criterion-based indicator model is a rather novel way of approaching attitudes towards democracy.

Attitudes towards the Other Nation: Operationalization

Like democratic attitudes, operationalizing attitudes towards a nation poses definitional problems. Given the constraints of the survey data, this investigation considers the attitudes towards establishing economic and familial relationships with the other nationality. The value of considering these two kinds of relationships is that they offer different levels of relationships with the individual. It is logical to assume that in the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations individuals will be more likely to be more open to establishing economic relationships (e.g. doing business, working in the same company) than familial relationships (e.g. marriage), which is confirmed by the survey results.

In order to quantify the attitudes towards Azerbaijanis or Armenians by the other, this study relies on two variables from the CRRC dataset:

• Approval of doing business with Armenians/Azerbaijanis
• Approval of women marrying Armenians/Azerbaijanis

Both variables are binary, with approval (= 1) and disapproval (= 0). The index is calculated by taking the sum of the two variables, giving the possibility of the following answers: 0, 1, 2. According to this index, individuals that have a higher index have a less hostile sentiment towards representatives of the other nation. It should be mentioned outright that a significant limitation of using these indicators is the extreme lack of variation of the dependent variable. This is especially true with regard to approval of marriage since, say, in 2013, only 4% of Armenians and only 1% of Azerbaijanis approved women to marry the representative of the other nationality.3 However, given the constraints and values of the data, the study uses these indicators with caution.

Trends in Armenia and Azerbaijan: Visualization

After all, how much do they “hate” each other? Considering the 2011-13 data, the frozen conflict has had a toll on the peoples’ attitudes towards the rival nation.

Figure 1 shows the attitudes of the respondents towards representatives of the other nation, according to the index created in the previous subsection based on approval of establishing economic and familial relationships. The figure shows the sample mean of the index in the years 2011-2013. Based on the bar plot on the left, it is apparent that the attitudes of Armenians towards the Azerbaijani are quite hostile and have been becoming more so throughout the years, with the index reaching as low as approximately 0.26 (out of 2).[29]

The Armenian respondents might seem surprising in terms of their hostility towards their neighbors. However, the Azerbaijani hostility is shown to be ten-fold as severe. The plot on the right of Figure 1 is the same graph as the previous one, with the Azerbaijani responses. Notice the scale on the y-axis: the maximum value on the axis in Armenian dataset is ten times as much as the one in the Azerbaijani dataset. These are extreme results. Having 0.008 (out of 2) as the greatest index in 2013 is an indication of the overwhelming majority of the people that were coded 0 on both of the two variables that comprise the index, highlighting the extreme hostility from the Azerbaijani side.

The gap between the attitudes amongst the two countries is further shown in Figure 2. The latter plots the respondents’ attitudes towards democracy[30] on the x-axis against the attitudes towards the other nation on the y-axis. The concentration of points in the upper sections around the y-values of 1 and 2 also show the differences between countries. The graph on the left showing Armenians’ views on their neighbors

has a lot more respondents that have a positive (= 2) or “average” (= 1) attitude. By contrast, one could literally count on the plot the number of the Azerbaijani respondents that expressed a slightly positive attitude towards their neighbors.

Figure 2, in fact, has another interesting story to tell. Considering the focus of this study, i.e. the relationship between attitudes towards democracy and the other nation, the figure highlights the correlation. There is preliminary suggestion that attitudes towards democracy covary positively with higher attitudes towards the other nation, given the lines of best fit. Although they do not have a very pronounced slope, especially in the case of the Azerbaijani dataset due to lack of variation in the responses, the rigorous statistical tests in the following section confirm the existence of the relationship.

Analysis

In order to rigorously test the hypothesis of this study, two methods are used: (1) the χ² test of independence, (2) and ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit regressions.

χ² Test of Independence

The two major variables of this study — attitudes towards democracy and attitudes towards the other nation — are categorical variables. Thus, the χ² test of independence can be used with the following hypotheses:

• Null Hypothesis (H₀): Attitudes towards democracy and attitudes towards the other nation are independent.
• Alternative Hypothesis (H_a): Attitudes towards democracy and attitudes towards the other nation are not independent. There is an association.

Table 1 shows the p-values of the test performed on all models of attitudes towards democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The only result that is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, rejecting the null hypothesis, is the self-evaluative indicator model in Armenia. This suggests that the relationship between the two central variables mostly holds according to the study’s theory in Armenia. By contrast, it is shown to not hold in Azerbaijan, which could be due to lack of variation in the attitudes towards Armenians.

Table 1: Chi-Squared Test of Independence p-Values

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Logit Regressions

The regression models developed in this section include the central independent variables (i.e. models measuring attitudes towards democracy) and other control variables in order to get the true significance measure of the independent variable. The description of control variables and justifications of including them follow:

• Settlement: Living in rural regions (coded as 0) may result in more hostile attitudes towards the other nation and democracy due to the preservation of cultural traditions.
• Gender: Being a male (coded as 0) may result in more hostile attitudes because of more direct association with the other nation through the army and due to stronger conservative ideology.
• Age: Being young may result in a less hostile attitude due to more tolerant views.
• Happiness: Being happy (coded as 1) may result in a much more optimistic attitude towards democracy and the other nation.
• Employed: Being employed (coded as 1) may result in higher intelligence and favoring of dialogue, resulting in less hostile attitudes.
• Household Income: The same argument as being employed can be used.

English: Knowledge of English (coded 1-4) may result in higher exposure to interna- tional media and information, potentially resulting in more liberal and progressive views and, hence, hostile attitudes.

• Computer: The same argument as knowledge of English can be used.
• Emigration: Tendency to emigrate may result in less hostility because one would not care as deeply about the other nation.
• Year: Dummies for 2012 and 2013 are added to fix year effects.

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the OLS regressions for Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. In each table, Model 1 focuses on Attitudes-SEI, while Model 2 on Attitudes- CBI. In addition, Models 3, 4, and 5 focus on the individual components of Attitudes-CBI – free speech, protests, and voting respectively. Model 6 includes all three components of Attitudes-CBI. Among the coefficients of interest, only Model 1 is statistically significant in both regressions, although more significant in Armenia than Azerbaijan. Figure 3 shows the coefficients with their 95% confidence intervals for Models 1 and 2. It is apparent that in the first model, the coefficients of both Armenia and Azerbaijan are significant on some level since they do not cross the x-axis. The fact that the rest of the Models did not produce statistically significant results is because of the flaws of the criterion-based indicator model. The latter is not absolutely exhaustive since it does not include all characteristic strands of a respondent that has democratic values; this warrants the development of a more comprehensive and holistic criterion-based measure by future researchers. Nevertheless, when the Armenian and Azerbaijani datasets are run together, the criterion-based model produces significant, positive results. This, combined with the significant results in Model 1, provides support for the argument of the study that having democratic views results in having less hostile attitudes towards the neighboring nation.

The argument is also somewhat solidified by the logit models that take the components of the attitudes towards the other nation as individual dependent variables. That is to say, the two models of democratic attitudes are also run by a logit model with the dependent variables of having business and marrying the other nationality variables individually.

Doing business in Armenia in Attitudes-SEI proved to be highly significant. The marriage models did not produce any significant outcomes likely because of lack of variation in the willingness to marry a representative of the other nationality.

Figure 3 also shows the other theme undertaken by the study – that is, which of the neighboring countries adheres by the hypothesis of the paper more.  One can see in the first model that the confidence intervals do not overlap, which means that the coefficients are statistically significantly different from each other. In addition, the coefficients in the Armenian dataset are much higher than those of Azerbaijan in the self-evaluative indicator model, highlighting that having democratic attitudes is tied to having less hostile views of the other nation more in Armenia than in Azerbaijan. Part of the reason this is the extreme homogeneity of responses that make up the attitudes towards the Armenians in the Azerbaijani dataset. This, in turn, could be explained in part by the relatively more extreme dictatorial rule in Azerbaijan by Ilham Aliyev who runs a massive anti-Armenian propaganda machine.[31]

Conclusion: The Caucasian Tragedy?

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is still very much a pivotal issue in the region. On the state level, a great proportion of the government expenditure of both countries is allocated to the military, while investors are scared off by the political and economic instability of the region, especially Armenia. On the individual level, citizens that identify with their ethnicity often tend to have extremely hostile attitudes towards their neighbor. This trend has been deteriorating in the recent years, especially around 2016 with the renewed armed conflict, filling the Caucasian highlands with an atmosphere of hatred and intolerance. Does the “Caucasian Tragedy” have a remedy?

The primary goal of this study was to analyze the relationship between having democratic values and ideals and attitudes towards the rival nation in Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a secondary goal, it explored which country fits with the established mechanism of the paper and which one more.  The very limited evidence used serves     as a very strong ground for the established mechanism of the paper — that individuals with democratic ideals that are used to the culture of dialogue and tolerance are more ready to form relationships with the representative of the other nationality. The χ² test of independence and the OLS and logit regressions serve as the basis of this conclusion. It is true that the χ² test did not produce significant results for Azerbaijan; most of the models in the OLS and logit regressions were not statistically significant either. However, that addresses the secondary goal of this research project; in fact, the predominant insignificance of the Azerbaijan results show that the linear association between the variables is very weak/nonexistent, showing that the mechanism operates less strongly in Azerbaijan that in Armenia. This comes to suggest that being Armenian or Azerbaijani is an antecedent variable that explains variations in attitudes towards the other nation.

The implications of this study are far-reaching. Today, democratic culture transcends borders, especially targeting the highly progressive youth. Could democracy be the cure to the wounds of the Caucasian conflict? The answer is two-fold and complicates the matter instead of simplifying it. Optimistically, the ethnic confrontation might be mitigated by increased democratic culture, given the findings that suggest that there      is a relationship between democratic values and decreased hostility towards the rival nation. In fact, just recently in April 2018, the Armenians peacefully protested against the elected Prime Minister who wanted to prolong his reign. The result was a peaceful, so-called “Velvet Revolution” that resulted in the transition of power to the opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan with no bullets shot.[32] This is, by all means, a manifestation of democratic culture and exercising of rights that could suggest renewed attitudes towards the Azerbaijani in Armenia. Pessimistically, there might be an unbalance between the attitudes towards their rival nation in Armenia and Azerbaijan. This study showed that the mechanism established works well with the Armenian respondents and less so with the Azerbaijani. Therefore, external factors — like the state-wide, anti-Armenian propaganda advanced by the Azerbaijani dictator — make even those that hold democratic values in Azerbaijan have negative views towards Armenians. This means that so far as the strong dictatorship is in place in Azerbaijan, even with a popular democratic movement, the attitudes towards the Armenians are unlikely to be ameliorated so easily.

Naturally, this study is not without its limitations, especially regarding internal validity. As mentioned earlier, lack of variation in the data, about which nothing could be done. In fact, the highly significant results of certain coefficients attested to the established mechanism, given the nature of the data. Later studies exploring the Caucasian conflict or other similar investigations should work on the operationalization of the variables by setting clear-cut and more comprehensive criteria. The criterion-based model was a rather new way of measuring democratic attitudes, which was flawed due to the limitations of the data in the survey. Similarly, measuring attitudes towards the other nation through doing business and marriage cannot be comprehensive. It is expected, however, that future research will solidify the argument that democratic values help “break the ice.”

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[1] Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998).

[2] Svante E Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” n.d., 164.

[3] Cornell.

[4] Aytan Gahramanova, “Peace Strategies in ‘Frozen’ Ethno- Territorial Conflicts: Integrating Reconciliation into Conflict Management,” n.d., 57.

[5] Gahramanova.

[6] Carol Migdalovitz, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict,” n.d., 20.

[7] P. L. Dash, “Nationalities Problem in USSR: Discord over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Economic and Political Weekly 24, no. 2 (1989): 72–74.

[8] David Rieff, “Case Study in Ethnic Strife,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (1997): 118–32, https://doi.org/10.2307/20047941.

[9] Dash, “Nationalities Problem in USSR.”

[10] Gal Ariely and Eldad Davidov, “Can We Rate Public Support for Democracy in a Comparable Way? Cross-National Equivalence of Democratic Attitudes in the World Value Survey,” Social Indicators Research 104, no. 2 (November 2011): 271–86, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-010-9693-5.

[11] John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (University of Chicago Press, 1993).

[12] Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy : Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press, 1973).

[13] Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press, 2008).

[14] Ralph Turner, “The Construction of a Democratic Culture,” Social Science 17, no. 3 (1942): 285–93.

[15] Martha L. McCoy and Patrick L. Scully, “Deliberative Dialogue to Expand Civic Engagement: What Kind of Talk Does Democracy Need?,” National Civic Review 91, no. 2 (2002): 117–35, https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.91202.

[16] Daniel Yankelovich, The Magic of Dialogue: Transforming Conflict Into Cooperation (Simon and Schuster, 2001).

[17] Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 75–88, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0033.

[18] Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior (Prentice-Hall, 1980).

[19] Leonardo Becchetti, Fiammetta Rossetti, and Stefano Castriota, “Real Household Income and Attitude toward Immigrants: An Empirical Analysis,” The Journal of Socio-Economics 39, no. 1 (January 2010): 81–88, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2009.07.012.

[20] Anna Maria Mayda, “Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants,” Review of Economics and Statistics 88, no. 3 (August 2006): 510–30, https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.88.3.510.

[21] Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens, and Roeland Beerten, “National Identity and Attitude toward Foreigners in a Multinational State: A Replication,” Political Psychology 24, no. 2 (2003): 241–57.

[22] J. Rick Ponting, “Conflict and Change in Indian/Non-Indian Relations in Canada: Comparison of 1976 and 1979 National Attitude Surveys,” The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 9, no. 2 (1984): 137–58, https://doi.org/10.2307/3340211.

[23] Michael J. Sodaro, Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction (McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004).

[24] Marc Hooghe, Sofie Marien, and Jennifer Oser, “Great Expectations: The Effect of Democratic Ideals on Political Trust in European Democracies,” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 214–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1210875.

[25] Sodaro, Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction.

[26] David Ignatius, “Karabakh : A Renewed Conflict in the Caucasus,” Washington Post, April 26, 2016, sec. Opinions, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-renewed-conflict-in-the-caucasus/2016/04/26/e6c2c344-0bec-11e6-a6b6-2e6de3695b0e_story.html.

[27] All missing values were due to random error and are, hence, eliminated from the data analysis.

[28] By doing so, the study assumes that going from an answer of “0” to “0.(3)”  has the same effect as,  say, going from “0.(6)” to “1”. In order to mitigate this issue, the individual criteria (first separately, then combined) are used to run the models later on.

[29] It is worth noting that this pattern is not observed with attitudes towards other nationalities. That is, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis were significantly more willing to do business or have women marry foreign nationals (other than Azerbaijanis or Armenians respectively). Thus, the possibility that the nations are against having relations with foreigners in general is ruled out.

[30] Attitudes-SEI is used but the other models would also be suitable.

[31] OSCE, “Anti – Armenian Propaganda and Hate Dissemination Carried out by Azerbaijan as a Serious Obstacle to the Negotiation Process” (OSCE, 2008), https://www.osce.org/odihr/34195?download=true.

[32] Arto Vaun, “Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’: A Masterclass in Socialism,” accessed May 11, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/armenia-velvet-revolution-masterclass-socialism-180507093619273.html.

Written by Sarah Lu

Introduction

Former US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered himself a formidable force in US diplomacy and US-Middle East negotiations from 1969 to 1975. After the 1973 War wherein Egyptian forces attacked Israel on the holy holiday of Yom Kippur, Kissinger was lauded for his implementation of “shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle East. More specifically, he was celebrated for somewhat successfully achieving bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel as a result of “shuttling” back and forth between nations to broker a series of disengagement agreements. While scholars like Rashid Khalidi and Paul Chamberlin emphasize the importance of Cold War divisions and the prioritization of US-Soviet relations in shaping US foreign policy during this period, the effects of Cold War politics and Kissinger’s implementation of shuttle diplomacy as a “wedge” are overstated. In addition to the superpower feud between the US and the USSR, shuttle diplomacy was also heavily influenced by Kissinger’s personal diplomatic and negotiating style in the years before it was formally instituted as well as domestic bureaucratic and political factors. These factors, including Kissinger’s relationship to former Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the Watergate scandal, played significant roles in influencing Kissinger’s bilateral relations with Israel and Egypt. This paper will investigate the role of Henry Kissinger in the US foreign policy pivot towards shuttle diplomacy. It will focus particularly on how and why shuttle diplomacy ensued in addition to tracing the trajectory of Kissinger’s approach to the Middle East from 1969 onwards.

Background: The 1973 War and Shuttle Diplomacy

Although shuttle diplomacy was more formally instituted after the 1973 War in which Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a two-front offensive against Israel, Kissinger’s strategy towards the Middle began developing during his tenure as President Nixon’s National Security

Advisor, which started in 1969. During this time, he established “standstill diplomacy” as a precursor to shuttle diplomacy. After the 1967 War, most of the international community, including the United Nations and the USSR, endorsed the comprehensive land-for-peace deal under UN Resolution 242, which would have resulted in Israel leaving its occupied territories and Arab nations recognizing Israel’s legitimacy in the region. Before UN 242 was discussed, however, Egyptian President Gamul Abdul Nasser declared a War of Attrition against Israel in 1969, which escalated until 1970. Despite Israel’s tactical victory in the war, the true result of the war was an impasse: Arab states refused to negotiate from a position of weakness, as they had suffered defeat and feared political instability from internal coups and revolts, and Israel saw no need to negotiate or concede due to their tactical victory.^[1]

In an attempt to resolve the impasse, Kissinger argued that the US should institute standstill diplomacy, a process in which the US would encourage a standstill in the peace process to convince Israel, Egypt, and other Arab countries that Moscow was powerless to help them.

