Part 3: Saudi Arabia’s Ascendancy: Balancing Power, Partnerships, and Global Influence

Saudi Arabia is emerging as one of the most consequential actors in the Middle East, redefining its role through a carefully calibrated foreign policy that balances regional leadership aspirations with global economic and diplomatic engagements. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the designated successor to the King, is steering the Kingdom toward greater geopolitical autonomy, leveraging its vast economic resources, strategic partnerships, and mediation efforts to expand its influence. However, Saudi Arabia faces challenges, particularly regarding its stance on Israel, its evolving relationships with the United States and China, and its role in shaping post-conflict regional dynamics. This analysis examines Saudi Arabia’s shifting influence in the Middle East as it fills the power vacuum left by the declining influence of Iran and Russia.

Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic strategy is defined by a mix of calculated pragmatism and bold initiatives. A prime example of this is its cautious approach to normalizing relations with Israel. While the Kingdom has signaled openness to normalization, it has repeatedly reaffirmed that any agreement must be contingent on the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This stance aligns more with the Arab Peace Initiative than the Abraham Accords- that do not list the creation of a Palestinian state as a precondition. The Arab Peace Initiative, adopted unanimously by 23 Arab states in 2002 and confirmed by the Arab Summit earlier this year, reversed the traditional negative Arab position toward peace with Israel and offered a comprehensive peace plan for ending the Arab Israeli conflict. The continued strikes in Gaza have further complicated the process, making it politically untenable for Riyadh to pursue normalization without substantial Israeli concessions. Saudi media has aggressively criticized Netanyahu, reflecting broader frustrations with his policy and its impact on regional stability. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia is spearheading an alternative Arab plan to counter American-Israeli proposals for Palestinian displacement. This initiative, which focuses on rebuilding Gaza with Gulf funding while sidelining Hamas from governance, underscores the Kingdom’s determination to shape the postwar order on its own terms, highlighting its ability to balance U.S. expectations with Arab consensus, reinforcing its leadership within the region.

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States remains central to its foreign policy, yet the Kingdom has adopted a more independent approach, continuing to pursue a policy of “active neutrality” in global affairs, beyond the Middle East. It has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the UN but has refrained from joining Western-led sanctions against the Kremlin, allowing it to maintain strategic flexibility and preserve economic and security ties with both the U.S. and Russia. In 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted a major international peace summit on Ukraine, demonstrating its ambitions as a global diplomatic power. Even though Russia dismissed the summit, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in prisoner exchanges and backchannel diplomacy underscored its growing influence beyond the Middle East. Similarly, despite being a key U.S. ally, Saudi officials have emphasized the importance of their relationship with China, describing it as complementary to their alliance with Washington. Hence, Saudi Arabia remains indispensable to both Western and Eastern powers.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest arms importers, historically reliant on U.S. and European suppliers for advanced weaponry. However, in recent years, it has diversified its defense partnerships, expanding military cooperation with China, including—areported joint production of drones and ballistic missiles. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has conducted naval exercises with the Chinese navy, signaling its intent to hedge against shifting U.S. commitments in the region. Despite this diversification, the United States remains Saudi Arabia’s primary security guarantor. Ongoing negotiations for a formal U.S.-Saudi defense treaty reflect the recognition that neither China nor Russia can fully replace American military support. However, Saudi leaders are leveraging their growing relationships with Beijing and Moscow to extract greater security guarantees from the U.S., including technology transfers and assistance in developing a domestic defense industry. 