The longer Kissinger promoted the impasse, the more Arab nations believed that Moscow could not assist them; as William Quandt states, “The main considerations underlying this stage of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy were to convince Sadat that a prolonged war of attrition, fueled by Soviet arms, would not succeed and to demonstrate to the Kremlin that the United States was capable of matching Soviet military deliveries to the Middle East.”^[2] It was during this time wherein Kissinger worked on overriding the implementation of UN 242. Instead, he focused on establishing bilateral relations with Egypt and Israel, which would set the stage for the Sinai I and Sinai II agreements that followed the 1973 War.

Kissinger’s Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategies

One crucial element of standstill diplomacy was that Kissinger saw no need to reach a comprehensive Middle East agreement that would solve fundamental issues like the Palestinian question:^[3] how would the borders of Palestine be defined, and would it be recognized as a legitimate state? Kissinger never sought to answer this quintessential question, yet it still continues to dominate the debate on the Arab-Israeli Conflict today. This diplomatic strategy towards the Middle East was not only the result of Cold War politics, but can also be attributed to Kissinger’s personality and diplomatic style, including his historic outlooks on diplomacy and foreign policy.

Before becoming  National Security Advisor, Kissinger was a prolific author and academic who held multiple degrees from Harvard University. He had also risen to national prominence as a supporter of realpolitik^[4], arguing that the US should have the capacity to wage a limited nuclear war^[5] as a response against President Eisenhower’s nuclear policy. In a Memorandum of a Conversation in 1971 between Kissinger and William Rusher, a publisher of the National Review, and other members of the conservative establishment, Kissinger heavily emphasized the deterioration of America’s defense capabilities, highlighting that American populations “would be defenseless if we were without retaliatory capacity” and advocated for “a policy for the use of tactical nuclear weapons”.^[6]

Prior to 1968, Kissinger also opposed many of the foreign policy outlooks he advocated  under Nixon, such as the emphasis on détente with the USSR, a greater partnership with Europe, and even Cold War politics^[7]. According to Joan Hoff in A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy, Kissinger reiterated: “I’m very worried that Nixon’s Cold War outlook has remained frozen since his vice-presidential years in the fifties and that therefore in the seventies, in the waning military pre-eminence of American power, it could lead him into taking undue risks.”^[8]  Even during the Nixon presidency, Kissinger  believed that Nixon was too optimistic in his view of foreign policy. Kissinger’s own foreign policy approach had 19th century European roots, which emphasized pessimism and restraint in comparison to Nixon’s tendency to take risks.

Kissinger’s aversion to risk with respect to foreign policy was incredibly pronounced in his approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, wherein he tended to tread lightly in order to avoid failure. In his conversation with Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz on March 30th, 1973, for example, Kissinger said, “I will take no initiatives. I will react in a slow-moving way to their proposals. If it moves slowly and drags through the summit, that is their problem. I am not aiming at a Nobel Prize in the Middle East”.^[9] As Hoff suggests, beginning in 1969, Kissinger initially did not want to get “bogged down” in the Middle East because failure was more likely than “flamboyant successes.”^[10] Kissinger also had limited prior experience in the region. Even Kissinger admitted that he knew “very little of the Middle East” when taking office as National Security Council Adviser, and had never been to an Arab country previously.^[11] Kissinger’s risk aversion and lack of experience in Middle East politics would follow him to the negotiating table in 1973, where he straddled the line between slow-moving diplomacy and wasting time. For Kissinger, this usually took form in making the US seem like a neutral arbiter in the Arab-Israeli conflict, even in light of the obvious tensions between the US and the Soviet Union and their vested interests in the region. In fact, Kissinger even portrayed Cold War “politics” as somewhat divisive in a memorandum to President Nixon in 1972, in which he suggested that the administration’s “ability to move Israel” would be dependent on avoiding the appearance of a US-USSR solution, justifying it as a “solution to a practical problem.”^[12] In his conversation with Ambassador Dinitz in 1973, Kissinger also seemed hesitant in taking a hard-line role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, going so far as to say that he was not even trying to negotiate peace. He states, “we are doing nothing, we are wasting time… So with the Russians there is practically nothing going on.”^[13]  In a cabinet meeting on October 18th, 1973, Kissinger employs a similar tone of diplomacy in relation to the USSR by saying, “we have told the Soviet Union this is a test of détente, but we have not thrown down the gauntlet… We are trying to use diplomacy as a bridge to a decent settlement. We will make our case to the public after the diplomacy has concluded.”^[14] What exactly Kissinger meant by “diplomacy” was relatively unclear. In such conversations, Kissinger was cautious to avoid an ideological approach, instead focusing on these so-called principles of diplomacy and negotiation to maximize political gains for the United States. There was no long-term plan or overarching policy stance because there seemed like there was more to lose; the vagueness was intentional. Thus, Kissinger’s standstill and shuttle diplomacy approaches are easily linked to his pre-existing philosophies of realpolitik and political pragmatism, in which he emphasized short-term, vague, and impartial solutions to increasingly complex issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Kissinger acquired more autonomy as a decision-maker in the Nixon administration, his approach towards the Middle East would eventually overshadow the alternative that sought to reign in a long-lasting, comprehensive, and multilateral peace: the Rogers Plan.

The Undermining of the Rogers Plan and U.N. Resolution 242

Although Kissinger repeatedly saw himself as a chessmaster with the Arab-Israeli conflict as just one piece on the chessboard, there was almost certainly an alternative to his approach. The alternative was a plan outlined by William P. Rogers, who served as Nixon’s Secretary of State from 1969 to 1973. Presented in 1969, the Rogers Plan emphasized a multilateral and comprehensive peace approach that advocated for UN 242’s land-for-peace deal. Nixon initially considered Rogers as the leading expert on negotiations in the Middle East, and both Nixon and Rogers had pressed Tel Aviv to rejoin UN-sponsored discussions after the War of Attrition, warning them that the Big Four powers would step in and intervene if Israel impeded negotiations.^[15] The sharp pivot in US policy from UN 242 towards shuttle diplomacy after 1973 was therefore largely the result of Kissinger’s attempts to impose his own diplomatic approach to the situation. By repeatedly undercutting Rogers and undermining Nixon’s faith in Rogers, Kissinger was able to create a political and bureaucratic environment wherein he was able replace Rogers himself. In a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on February 21, 1973, for example, it was clear that both Nixon and Kissinger were intent on Kissinger meeting the Egyptians for negotiations, despite not having informed Rogers beforehand. They were also explicitly collaborated without informing Rogers and even criticized his tactics for negotiation. Kissinger stated to Nixon that “I really hope we don’t give anybody exclusive jurisdiction, because he’ll [Rogers] get us into the same mess he’s gotten us. Your methods—the methods you and I, on your behalf, have used—work because we never get ourselves in.”^[16] Rogers became so isolated in the White House that Nixon rarely wrote any of his memoranda or comments on news summaries to Rogers.^[17] Nixon would also criticize Rogers for his lack of ability and initiative, which Kissinger would exploit to his own benefit. As Kenneth Stein emphasizes,

As national security adviser, Kissinger ‘mercilessly exploited Secretary of State Rogers’ laid-back style and unwillingness to jump into a fray.’ As a Kissinger aide noted, ‘Their relationship revealed all the shabby traits of Henry’s character: his secretiveness, suspiciousness, and vindictiveness.’ The under-secretary of state at the time recalled that he spent as much time negotiating between Rogers and Kissinger as he did on the Arab-Israeli conflict.^[18]

Bureaucratic scuffing aside, Kissinger took advantage of his proximity to Nixon and his penchant for realpolitik to therefore discredit UN 242 as a potential solution, believing that the need for just and lasting peace within secure and recognized borders under the resolution was “so platitudinous that the speaker could not be serious.”^[19] Kissinger even personally reached out to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and encouraged her to not accept the Rogers Plan; he would also meet separately with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him that the White House had no interest in the Rogers Plan. For Kissinger, this was the most efficient way to establish bilateral relations in the Middle East, as he believed that shuttling between Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, and Israel’s Prime Minister, Golda Meir, would save him from Nixon’s “unproductive interface” and the bureaucracy of the slow-moving Geneva committees^[20]. In addition to strengthening bilateral ties between the US and Israel and the US and Egypt, Kissinger’s ability to sidestep bureaucracy and manipulate the key players within would prove beneficial for his own vision of diplomacy. In a 1973 Cabinet Meeting, Kissinger directly rebutted Nixon’s stance that a ceasefire could be negotiated with UN 242. Kissinger stated that “242 is not a new proposal. It is very dangerous to speculate about any particular formula. The major problem now is to get the parties into a negotiation with a formula so vague that each party can save face.”^[21] With Kissinger’s pessimistic foreign policy approach and his tendency to minimize risk, it follows that he would harp on UN 242 for being too “particular”—it was perfectly consistent with his entire approach to the Middle East.

The declining influence of Rogers paved the way for Kissinger to increase his foothold in the bureaucracy of US foreign policy decision-making. By 1973, Rogers’ authority had already been heavily undermined by Kissinger, who had become much closer to President Nixon during that time. Additionally, Rogers and Joseph J. Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and Asia, had attempted to negotiate a ceasefire in 1970 that was violated within seconds, which represented another harsh blow to Rogers’ credibility. Meanwhile, Kissinger had established himself as the necessary intermediary between the US, Israel, and Egypt via his back-and-forth meetings behind Rogers’ back with major actors such as Meir. There was even an indication of an “American special relationship” with Israel that encouraged the Arabs to deal with Washington instead of Moscow when it came to diplomacy.^[22] With the Rogers Plan now out of the picture, Kissinger was fully able to execute his method of diplomacy, pivoting away from the Cold War framework of a one-sided, superpower-negotiated solution and instead established the US as an intermediary between parties like Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. In a memorandum to Nixon on May 17th, 1972, Kissinger states: “I would want to avoid the atmosphere of total inflexibility since that could lead the Soviets to step up their military program in Egypt.”^[23] Kissinger realized that calling for the expulsion of Soviets in the Middle East would polarize Arabs and drive militants towards buying Soviet arms–his tactics needed to be flexible and adaptable in order to establish bilateral relations.

Kissinger’s Dominance in Post-1973 Negotiations

It was this notion of flexibility that allowed Kissinger to appease both the Israelis and Arabs,^[24] and and it was his dominant position in negotiation as well as his previously established relations with Middle East dignitaries that established him as indispensable. In addition, due to Moscow’s “rigid bureaucratic chain”,^[25] Kissinger was able to gain the upper hand in negotiations, as he had less constraints and less bureaucratic limitations. There was no particular idea which Kissinger brought to the table that made the difference. Instead, it was the need for an intermediary who had the confidence of both sides,^[26] which Kissinger managed to acquire over time. He was also overly insistent on gaining Egypt and Israel’s trust during negotiations. There are accounts that Kissinger refused to leave the Middle East until he had firm commitments from Cairo and Tel Aviv to an agreement, even when Nixon wanted Kissinger to come home and stage a public agreement with him.^[27]

With Egypt, Kissinger maintained communications with Sadat’s national security advisor, Hafez Ismail, through a CIA backchannel. He would often meet with Ismail without Rogers’ approval as the Rogers Plan was still being considered, presenting himself as Egypt’s ally against Israeli manipulation and rejecting the Israeli demand that disengagement would mean the withdrawal of Egypt from its territory among the Suez.^[28] Egypt would therefore appeal to the US to help its Third Army Corps during ceasefire negotiations in the 1973 War, as exemplified in Sadat’s message to President Nixon: “Thus, while the Egyptian side has kept to its word, the Israeli side is still resorting to dilatory methods… I therefore request you to take a firm and clear stand with respect to these continued Israeli methods of defeat.”^[29] Kissinger and the US were vital in negotiations between Egypt and Israel, with Kissinger often overstating his promises to one country or the other in order to deepen their respective trust.

In regards to Israel, many suggest that Meir’s faith in Kissinger was also the result of his success. According to Stein, Meir had “regarded him as a friend of Israel and trusted his basic instincts to ensure Israeli security.”^[30] Though Meir had major ideological differences with Kissinger, she understood his vital role in the negotiation process, as Kissinger had almost daily contacts with Israeli Ambassador Dinitz. It seemed that the rest of Israel did as well.^[31] When Nixon and Kissinger visited Israel in 1974, a New York Times article reported that while “a crowd outside cheered the President, [they] cheered louder for Secretary of State Kissinger, who seemed delighted.”^[32] The article also stated that Nixon’s role in the Watergate Scandal had been heavily problematized in Israel, which allowed Kissinger to be seen as the shining diplomat in US-Israel relations. Therefore, domestic factors like Watergate had a considerable influence on the structures and institutions that allowed for American decision-making on foreign policy, and it is one of the reasons why Kissinger’s power in the Nixon Administration became so salient.

Domestic Factors: Public Opinion, Watergate, and Bureaucracy

The influence of domestic factors, like public opinion and the Watergate Scandal, significantly affected Kissinger’s position in negotiations, his power in the administration, and consequently, US foreign policy in the Middle East. When Watergate emerged in 1973, Nixon aimed to replace front-page Watergate headlines with news of Rogers’ resignation and Kissinger’s appointment as his successor.^[33] Believing that foreign policy could rescue Nixon from impeachment proceedings and domestic troubles, Kissinger also attributed multiple successes in the Middle East to Nixon in order to bolster his approval ratings. In the 1974 New York Times article entitled “Kissinger Takes Edge Off Watergate”, Philip Shabecoff writes that “for the first time in recent memory, issues of Watergate and impeachment did not arise at the midday White House news briefing… instead, questions concentrated almost exclusively on foreign affairs, including the agreement between Israel and Syria and the President’s forthcoming summit meeting in the Soviet Union.”^[34] On the eve of Nixon’s resignation in 1974 within the confines of the White House sitting room, Kissinger told Nixon that when it was all over, the President would be remembered for the peace he had achieved,^[35] even if Kissinger had done most of the legwork.

Nixon’s preoccupation with Watergate therefore created a power vacuum in which Kissinger and other foreign policy officials like Alexander Haig and Brent Scowcroft could dominate foreign policy. Kissinger himself stated, “one of the more cruel torments of Nixon’s Watergate purgatory was my emergence as the preeminent figure in foreign policy”.^[36] With the scandal, Nixon’s closest officials like Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and Domestic Policy Chief John Ehrlichman both resigned. Kissinger was the only one who remained. Although Nixon wanted to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, his preoccupations with Watergate would force Kissinger to take the rein, allowing him to have “extraordinary latitude in shaping the details of American diplomacy, calling on Nixon to invoke presidential authority as necessary…and on occasion ignoring his directions.”^[37]

It was also obvious that Nixon was not functioning at full capacity and could not deal with the consequences of the 1973 War himself. On October 20th, 1973, Scowcroft advised Kissinger that Nixon was “devoted exclusively to the Watergate tape crisis” and became “very relaxed with respect to the Middle East issue… he is quite preoccupied with the domestic situation and much more passive toward your mission and the Middle East crisis.”^[38] During the proposed ceasefire and the subsequent Israeli and Egyptian violations of the ceasefire, Kissinger noted that Nixon sounded very distressed and overwhelmed by his own impeachment; Nixon was also far more concerned with the OPEC oil embargo and Geneva peace negotiations than he was with Kissinger’s discussions with Middle East diplomats.

Watergate even made its way to Israel.  A New York Times article detailing Nixon and Kissinger’s visit stated that “[Nixon] encountered, here in Israel, the first show of hostility of his Middle Eastern journey — signs, held by some in the crowds, disparaging his role in the Watergate affair.”^[39] The weight of the Watergate affair stood almost fully on Nixon’s shoulders, affecting Nixon’s ability to negotiate and make decisions about the Middle East. Kissinger, who replaced Rogers as  Nixon’s right-hand man on foreign policy, was entrusted with the power to make decisions when Nixon was incapable. When Soviet forces threatened intervention in October 1973, Kissinger had been the one to place US military forces on DEFCON III alert—the highest state of readiness during peacetime conditions—when Nixon was asleep, completely missing the Cabinet meeting when the alert was called. Both Haig and Kissinger believed he was “too distraught to participate in the preliminary discussion,”^[40] and while none of the officials who had met during the discussion were even elected to public office, Kissinger’s decision was rarely questioned due to Nixon’s prior trust in Kissinger as well as Nixon’s lack of engagement due to Watergate. Quandt emphasizes that these decisions were typical for Kissinger, especially in the context of Watergate: “Kissinger was concerned that the Watergate scandal not appear to impede the conduct of American foreign policy. Intentional overreaction would be better than underreaction.”^[41] The DEFCON III alert turned out to be a necessary overreaction for the US, as it would eventually deter Soviets from intervention and result in unprecedented negotiations between Egypt and Israel.