Saudi Arabia’s military posture is undergoing a transformation, shifting from direct interventionism—exemplified by its involvement in Yemen—to a more calculated security strategy focused on regional stability and diplomatic engagement. Having significantly reduced its military operations in Yemen, the Kingdom is pursuing a negotiated settlement with the Houthis, who reject the Saudi-backed government,  while simultaneously reinforcing its defense capabilities against potential threats. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s reassessment of its relationship with Iran once again reflects its broader shift toward diplomacy over confrontation. The China-brokered détente in 2023 signaled a preference for regional stability over prolonged hostilities. While tensions persist—especially regarding Iran’s support for proxy groups—Saudi Arabia’s engagement with Iran highlights its commitment to preventing further destabilization in the Middle East, rekindling hopes for ending the Yemen conflict, where both countries have historically supported opposing factions. 

Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has aggressively pursued economic diversification, reducing its dependence on oil while expanding investments in infrastructure, technology, and renewable energy. Non-oil sectors account for 52% of GDP, with a projected 6.2% increase by 2026, with Saudi Arabia aiming to position itself as a hub for green energy and advanced technology, aligning its economic ambitions with global trends. In pursuit of Vision 2030, the Kingdom has deepened cooperation with China, now its largest trading partner, in infrastructure, 5G technology, and renewable energy. The Sino-Arabian alignment plan integrates China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Vision 2030, facilitating joint investments in hydrogen energy, electric vehicles, and industrial projects. This shift signals Riyadh’s effort to diversify its partnerships and reduce exclusive reliance on Western economies. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia wields strategic influence over global energy markets through OPEC+, which it co-founded, working closely with Russia to manage oil production and pricing. Despite U.S. pressure to increase production following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kingdom instead coordinated production cuts that favored Moscow, underscoring its prioritization of economic self-interest over Western expectations. This stance is further reflected in its overtures toward joining BRICS—an increasingly potent counterbalance to U.S. influence—as well as its hosting of a meeting between Russia and Ukraine, a significant development after Zelensky’s meeting with Trump. This move underscores Saudi Arabia’s growing confidence in charting an independent economic and foreign policy.

At the regional level, Saudi Arabia has all the qualifications to be a powerhouse—34 million inhabitants, a stable political system, a booming economy, and one of the world’s largest oil reserves. Its past isolationism and extremist Wahhabi social order are largely relics of the past, replaced by a rapid modernization drive that began a few years ago, with tangible change unfolding daily. Leveraging its economic strength and strategic partnerships, Saudi Arabia is reshaping the regional order. By balancing ties with the U.S., China, and Russia, while spearheading regional economic transformations and redefining security strategy, Saudi Arabia is positioning itself at the center of an emerging multipolar order. This new order is defined by fluid alliances and pragmatic diplomacy, moving beyond the past dynamics of U.S. hegemony and Iran-Saudi rivalry, with Saudi Arabia standing at the forefront.As things stand, the war in Gaza remains a determining factor in shaping the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia’s role in normalizing relations between Israel and the Arab world will be pivotal. As regional power structures shift following the decline of both Russia and Iran, a power vacuum has emerged—one that Saudi Arabia is poised to fill. The Kingdom’s support for the two-state solution, tying diplomatic normalization with Israel to the creation of an independent Palestinian state, places it in a unique position of leadership. Saudi Arabia’s potential to broker a peace agreement that reflects broader Arab consensus and upholds Palestinian self-determination could set a new precedent for regional cooperation in the Middle East, countering the status quo.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Saudi Arabia said Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman conveyed the kingdom’s stance in ‘a clear and explicit manner’ without room for interpretation,” Image source from Free Malaysia Today | CC License, no changes made

The pressing issue at hand in the Middle East is the growing tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  The conflict between these two nations has its roots in the Iranian Revolution of 1979 when the anti-west Ayatollah Khomeini replaced the pro-Western monarch Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. This transition marked a turning point for the Middle East, particularly in regards to alliances and security. Hostility has since engulfed the two nations.

The Saudi-Iran conflict reached new levels on September 14 of this year. Advanced drone technology was used to target the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia, causing a major scare in the global oil supply. Houthi rebels later claimed responsibility, but many U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, say all signs point toward Iran. In an interview on “Face the Nation,”-Pompeo stated the alleged Iranian involvement in the strike was an “act of war.”