Sinai I and Sinai II

The DEFCON III alert and the negotiations that followed resulted in the Sinai I and Sinai II peace agreements between the US, Egypt, and Israel. While the agreements were not a comprehensive solution aimed at long-term peace in the Middle East, Sinai I and Sinai II were the logical outcomes of Kissinger’s entire diplomatic trajectory in the Middle East from 1969 onwards. Moreover, they would not have been possible if Kissinger did not already establish a relationship of mutual trust and dependency with Egypt and Israel, nor if Kissinger had not been able to cement his position in the Nixon Administration to have a decent amount of control over foreign policy.

During Sinai I negotiations in 1974, Kissinger shuttled back and forth to broker an agreement between Israel and Egypt, which focused on army lines and buffer zones. It was followed by negotiations for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement plan, which took much longer and centered on the control over the city of Quinetra, but nevertheless reached an agreement on May 31, 1974. After Nixon had resigned, Kissinger negotiated another agreement between Israel and Egypt, or Sinai II, which led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai and an UN buffer zone established in 1975.

Sinai I and Sinai II were transformational in the Middle East, as they had represented a de facto alliance between the US, Egypt, and Israel; not only did US aid for both Israel and Egypt increase staggeringly from the 1970s onward, but the US managed to broker peace between two countries that were locked in conflict for decades. Unfortunately, the unseen consequence was that the agreements completely omitted the issue of Palestine and its potential role in securing long-term peace in the Middle East. This oversight would become the main issue in the Middle East for decades to come–the effects of which extend beyond the scope of this paper. In the years before Sinai I and Sinai II, however, alleviating the pressures generated by the 1973 War was of utmost importance to Kissinger, and his unorthodox means of doing so certainly corresponded with his tactical approach to diplomacy.

Conclusion

Within the scope of Kissinger’s diplomacy and foreign policy outlook, long-term peace in the Middle East from 1967 onwards was never the ultimate goal. As a man dictated by political pragmatism, Kissinger was less influenced by the need for peace within secured borders than his concern for solving political problems as they arose. Oftentimes, this meant establishing relations of trust with countries like Egypt and Israel despite US long-term goals in the region. Furthermore, Kissinger’s disdain for bureaucracy and personal philosophies towards diplomacy would significantly influence the ways in which he dealt with the Middle East, most of which would have never come to fruition had he not exerted a huge amount of influence in the Nixon White House. With the declining influence of Rogers and the emergence of the Watergate scandal, Kissinger was in an ideal position to take the lead on negotiations within the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he had the personality and diplomatic approach to insert himself into such a position. Shuttle diplomacy was therefore not only an isolated, Cold War-approach solution to the 1973 War, but had also followed a much longer trajectory in relation to Kissinger’s diplomacy and the domestic factors that arose during the Nixon years.

Yet, in the long-term scheme of US foreign policy, Kissinger’s policies actually created a foreign policy blowback that contradicted  his original goals of restraint and success in the Middle East. By focusing on Egypt-Israel relations and sidestepping the Palestinian question, the US was inherently unable to serve as a neutral arbiter in future Middle Eastern relations, unfortunately stalling any future prospects for US-led peace in the region. The biggest consequence of Kissinger’s tactical and pragmatic politics was therefore his hubris and inability to see the need for a comprehensive peace plan in the Middle East—an area of the world that requires more than a realpolitik game of chess to navigate.

Bibliography

Hoff, Joan. “A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26,

no. 1 (1996): 107–29.

Woodward, Bob, and Carl Bernstein. “Book Says Nixon Prayed, Wept on Departure.”

Washington Post. March 27, 1976. Item 06. The Harold Weisberg Archive.

http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%20Files/N%20Disk/Nixon

Kissinger, Henry, and Richard Nixon. “Conversation Between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger).” Office of the Historian, February 21, 1973.

Conversation No. 860–15. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d22.

Stein, Kenneth W. Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace. Taylor & Francis Group, 1996.

Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. Simon and Schuster, 2005.

Shabecoff, Philip. “Kissinger Takes Edge Off Watergate.” The New York Times. May 31, 1974. https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/01/archives/kissinger-takes-edge-off-watergate.html.

Sadat, Anwar al-. “Memo: Message for the President from President Sadat.” Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/51112a4a993247d4d8394484.

Kissinger, Henry. “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon.” Office of the Historian, May 17, 1972. Box 1167. National

Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d287.

Kissinger, Henry, and Simcha Dinitz. “Memorandum of Conversation.” National Security Archive, March 20, 1973. The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/HAK-8—11-71.pdf.

Kissinger, Henry, and William Rusher. “Memorandum of Conversation with Conservative Opinion Leaders.” National Security Archive, August 12, 1971. The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB193/HAK-8—11-71.pdf.

Kissinger, Henry. “Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting.” Office of the Historian, October 18, 1973.

Document 201. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p1/d20.

Korn, David A. “US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan.” Middle East Journal 44, no. 1 (1990): 37-50. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328055.

Herbers, John. “Most Israelis Hail Nixon; Some Cite Watergate Role.” The New York Times. June 16, 1974. https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/17/archives/-most-israelis-hail-nixon-some-cite-watergate

Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Washington DC: Brook

Endnotes

^[1] Paul Chamberlin, Lecture (How would I cite this?)

^[2] William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington

DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 114

^[3] Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (Simon and Schuster, 2005), 551

^[4] A system of politics or principles based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations.

^[5] Lecture 2/20/18

^[6] Henry Kissinger et. al, Memorandum of Conversation with Conservative Opinion Leaders  (The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977, 2006)

^[7] Joan Hoff, A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy (Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1996), 107-129

^[8] Ibid., 109

^[9] Henry Kissinger and Simcha Dinitz, Memorandum of Conservation (The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy, 1969-1977, 2006)

^[10] Joann Hoff, A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy (Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1996), 107-129

^[11] David Korn, US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan (Middle East Journal, 1990), 42

^[12] Henry Kissinger, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, 1972)

^[13] Henry Kissinger and Simcha Dinitz, Memorandum of Conversation

^[14] Henry Kissinger et. al, Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting (Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973)

^[15] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 274

^[16] Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon, Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes)

^[17] Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (Taylor and Francis, 1999)

^[18] Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 31

^[19] David Korn, US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan (Middle East Journal, 1990), 42

^[20] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 550

^[21] Henry Kissinger et. al, Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting

^[22] Quandt, Peace and Progress: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967

^[23] Henry Kissinger, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

^[24] Joann Hoff, A Revisionist View of Nixon’s Foreign Policy, 120

^[25] Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 34

^[26] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power

^[27] Ibid.

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] Anwar al-Sadat, Memo: Message for the President from President Sadat (Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Electronic Room)

^[30] Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 34

^[31] Ibid.

^[32] John Herbers, Most Israelis Hail Nixon: Some Cite Watergate Role (Jerusalem: The New York Times, 1974)

^[33] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 505

^[34] Philip Shabecoff, “Kissinger Takes Edge Off Watergate” (Washington DC: The New York Times, 1974)

^[35] Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, Book Says Nixon Prayed, Wept on Departure (Washington DC: Washington Post, 1976)

^[36] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 505

^[37] Quandt, Peace and Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, 208

^[38] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 526

^[39] John Herbers, Most Israelis Hail Nixon; Some Cite Watergate Role

^[40] Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, Partners in Power, 530

^[41] Quandt, Peace and Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 197

Written by Kassandra Neranjan and Sakshi Shetty

According to the United Nations, the Rohingya are amongst the most persecuted minorities in the world. The Rohingya Muslims of Burma have been victim to ethnic cleansing and genocide for decades. Although Islam is practiced by four per cent of Myanmar’s population (most of these Muslims identify as Rohingya), the Rohingya Muslims have been deprived of citizenship rights and are denied recognition as a ‘national race’ based on their alleged “immigrant status”. The institutional and systematic discrimination of this population has raised concerns of how to best provide aid to this group. We intend to dig deeper and explore the intricacies of the complex history of this population, and trials that have arisen due to state prejudice. This essay analyzes this political puzzle through examining themes of Western intervention in Burma, processes of democratization, isolationist state practices of Burma, global norms and anti-norms of Islamophobia, and the capitalistic efforts to open Burma’s doors to trade regardless of human rights abuses.

The narrative of the Rohingya muslims of Myanmar is a story about politics, power, and ethnic discrimination. While humanitarian organisations and Western nations see the Rohingya muslims as the world’s most persecuted minority, the government of Myanmar and an overwhelming majority of its people see a foreign group with a separatist agenda, fueled by Islam, and funded from overseas. [1]^,[2] It is this difference in perception that makes finding a resolution for the Rohingya crisis an extremely difficult issue. In this essay, we hope to explore the various obstacles to aid provision for the Rohingya Muslims of Burma. In analysing this complex case of mass ethnic cleansing, we shine light upon themes such as Myanmar’s Isolationism and the motivation for some of its policies. Furthermore, in analysing normative international phenomena such as Islamophobia and Western intervention in Myanmar, this essay attempts to question the existing status quo and analyse the future of the state and specifically, the Rohingya Muslims.

The Rohingya peoples’ presence in Burma came to be due to a number of complex historical trajectories. A key part of the narrative spun by the military, ethnic extremists, and Buddhist fundamentalists amongst others is that the Rohingya are illegal immigrants, and thus have no right to exist in Myanmar. In almost every Burmese media outlet and official issued statement by the government, the Rohingya are termed as illegal “Bengali” immigrants and never referred to as “Rohingya”.^[3] The answer to how this situation came to be, and whether this assertion can be considered just, partly lies in the history of the Arakan region itself.

The Present till Now: A Brief History of Discrimination

Muslim traders first came into the Burmese region in the eighth century.^[4] Their local dynasty was seated at Wesali, not far from contemporary Mrohaung in Arakan.. Due to the close proximity, Arakan saw a greater influx of Muslim sailors during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and migrants from neighboring Muslim Bengal. Looking back at that period in time, there are records of Buddhist Mrohaung kings using Muslim court titles alongside traditional ones. Indeed, it was a common practice to be inclusive of ethnic minorities and religious officers in courts in the Southeast Asian sub-region.^[5]

The first recorded instance of Rohingya fleeing persecution occurred after the Burman King Bodawpaya conquered and incorporated the Arakan region into his kingdom of Ava in central Burma in 1784, consequently leading to a high influx of Rohingya refugees pouring into British controlled Chittagong in East Bengal.^[6] After multiple insurgencies and failed attempts at recapturing Arakan back from King Bodawpaya in 1811, many Rohingyas were forced out of their homes, and thus settled in the area of Cox’s Bazar and became integrated within the local community there.^[7]

Moving forward in time to the beginning of 1824, the British colonized Burma in a series of three wars. The British administered Burma as a province of India, resulting in much fluid migration. Though it was all considered internal movement then, as the region was one entity of the British Empire, the Burmese government still identifies any migration to and from Burma that took place during British rule as illegal.^[8] It is on this basis that the Rohingya are denied citizenship and are considered illegal “Bengali” immigrants, despite their well-established presence dating back to the twelfth century.

After Japan’s invasion of British controlled Burma in 1942, communal violence erupted targeting those groups that had benefited from British colonial rule.^[9] A common tactic by colonizers was to divide and conquer, and the application of such a strategy in Burma manifested in a way that provided Rohingya with several benefits including civil sector employment that many Buddhists were not afforded. This disparity in opportunity furthered tensions between the Rohingya and the Buddhist majorities.^[10] A violent clash between Buddhist villagers and Rohingya Muslims in Arakan during this period in time resulted in some 22,000 Rohingya crossing the border into Bengal.^[11] Although some of the displaced Rohingya people returned after a British offensive drove out the Japanese in 1945, tensions between the Buddhist individuals and Rohingya Muslims lingered.  When forebears of the Rohingya appealed to Pakistan to annex their territory, which at the time included what is now Bangladesh, tensions worsened. Pakistan did not do so. Subsequently, many of the Muslims took up arms and fought a separatist rebellion until the 1960s, though vestiges of the rebellion continued until the 1990s. Immediately after independence, the conflict  escalated to the point where Burmese immigration authorities imposed limitations on movement of Muslims, treating them as illegal immigrants.^[12] Since they were denied the right to citizenship, the Rohingya were also barred from military service and other civil jobs. To date, the Burmese government restricts Rohingya from traveling from Arakan, to other parts of the country, and abroad:

A valid permit allows a Rohingya to travel for up to forty-five days.^[13] A copy must be submitted to authorities upon departure and arrival at the destination. Should a Rohingya wish to stay overnight in a village within the township, a similar permit must be procured and then presented to the headmen of the home village and the village visited. Heavy fines of up to 10,000 kyat (twenty-nine US dollars) and detention have been imposed on those violating the requirements.^[14]

This set of stringent rules and regulations associated with travel have only exposed the Rohingya to further systemic exploitation by corrupt officials and impeded upon any universal right they are granted to mobility.^[15] Furthermore, the Burmese government reserves secondary education only for citizens, leaving the Rohingya without access to state run schools beyond primary education. With little education and limited mobility, they are forced into labour by local government authorities with little to no pay, vulnerable to extortion and theft.^[16] For instance, the army can arbitrarily confiscate personal property of the Rohingya.^[17] The Rohingya have faced brutal torture, and inhumane treatment from their own government and military officials. These acts rooted in impunity serve to strip the Rohingya away from everything they own, leaving them helpless and vulnerable to further abuse.

In 1977, Operation Nagamin was put into place: a military operation attempting to register citizens and expel any foreigners prior to a national census, from which the Rohingya were excluded. Mass arrests, forced evictions, torture, and widespread military brutality in the following year caused more than 200,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh, only to be sent back after the Bangladeshi government requested repatriation.^[18] The greatest outflow of Rohingya people from Arakan into Bangladesh occured in 1991 and 1992, leaving approximately 250,000 Rohingya refugees displaced.^[19] Forced labour, limited mobility, rape, and religious persecution at the hands of the Burmese army and Burmese nationalists left the Rohingya no other option but to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh. It is crucial to note that these instances of racist eviction and cruelty derive from colonial histories and the consequent ethnocentrism that has allowed for such disdain between populations. One may argue that instances of ethnic divide were apparent prior to British rule, but the core premise of the systematization of discrimination through resource allocation via job opportunities and other limited resources codified racism through colonial laws and practices. The ramifications of these policies in Burmese society have allowed for the discrimination of Rohingya to seep into the twenty-first century.

Over the past year, military operations against the Rohingya have become so intense and cruel that some have characterized the crisis a genocide. Yet, this crisis still receives little acknowledgment by state officials. When asked about the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya people in Burma, Burma’s State Counsellor and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi denied any such claims. She too, like the military, identifies the Rohingya as illegal immigrants propagating terrorism in the Arakan region.^[20]  The politics of these opinions will be analyzed in later portions of this essay.

In response to the centuries of discrimination and violence the Rohingya have faced, some Rohingya groups have turned to violent resistance. Local Rohingya insurgent groups have existed for decades, fighting for their rights and protecting their people with limited resources. They often use home-made weapons such as sharpened bamboo sticks, machetes, and knives.^[21] The worst of this violence erupted in 2012 following the alleged rape of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men. Mass religious violence and state riots erupted against the Rohingya, forcing 140,000 of them into camps in Rakhine for internally displaced people. But in 2013, their resistance created the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). ARSA is active in the Northern Rakhine state and is declared as a terrorist group by the Central Committee for Counter-Terrorism of Myanmar.^[22] On August 25^th, 2017, about 200 Rohingya ARSA militants attacked a police post, killing nine border officers and four soldiers. Since then, a military crackdown has caused almost 800,000 Rohingyas to flee from Myanmar into under-developed and overpopulated refugee camps into Bangladesh.^[23] Although there is no firm evidence to validate this claim, the Burmese government continuously alleges that ARSA is involved with and subsidized by foreign Islamists. This claim was refuted by Ata Ullah, the current leader of ARSA. Time and again they reinstate their ideology of ethno-nationalism and deny being a jihadist group. The capabilities of ARSA however, do not compare to that of the Burmese military. On September 10, 2017, Amnesty International and Bangladeshi government sources accused Burmese authorities of laying landmines at border crossings used by fleeing Rohingya. ^{[24] [25]}   Thus, the Rohingya continue to fight for their rights in a manner that is outside of legal proceedings, due to their inability to be represented by the law. This poses a critical need for governmental representation of a marginalized group that has been systematically denied of their fundamental human rights.

With the Rohingya people living in such dire conditions, a health crisis is also underway. And with their own government ostracizing them, turning to international aid organizations appears to be their only option. While Myanmar’s consistent rejection of international assistance makes it harder for aid organizations to interact with this population, concerns about the best forms of aid provision have emerged in the past decade.

In the international community the Rohingyas are seen as innocent people who are uniquely abused. And, of course, it’s true they are largely innocent and uniquely abused as presented throughout the course of this text. But to people in Myanmar, the name suggests something much more. The people of Myanmar fear that a Rohingya autonomous area along the border with Bangladesh would come at the expense of Rakhine territory, and maybe at the expense of Bangladesh as a whole. This deeply felt fear comes from a real place and is rooted in Burma’s history. In breaking down this complex history, Myanmar’s actions can be better understood, and the international community can work towards more appropriate resolutions. 