The implications of Iran’s involvement could provoke major hostility in an already fragile region, and the escalating dispute between the U.S. and Iran places America in a potentially compromising position. The U.S. has already deployed troops to Saudi Arabia to assist the country in the defense against future attacks, the Pentagon confirmed this week.[i]

The major victim of this attack, however, is neither Saudi Arabia nor its allies, but the people of Yemen.

Yemen has seen little reprieve from violence since the outbreak of civil war in 2015 between the Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi-led government and the Houthi-rebel faction. The Saudi-led bombing campaign on Yemen to combat Houthi rebels and Iranian influence in the area has led to staggering numbers of casualties: an estimated 17,729 civilians have been killed or injured since March 2019. Just this past week, 16 people, including seven children, were killed in the Sawd District of Northwestern Yemen by a Saudi-led airstrike. This attack came in response to the Saudi oil field bombings just a few days earlier.

Perhaps most concerning, Yemen is home to the worst humanitarian crisis in the world according to the United Nations. The country currently suffers from a widespread food shortage with 13 million Yemeni civilians facing starvation in what is being referred to as “the worst famine in 100 years.”[ii] The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen resulted in a complete blockade of medicine and food from the country in 2015, leaving the country susceptible to starvation and disease outbreaks. In fact, the number of cholera incidents in Yemen has risen dramatically since 2015: 109,000 cases of suspected cholera have been reported from the beginning of 2019 to March 2019, and almost 2,000 new cases are added each day according to the World Health Organization. Experts are certain the cholera endemic coincided with the outbreak of war between Houthi rebels and a Saudi-led coalition in March 2015.[iii]

In addition to this, UNICEF confirms over 2 million children are out of school in Yemen, with an estimated 3.7 million more at risk. Since the outbreak of civil war, almost a fourth of children have dropped out of school.

What this all means for Yemen’s future remains unclear, though one thing is certain: the crisis in Yemen will continue to deteriorate as long as the Saudi-Iran proxy war calls Yemen home. Expect additional U.S. military personnel to deploy to the region in the weeks to come.

Endnotes

[i] Gibbons-neff, Thomas. “New U.S. Aid to Saudi Arabia Will Include 200 Troops.” The New York Times. The New York Times, September 26, 2019.

[ii] “Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen Remains the Worst in the World, Warns UN | UN News.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed September 28, 2019. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811.

[iii] Gladstone, Rick. “Cholera, Lurking Symptom of Yemen’s War, Appears to Make Roaring Comeback.” The New York Times. The New York Times, March 28, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/middleeast/cholera-yemen.html.

Written by Alayna Lee

After three years of conflict, the war in Yemen has not shown any signs of stopping, and it has  turned into one of the most severe humanitarian crises the international community faces today.

On Friday, February 22nd, the Yale International Relations Association and Students for Yemen hosted a panel discussion entitled “What Will it Take to End the War in Yemen?” The three panelists each brought a different perspective to this pressing issue, which has become even more relevant as the U.S. House of Representatives has voted to end U.S. funding of the war in Yemen.

Caught between the two opposing factions — the Houthi rebels and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government — are Yemen’s civilians. Around 22 million people are now in need of some sort of assistance and 6,000 have already been killed. The presence of additional foreign military involvement exacerbates the dangerous conflict. Most of the international community regard the war in Yemen as a proxy war, fought between Saudi Arabia, who backs the ousted Yemeni government, and Iran, who has been accused of supplying arms to the Houthis. More and more states have become involved with the conflict as well, resulting in even more crossfire for Yemeni citizens to be caught between. While the U.S. has not committed air or land forces to the Saudi-led coalition, like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have, the U.S. has contributed arms and logistical support. Militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have taken advantage of the chaos the war has caused as well, a target that U.S. officials often use to justify airstrikes in Yemen. Yet these airstrikes do not discriminate between would-be terrorists and innocent Yemeni people — according to the U.N. human rights office, thousands of civilians perish from these attacks. Despite vocal opposition from President Donald Trump — who continues to support Saudi Arabia even after its crown prince is implicated for the murder of reporter Jamal Khashoggi — there has been broad bipartisan support for H.J. Res. 37, which would remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities in Yemen without Congressional authorization.