Burma in Isolation: State Policy

 “Burma was the quintessential neutralist nation” says David Steinberg^[26]. After studying the complex interactions and political manifestations that have been taking place between states on the world stage, he argues how Burma’s actions, in the past two decades, point more towards isolationism than taking a neutralist stance.^[27] Steinberg’s claim refers to multiple actions taken  by Burma to maintain this neutralist stance. For instance, to ensure its sovereign autonomy, Burma forfeited its Commonwealth membership in 1948, after gaining independence from the British.^[28] During this time, Burma sustained cordial relations with its Western counterparts, China and Russia. It also received considerable foreign aid, partly designed to win friends, and from an American vantage point to deny Communist China and the Soviet Union a foothold in Southeast Asia. Although Burma and China enjoyed good relations on the whole, one major exception came during China’s cultural revolution, when the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) troops fled to Burma after the People’s Liberation Army infiltrated the Yunnan Province.^[29]  Plagued by two communist insurrections as well as major ethnic revolts causing an internal civil war, the fledgling Burmese nation struggled to keep its balance between survival and political stability. Surreptitiously backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the incursion of Chinese Nationalist forces in northeastern Burma brought about the banning of all US aid programs in Burma.^[30] Steinberg states how following the coup of 1962, Burma’s isolationism slowly became more evident: “The Burmese felt insecure. They believed foreigners were unsympathetic and their views antithetical to the foils of the society, which were both Buddhist and socialist and therefore outside of the Western mainstream”.^[31]Within a year of the coup, the government drastically restricted international and domestic travel. Gradually, Burma was cut off from the outside world as most media outlets were managed by the state; only to be slipped off the news radar screen.^[32]This act of denying aid and restricting mobility still reflects existing sentiments in the Burmese political system and also the lack of attention the Rohingya Muslims have received. This is crucial to understanding the isolation faced by the Rohingya population in Myanmar as they are unable to receive representation by their own government, and consequently face several barriers in receiving recognition or support from the international community.

Soon after independence, Burma had an ongoing civil war. The root of that conflict is best explained in Martin Smith’s words as a “dilemma of unity in a land of diversity.”^[33] This refers to the backlash the Burmese government faced from its ethnic minorities. As Burma became more isolated from the outside world, the ethnic minorities in the “Frontier Areas” came in closer contact with the outside world. The majority Burmese were located well within state boundaries, but Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karen, and Mon peoples all had relatives across the arbitrary boundaries of Burma.^[34] The Rohingya Muslims resided in the northern Arakan region of Burma, which borders Bangladesh.^[35] Furthermore, some Christian minorities were also in touch with international Christian movements. All these factors of geographical and social isolation came into play, creating a sense of conflict. The impending threat against the Burmese military, by both minorities and foreigners, soon became a central concern for the government.

Burma’s civil conflicts alongside their perceptions within international relations have further determined the rigidity and application of the state’s isolationist policies. The 1988 uprising was a specific turning point for Burma’s political position, another step closer to becoming a strict isolationist state. The massacre of thousands of protesters followed by the nullification of the election result were instances that stood in stark contrast to America’s fundamental diplomatic goals of democracy and human rights.^[36]  Thus, downgrading the US representative in Burma from “ambassador” to “charge d’affaires” was an occurrence that only made the Burmese-US diplomatic fallout more evident.^[37] The troubles in this relationship were exacerbated by the imposition of a broad range of sanctions by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, respectively.^[38] It can be said that through these sanctions, the US government intended to pressure Burma to follow the path to democratisation.^[39] A former Burmese foreign minister chastised this Western approach, saying that Myanmar was not a donkey, and that a “carrots and sticks” approach to relations was not appropriate.^[40] Some argue that these sanctions have not only failed, but are indeed counterproductive as they have largely neglected the country’s multiple ethnic and armed conflicts as well as its pressing humanitarian challenges.^[41] According to Thant Myint-U, sanctions first weakened the very forces that supported the democratic reforms “reinforcing isolationist tendencies, constraining moves toward market reforms, and decimating the position of the Burmese professional, managerial, and entrepreneurial classes. Sanctions and related divestment campaigns, and campaigns to minimize tourism, have drastically reduced chances for the emergence of new and outward-looking economic forces.”^[42] Second, the sanctions strengthened the military forces. He pointed out that “The political economy, which has emerged under sanctions, based on a few extractive industries and trade ties with a handful of regional countries, has proven particularly easy for the incumbent regime to control. Aid restrictions, restrictions on high level contact and travel by senior Burmese officials, and embargoes on trade and investment all had the direct, if unintended, consequence of reinforcing the status quo.”^[43] Upholding of the status quo consequently engaged in isolationist policy so as to strategize how the state could exist under this existing status quo. It is ultimately evident that Western intervention has furthered a need for Myanmar state officials to view such intervening as harmful, and thus adopt policies of isolationism that have only served to isolate the Rohingya from any external assistance.

This policy of isolationism and its ramifications for its citizens and those that live within state borders can be addressed through the constrained policy choices the Burmese state was forced to take as a result of the actions of the international community. Within international relations, as a policy, sanctions mean tightening the policy choices of the government being sanctioned, to the point where there is no other option for the government except surrendering or impoverishing the people of the nation to that degree that there is no other choice but to overthrow the present government.^[44] To achieve this policy objective, all other states must impose strict sanctions against the targeted state. Furthermore, the targeted state must have very few resources. In the case of Burma, neither of these prerequisites apply.^[45] Firstly, Myanmar has abundant natural resources such as oil, gas, and jade. Secondly, Burma’s neighbouring states, such as China, India, and other ASEAN countries have not imposed sanctions on Burma. In fact, having previously vacillated between friendships with US and China, the tense relations with America provided an opportunity for Burma to form closer ties with China. China thus became the prime source of support and protection in the international community.^[46] Burma being a nation rich in natural resources like timber, oil, and precious gems, it opened a new possibility for bilateral trade between Burma and China. Soon after that, China became Burma’s major supplier for military equipment and training.^[47] Thus, Burma’s foreign trade not only flourished during the years of US sanctions, but also worked to increase the metaphorical distance in the US-Burma relations.^[48]

With Burma pursuing goals similar to that of an isolationist state, it was evident that the nation’s ongoing ethnic crisis only worsened over time through restricting any information dissemination of the current state of affairs within Myanmar to the outside international community. Although many may push this label of ethnic crisis, especially after Aung San Suu Kyi’s rise to power, the intricacies of the Rohingya Muslims’ plight only reinforces Burma’s rejection to Western intervention. In March 2017, the UN Human Rights Council decided to launch a review into the allegations and reports of abuses of the Rohingya Muslims in areas of Rakhine.^[49] This US endorsed EU probe was immediately rejected by Suu Kyi, saying it would “divide communities in the troubled western state of Rakhine.”^[50] During the military regime, the censor had control over all media outlets.^[51] It filtered almost all important information in the media regardless of whether it was true or not, as long as the information supported the military leadership, it was circulated and advertised. However, since the new government took power in 2011 and the censorship board was then abolished, the media landscape has been substantially transformed.^[52]  All of this is irrelevant when it comes to reporting the mass genocidal activities taking place in Burma. Leaders and news outlets still disseminate retrograde-sounding opinions and sometimes outright denial of any claims of such atrocities.^[53] Furthermore, a commission appointed by Suu Kyi concluded that “there were no cases of genocide and religious persecution in the region”, despite there being significant evidence of the mass killing of Rohingya Muslims.^[54]  In an effort to muzzle reporting, Myanmar’s government has barred independent journalists from the region, and dismissed reports of abuses of power as “fake news”.^[55] To go one step further, Suu Kyi’s office emblazoned the words “Fake Rape” on its website to discredit reports that troops had committed sexual violence.^[56] These anecdotes and systems of censorship and knowledge dissemination suppression further enforce the isolationism Myanmar adopts for its political survival, with the consequences being felt by the Rohingya population who are thus unacknowledged by their own government.

This isolationism affecting the Rohingya Muslim population can be exemplified by the restrictions of international aid the community has faced. If the human rights abuses are as ‘non-existent’ as the Burmese government claims, then there would be no need to provide aid. Thus, preventing international aid from entering Burma becomes legitimized. Up until February 2014, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) had six primary care clinics, 20 malaria clinics, and three HIV/AIDS clinics in Rakhine State, until they were ordered by the government to suspend all activities.^[57] This left a large health-care void for those Rohingya dependent on MSF as their sole provider for health care. Only after nine months of suspension, MSF was allowed to return to Rakhine State.[58] A presidential spokesman from Burma, Ye Htut told a local newspaper that MSF’s contract would not be extended any further as it hired “Bengalis” and because it lacked transparency in its work.^[59] This nine-month suspension of MSF is one of many examples of the Burmese government restricting aid for the Rohingya, showcasing an attitude of isolationism that prevents other nations from intervening.

Myanmar’s closed-door policy also makes it difficult to get a complete understanding of the present crisis. This has several subsequent ramifications. There is a lack of summative data about the Rohingya population in any stream of academic literature. Assessments of health, nutrition, and human security provide insight into the needs of vulnerable populations. It is extremely difficult to collect data about the Rohingya because the Myanmar Government does not recognize the Rohingya as a distinct and legitimate group, let alone as citizens. With the lack of recognition and acknowledgment of this issue, it serves to completely neglect the plight of Rohingya Muslims. Moreover, government-induced restrictions on aid and a lack of data makes it difficult for aid organizations to reach their target audience. These acts tie together to further deteriorate the conditions of the Rohingya, while providing an image of an unfavourable future for this ostracized population.

A Fatal Myth: Democratisation as Remedy

Throughout history, democracy has been viewed as the ultimate form of government that allows a nation to reflect its values in its power to choose leaders whose visions align with such values. that allows a nation to elect its state representatives. Although in theory the system when applied to a population and its members equally sounds robust in attaining fair representation, Theoretically, democracy should give equal and fair representation to every citizen in a democratic nation. However, when imposed upon another nation, this is not always the case. This is seen with Myanmar. This portion of the essay will analyze Western responses to various affairs in Myanmar and how this has ultimately affected the Rohingya Muslim population. We will do so by addressing the West’s idolization of Aung San Suu Kyi, Western paternalism, and the failings of what may appear as Western altruism rooted, in fact, in self-interest.

Nearing the end of the Cold War, Western intervention in Burma became central to the West’s propagation of democracy. Burma and the West had fairly distant relations until the marked uprisings and riots that emerged on August 8, 1988, upsetting the West’s understandings of Burma’s political strife.^[60] Following atrocities that left civilians injured and dead at the hands of military forces, Burma clashed with the idyllic international relations the democratic West strove to achieve.^[61] The United States specifically, spearheaded sanctions against Myanmar to encourage a process of democratization to ensue.^[62] This however, did not gain traction in its early stages. Particularly, in 1990 Myanmar held its first elections, in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won eighty percent of seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw^[63].  The military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), however, would not cede power.^[64] With the rise of militaristic authoritarianism, and growing adoration of Aung San Suu Kyi—leader of the NLD, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and political prisoner— the West began to view Burma’s politics as a “one-dimensional” issue.^[65] This one dimension was thus thought to be absolved with a symmetrical one dimensional solution: democracy. This perception can be viewed as paternalistic and dismissive of human rights abuses in Myanmar. In pursuing democracy, the West’s backing of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD overlooked Azeez Ibrahims affirmation that in these elections both the SLORC and NLD were arguing for the expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims from the north of the Rakhine province.^[66] In working to achieve democracy, the West indirectly condoned the racist views both parties carried and, in doing so, allowed for the rights of an ethnic minority to remain unaddressed, further imperilling the Rohingya to genocide. This mindset is very much embodied by Senator Mitch McConnell’s statements of Suu Kyi as follows:

“She could have chosen the route of Gandhi and just been an icon…Instead she chose the route of Margaret Thatcher by accepting responsibility by bringing along a country that was essentially in the dark ages”^[67]

Mitch McConnell’s opinions, representative of the overarching American congressional view of Burma at the time, shows that the South Asian figurehead of Mohandas Gandhi is an inadequate figurehead of peace, attributing a lack of action towards an individual many deem a hero^[68]. Instead, McConnell draws a distinction between a leader many determined to be the impetus of India’s independence to a Western leader. Margaret Thatcher has a notorious history for being on what many would argue as the wrong side of history when speaking to issues of race – especially considering her involvement in pro-South African stances during its era of apartheid^[69]. Yet, McConnell sees her as a stronger leader, which might be rooted in Eurocentric understandings of leadership and further emphasizes the simplistic notion with which American officials analysed Burmese politics at the time. Furthermore, this description of a country in the “dark ages” may denote an ingrained mindset of civilizational standards that is held against countries in the Global South deemed primitive and ‘backwards.’ These perceptions date back to colonial understandings of non-European races and cultures, and as Rudyard Kipling explains, creates a ‘White Man’s Burden’ in the attempt to civilize.^[70] In the West, civilization is suggested to take the route of democracy. Kirsten Haack addresses this notion by addressing the agenda of the United Nations. By analyzing a body of governance developed as a response to war, one can determine that the United Nations is deemed a solution that was created primarily by the West. Haack outlines that the key vision for the United Nations was democracy through civilization, elections, governance, and developmental democracy.^[71] When combining these ideals with the thesis stated within this argument, one can draw the conclusion that democracy is viewed as essential to the functioning of a state, but more so that this American construct is very much tied with ideas of civilized states, and that those that are not civilized require the development of a democracy. In the Burmese context we see that this is the basis for the idyllic representation of Aung San Suu Kyi as she is an active proponent for democracy. This essay will argue however, that this effort to instate democracy does more harm than good, thus showcasing the marginalization of the Rohingya is in part due to Western interventionism. One may argue that human rights is a Western norm championed across the world, but the West’s ideational commitment to democracy overshadowed the possibility of considering this crucial consideration  to Burmese politics.^[72] Assuming democracy allows the propagation and development of human rights in the future, this may diminish the value of lives in the Global South as simply ‘part of the process.’ This can be attributed to the atmosphere of islamophobia, and orientalist perspectives that disregard the rights and freedoms of those who do not live in the West, as can be analysed above by Senator McConnell’s commentary.^[73] As a consequence of this mode of thinking, Burma today is the only country where the UN’s priority is attaining democracy, and thus, receives less international assistance than any other least developed country.^[74] Ultimately, the West’s complicity in exacerbating the persecuted condition of the Rohingya peoples lies in its inability to gauge Western society’s altruism in the case of Burma. 

While Western intervention in Burma exists, the aid may be insufficient, endangering the lives of countless Rohingya Muslims fleeing from Myanmar. During the Obama administration, with Secretary Clinton leading the agenda for Foreign Affairs, the country was promised reduced sanctions conditional upon the follow-through of democratisation of the state.^[75] With the extension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s party into the political sphere, this slowly became a reality. There still exists tensions between the military and the ability to govern, but many of the sanctions imposed on Burma have been reduced.^[76] As of 2015, the United States officially recognizes the injustices the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar have faced.^[77] This action, after centuries of conflict, is core to advancing human rights in the region. However, the only follow-up came through one specific sanction restricting arms trades with Burmese military forces.^[78] In contrast to the various sanctions placed upon the military dictatorship that ruled Burma for decades when the setting was conducive to American politics to promulgate ideologies of democracy and freedom, the action depicts an inequitable distribution of effort? of action. These choices suggest America’s commitment to democracy can be understood to be dependent upon its expected gain in the American value dissemination in Burma – whether or not it actually helped minorities as they so believed it would.

With these perspectives in mind, however, addressing the rights of the Rohingya Muslims does not simply categorize itself within the confines of Western altruism. Burma has been subject to economic sanctions since the 1970s and 80s, especially after 1988 as previously mentioned.^[79] Transnational boycotts were enacted against large corporations such as Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL), an American organization that had a partnership with the Burmese military regime and used forced labourers to enact their work.^[80] John G. Dale argues in his work Free Burma that the political consumer is capable of shedding light on issues of unethical consumerism through articulating claims clearly and with a specific point and call to action^[81]. Furthermore, these messages gain traction when there is a collective trans local identity acting against a transnational corporation. These protests against UNOCAL occurred in Massachusetts showcasing a trans local attempt at solidarity. A few months after these protests, the US Congress authorized the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 imposing sanctions on Burma “until such time as the President determines and certifies to Congress that Burma has made measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices and implementing democratic government.”^[82] This law called for the president to develop a “multilateral strategy”—calling for cooperation of members of ASEAN and Burma’s other major trading partners in the region to hopefully ensure an improved state of democracy.^[83] Famously in 1993, Aung San Suu Kyi herself stated:

In Burma today [,] our real malady is not economic but political… Until we have a system that guarantees rule of law and basic democratic institutions, no amount of aid or investment will benefit our people. Profits from our business enterprises will merely go towards enriching a small, already very privileged elite. Companies [that trade in Burma] only serve to prolong the agony of my country by encouraging the present military regime to persevere in its intransigence.^[84]

With this in mind, Western governments ensured that corporations attempted to mitigate the exploitation of Burmese citizens’ rights. The role of sanctions was to ensure that democracy could be laid as a foundation prior to capitalist ventures undermining the ability for human rights to establish themselves in the state.