The discussion began with a brief introduction of each panelist. Summer Nasser, chairperson of Yemen Aid, detailed her experiences from leading  an international humanitarian NGO. Some of the work her organization has done in Yemen include establishing an ambulance service similar to the emergency service 9-1-1 in the U.S. in order to create jobs and empowering women through health education.

Stanley Heller — chairperson and executive director of the Middle East Crisis Committee, a peace and human rights organization based in New Haven — continued the discussion by outlining his history of general activism in New Haven. After beginning his activist work in 1969 with the Vietnam War, he’s continued to this day and still believes in the power of grassroots movements.

As a Senior Lector of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at Yale, Muhammad Al-Aziz furthered the discussion by providing some context on Yemen’s political and religious history.  . Due to its remote location and rugged terrain, Yemen has historically been a divided country. Until the establishment of the Republic of Yemen in 1990, the country was split between the northern Yemen Arab Republic and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Azis added that it was very difficult for an army to come and invade, so that many people, such as the Ottomans, had a strenuous time with the local people and “eventually left the country.”

During a part of the panel discussion pertaining to a plausible end to the current civil conflict, , Heller spoke from an activist point of view  about how he believes that religion is merely an excuse for many sides during civil wars. “Usually, a gang wants power and adds religion onto it,” he said.

According to Heller, the main objective should be to stop Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from launching airstrikes in Yemen and to stop the U.S. from helping them do so. “[The U.S. government] is there for one reason: to please the Saudis,” he said. “They buy our weapons, and Trump is happy to do anything he can for that.”

Heller described specific actions that U.S. citizens could take to affect change. He recommended calling congressmen, writing op-eds, or boycotting groups with ties to Saudi Arabia. He added that photo exhibits centered on Yemen can be particularly moving, considering its simplicity and emotional impact. Still, Heller advised that people interested in helping should be creative when thinking about what can be done.

Summer Nasser also emphasized that H.J. Res. 37, the legislation currently in Congress, is not necessarily about ending the war in Yemen but instead about “saving the reputation of the U.S.” She added that while important for the U.S. to exit the conflict, there is still an internal crisis within Yemen to contend with, and that once the U.S. steps away from involvement with the conflict, that “guarantees that no one will talk about Yemen again.”

Ultimately, the panel could not reach a consensus on what, exactly, it will take to end the war in Yemen. Each of the panelists acknowledged that the answer is not as simple as the legislation in Congress makes it appear,. Yemen’s citizens will be affected by its civil war for years to come, necessitating continual international humanitarian attention.

Written by Zhen Tu

Earlier this year, nearly 500 Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at JeJu, a resort island in South Korea. At the end of 2018, only two people— journalists who put their lives at risk if they returned—received official refugee status. Even though a vast majority obtained temporary humanitarian visas, the refugees are expected to return to Yemen once circumstances in the war-ravaged country become no longer life-threatening.

The government’s failure to aid asylum seekers reveals one paradox in Korea’s current cultural and political practices: while many facets of Korean culture, such as the entertainment industry, have made a strong global impact in the past several years, a strong sense of nationalism rooted in a desire to preserve the country’s cultural homogeneity is still ingrained among many Koreans—even the younger generation. The treatment of Yemeni refugees is one manifestation of this phenomenon.