When examining these sanctions, however, there is an opportunity cost for American corporations to profit from cheap and forced labour. Under the Obama administration, sanctions were reduced against Burma, so long as promises of democratisation were achieved.^[85] Recognition of abuses against the Rohingya have been made, but sanctions to ensure the human rights of this group have not been pursued. This poses a key question – why did this corporate loophole emerge whereby human rights are at risk but companies are allowed to profit from them? For example, Japan was a former imperial power over Burma, but imposed various sanctions in conjunction with the United States in a display of partnership. Now, however, with the ostensible rise in democratisation in the state, Japan has dramatically increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the country^[86]. These ties have slowly allowed for Japan to gain access to Burma’s markets but also their raw materials and the ability to compete with “an economically expansive China^[87].” Furthermore, this splicing of Burmese markets will only further exacerbate ethnic conflicts in the region.^[88]

There is more at play in the politics of addressing the ethnic conflict in Burma than what meets the eye. Sanctions may be removed for democratisation, but unless this is fully fledged and consistent with protecting the rights of the marginalised Rohingya Muslims in the state, there is no guarantee for an improvement in the situation.

Muslims on the Margins: A Global Culture of Islamophobia

The roots of a clash of civilisations can also be traced to a culture of Islamophobia that may be present in Western nations today.^[89] For instance, President Donald Trump’s has repeatedly attempted to enact travel bans barring Muslims in Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States for fear of terrorism. This is indicative of the nature of Islamophobia taking root in international relations. The stigmatizing notion that Islam is monolithic in representing a population of extremist radicals challenges the ability to create empathy for any Muslim population—including the Rohingya. This is crucial to determining that aid cannot be provided when there is not enough public outcry to validate or catalyse aid provision.^[90]

This was continued during the Obama Administration. Although it is often cited that Obama inherited the previous administration’s inadequate policies with regards to the Middle East and Asia, Bush was responsible for 42 predator drone strikes while Obama initiated over 300 in the region.^[91] Although the Bush administration very much destabilized the region and caused many of the disturbances in the Middle East, the Obama administration has done little to quell these tensions. In fact, Rubin claims that Obama’s policies in the Middle East ultimately have redefined politics in the region from being rooted in ‘Arab Nationalism’, which has been its framing since the 1950s, to a new conception of roots in Islam and fundamentalism.^[92] Finally, George W. Bush allowed for a large misperception of Islam which contributed to the marginalization of Muslim people in America. Kumar argues that since the events of 9/11, the range of debate on issues pertaining to Muslims or Islam has narrowed to a point where “Orientalist modes of thought” are dominant once again.^[93] The “Clash of Civilizations” thesis disdained by the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations, was adopted by George W. Bush’s government which journalists reported upon with a tone of a political climate of fear. This portrayal of Muslims acquired the status of “common sense,” framing the lives of Muslims across the world normatively.^[94] In combining terrorism and Islam, the past three American governmental administrations have contributed to the normalisation of dehumanising Muslims. Ultimately, these policies have shaped the lens through which Muslims are viewed and thus undermine the role they can play in norm dissemination for the human rights of Rohingya peoples. This trivializes the creation of solidarity, which in turns questions the impetus for action to follow to ensure aid provision for the Rohingya. This again is a reframing of Islam as the ultimate enemy, clashing against democratic Western ideals. This consequently hurts the Rohingya by lessening the opportunity to garner compassion and Western altruism, if they are deemed part of a primitive group not worth assisting. As a Muslim minority, the Rohingya are hurt not only because of the racial prejudice they face as “Bengalis” in that they are referred to as non-natives to Burma, but that they are also of a minority religious background. They are both minorities in Burma, and also the global stage, where Islam – through these continuously imperialistic means of framing minorities – is still very much misunderstood and so, Muslims continue to be misunderstood too. If a population is misunderstood and deemed to be a threat or ‘the Other’, it is difficult to engender compassion without striking fear or prejudice as well. In the context of aid, where funding often relies on the compassion of Western masses to donate, the Rohingya are at odds with the ability to foster empathy for their plight, because of their identity.

It is also further important to note the modern lens through which the Rohingya Muslims are viewed. Al Jazeera’s extensive journalism in the region has found numerous examples of cultural and physical genocide against the Rohingya enacted on behalf of the Burmese government. The 1982 Citizenship Act that prevented Rohingya Muslims from attaining citizenship on the basis of identifying them as of Bengali ethnicities had far reaching effects on their integration and participation into society and into government structures and institutions; they effectively became a stateless population, with limited and differentiated access to healthcare, education and other social services^[95]. Without citizenship came obstacles to attaining work, food rations, access to the legal system and government services. Further restrictions were implemented to discourage the growth of the Rohingya population by adding taxation measures for foundational social practices, including taxes for marriages and taxes for each child born into a family^[96]. An investigation by Al Jazeera also uncovered secret memoranda passed within government that explicitly stated intent to diminish and bar the growth of the Rohingya peoples^[97]. These institutional acts have taken place alongside years of physical violence and destruction. This includes the case of the 2012 uprisings where the Na Sa Ka (or military forces) were allegedly responsible for the burning and destruction of Rohingya homes, and the rape and murder of Rohingya Muslims peoples. The riots displaced thousands and allowed the government the means to restrict the mobility rights of many Rohingya by placing them in makeshift refugee camps. Furthermore, one can compare the acts taking place in Burma with already existing international law surrounding genocide.

The Rome Statute and the Genocide Convention outline that genocide is:

any of [these]… acts committed with intent to destroy… a … group…:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group^[98]

Considering the circumstances outlined above, the killing of the members of this ethno-religious group, the trauma caused by sexual violence and forcible displacement, the governmental action that made it extraneous to grow the population, and further action are all indicative of genocide. These acts highlight several problems –  mainly that there is evidence of state-sponsored genocide and that nothing is being done to fix it.

• When addressing global Islamophobia it is important to note that Burmese nationalism that evokes hatred against the Rohingya Muslims has Islamophobia at its core. Peter Coclanis writes that in all of Burma’s independence struggle, there was a strong sentiment of Buddhist promulgation that came with it, especially in seeking independence from the British^[99]. Furthermore, in the era of anti-government uprisings in the 1980s in Burma, much of the protests included what Coclanis calls a “Buddhist renewal movement” that combined “Buddhist religious fanaticism with intense Burmese nationalism and more than a tinge of ethnic chauvinism.^[100]” The antagonisms between Muslims and Buddhists is not simply a military-Rohingya, state-Rohingya, or international relations-Rohingya issue. It is a civil Burmese society-Rohingya issue as well. With no support internally due to the religion of the Rohingya, Islamophobia has been pertinent to their disappearing from Burmese society.^[101]
• Burma has enjoyed the support of the West for decades, but this has never helped the Rohingya Muslims. With Aung San Suu Kyi now at the helm of government, this complicates the attempt to address the human rights abuses in the country when a seeming champion of human rights denies the injustices the Rohingya have faced. This is ironic, but to assume that Aung San Suu Kyi is not willingly complicit in the genocide of a minority Muslim population is dismissive of the history of Burmese politics and her role within them. It is arguably ignorant to assume that because an individual shares the title of Burmese in the international community, that they will thus share that title internally is dismissive of ethnic tensions in the region. The Rohingya Muslims for centuries have existed on Burmese land, prior to British colonisation, but have repeatedly been labelled Bengali.^[102] They have been victim to decades and centuries of attempts to be forcibly removed from society and the state as a whole.^[103] The lens of modernity, that assumes a leader believing in democracy to spearhead government will thus result in the inclusion of Rohingya human rights showcases a structural dismissal of Islamophobia and other factors addressed in this essay.

Institutional Failures and Counter Revolution: What Next for the Rohingya?

After post-Holocaust calls of ‘never again’ were enshrined by the Genocide Convention of 1948, international law failed to prevent the horrific act in several circumstances. This is evident after the Rwandan genocide and after the massacres at Srebrenica.^[104] When legality came at odds with the politics of the international system, countless lives were lost. More importantly, these lives were already marginalized and not paid heed to on the international stage to begin with. The ongoing case of the persecution of the Rohingya population in Burma is a very real and current example of the failure of international legislation to protect vulnerable populations. It can be suggested that the modernist and Orientalist views of claiming these populations as “Other” to the West have perilous ramifications throughout history. In drawing these distinctions between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’, it is important to distinguish that the international system is failing. Ultimately, some populations have been deemed worthier than others in the Western public sphere of assistance. It is seen again and again that people of colour and Muslims, as evidenced in the case of Rwanda, Bosnia and now Burma, are dismissed and not worthy of timely aid.^[105] This has direct links to the culture of Islamophobia developed for the past few decades as mentioned earlier in this essay.

The dismissal of the Rohingya Muslims within the sphere of Western aid and politics can be proven when compared to the case study of the Free Tibet Movement. Stephen Noakes argues that norms “provide a principled basis for advocacy network formation, aiding in the creation of identities and preferences” core to transnational advocacy.^[106] He goes on to determine that “to the extent … networks manage to sustain themselves and … influence national priorities, the normative commitments underpinning their formation and mobilization are treated as fairly static.”^[107] If norms are core to the ability to advocate for people, and a norm of Islamophobia has been static within Western society for decades, it can be argued that it is difficult for Westerns to feel sympathy this group. In the case of Tibet, there is a global network of some 170 organizations providing financial and diplomatic resources to further the cause of independence^[108]. More importantly however, the stateless Tibetan people had the support of the American Whitehouse at the time:

“Beginning in the 1980s, an effort to raise the profile of the Tibet issue in congress and the White House was taken up by the prominent DC law firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering, which was registered with the US Department of Justice in 1985 as an agent of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Its message found particular resonance with members of the house of representatives, who, already upset with China over a host of other matters ranging from trade to arms sales, voted in June 1987 to approve an amendment to the foreign relations authorization act specifically denouncing what it called human rights violations in Tibet and the illegal occupation of the region by the Chinese”^[109]

With the common enemy of the Chinese, the US had strategic and ideological agendas aligned with the desire to assist the Tibetan people. The Rohingya Muslims do not have a common enemy to share with America. If anything, Aung San Suu Kyi was a proud ally of the United States for decades. Furthermore, the Rohingya are a Muslim population. They do not hold any power on the world stage as a result of their identity. Noakes argues that these early successes of US support, alongside other large parties including the British and Russians, are what allowed the Free Tibet Movement such momentum^[110]. The Rohingya lack this expediency or transnational advocacy due to their existence as stateless Muslim peoples – ultimately holding back the ability to assist.

As of September 2017, several violent uprisings have come to the attention of the  global media, shining a spotlight on Rakhine State. Sparked by military attacks against the Rohingya minority in remote villages, pleas for help have begun to be recognized. The difference at this moment, however, in Western recognition of the atrocities occurring in Burma, are not a direct result of the magnitude and livid horrors of actions that have ensued, but rather because they have occurred under the watch of Aung San Suu Kyi.^[111] The Nobel Peace Prize laureate is facing condemnation for her ignorance towards the actions of the Buddhist majority and her continued assertions that there is fear on both sides.^[112] In an interview in 2016 that is gaining traction in media today, Suu Kyi asserts that she will not speak against the “ethnic cleansing” of the Rohingya population because she alleges there is not enough violence enacted against them.^[113] Sources such as The Guardian, the New York Times, and politically satirical television shows such as the Daily Show with Trevor Noah have all addressed the recent escalation in violence in relation to Aung San Suu Kyi and thus question not the illegitimacy of the human rights violations, but their illegitimacy under the watchful eye of a Nobel peace prize laureate.^[114]

Distinct within this situation, are the analyses drawn in relation to President Donald J Trump of the United States of America. The left wing of the political spectrum has been of late under stressful circumstances due to a communal disbelief of the leader’s policies and subsequent repercussions worldwide. Social movements have emerged to challenge Trump’s views and political assertions, through the Women’s March, the March for Science, protests against anti-immigration reform, and solidarity amongst Black Lives Matter groups, marginalized and racialized groups.^[115] Pride marches have shown more political backing due to the circumstances regarding the vulnerability of queer populations under a Trump administration.^[116] It is in this regard, that the left is beginning to step forward and address injustices that are occurring worldwide, with a stark distaste for anything remotely reminiscent of Donald Trump.

Although there are movements promulgating views of Islamophobia, for example by the Neo Nazi march in Charlottesville, there are similar movements attempting to promote a counter perspective. During the Miss America Pageant for 2017, a nationwide broadcasted event with millions watching, Ms. Texas asserted in relation to right-wing violent protests that President Trump’s inability to address domestic terrorism was wrong and that the fault being on the side of white supremacists was “obvious.”^[117] With these clashes of political viewpoints and leanings at play, there is understanding that a social wave of altruism is possible to emerge as well. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norm entrepreneurs are responsible for disseminating an idea to be a standard of expected behaviour.^[118] Once this idea has achieved a critical mass of followers—whether this be in numbers or the power of the few who follow who are considered to be global leaders—this  norm reaches a norm cascade becoming an ingrained standard that slowly comes to be taken for granted.^[119] Anti-islamophobia views stand is questionable in terms of this process. However, it is crucial to discern that hope for the Rohingya is not lost. Aung San Suu Kyi, having been analysed in comparison to President Trump in her belief that there is fear on both sides of the physical violence occurring in her country—even though it is proven that the Muslim minority has faced a much larger extent of persecution in terms of physical, sexual, and psychological harm^[120] —proves to be a target of disdain by the left. As a very politically mobile group, this indicates that there is political consciousness among the left surrounding the human rights violations of the Rohingya. Since Aung San Suu Kyi is now questioned as categorically similar to Trump, anti-Trump sentiment can potentially be used to mobilise pro-Rohingya rights movements and attitudes. Anti-trump views allow for a lens to analyse global affairs, working to effectively explore the issue of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. Drawing these parallels is crucial to understanding that there is the possibility of global norm shaping processes to ensue. This would allow the protection of the rights of the Rohingya Muslims through current reactions to the climate of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and alt-right messaging.

In order for the Rohingya crisis to be addressed and resolved, institutional action is required. Time and again, from Rwanda to Srebrenica to Venezuela, the bureaucratic nature of international political agenda-setting intertwined with capitalist gain has allowed for the loss of life in exorbitant numbers. Genocide continues to be committed against those in the world with the least political representation, while those with the most remain idle. Systems such as the United Nations were created for purposes such as these, but their lack of democracy within the decision-making process, and ability to act promptly within emergencies has served as the organization’s downfall.

In the present situation, recognition is key. Western media has begun to recognize the Rohingya crisis as an ethnic cleansing, although this essay goes on to use stronger language of genocide.^[121] It is crucial that Aung San Suu Kyi admit to this circumstance and allow for the United Nations to carry out probes, investigations, and further measures to ensure the protection of human rights in the region. This includes culturally relativistic data that analyses the state-sponsored oppression and violence enacted against the Rohingya and analysing further structural violence committed in terms of lack of mobility rights, or the ability to seek justice for crimes committed during the civil war.

The status quo has been upheld for far too long. To ensure that this crisis is ended and to prevent history from repeating itself, it is necessary that the focus of the human rights and collective rights of the Rohingya are recognized, protected, and fought for. Furthermore, these rights must be mobilized actively in contrast to the circumstances of Western sanctions being uplifted and the ability for corporations to further exacerbate the situation in the state. It is the continual dismissal of human value for those of broader institutions and organizations such as the state or corporations. In this quest, one often forgets that the thread that holds this fabric together is each individual human life. Without recognition for such lives, society cannot function. Thus, without the active recognition of the Rohingya Muslims’ rights, we as a global society cannot function.

Endnotes

[1] “Human Rights Council Opens Special Session on the Situation of Human Rights of the Rohingya and Other Minorities in Rakhine State in Myanmar.” OHCHR | Freedom of Religion: UN Expert Hails Albania, but Notes New Challenges and Unresolved Issues from the past. December 5, 2017. Accessed November 23, 2018. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22491&LangID=E.

[2] Cai, Derek, and Associated Press. “Aung San Suu Kyi Says Myanmar’s Campaign against Rohingya Muslims Was Triggered by Terrorism.” National Post. August 22, 2018. Accessed November 22, 2018. https://nationalpost.com/news/world/suu-kyi-says-timing-of-rohingya-return-depends-on-bangladesh

^[3] Canadian House of Commons. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. Sentenced to a Slow Demise: The Plight of Myanmars Rohingya Minority: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development / Hon. Robert D. Nault, Chair ; Subcommittee on International Human Rights ; Michael Levitt, Chair. By Michael Levitt and Robert Nault. Federal 42nd Parliament., 1st sess. H.

^[4] “II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.” Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh – Historical Background. May 2000. Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm#P94_20222.

^[5] Ibid.

^[6] Harvey, G. E. History of Burma: from the earliest times to 10 March, 1824: the beginning of the English conquest (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2000),

^[7] Aung, Maung Htin. A history of Burma. New York …: Columbia U.P., 1967.

^[8] “II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.” Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh – Historical Background. May 2000. Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm#P94_20222.

^[9] Silverstein, Josef. Burmese politics: the dilemma of national unity. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980.

^[10] “II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.” Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh – Historical Background. May 2000. Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm#P94_20222.

^[11] Yegar, Mosheh. The Muslims of Burma: a study of a minority group. Harrassowitz Verlag, 1972.

^[12] “II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.” Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh – Historical Background. May 2000. Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm#P94_20222.

^[13] Burma Act VII, Registration of Foreigners Act and Rules, 1940

^[14] Burma Act VII, Registration of Foreigners Act and Rules, 1940

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] “III. DISCRIMINATION IN ARAKAN.” Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh – Discrimination in Arakan. May 2000. Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm#P156_46033.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Smith, Martin. Burma: insurgency and the politics of ethnicity. London: Zed, 1999.

^[19] “II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.” Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh – Historical Background. May 2000. Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm#P94_20222.

^[20] Krol, Nicola Smith; Charlotte. “Who are the Rohingya Muslims? The stateless minority fleeing violence in Burma.” The Telegraph. September 05, 2017. Accessed September 22, 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/rohingya-muslims/.

^[21] Edroos, Faisal. “ARSA: Who Are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?” Myanmar News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 13 Sept. 2017, www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-arakan-rohingya-salvation-army-170912060700394.html.

^[22] “Order No. 1/2017.” The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Anti-terrorism Central Committee. August 25, 2017. Accessed December 20, 2017. http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/nrpcen/node/124.

^[23] “Myanmar: What sparked latest violence in Rakhine?” BBC News. September 19, 2017. Accessed September 19, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41082689.

^[24] “Amnesty International.” Myanmar: New landmine blasts point to deliberate targeting of Rohingya. September 10 , 2017. Accessed September 19, 2017. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/myanmar-new-landmine-blasts-point-to-deliberate-targeting-of-rohingya/.

^[25] “Rohingya crisis: Myanmar ‘mining border’ as refugees flee.” BBC News. September 06, 2017. Accessed September 22, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41176488.

^[26] Steinberg, David I. Burma: the state of Myanmar. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2002. p 25

^[27] Steinberg, David I. Burma: the state of Myanmar. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2002. p 25

^[28] Ibid

^[29] Young, Kenneth Ray. Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma — obstacle in Burmas foreign relations: 1949-1961. 1970

^[30] McCoy, Alfred W. The politics of heroin: CIA complicity in the global drug trade. New York: Hill Books, 1991. p 171

^[31] Steinberg, David I. Burma: the state of Myanmar. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2002. p 26

^[32] Ibid

^[33] Smith, Martin. State of strife: the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Burma. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007. p 7

^[34] Steinberg, David I. Burma: the state of Myanmar. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2002. p 26

^[35] Ibid

^[36] Fong, Jack. Revolution as Development: the Karen Self-Determination Struggle Against Ethnocracy (1949-2004). Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, 2008. p 151

^[37] Kipgen, Nehginpao. “US-Burma relations: From isolation to engagement.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. December 31, 0000. Accessed September 23, 2017. http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/US-Burma-relations-From-isolation-to-engagement.

^[38] Kipgen, Nehginpao. Democratisation of Myanmar. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016. p 95

^[39] Ibid

^[40] Li, Chenyang, Chaw Chaw Sein, and Xianghui Zhu. Myanmar: Reintegrating into the International Community. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2016. p 12

^[41] Ibid p 130

^[42] Ibid 131

^[43] Ibid

^[44] Ibid 132

^[45] Ibid

^[46] Steinberg, David I. Burma: the state of Myanmar. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2002. p 26

^[47] HAACKE, JURGEN. MYANMARS FOREIGN POLICY: domestic influences and international implications. S.l.: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. p 25

^[48] “China’s Relations with Burma.” United States Institute of Peace. December 30, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2017. https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/chinas-relations-burma.

^[49] Emmott, Robin. “Burma angered as EU backs UN investigation into plight of Rohingya Muslims.” The Independent. May 03, 2017. Accessed September 23, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-eu-supports-un-human-rights-council-resolution-investigate-rohingya-muslims-aung-san-suu-kyi-a7714471.html.

^[50] Emmott, Robin. “Burma angered as EU backs UN investigation into plight of Rohingya Muslims.” The Independent. May 03, 2017. Accessed September 23, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-eu-supports-un-human-rights-council-resolution-investigate-rohingya-muslims-aung-san-suu-kyi-a7714471.html.

^[51] Kipgen, Nehginpao. “Conflict in Rakhine State in Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims Conundrum.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs33, no. 2 (2013): 298-310. doi:10.1080/13602004.2013.810117. p 66

^[52] Kipgen, Nehginpao. “Conflict in Rakhine State in Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims Conundrum.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs33, no. 2 (2013): 298-310. doi:10.1080/13602004.2013.810117. p 66

^[53] Board, The Editorial. “Opinion | Myanmar’s Shameful Denial.” The New York Times. January 10, 2017. Accessed September 23, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/opinion/myanmars-shameful-denial.html.

^[54] England, Charlotte. “Burmese government denies ongoing genocide of Rohingya Muslims.” The Independent. January 04, 2017. Accessed September 23, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burma-government-rohingya-muslims-aung-san-suu-kyi-genocide-massacre-rape-minority-myanmar-a7508761.html.

^[55] Lewis, Simon, and Wa Lone;. “Myanmar says fake news being spread to destabilise Suu Kyi government.” Reuters. May 05, 2017. Accessed September 23, 2017. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-suukyi/myanmar-says-fake-news-being-spread-to-destabilise-suu-kyi-government-idUKKBN1810DD.

^[56] “INFORMATION COMMITTEE REFUTES RUMOURS OF RAPES.” Myanmar State Counsellor Office. Accessed September 23, 2017. http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/551.

^[57] “Doctors Without Borders kicked out of western Myanmar.” Al Jazeera America. Accessed September 23, 2017. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/28/doctors-without-borderskickedoutofwesternmyanmar.html.

[58] Ibid.

^[59] Ibid.

^[60] Egreteau, Renaud, and Larry Jagan. Soldiers and diplomacy in Burma: understanding the foreign relations of the Burmese praetorian state. Singapore: NUS Press, 2013. Pp.138-156

^[61] Pedersen, Morten B. Promoting human rights in Burma: a critique of Western sanctions policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. p 21

^[62] Ibid. p 22

^[63] Ibid. p 22

^[64] Miller, Janelle D. “The National Convention: an Impediment to the Restoration of Democracy.” In Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society. St. Martin’s Press, 1997. P. 27.

^[65] Pedersen. Promoting human rights in Burma p 22

^[66] Ibrahim. The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide p79.

^[67] Steinhauer, Jennifer. “Myanmar’s Leader Has a Longtime Champion in Mitch McConnell.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 14 Sept. 2016.

^[68] Steinhauer, Jennifer. “Myanmar’s Leader Has a Longtime Champion in Mitch McConnell.”

^[69] Ibid

^[70] Postrel, Virginia. “The Poverty Puzzle.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 19 Mar. 2006

^[71] Haack, Kirsten. “The United Nations democracy agenda: A conceptual history.” (2013).

^[72] Pedersen. Promoting human rights in Burma p 24

^[73] Weller, Paul. 2006. “Addressing Religious Discrimination and Islamophobia: Muslims and Liberal Democracies. the Case of the United Kingdom.” Journal of Islamic Studies 17 (3): 295-325.

^[74] Pedersen. Promoting human rights in Burma. p.22

^[75] CLAPP, PRISCILLA. “Prospects for Rapprochement Between the United States and Myanmar.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 3 (2010): 409-26.

^[76] Ibid p 424.

^[77] https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252963.pdf

^[78] Ibid

^[79] Dale, John G. Free Burma: transnational legal action and corporate accountability. Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 102

^[80] Ibid. 107

^[81] Ibid

^[82] Ibid 107

^[83] Ibid. 107-114

^[84] Ibid. 104

^[85] Paddock, Richard C. “Obama’s Move to End Myanmar Sanctions Promises a Lift for Its Economy.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 15 Sept. 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/world/asia/myanmar-sanctions-economy-us.html?mcubz=0&_r=0. Accessed 24 Sept. 2017.

^[86] Seekins, Donald M. “Japan’s development ambitions for Myanmar: the problem of “economics before politics”.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs., vol. 34, no. 2, Aug. 2015, p. 113. University of Toronto Libraries.

^[87] Ibid

^[88] Ibid

^[89] Kumar, Deepa. “Framing Islam: The Resurgence of Orientalism during the Bush II Era.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 34.3 (2010): 254. Web.

^[90] Gostin, L. O. (2017), Best Evidence Aside: Why Trump’s Executive Order Makes America Less Healthy. Hastings Center Report, 47: 5–6.

^[91] Navia, Tomás, and Pénélope Kyritsis. “On Drones and Foreign Correspondence.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 22, no. 1 (October 1, 2015): 311-20. University of Toronto Libraries

^[92] Rubin, Barry. “NAVIGATING THE NEW MIDDLE EAST? THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION IS LOST AT SEA AND ON THE ROCKS.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 15, no. 4 (December 2013): 1-12

^[93] Kumar, Deepa. “Framing Islam: The Resurgence of Orientalism during the Bush II Era.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 34.3 (2010): 254. Web.

^[94] Ibid. 254

^[95] Al Jazeera. “Myanmar: Who Are the Rohingya?” Humanitarian Crises | Al Jazeera. February 05, 2018. Accessed April 16, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/rohingya-muslims-170831065142812.html.

^[96] Al Jazeera. “The Rohingya: Silent Abuse.” Myanmar | Al Jazeera. August 09, 2017. Accessed April 16, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2017/07/rohingya-silent-abuse-170730120336898.html.

^[97] Ibid

^[98] Article 125 of the Rome Statute, http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm .

^[99] Coclanis, Peter A. “TERROR IN BURMA: Buddhists vs. Muslims.” World Affairs 176, no. 4 (2013): 25-33. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43554876.

^[100] Ibid

^[101] Ibid.

^[102] Zarni, Maung. “Myanmar’s Step-by-Step Approach Toward Rohingya Genocide and Ethnocide.” In The Rohingyas of Arakan: history and heritage, 496. Chittagong, Bangladesh: Ali Publishing House, 2014.

^[103] Mahmood, Syed S., Emily Wroe, Arlan Fuller, and Jennifer Leaning. “The Rohingya people of Myanmar: health, human rights, and identity.” The Lancet389, no. 10081 (2017): 1841-850.

^[104] Patricia A. Weitsman. “The Politics of Identity and Sexual Violence: A Review of Bosnia and Rwanda.” Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2008): 561-578. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed September 24, 2017).

^[105] Meer, Nasar. “Racialization and religion: race, culture and difference in the study of antisemitism and Islamophobia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 385-398.

^[106] Noakes, Stephen. “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Moral Commitment: The Free Tibet Campaign Meets the Chinese State.” International Journal 67, no. 2 (2012): 509

^[107] Ibid

^[108] Ibid

^[109] Ibid

^[110] Ibid

^[111] Lee, Ronan. “A politician, not an icon: Aung San Suu Kyi’s silence on Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya.” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 25, no. 3 (2014): 321-333.

^[112] “Rohingya crisis: Are Suu Kyi’s Rohingya claims correct?” BBC News, BBC, 19 Sept. 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41312931. Accessed 24 Sept. 2017.

^[113] Guardian Staff and Agencies. “Aung San Suu Kyi denies ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 5 Apr. 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-ethnic-cleansing. Accessed 24 Sept. 2017.

^[114] McLaughlin, Timothy. “How Aung San Suu Kyi Lost Her Way.” The Atlantic. September 28, 2018. Accessed October 18, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-united-nations/571618/.

^[115] Stewart, Emily. “Poll: More Americans Are Hitting the Streets to Protest in the Era of Trump.” Vox. April 07, 2018. Accessed October 18, 2018. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/7/17209710/trump-protest-poll.

^[116] Lee, Matthew J. “The stirring of an anti-Trumpfmovement – The Boston Globe.” BostonGlobe.com, 21 Aug. 2017, www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/columns/2017/08/21/the-stirring-anti-trump-movement/JdTeN4sRIYVxXkntWuSIOK/story.html. Accessed 24 Sept. 2017.

^[117] “Miss Texas Criticizes Donald Trump Over Charlotteville.” Time, Time, time.com/4935917/miss-texas-trump/. Accessed 24 Sept. 2017.

^[118] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 887-917

^[119] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 892

^[120] Ekin, Annette. “The Mental Health Toll of the Rohingya Crisis.” Rohingya | Al Jazeera. October 10, 2017. Accessed October 18, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/mental-health-toll-rohingya-crisis-171010111603004.html.

^[121] Hughes, Roland. “Myanmar Rohingya: How a ‘genocide’ Was Investigated.” BBC News. September 03, 2018. Accessed October 18, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45341112.

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Written by Yixin Claire Ren

“Events do not deliver their meanings to us. They are always interpreted.”—The Gate of Heavenly Peace

While the 1989 student movement remains a topic of heated discussion in the West, in China, it is forced into national amnesia because discussion of and retrospection on the event have been strictly censored in China’s mainstream media, if not outright banned. Details of the crackdown on June Fourth have been kept from public disclosure since its occurrence, and the divergent yet individually coherent interpretations of the historical mystery between East and West suggest that there are multiple possible truths at work. Six years after the student demonstrations gripped global attention through massive media coverage, the release of The Gate of Heavenly Peace (hereafter abbreviated as The Gate) in 1995 brought back painful memories of the seven-week-long student movement in China. In the face of China’s denial of the massacre and US reluctance to endanger business interests and diplomatic ties, the directors Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon join a battle for the meaning of these events and self-consciously engage in the writing of history (Taylor). Interweaving videotaped scenes of the demonstrations and conversations with participants and eyewitnesses, The Gate provides a detailed chronicle from mid-April, when the public mourning of pro-democracy official Hu Yaobang provoked demonstrators’ expression of long-standing frustration with the lack of political freedoms, to June 4, when the sequence of protests culminated in a government crackdown.

Upon its premiere at the 1995 New York Film Festival, The Gate received wide acclaim. Hinton and Gordon amassed over 250 hours of archival footage from nine different countries and conducted lengthy, thoughtful interviews with intellectuals, workers, former government officials, and Chinese student leaders (Lee 134; Litzinger 837). Critics applaud that by including a multiplicity of different voices and a detailed historical background, “[the film] escapes the sensationalism that informed much of the media coverage” (Litzinger 828) and “presents a balanced and ‘dialogical’ perspective on the Tiananmen protests” (Litzinger 837). Acclaimed film critic Charles Taylor remarks that it has “the richness, clarity, and complexity that only the best documentaries afford,” and another critic goes further, saying “[s]uch richness of material is perfect for classroom teaching at the university level” (Lee 134). The Gate is also praised for its masterfully designed web page, a comprehensive digital collection of posters, photographs, music, videos and scholarly works that together explore the underlying themes of the student occupation, such as nationalism, human rights, reform, and revolution.

Situating the 1989 student movement in a larger historical background and analyzing it through the lens of political culture in China, The Gate achieves contextualization and demystification of the June Fourth events which other narratives—particularly those in the U.S. news media—fail to accomplish. By rejecting the dominant anti-communist rhetoric of those narratives, the film does not make the event an ideological commodity, but an object of critical debate and meaningful commemoration. However, The Gate’s subtle argument that demonstrators had been socialized in a political culture from which they could never escape causes the film to diverge from a completely distanced, objective account of June Fourth. Though subtle, the negative portrayal of radical students and ideological reading of the conflict between radical and conciliatory camps contribute to the framing of China’s international image, inadvertently reinforcing the “alienatingly different” image of China from the freedom-granting democracies of the West (Chen 18).

June Fourth in the American News Media: Decontextualized and Mystified

Back in 1989, the U.S. news media domesticated June Fourth to the American audience by media broadcasts that were refracted through the lens of democracy promotion. Among all the iconic images that appeared in the news coverage, Tank Man is the most memorable—alone and unarmed, an ordinary Chinese man standing motionlessly in front of a battalion of armored tanks, which rolled to Tiananmen Square in response to the Chinese government’s martial law. Cut from a video, Tank Man is condensed and mythologized into a single frozen image and has been generally understood to represent his bold defiance of inhumane state machinery and a heightened and unsolvable tension between an authoritarian state and powerless citizens. A shockingly wide dissemination of the Tank Man image in the U.S. media and the image’s entrenchment in collective memory are indicative of the prevailing anti-communist rhetoric of the Western discourse on the June Fourth events. Tank Man also appears in The Gate, but the directors present it in a meaningfully different way that undermines the validity of the established American interpretation.

Yasmin Ibrahim, an extensive publisher on international communications, uses Tank Man as an example to reflect on the problematic role of popular news images in representing events. The recurrence of Tank Man, in both media coverage then and anniversary commemorations in the following decades, affirms his “indexicality” to the June Fourth events (Ibrahim 583). Recalling and retrieving the events of 1989 through the Tank Man, a single evocative image, inevitably results in “collapsing complex events into image narratives and delimiting political analysis into a trope of pro-democracy struggles” (Ibrahim 583). In the process of recirculation, the Tank Man image is “disembedd[ed]” from the original complex historical background, obfuscating the history; meanwhile, it gets “relocat[ed] in popular culture” and consumed within the changing contexts dictated by dominant cultural values and political ideologies (Ibrahim 586). This process of “disembedding” and “relocation” causes decontextualization, and the discourse power of news media reinforces the anti-communist rhetoric that surrounds the June Fourth events.