The influx of refugees from Yemen to Korea stems from years of warfare in an already poverty-stricken country. The civil war in Yemen, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and displacement of millions of people from their homes, began when Houthi rebels from northern Yemen sought to overthrow the government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Subsequently, the government was forced into exile. In March 2015, the Houthi regime faced severe pushback as Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations joined in the hopes of reinstating the exiled government. Yemen has thus turned into a battleground between the Houthi regime, backed by Iran, and the Hadi government, backed by Saudi Arabia. Ever since then, airstrikes from Saudi Arabia’s military coalitions have killed innocent civilians, ruined infrastructure such as factories and hospitals, and made it more difficult for people to receive humanitarian aid. Indeed, according to the World Food Program, sixty percent of the 29.3 million people in Yemen are classified as food insecure.

The extremely dire circumstances in Yemen have led many to flee from their home country. Around 500 of them ended up in JeJu, mostly because the island did not demand advance visas from Yemeni refugees at the time. Hardly an expected destination for displaced refugees, JeJu is renowned for its beaches, turquoise seas, and frequent sightings of newlyweds on their honeymoon. Therefore, when the Yemeni refugees stepped foot on the island, opposition was immediate and vociferous. Throughout the summer, protests erupted not only at JeJu, but also in cities on the mainland, such as Seoul. Online petitions calling for the removal of the refugees garnered hundreds of thousands of signatures. Thus began Korea’s first organized anti-asylum movement.

Nevertheless, it is important to realize that opposition towards refugees in Korea did not simply begin with the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers. More than 1,200 Syrians who currently hold humanitarian permits still lack adequate health care coverage and access to education. Lee Il, a human rights lawyer with the Seoul-based Refugee Rights Network, states that refugee status is granted only to one percent of applicants annually, an incredibly low rate for an already developed country. Even North Koreans, who have the highest rate of acceptance when applying for refugee status, often face a myriad of challenges integrating into South Korean society.

While the idea that xenophobia is a driving factor in the treatment of Yemeni refugees holds some truth, it should be explained within the economic, political, and cultural context in Korea. Monoculturalism, coupled with a history of foreign occupation, has instilled in many people a fear of outsiders. Consequently, foreigners in Korea still make up less than five percent of the entire population today. Furthermore, because economic circumstances have worsened over the past few years, the unemployment rate among the younger generation has risen to ten percent. This explains the surprisingly high rate of opposition to the incoming refugees among those in their twenties and thirties. While 49% to 56% of the general population are against admitting refugees, 70% of the people in their twenties object to the idea.

Further fueling the resistance is the prevailing belief that a large population of Yemeni men will threaten the stability of Korean society. As one female rural worker, Oh Mi-jin, said, “If Jeju is breached, South Korea will be breached.” She resents the government for putting people like her, who often work alone in fields, in danger. While many fears may be unfounded, they stem from the country’s lack of ethnic and cultural diversity. Therefore, Esmail al-Qublani, a 31-year-old Yemeni refugee who arrived on JeJu this year, sought to defend himself and his countrymen. He explains, “We are only humans. We are refugees from a war. If they can get to know us, they will come to understand our reality by getting to know us one by one—if they want. We’re easy to make friends with.”

On the other side, criticism abounds against the government’s procedure in screening applicants and its refusal to allow more refugees to remain in the country. Choi Young-ae, chairwoman of the National Human Rights Commission in South Korea, denounced the government for acting “in an indiscriminate manner to mitigate the public sentiments” against the Yemeni refugees. Needless to say, South Korea’s current practices—or lack thereof—of granting asylum to refugees does not bode well for its status as a developed country in a world that is arguably becoming more inclusive, albeit with reluctance from some.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/yemen-refugees-south-korea-jeju-island.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/opinion/south-korea-racism.htm

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/23/world/middleeast/yemen-cholera-humanitarian-crisis.html?module=inline

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/south-korea-denies-refugee-status-to-hundreds-of-yemenis-fleeing-war/2018/10/17/5d554d1e-d207-11e8-8c22-fa2ef74bd6d6_story.html?utm_term=.fbf0529b13be