Ibrahim’s view is echoed by Lee, Li, and Lee’s criticism that editorial news over-simplifies complex events according to pre-packaged ideology. In their article “Symbolic Use of Decisive Events: Tiananmen as a News Icon in the Editorials of the Elite U.S. Press,” Lee et al. examine references to June Fourth in the editorials of The New York Times (NYT) and The Washington Post (WP) over time, in an attempt to show that the meaning associated with the event has changed along with the evolution of U.S.-China relations in the past two decades. From 1989 to 1992, the descriptive lexicon employed in the editorial discourse is “killing,” “slaughter,” and “massacre,” revealing strong moral condemnations (Lee et al. 342). At the end of the Cold War, the elite U.S. press still viewed China as a communist threat from the East and solidified the image of Tiananmen as a symbol of inhuman authoritarianism in the minds of American people. As the mouthpiece of American political ideology, the press turned June Fourth into a tool to stoke anti-communist sentiment, which in turn strengthens the might and righteousness of American liberalism. In this sense, the “[s]ocial memory” of June Fourth is “stripped of context” and becomes “unstable at the level of information” but “stable at the level of shared meanings” (Ibrahim 589). June Fourth in the editorial discourse, therefore, became less of a complex historical event full of nuanced information than a means to propagate the dominant political ideology.

Lee et al. also show that the meanings associated with June Fourth have been reenacted “through the process of continual recirculation” (337). In the second period from 1993 to 2000, Tiananmen “evolved from a sweeping symbol of authoritarianism and Communist dictatorship into a more concrete and specific symbol of human rights abuse” (Lee et al. 345). Into the 2000s, U.S.-China relations took a friendlier turn because of strategic reciprocity—America declared war on terrorism for which China’s alliance was important; China needed America’s support to enter the World Trade Organization. The focus of NYT and WP’s editorials shifted to the personal stories of Chinese dissidents and activists, and the use of Tiananmen was less condemnatory than commemorative (Lee et al. 348). Over time, June Fourth has evolved artificially from a catch-all symbol of dictatorship to an allusion to Beijing’s indifference to human life, and finally to an entry point for the press to comment on the current repressive political climate in China. Different generations of audience are provided various versions of the story, causing them to perceive the same event in manipulatively different ways. The negative consequence is that June Fourth has been mystified over the course of circulation. In light of the persistence of journalistic accounts to either condense the sequence of events in 1989 to evocative images of debatable meaning such as the Tank Man, or to impart different symbolizations to a foreign event, it becomes easier to understand why the coherence of the global collective memory of June Fourth continues to be undermined by the discrepancies between various accounts of the story that correspond to changing national interests and cultural repertoire.

The Gate: An Attempt to Restore Historical Complexity to June Fourth

In contrast to foregoing decontextualizing and mystifying tactics utilized by other narratives to project self-serving ideologies, The Gate distinguishes itself by giving back historical complexity to June Fourth and narrating the event with distanced objectivity. The film succeeds in subverting, at least partially, the undercurrent of anti-communist sentiment that underlies most of the dominant American accounts. The first meaningful move taken by the film is to provide the video version of Tank Man at the beginning, counteracting the misleading message sent by the popular motionless version. In the static image, it seems as though the tank is about to crush the innocent young man, which tempts the viewer to condemn the overpowering state and the photograph has become a cultural symbol of resistance. In contrast, the video clip in the film shows that in fact, the tank is constantly changing its advance direction to back off from the man; it is the man who keeps harassing the tank and even climbs up on it to flaunt his prowess. By providing the original videotape of Tank Man, the film argues that it is not the callous authoritarian state machine that we have always assumed, but one that is capable of restraint and compromise. This argument sets the groundwork for the rest of the film to dissolve a series of misinterpretations that revolve around June Fourth.

In the rest of the beginning of the film is the reminder of China’s recent evolution until 1989. This lengthy recollection, which helps to provide insight into the historical roots of the event, orients the viewer to a larger historical context. Instead of directly delving into the events in 1989, the first thirty minutes of the film provide a fleshed-out account of decisive social transformations that China has undergone since the 20th century, from the May Fourth Movement, to the People’s Republic of China under Maoism, to the Cultural Revolution, to Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power, and finally, to the successes and ramifications of his economic liberalization initiatives.

The recounting of recent Chinese history is an important contextualization strategy: Instead of isolating June Fourth in a confined time span, which may very likely lead to simplistic conclusions due to a lack of context, the film equips the audience with the historical background necessary to understand the final crackdown in light of China’s inherited political radicalism. As Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropologist at Duke University, Ralph Litzinger points out, “the time the viewer is asked to inhabit is not only the chronology of events traced through April, May, and June 1989 but extends as well to the last imperial regime and the birth of twentieth-century Chinese nationalism and Maoist socialism” (838). Cutting back and forth between videotaped scenes of former historical events and student demonstrations in 1989, this film strategy places “student actions, comments, and reflections in the context of a history of student radicalism” (Litzinger 837). The viewer is invited to understand students and their movements “as products of their own culture and time” (Litzinger 383).

While other narratives, particularly those in the news media, tend to frame June Fourth as a bilateral confrontational drama between the students and the government, The Gate highlights the Chinese government’s multiple concessions and its willingness to cooperate with the dissidents. In the film, every time the government conducts dialogue with student representatives, the voice of radical students always drowns out that of reform-minded students. The hope of reconciliation is repetitively ruined by student extremists’ demand that transformation into a liberal democratic state be completed overnight. Thus, “the conflict of the movement was not just between the students and the government, but between the students and an older, more cautious generation of intellectual dissidents, and within the student organizations themselves,” writes Charles Taylor. “[T]he tragedy was even deeper than we assumed, a result of missed opportunities, past demons, and unyielding positions on both sides” (Taylor). A simplistic characterization of the Chinese government as bigoted and repressive is the very foundation upon which anti-communist narratives are based. By exposing the audience to the unrecognized moderate side of the state, The Gate cripples those biases at a fundamental level and brings a more balanced appreciation of the Chinese government.

Regretfully, the historical richness of The Gate that is “perfect for classroom teaching at the university level,” as one critic terms it, does not yield much discourse power due to its confined circulation among liberal scholars in the West (Lee 134). Lee gives insight into the reason why the mass media has monopolized the power in giving meaning to June Fourth: “[t]he overall effect is overwhelming and perhaps more than a little confusing for the average television viewer in the West, whose viewing habits have been shaped by countless smooth, quick-cutting Hollywood movies and the fast-moving linear narrative mode of television news programs that do not require long attention spans” (134). This statement can be corroborated by the fact that The Gate has reached a relatively small group of viewers compared to other documentaries. The film has not reached a large enough audience to exert otherwise considerable influence on the public discourse on June Fourth.

The Gate: Ultimately Joins the Meta-Narrative of Democracy and Freedom

The Gate satisfies many of the demands we have placed on documentary films, and the audience is given the opportunity to engage with the wider significance of the events in 1989. But it is a dubious practice to uncritically laud the film’s historical realism without also interrogating the ways in which it inadvertently joins the larger Western discourse that attempts to code the series of 1989 events as a failed experiment of democracy in the distant Communist East. The Gate’s strategic treatment of U.S. journalist Philip Cunningham’s interview with Chai Ling speaks to the ideological force of the film’s underlying argument that student demonstrators had been radicalized by the very political atmosphere they intended to transform.

Chai Ling was the self-proclaimed commander in chief of the Tiananmen occupation, throughout which she insisted on uncompromising antagonism against the state government even when there had been chances for reconciliation. The film returns to the interview in bits and pieces more than fifteen times, juxtaposing Chai’s stinging denunciation of the government and fanatical appeal for violent insurrection in stark contrast with other interview subjects, who chiefly speak with reasoned reflection and advocate less confrontational means of political organizing. Litzinger observes an interesting tension between the film’s overall complexity and its over-reliance on Chai’s dramatic account; he writes, “What is striking to me is how the film, on the one hand, is so intent to show the complexity and deep historical roots of the tragedy, while on the other hand, it draws so much dramatic attention to the figure, words, and performance of the Chai Ling interview, which was, in fact, a very small part of the overall event” (842). Geremie Barmé, an Australian sinologist as well as one of the screenwriters for The Gate, builds on Litzinger’s observation that the film is disproportionately devoted to the Chai interview, saying “[Chai] is seen as embodying, in a metonymic way, the Maoist State itself” and “[she is] forced to occupy the space of the incommensurable other” (qtd. in Litzinger 843). In the interview, Chai reflects on the bitter divisions between moderate and radical student factions, reiterates the importance of taking extreme approaches unyieldingly against the corrupt hardline state, and repeatedly identifies bloodshed as the only means to awaken Chinese to overthrow the brutal regime. All of her discussion of life and death, class division, and the red battle is reminiscent of the Maoist revolutionary rhetoric. The depiction of Chai—a gallant rebel speaking the very language of the Party that she seeks to dethrone—is consistent with the film’s underlying argument that these passionate, young political activists, despite their best intentions, may never escape the political culture that has shaped their actions.                       

In addition to Chai Ling, there were numerous other students and intellectuals who have gone to the extreme to defend their political beliefs. Demonstrators broke up into two opposite camps, reform-minded or revolution-inclined, and acute tension rose between them. As the movement proceeds, “[t]hey try to stifle alternative positions, accuse their opponents of being traitors, and attempt to manipulate events to their advantage to maintain power,” writes Gina Marchetti, a critical theorist on cultural studies at University of Hong Kong (223). “Perhaps even more than the old men in power, the demonstrators are ‘children of Mao,’ and they exhibit the legacy of Mao’s romantic revolutionary idealism” (Marchetti 223). A cruel irony thus operates in the film: The protesters, in their quest for democratic representation, are portrayed as having adopted the very instruments of oppression that they were seeking to eradicate. The political infighting among demonstrators reminds us of a staggering parallel between the dissident camp and the state: they have similarity in terms of suppressing dissenting views and persecuting political opponents. The Gate, by presenting this striking resemblance—not in words, but in its methods of reenactment—turns our attention again to the Chinese political culture that looms large in the background, which has been incredibly powerful in moulding the behaviors on both sides.                   

Moreover, The Gate’s portrayal of the idiosyncratic political culture in China joins the meta-narrative that promotes the most salient elements—democracy and freedom—of American national identity. Pauline Chen, a New York Times columnist, examines how the film creates an “alienatingly different” image of China:

For most Americans, the images of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement offered a vision of the Chinese people as reassuringly similar to ourselves. . . . In the subsequent brutal crackdown by the Chinese government on June 4, 1989, the illusion of similarity receded, and we again saw China as alienatingly different. (Chen 18)

Presented with the painful disjunction between these two sets of images, the viewer is reminded anew that democracy and freedom, which are pivotal to American national identity, are still very far from being achieved in China. The audience, therefore, is invited to interpret June Fourth as a failed episode of pursuing democracy, a tale about how political freedoms and participatory democracy are still lacking in a monolithic state ruled by an outmoded socialist system. The way in which the film subtly encourages the use of political stereotypes about China has an actual effect of valorizing the values underpinning American liberalism. The Gate intensifies the United States’ ideology of seeing itself as the benchmark for and beacon of democracy and freedom. Hence, the film ends up joining the larger news media discourse that tries to peddle this ideological commodity, just like the strategic reenactment of Tank Man and by the elite editorials.

The Gate of Heavenly Peace ultimately participates in the dominant Western ideological discourse due to its problematic portrayal of Chinese demonstrators through the editing of interviews, its drawing of an analogy between protesters and the state to emphasize ingrained political radicalism and revolutionary idealism, and its subtle construction of an idiosyncratically different image of China that stands in stark contrast to paradigmatic American ideals. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to dismiss the film’s bold challenge of authoritative narratives of June Fourth in the West. The Gate has outstripped its numerous counterparts, primarily in the U.S. news media, by providing an objective reading of Tank Man, underscoring the moderate line within the Chinese government, and uncovering the complicated historical and political situations that lead to June Fourth. Through making sense of June Fourth in light of the larger historical context and inherited political culture in China, The Gate is a successful attempt to restore historical complexity to the event. The film’s astute and thoughtful reading of Chinese society interrupts the interpretive coherence constructed by the U.S. news media which largely oversimplifies and condenses June Fourth into an ideological package.

Viewed from this perspective, The Gate has a dual interpretive identity: on the one hand, it tries to recover the causes, consequences, and historical truth of June Fourth; but on the other, through igniting political stereotypes, it also successfully propagates American-flavored ideas of democracy and freedom. At the end of the day, the film does not escape the curse of the limit of representation—it is produced in a cultural environment that is imbued with stereotypical generalizations about June Fourth and about China, and it eventually joins the meta-narrative from which it intended to depart.

Bibliography

Chen, Pauline. “Screening History: New Documentaries on the Tiananmen Events in China.” Cineaste 22.1 (1996): 18-22. JSTOR. Web. 8 Nov. 2016.

Ibrahim, Yasmin. “Tank Man, Media Memory and Yellow Duck Patrol: Remembering Tiananmen on Social Media.” Digital Journalism 4.5 (2016): 582-96. Print.

Lee, Chin-Chuan, Hongtao Li, and Francis LF Lee. “Symbolic Use of Decisive Events: Tiananmen as a News Icon in the Editorials of the Elite U.S. Press.” The International    Journal of Press/Politics 16.3(2011): 335-56. Print.

Lee, Leo Ou-fan. “Visualizing the Tiananmen Student Movement.” The China Journal 35 (1996): 131-36. JSTOR. Web. 21 Nov. 2016.

Litzinger, Ralph A. “Screening the Political: Pedagogy and Dissent in The Gate of Heavenly Peace.” Positions 7.3 (1999): 827-50. Print.

Marchetti, Gina. From Tian’anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989-1997. Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 2006. Print.

Taylor, Charles. “A Tiananmen Square Documentary is the Holiday Movie of the Year.” Movie Reviews. Boston Phoenix, n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2016.

The Gate of Heavenly Peace. Dir. Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon. Perf. Chai Ling, Wang Dan, Dai Qing, Ding Zilin, Han Dongfang and Wuer Kaixi. Ronin Films, 1995. Film.

Written By Amelia Pollard

Abstract

This research paper evaluates the externalities that have ensued from the rise in consumption of electronic products. The atrophy of these products in developing countries has led to adverse health effects that disproportionately impact marginalized groups such as people of color, women, and children. The transboundary nature of this environmental problem has resulted in researchers often analyzing the issue within the framework of a stark Global North vs. South dichotomy. I attempt to break down this binary by considering the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the effectiveness of major directives such as the Basel and Rotterdam Conventions and the prevalence of non-state actors such as the Basel Action Network. In turn, I restructure the framing of electronic waste disposal in order to place the onus on producers, who have the greatest responsibility and access to resources in order to mediate the environmental degradation caused by the dumping of electronic waste.

Consumption and Sacrifice 

Environmental regimes are driven by public outcries that ensue from the discovery of a negative externality in the environment. These externalities often come from powerful industries during the manufacturing process. Increased production and globalization has led to an exponential growth in environmental degradation.[1] One of the greatest problems that has come from these unchecked industries is the rise in the consumption of electronic products. In the last century, the vast majority of this consumption has come from the Global North. In Bill McKibben’s book, Maybe One, he argues that after years of gluttonous consumption, the North has to begin sacrificing in order to create space for the South. This is reframing the concept of ecological debt, in which the Global North owes the South for its history of dominating production, thus perpetuating environmental degradation. McKibben argues that there can be more consumption overall as long as there is a shift in which countries are consuming more.[2] This approach signals maturity, in which there is a shift from a North-centric structure to that of equality. Currently, both producers and consumers in the Western Hemisphere create and dispose of electronic products with little to no consideration of their effect on developing countries.

One key strategy for reigning in the expanse of electronic waste follows the philosophy of Promethean Environmentalism, where technology and innovation help alleviate environmental degradation rather than exacerbate it.[3] This idea appeals mostly to “societies of comfort,”  countries that are accustomed to a high degree of luxury, and are unwilling to make drastic changes to their qualities of life for environmental concerns.[4] Collective action problems help explain why countries are unwilling to sacrifice luxury goods and technology. For instance, former president George W. Bush pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 after citing that it did not hold developing countries accountable for emitting too much CO₂. Here, Bush exemplifies the fear of “free-ridership,” in which the distribution of economic costs and sacrifice are imbalanced.[5] This stands in contrast with McKibben’s philosophy that there needs to be collective action defined by trust in order to optimize the balance of sustainability and production.   

Health Effects of Electronic Waste

The plight of electronic waste began with the discovery of health hazards linked to chemicals found in products when they began to deteriorate. Electronic waste is extremely toxic, containing lead, mercury and arsenic in high concentrations.[6] Since these chemicals are not prone to natural degradation in the environment, they have lasting impacts on human health, including poor fetal development and nervous system damage.[7] Electronic waste health effects primarily enter through the food chain. This occurs through the grazing of livestock and the seeping of toxins found in e-waste into agricultural areas. The toxins then bioaccumulate and biomagnify through the food chain.[8] These toxins are often in the form of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and as persistent organic pollutants (POPs). Methods for disposing of waste involves using highly concentrated acidic solutions to dissolve the metals and mechanically shred the plastics involved.[9] In 2014, UNEP deemed electronic waste the fastest growing waste stream in the world.[10] Despite increasing health hazards, the growth of production and the drag of substantial, effective legislation led to delayed global awareness.

The Transboundary Movement of Waste and the WTO

In the age of the ‘information economy,’ it is hard to comprehend the scale of electronic waste that is being transported. NGOs have estimated that between 50 to 80 percent of electronic waste that is consumed in Canada and the United States is processed in socioeconomically marginalized countries, often by hand.[11] However, the troubling component of the transboundary movement of waste is that, while it does cause environmental and health hazards, it also has the potential to provide economic opportunities. Developing countries are economically incentivized to accept not only reusable electronic waste, but harmful and toxic waste with no community benefit. There is a direct correlation between decreasing GDP as the rate in which countries import waste increases.[12] In recent years, there has also been a surge of waste transport between developing countries. This form of transportation has fewer regulations, since it does not hold the same saliency of injustice as the Global North to South relationship.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) plays a major role in the movement of transboundary waste. Through its promotion of free trade, the WTO often encourages the movement of electronic waste with the hope that it will ignite economic opportunities for developing countries. This perspective is short-sighted. Reparation costs of fixing both the environment and impacted individuals will most likely equal, if not surpass, the profits that these developing countries gain by attempting to repurpose electronic waste. However, members of the WTO do have the sovereign right to protect their people and environment if engagement in trade threatens their society. The temptation of economic opportunities from electronic waste often deters developing countries from reducing trade. The WTO frowns upon any form of trade restriction, though, and keeping this in mind, developing countries may withhold from adopting restrictive policies. As a result, looking towards non-trade-restrictive remedial measures is the favored approach because economic interdependence is optimized and helps to support the GDP of all parties involved.[13]

In early November 2017, China pitched the “National Sword” campaign against foreign waste being disposed of in the country. Through the ban, 24 different grades of waste will be restricted from entering the country. The WTO has yet to ratify the proposal. In its submission for review to the WTO, the government cited significant degrees of environmental degradation as grounds to limit the amount of waste imported.[14] Although addressing this issue in the short-term will require redirecting recycling locations, long-term solutions lie in the adoption of Extended Producers’ Responsibility. This shifts the onus of waste disposal to the countries that produce it, rather than from the disposal end.

Major Directives

The Basel Convention is the most significant and well-known international transboundary waste management agreement to take place. The convention took place in 1989, and was a multilateral agreement (MEA) with 180 parties that agreed to regulate the transboundary movement of hazardous waste. Its primary role is to prevent countries from receiving hazardous waste when they do not have an environmentally sound system of processing the material. Exports are allowed when they can be processed in an environmentally sound manner or when used as raw materials.[15] The Ban Amendment of 1995 prohibits export of all hazardous wastes incorporated in the Convention from Annex VII countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] & EU countries) to all others.[16] After years of legal disagreement, the amendment has ended in a stalemate. However, 74 of the countries in the Convention have ratified it. The Ban Amendment contradicts the ideologies of trade liberalization and globalization of the Washington Consensus. This leads to corporations needing to address their production methods instead. Gaps in the Basel Convention include the United States inability to ratify it, as well as electronic waste not being included in the definition of hazardous waste. The discrepancy in wording leads electronic waste to often go unregulated by the Basel Convention.  

The Rotterdam Convention of 1998 also served as a significant step towards managing the international trade of hazardous waste. The Convention stemmed primarily from awareness of the health implications of pesticides on human health. The most significant aspect of the MEA was the inclusion of the legally binding Prior Informed Consent Procedure, which is designated “for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade.”[17] The specificity in wording makes it evident that the Convention was in direct response to specific cases of harm caused by pesticides. The treaty, which was implemented in 2004, planned on improving upon voluntary prior informed consent procedures that were already in place internationally by facilitating information exchange about the chemicals.[18] Rotterdam primarily built upon the preceding voluntary guidelines instituted by UNEP and FAO in 1989.[19]

The most recent treaty in the series of international MEAs regarding hazardous waste was the Stockholm Convention, which was ratified in 2001. The treaty targets POPs that adversely affect human health and the environment. The Convention substantially limited or banned the use, production, and trade of 12 particularly harmful pollutants, which are often known as the “dirty dozen”.[20] POPs are defined in the Convention as having four key characteristics: bioaccumulation, transport over significant distances, toxicity and environmental persistence. However, brominated flame retardants, which are restricted through the convention, continue to be used in electronic products. As a result, they are still being detected in the global recycling flow, particularly in West African countries such as Nigeria.[21]

The European Union has taken on a more targeted approach to electronic waste regulation. The EU’s Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) directive has targets for the recovery and recycling of all electrical products. Along with the WEEE directive, the EU also passed the Restriction on Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS). Both directives were passed in February 2003 as a means to address electronic waste disposal in Europe.[22] EU’s RoHS was momentous because it restricted the use of six toxic components, including lead, mercury and cadmium, in electronic equipment. Increasingly eco-friendly electronic products are not always financially feasible for developing countries, however. The targeted initiatives by the EU have showed some promise in setting a standard for producers, but they still do not cover the consumption of the United States and other hegemonic states. 

Non-State Actors

The inability of the U.S. to ratify the Basel Convention created regulatory gaps that non-state actors were able to fulfill. Often in environmental regimes, non-state actors’ main role is in creating public awareness around issues. This took place in the electronic waste regime through the NGO Greenpeace International, which raised awareness about e-waste disposed of in Asia. This formed a basic understanding of how developed countries were dumping waste in a non-environmentally sound manner.[23] However, other organizations like the Basel Action Network (BAN), took more pointed action at countries as well as producers in remediating environmental waste production and disposal. BAN targeted producers by cornering major corporations through the creation of certification incentives. Among the most prominent of these corporations was Hewlett-Packard, which eventually adopted a producer responsibility framework after being embarrassed and coerced by BAN.[24] One of the crucial disposal certification programs of BAN is the “Responsible Recycling Practices for Use in Accredited Certification Programs for Electronics Recyclers” (R2). This is an upstream supply chain regulatory target, as it is focused on the post-consumer phase. BAN developed most of these initiatives through its e-Steward program which attempts to legitimize the Basel Convention by incorporating its language into its initiatives.[25]

Challenges in Enforcement

One of the greatest challenges with electronic waste is the vague wording in the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions. In order to appeal to dozens of countries in the agreements, it became necessary to ignore certain facets of hazardous waste that are innately part of the toxic international flow of disposal. Electronic waste is not inherently considered a hazardous waste, particularly if it is advertised as reusable, raw material. However, electronics clearly encapsulates heavy metals and harmful chemicals that are concealed by their complex manufacturing.[26]

Although substantially more specific, the European Union’s WEEE directive also struggles with enforcement. The gap between the regime of electronics and waste management, is distinct. In tackling the electronic waste regime, a holistic approach of equally targeting the production as well as disposal is necessary to effectively reduce the hazards that ensue from e-waste. The directive closely followed the underlying regulatory principle, which is also known as the “cradle-to-grave” approach.[27] However, this still allowed for producers to include hazardous chemicals in the manufacturing of electronics.[28] This has caused the directive to be inefficient. The significant amount of resources that are spent on remediation are superfluous given that the production could have factored in the disposal from the start. There has also been a conflation of the initiative’s success with increasing metal prices, which has encouraged firms to reuse as many precious metals as possible in production. Only 13% of the electronic waste assessed by the WEEE is disposed of in landfills or incinerated, compared to the more than 90% of waste that was disposed of in this way in 2000.[29] Studies have shown that transported waste is not being documented properly if it contains hazardous materials, which also accounts for the substantial decrease in disposal percentages.[30] The directive has made an impression on the waste management component of electronic waste, but has yet to outline the exact way of forcing producers into not using hazardous materials.

Reframing the Global North vs. South Narrative

In order to effectively address the electronic waste regime, it is necessary that the international community acknowledges its changing nature in the last decade. In 2012, the UNEP released a study called “Where are WEEE in Africa?” The report unveiled the status of electronic waste disposal in five different countries. It found that 5% of all European waste is still illegally disposed of on the continent.[31] The important component is that increased local use of electronic products has caused a jump to 85% of waste being materials that were consumed domestically.[32] The emerging problem therefore is that there are still no local facilities to process these products. The problem is shifting from a Global North vs. South relationship to one that is insulated within developing countries. This may serve as a disincentive for developed countries to fund recycling facilities for these regions. To show how rare sufficient recycling facilities are, one located in Germany is only one of five in the world which is properly equipped to take apart the components of a circuit board.[33] 

When the Basel Convention was drafted, trade from Annex VII (developed) countries to non-Annex VII countries accounted for 35% of total trade that needed to be monitored.[34] In 2012, it was found that it only accounted for 1%.[35] This reshapes the traditional framing of the problem from being strictly a Global North verses South environmental regime, to being exclusively founded on environmental injustice. Although the disposal of electronic waste is shifting away from one of classical injustice between states, it is evident there is still an imbalance of power at play. The tech industry is now holding the authority that hegemonic states once did. In turn, the tech industry’s continual refusal to rethink the design of tech products is perpetuating the horrendous living conditions of developing countries.[36] Multilateral funding facilitated by the United Nations or another international institution could create the capacity and resources for these developing countries to mitigate local environmental damage. Electronic wastes contain predominantly re-workable and re-sellable equipment, and as a result non-Annex VII to Annex VII electronic trade has become much more significant.[37] This fact makes the main goals of the Basel, Rotterdam and Basel Conventions extraneous as waste streams reshape and require new legal parameters. 

The Silver Lining of Producer Responsibility

Within these regime gaps it is evident that complete elimination of hazardous waste and electronic products needs to come from the producers. A variety of tactics, ranging from public harassment of producers to economic incentives, has pushed producers to adopt a greater responsibility in the disposal of hazardous waste. The true irony of the electronic waste regime is that tech companies, who proclaim themselves a “clean industry,” are the producers of such a significant proportion of the globe’s most toxic waste. A computer monitor alone contains several pounds of highly toxic substances.[38] The vicious cycle of the increasing efficiency of electronic devices only leads to an exponential growth of waste as people leap for new gadgets on a regular basis. This is the concept of Moore’s Law, in which processing power doubles every eighteen months into the indefinite future. This idea was conceptualized by the founder of the Intel Corporation, Gordon Moore.[39] This feeds into the strategy of planned obsolescence, in which firms deliberately design their products to deteriorate after a relatively short period of time. Although producer responsibility initiatives have emerged as a tactic in checking electronic waste, planned obsolescence has remained difficult to regulate.

One of the greatest successes of the electronic waste regime has been the Computer TakeBack Campaign. The International Campaign for Responsible Technology (ICRT) includes a substantial number of the environmental groups that have been involved in the global initiative. The conglomerate’s main mission is for producers to take responsibility for the entire life cycle of their products through effective MEAs. There have been domestic directives in targeting producers, such as the EPA’s National Electronic Products Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI), which in actuality has no true regulatory teeth.[40] The initiative collapsed as environmentalists and corporations diverged in their visions of what take-back programs would look like. Tech giants often avoid having take-back services in developing countries (such as Apple, Microsoft, Panasonic, Philips, Sharp, Sony and Toshiba) although they have them in place in countries like the United States that hold more social capital.[41] However, with help from the BAN, CBTC managed to investigate, embarrass and force Dell and Hewlett-Packard into adopting a comprehensive pledge of producer responsibility—all within a span of a few years. CBTC operates on the assumption that effective change needs to come from within industries, not governments. Ineffective international governance, coupled with the transboundary nature of the electronic waste regime, has led to the emergence of hegemonic companies rather than states. These firms dominate the industry and therefore need to be coerced as defecting nations traditionally are, by NGOs in other environmental regimes.

There have been some attempts at producer responsibility clauses in governance. The European Union’s WEEE directive provides a brief suggestion of conscientious electronic goods production. The section on producer responsibility says, “Member states shall encourage the design and production of electrical and electronic equipment which take into account and facilitate dismantling and recovery, in particular the reuse and recycling of WEEE, their components and materials”.[42] This section provides no clear guidelines as to how states should encourage this type of production, not to mention any repercussions for firms that do not comply with the clause. 

With increasing public exposure, companies are starting to have to pay the costs of including harmful chemicals in production. In late November of 2017, DirecTV was required to pay a $9.5 million settlement because the firm had illegally dumped hazardous waste. An investigation conducted by Alameda County found that all 25 facilities in California were improperly dumping batteries, electronic devices and other hazardous wastes in the vicinity.[43] The trend of firms being exposed, and having to pay for the market failure of hazardous externalities, will hopefully begin to convince companies to eliminate the materials from the production process entirely.  

Endnotes

[1] Robinson, Brett H. “E-Waste: An Assessment of Global Production and Environmental Impacts.” Science of the Total Environment, vol. 408, no. 2, 2009.

[2] McKibben, Bill. Maybe One: A Personal and Environmental Argument for Single-Child Families. (New York: Simon & Schuster): 161. 1998.

[3] Maniates, Michael and John M. Meyer. The Environmental Politics of Sacrifice. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press): 40. 2010.

[4] Ibid.  

[5] Svendsen, Gert T. “Soft or Tough Guys in Kyoto? Free-Rider Incentives and the Samaritan’s Dilemma.” International Journal of Global Energy Issues, vol. 23, no. 4 (2005): 281.  

[6] Raffael, Nick. “iDump: How the United States should use Disposal Bans to Legislate Our Way Out of the Electronic Waste Crisis.” William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 39, no. 2 (2015): 483.

[7] Ibid.  

[8] Borthakur, Anwesha. “Health and Environmental Hazards of Electronic Waste in India.” Journal of Environmental Health 78, no. 8 (2016): 23. ProQuest.

[9] Ibid., 18.

[10] Wood, Molly. Recycling Electronic Waste Responsibly: Excuses Dwindle. The New York Times, 31 Dec. 2014. Accessed Nov 7, 2017.

[11] Lepawsky, John and McNabb, Chris. 2009. Mapping International Flows of Electronic Waste. The Canadian Geographer.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Christian, Gideon Emcee. “Trade Measures for Regulating Transboundary Movement of Electronic Waste.” Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 33, no. 85 (2017): 105.

[14] Robertson, Jamie. The Chinese Blockage in the Global Waste Disposal System. BBC News, 19 Oct. 2017. Accessed Nov. 9, 2017.

[15] Renckens, Stefan. 2013. The Basel Convention, US Politics, and the Emergence of Non-State E-Waste Recycling Certification. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science & Business Media: 142. ProQuest.

[16] Ibid., pp. 148.

[17] Barrios, Paula. “The Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals: A Meaningful Step Toward Environmental Protection?” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 16, no. 4 (2004): 679.

[18] Ogunseitan, Oladele A. “A Russian Roulette with the Rotterdam Convention.” Jom 67, no. 11 (2015): 274.

[19] “Overview of Rotterdam Convention,” Rotterdam Convention, accessed December 5, 2017. http://www.pic.int/theconvention/overview/

[20] Mulvaney, Dustin. Green Politics: An A-to-Z Guide. 1^st Edition. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2011: 376.

[21] Babayemi, Joshua; Sindiku, Omotayo; Osibanjo, Oladele & Weber, Roland. “Sustance Flow Analysis of Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers in Plastic from EEE/WEEE in Nigeria in the Frame of Stockholm Convention as a Basis for Policy Advice.” Environmental Science and Pollution Research 22, no. 19 (2015), p. 14503.

[22] “Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE).” European Commission, The Environment. 24, April 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/index_en.htm.

[23] Brigden, Kevin, Iryana Labunska, Dabid Santillo, and Michelle Allsopp. “Recycling of electronic wastes in China and India: workplace and environmental contamination.” Greenpeace International (2005): 55.

[24] Renckens, 150.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Raffaele, 483.

[27] McDonough, William & Braungart, Michael. Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things. North Point Press, New York (2002).

[28] Lauridsen, Erik Hagelskjær & Jørgensen, Ulrik. “Sustainable Transition of Electronic Products through Waste Policy.” Research Policy 39, no. 4 (2010): 486. ScienceDirect.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Lubick, Naomi. “Shifting Mountains of Electronic Waste,” Environmental Health Perspectives (2012). ProQuest.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Lepawsky, Josh. “The Changing Geography of Global Trade in Electronic Discards: Time to Rethink the e-Waste Problem.” The Geographical Journal 181, no. 2 (2015): 148.

[35] Ibid.  

[36] Rauschenbach, Thomas M. “Competitiveness and Cooperation in a Global Industry.” International Journal of Technology Management, vol. 3, no. 1. 2009: 345.

[37] Ibid., 153.

[38] Pellow, David Naguib. Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movement for Environmental Justice. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007): 185.

[39] Ibid., 191.

[40] Ibid., 195.

[41] Greenpeace. (2008). Take back blues: An assessment of e-waste take-back in India. Accessed November 27, 2017. Retrieved from www.greenpeace.org/india/press/reports/take-back-blues.

[42] EC, 2002a. Directive 2002/96/EC on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE). The European Commission, Brussels.

[43] Associated Press. DirecTV to Pay $9.5M to Settle Hazardous Waste Allegations. The New York Times, 22 Nov. 2017. Accessed on Dec. 5, 2017.